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CAVALRY STUDIES

STRATEGICAL AxND
TACTICAL

CAVALEY STUDIES

STRATEGICAL AND
TACTICAL

MAJOR-GENERA.L DOUGLAS HAIG

Late Intpector-Otntral of Cavalry in India

WITH NUMEROUS MAPS AND SKETCHES

Honhoti

HUGH REES, Ltd., 119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1907

.H\6

PRINTED AND BOUND BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINBY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

PREFACE

SOME explanation seems due to the reader for the publi-
cation of these Cavalry Studies,

The present volume has grown out of the proceedings
of Five Staff Ridea which took place under my direction
when Inspector-General of Cavalry in India (1903-6).
These Rides were held under somewhat favourable circum-
stances. In the first place, India is very suitable for such
exercises — every description of country is easily reached
from the military cantonments, and no difficulties present
themselves In the matter of camping or marching to suit
the supposed military situation ; in winter the climate
is an ideal one for camping and outdoor life ; and lastly,
ample transport can usually be obtained without expense
to those taking part in the exercise. Under such circum-
stances but little difficulty need be experienced in arranging
a practical scheme and in carrying it out under conditions
closely resembling those of active service.

But besides the natural advantages of the country it was
my good fortune to have, not only on the directing staff',
but also among those attending for instruction, a number
of officers of the several arms who had not only studied
the "deeds of the great masters," but who had also had
practical experience of war in various parts of the world.

vi PREFACE

Thus, as Director of these Rides, I received very valuable
assistance on many points ; and the problems which
daily arose for consideration, were handled, I venture to
think, in an especially fresh and practical manner. As a
result there was accumulated a mass of material on important
Cavalry questions of the day, far beyond the scope of any
single English work dealing with Cavalry matters. Afto:
each Ride, thanks to the industry of certain of my staff
officers, a Report embodying the more important portions of
the work was published for the use of those who had been
present ; and last summer, before I left India, all the Reports
were published in one volume under the title of " Five
Cavalry Staff Rides." 1 owe special acknowledgment to
Captain Howell of the Guides Cavalry for preparing it U
the press.

Copies of the above volume being exhausted, I have
been asked by several friends to republish it. These SlafE
Ride Reports, however, were intended merely as a reminder
to those who had taken part in one or other of the Rides,
Their form was rather that of a precis of proceedings than
a carefully compiled .study of certain imaginary Cavalry
operations, and so, for the ordinary military reader, they
must be difficult to follow, and hence somewhat unintellt-
gible. It was therefore clear to me that if the Reports
were to be published they must be remodelled. This would
entail much labour, and, as 1 could not myself at the present
moment spare the necessary time to undertake the work,
I handed it over to my old friend Colonel Lonsdale Hale,
requesting him to deal with the material as he thought fit.
The present volume is the result. The first four Rideff
have been converted into " Studies " ; the fifth retains it^l

PREFACE

original form, The conversion has been utilised to group
together views, opinions, and remarks on the same subjects,
but which were necessarily scattered over the original
records of the three years' work. For the invaluable work
which Colonel Lonsdale Hale has performed I desire to
express my deep gratitude and obligation ; indeed, without
his aid, this volume could never have appeared at all.

1 also desire to thank the many friends who have helped
me, both in India and at home. Chief among these stand
Major Barrow (4th Cavalry), Major Hudson (19th Lancers),
Major Macandrew (5lh Cavalry), Major Shore (i3th Lancers),
Major Stewart (R.F.A.), Major Stotherd (30th Lancers),
Major Vaughan (lolh Hussars). I am also indebted to
Colonel H. Gough (16th Lancers), to Major Dallas fGeneral
Staff), and to Captain Dc Pree (General Staff) for some
valuable hints and suggestions. It is not practicable to
give proper credit in each instance, but the reader will
be able to judge, from the large number of technical details
included in the volume, how much I am indebted to officers
of the Royal Engineers and Army Service Corps for
information. For this I desire to express a general
acknowledgment here.

I. Introductory i

II, The Organisation of the Cavalry Division 20

III. First Study (Jhelum) 37

An Invasion on a double Line of Operations across
a River Frontier, up to and including the first Decisive
Battle.— The Work of The Cavalry Division.

IV. Seconu Study (Delhi) 90

The employment of independent Cavalry Divisions, to
follow up a defeated Hostile Army, to ascertain its inten-
tions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.—
Work of the Cavalry with the t st and znd German
Armies, 8th — 1 8th August, 1870.

V. Third Study (Aurangabad) 140

A " Decisive Battle " the real object in War.— Strategical
Preparation. — Selection of a "Primary" and a "Second-
ary" Theatre of War, and Use of Entrenched Dep6ts,
illustrated by 1809.— Measures to be taken with regard to
a " Buffer Stale." — Employment of the Cavalry Division
and of the Army Cavalry up to the " Decisive Battle."

VI, Fourth Study (Medak) 183

The Operations of a Containing Force in a " Second'
ary " Theatre of War. — Notes on Prince Eugene's
Campaign in Italy, iSog.

VII. AiTOCK Staff Ride 230

The Strategical Employment of Cavalry covering the
Concentration of the Main Army to one Flank. — Notes on
the Ulm Campaign, 1805.
VIII. Attock Staff Ride — continued 267

I. Notes on Work DONE BY Officers DURING the Rides 3*6 j
li. Notes on the Organisation of a single Staft Ride ;
HI. A FEW Specimens of Tasks set .... 331

LIST OF. MAPS

No. I. General Map.

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Medak .... In pocket

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Of the Campaign of 1805 Facing page 266

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THERE, as in dealing with the work of a Cavalry
Division, so many subjects come up for considera-
tion, it is impossible to specify the exact order of their
importance. But the leading idea throughout all these
Studies is to bring into prominence the strategical employ-
ment of Cavalry, the role of the Independent Cavalry Division,
and also the tactical employment of Cavalry in co-operation
with the other arms.

A thorough study of the strategical situation as a wItoU,
and of the probable theatre of operations, is essential in
order that Brigadiers may be able to appreciate intelligently
the special rSie of the Cavalry Division, and also that of their
own Brigades. In fact, even the most junior Cavalry officers,
whether they be scouts, patrol leaders, troop leaders, or
orderly officers, must understand something of strategy in
order to be able properly to discharge their duties.

The following extract is taken from some remarks made
by Colonel Lonsdale Hale during a discussion at the R. U. S.
Institution in London in 1905, on the " Strategical Employ-
ment of Cavalry " :

". . . A Cavalry subaltern is sent out in front of an army
with three or four troopers, and he is told to find out all
about the enemy. If he is lucky, he may come across the
enemy and get hold of a certain amount of data, although
imperfect. On these data he has to form a conclusion as to
what the enemy is doing, and that conclusion he has to send
to his Colonel or General behind, and on that the Commanding
Officer, perhaps, bases his orders. It requires not merely the

2 CAVALRY STUDIES

power of close observation. What is the good of officers
knowing all these things unless they understand them ? The
officer must have an understanding of the phenomena which
come before his eyes. Let me take a case. Let me take
the case of Lieutenant von Busse, of the 6th Cavalry Division,
He was sent out in front of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg- j
Schwerin's Detachment (Armee-Abtheilung) to find out about I
the French. He was a brave young fellow, and rode forward ^
with ten men, and entered the town of Chateaudun, and
found a large body of French of all arms. He made his way
out of the town, and, after losing four men, got back to a
wood at night, and said to himself, ' I will stop here for the
night, and I will send in my report to-morrow after having
looked again.' That was the failure. Had he known the
strategical situation lie might have said, ' What on earth is
the meaning of this great body of French troops here? Are
they all going north to intervene between our Army and the
Second Army, or arc they going south, or are they stationary?'
At all events, if he had had the strategical situation in his
mind he wouid have realised that the mere fact of a large
body of all arms being there was of the utmost importance,
and that the information should be sent back to his com-
mander as quickly as possible. But he did not do that. He
said, ' I will wait until to-morrow morning.' What was the
result of this young officer not grasping the situation ? The
Grand Duke commanding the army behind had heard of a
body of troops marching north, and our young lieutenant
had hit on the main body due east of his own army. If the
lieutenant's report had gone in that night, the Grand Duke
might have marched due east the next morning, and perhaps
have swept that corps off the ground. As it was, owing to
the delay of the young officer and his not realising the im-
portance of the situation, the Grand Duke marched north-east,
and the whole of the enemy escaped him."

The duties which fall to the lot of Cavalry in war necessitate
that arm being formed into three groups — viz. :

INTRODUCTORY 3

(i) Independent Cavalrj', for strategical exploration, under
the direct orders of the Chief.

(3) Protective Cavalry, for the provision of the First Line
of Security for the Army as a whole,

(3) Divisional Cavalry, for scouting in the close vicinity
of the Infantry Divisions, for orderly work in the Division,
and for inter-communication between Divisions.

The division of the Cavalry into these three distinct groups
is based on the recognition of the fundamental difference that
exists between the Service of Information (or, to discover)
and the Service of Security (or, to cover). To the last two
groups falls the latter Service ; the first group is reserved
for the former. These two duties of Cavalry are quite
distinct, and must never be confused.

Although, in the first instance, Cavalry should be told off
into these groups, the actual distribution must be considered
as elastic, and sometimes it may be necessary to reinforce
the first group from the second, or vice versd.

The questions are sometimes raised, "Why devote staff
rides to the consideration of the work of Cavalry Divisions ;
why, at Cavalry Manceuvres, work with Cavalry Divisions
when our organisation does not acknowledge so large a unit?"*
The reply is, that although a Brigade organisation may be
deemed the most satisfactory, ail things considered, for our
requirements in peace, there can be no doubt that in the
event of war on any but a small scale, circumstances will
cause Cavalry Brigades to be grouped into Divisions, as has
happened in most wars. In order to achieve really decisive
results, cither in strategical reconnaissance or on the battle-
field, we ought, indeed, to be prepared to group our Cavalry
even still further, and to be ready to form one or more
Cavalry Corps.

This, at any rate, was the result of the practical experience
for instance, of the Americans, in 1863-5. The Cavalry of

* Since this was wrilten, a ponion of ihe Cavalry of the Field Force (Home
Anny) has been organized as a Oivislan, but the statement still holds true as
regards India.

4 CAVALRY STUDIES

the Army of the Potomac was first distributed amongst large
Infantry units, then concentrated into Divisions, and eventu-
ally grouped as a Corps of three Divisions ; this Corps
comprised a total of some thirty regiments and twelve
batteries.

Or again, it is now fully recognised that the German
Cavalry in 1S70-71, not being suitably organised beforehand,
let slip many opportunities of obtaining great results.

The question, however, of grouping our Cavalry into Corps
may, perhaps, be disregarded for the moment ; but the necessity
for forming Cavalry Divisions ought to be recognised, their
composition arranged for, and sufficient staffs (including a
Commanding R.H.A. Officer per Division) allotted. Cavalry
Brigades should also from time to time be methodically
trained as part of a Division. The want of previous exercises
of this nature was most noticeable on the first day of the
Rawalpindi manceuvres in December 1905.

It is commonly argued that so far as India is concerned.
Cavalry Divisions or even Cavalry Brigades will never be
required, and can never be employed on or beyond the
North-West Frontier of India, owing to the difficulties of
terrain, and of transport and supply. But with our vast and
widely scattered Empire, it is impossible to say where our
Army may not be required at any moment, and it would
be suicidal to confine the higher training of an arm within
the limits which appear, rightly or wrongly, to suffice for
local requirements, when, without any warning, its services
may be peremptorily called for in some theatre of war of
a totally different character. To prepare British Cavalry in
India for frontier warfare solely, would be nearly as sensible
as to restrict the training of the British Cavalry in South
Africa to working on the veldt.

It must be borne in mind that the days of small Armies
are past, and it is a simple fact that large Armies entail large
numbers 0/ Cavalry.

" Infantry and Artillery," says Colonel Henderson, " un-
accompanied by Cavalry, if opposed by a force complete

INTRODUCTORY

all arms, are practically helpless, always liable to surprise,
and, whether attacking or defending, hampered by ignorance
of the enemy's movements and bewildered by uncertainty. . . .
It is essential, then, for decisive success that every force which
takes the field against an organised enemy should be com-
posed of the three arms."

Again :

" Moltke, indeed, has laid it down that the junction of
two previously separated forces on the field of battle is the
highest triumph of generalship. ... It may be assumed,
therefore, that the directors of future campaigns will have
always in view the advantages to be derived from hurling
a fresh force — whose approach, if possible, has been concealed
until it opens fire — against the enemy's flank and rear ; and
the sudden onset of BlUcher at Waterloo, of Lee at the second
Manassas, of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, of the
Crown Prince of Prussia at Koniggratz, will be the ideal of
the decisive act of battle. It is to be observed, however, that
successful converging movements have been carried out more
frequently by a force acting on the offensive than on the
defensive. In the first place, an Army which adopts the
offensive has usually the superior numbers or the superior
moral, and It consequently incurs less risk in separation. In
the second place, it is usually superior in Cavalry, and is thus
able to prevent all knowledge of the separation from reaching
the enemy, as well as to conceal the march of the outflanking
column. We may conclude, therefore, that it is only when
the defender has the more powerful Cavalry, and is at least
equal to his adversary in numbers and in moral, that he will
dare to deliver a converging counter-stroke.

■' The army, then, which assumes the strategical offensive
has, as a general rule, the best chance of employing this most
effective manoeuvre ; but much depends on tlie quality and
handling of the Cavalry. . . . Cavalry, then, sharing the
enormous defensive power conferred by a low trajectory rifle
and rapidity of fire, plays a rfile in grand tactics of which the
importance can hardly be over-estimated. They make it

6 CAVALRY STUDIES

possible for a general to adopt the most brilliant of all
manceuvres, the converging attack, and to make that attack,
as indeed all other attacks, more or less of a surprise.

" But to protect the troops in rear from observation is not
the only duty of Cavalry, Reconnaissance of the enemy's
position is the foremost of its functions, and the occupation
of points of tactical vantage, such as hills, woods, villages, etc.,
behind which the main Army can deploy in security, or the
outflanking columns march unobserved, is not far behind.
The pursuit, too, falls upon the mounted arm, the destruction
of the enemy's trains, the capture of his guns, the spreading of
demoralisation far and wide. But most important, perhaps,
of all its functions are the manceuvres which so threaten the
enemy's line of retreat that he is compelled to evacuate his
position, and those which cut off his last avenue of escape.
A Cavalry skilfully handled, as at Appomattox or Paardeberg,
may bring about the crowning triumph of grand tactics — viz.
the hemming in of a force so closely that it has either to
attack at a disadvantage or to surrender." — ("The Science
of War.")

Now it would be most unwise to assume that our
opponent will be so overwhelmed with prospective difficulties
of supply, etc., as to enter on a campaign without a due
proportion of Cavalry. If then, ignoring the whole teaching
of history, and scorning the experiences of others, we propose,
unaccompanied by our proper proportion of Cavalry, to meet
a force complete in all three arms, our prosf>ects of success
will be very small indeed.

Again, with regard even to Indian trans-frontier difficulties
of terrain and of transport and supply, those of terrain
reduce themselves to either mountains or waterless deserts,
and in neither will decisive results ever take place. The
trans- frontier area is not wltolly composed of such features,
and we may be certain that large scale operations will
surely gravitate towards the cultivated valleys and plai;
and away from the mountains and sand.

Difficulties, moreover, of terrain, etc, are invariably

,bi,^^

INTRODUCTORY 7

" And yet these difficulties," says Marshal Soult,
after some twenty-five years of almost continuous active
service many years before railways were invented, " were
never insurmountable, even when taken as a point in the line
of defence. Some issue invariably left ignored, some difficult
pass left to be discovered, afforded the means of a. passage
to obtain another and a still better one. The first point
gained left others won or compromised, «W t/iere is no
exampk of an Army which made any serious attempt Slaving
failed."

The Boers succeeded on more than one occasion in
executing tasks pronounced by our military experts to be
quite impossible — as, for instance, the mounting of the
heavy guns on the hill outside Ladysmith — whilst the
Japanese during the recent war constantly carried out the
" impossible."

If then it be granted that in a decisive stru^lc — in a war,
as opposed to a punitive expedition — large armies will be
employed, and that with the large armies will be their due
proportion of Cavalry, then the necessity to study and prepare
beforehand how best such Cavalry may be employed can
need no further demonstration.

In considering the work of Cavalry in the field, we must
never lose sight of the fact that the decisive and governing
factor on which depend the result and the value of that work
is Leadership ; the quality and character of the Leading in
one and all of the ranks of Command — from the General,
the Leader of the Corps of Cavalry, down to the Non-Com-
missioned Officer, the Leader of a Patrol. In Cavalry work,
individuals can make or mar, to an extent almost, if not
totally, impossible in the work of the other arms.

The influence of this Leadership is felt as much in the
tactical work as in the .strategical work, and it is a simple
fact that at any moment in a campaign may arise, for a
Cavalry Leader of any rank, a situation which, for its satis-
factory solution, need.s mental power and capacity not often
called on in Leaders of similar rank in the other arms. It

8 CAVALRY STUDIES

is to Incapacity to rise to the mental requirements necessary
that is due the painfully small proportion of opportunities
utilised, to opportunities let slip, so noticeable in ail the wars
of the past ; and hence the small esteem sometimes displayed
towards the arm by soldiers, and the neglect of it in peace
time. Moreover, as Colonel Ardant du Picq wrote, about the
year r86S : " The value of Cavalry has been questioned in all
periods of history ; the reason for this is that it costs a great
deal, and is but little employed, simply because it is such an
expensive arm. The question of expense always arises in
times of peace."

On the other hand, the far-reaching and valuable results
Met have been actually derived from successful leading are I
apt to be overlooked or ignored. '

One of the favourite statements employed in depreciation
of the Cavalry as an arm, and which, generation after genera-
tion, comes to the front, is that, owing to the improvement in
Infantry armament, " the day of Cavalry is past" Some
views, which we hold to be correct, in opposition to these
poor estimates of Cavalry, are now given.

Skobeleff published the following order to the Cavalry
Division of the 4th Corps on June isth, 1882: "If
Infantry can after suffering tremendous losses succeed in
coming hand to hand, why should not Cavalry be able to
do the same, seeing that its rapidity of movement is incom-
parably greater ? "

The rdle of Cavalry on the battlefield will always go on
increa^g, because —

. The extended nature of the modern battlefield means
that there will be a greater choice of cover to favour
the concealed approach of Cavalry.

, The increased range and killing power of modern
guns, and the greater length of time during which
battles will Sast, will augment the moral exhaustion,
will affect men's nerves more, and produce greater
demoralisation amongst the troops. These factors

INTRODUCTORY 9

contribute to provoke panic, and to render troops
(short-service soldiers nowadays) ripe for attack by
Cavalry.

3. The longer the range and killing power of modern arms,

the more important will rapidity of movement become,
because it lessens the relative time of exposure to
danger in favour of the Cavalry.

4. The introduction of the small-bore rille, ihe'bullet from

which has little stopping power against a horse.

General Maillard, Professor of Infantry Tactics at the
tcole dc Guerre in France in 1S9S, wrote as follows: "To
believe that Cavalry can effect nothing against Infant^^
because the latter is now armed with a long-range repeating-
rifle, is to suppose without proper reason that surprises are
no longer possible ; that leaders will never again make
mistakes ; that troops will always be in good heart, and
ready at any moment for fighting; that they will never be
affected by fatigue nor hunger, nor by the results of an
unsuccessful fight. Such conclusions arc contrary to human
nature ; and surprises, misunderstandings, mistakes, and
failures will constantly recur ; and the Cavalry will be at
hand to take advantage of them.

"The r61e of Cavalry is far from being over upon the
battlefield. In the nature of the country it will find a
valuable ally. At any rate, it will be able to take advan-
tage of it just as much as, if not more than. Infantry can.
because Cavalry will not hesitate to make a detfttr in
order to get the benefit of an undulation to condlal its
approach."

From a lecture given before the Berlin Military Society
by Lieut.- General von Pelet-Narbonne we take the following
extracts :

"General von Moltke in a report to King William I. on
July 25th, 1868, writes as follows:

"'Where, in the war of 1866, the Prussian Cavalry were
successful in action, it always charged down upon the enemy.

lo CAVALRY STUDIES

Some individual squadrons and regiments again and again
showed themselves superior to the enemy, and some splendid
march operations have been performed. Still, the value
of this arm remained, comparatively speaking, small, while
a large number of units never came in contact with the enemy
at all.' In another place, he says, ' Practically the Cavalry
w^z^cr supported the Infantry.' The General quotes only ten ■
instances where regiments, as regiments, and one where |
brigades, as brigades, have attacked.

" On the other hand, the Cavalry was often not at hand when
required, and had to be sent for. At Koniggratz, where the
Cavalry of the ist Armywas opportunely in the right place at
the right time, but was prevented from moving forward until
*he Infantry had crossed the Sadowa, it neglected to prepare
and to arrange beforehand crossing- places. Only two fords
were practicable, and the leading detachments came into
action before those in rear were across. When the general
pursuit should have begun the action of the Cavalry ceased
altogether. Some Brigades remained quite inactive. The
reserve Cavalry Division of the 2nd Army was kept so far
in rear that it only came up at the end of the battle. The
cause of the indifferent performance of the Cavalry lies not in the
material, biU in the leading, the formation, and the distribution.
The Cavalry also often shirked coming under shell fire.
1 shall come back later to this point.

" Moltke then remarks : ' Our Cavalry failed, perhaps, not
so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence. But all its
initiative had been destroyed at vianwuvres, where criticism I
and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
shirked independent bold action, and as much as possible I
kept out of sight far in the rear.' Further on, Moltke com-
plains that 'the reserve Cavalry of the ist and 3nd Armies,
which, in spite of the supply difficulties, was carefully kept in
hand until the battle of July 3rd, was then never thrown
in front of the advancing columns just when it might have
performed important reconnaissance duties.' He concluded
with the words: 'The reserve Cavalry of the ist and 2nd

INTRODUCTORY ii

Armies has been employed very little, or not at all, in
the duty of guiding the Army. For long-distance scouting
this Cavalry has never been used at all'

" If one compares the efficiency, as sketched by Moltke,
of the Prussian Cavalry of iS66 — that of the enemy in self-
sacrifice, as shown on July 3rd, was on much the same
plane^with the performances of the Cavalry arm in the
American Civil War. one must impartially admit, after con-
sideration of the different conditions, that the latter was the
rtW article. How helpless and inept were these European
horsemen compared with those led by Stuart !

" Most extraordinary of all, to our modern ideas of the
employment of Cavalry, seems the meagre use made of the
mounted men for reconnaissance. Although Murat's Cavalry
Divisions of the French Army had never been sent far
to the front, with us the Cavalry force — known by the ill-
omened name of ' Reserve Cavalry ' — was kept in rear, while
the Divisional Cavalry, composed of advance guard, main
body, and reserve, reconnoitred anything but far a-field. Thus,
approved methods were altogether forgotten, a heavy indict-
ment against the manner in which military history has been
studied during the years which have elapsed since the
Napoleonic wars.

" We shall see that the defects recognised by Moltke in 1866
were remedied in 1870-71, in so far as concerns the work of
reconnaissance, and so far also as reform was possible in so
short a time. Other shortcomings, which had not revealed
themselves in the brief campaign and which were unnoticed
by Moltke — such as the unsatisfactory fire-arm, and the want
of practice in its use — were not remedied. A further evil,
which may not have come before the General, was the poor
condition of the numerous registered horses in the squadrons.
This was, however, noticed, and the Cavalry reorganisation,
which had already been put in hand, was continued after the
war. In regiments where a fifth squadron had not already
existed it was raised, and this was not mobilised as in 1864
and 1 866, but was organised as a dep6t or reserve squadron,

CAVALRY STUDIES

appreciably^^^H

tlie Cavalry ^^^
1 * „f '

whereby the intrinsic value of the Cavalry was appreciably^
increased.

" I now come back to Moltke's remark that tlu <
shirked exposure to shell fire. As an example, in the report of
the battle of Konig^ratz reference is made to a Cavalry
Brigade of the Elbe Army which did nothing, but which,
according to its own account, was subjected to a heavy
artillery fire in which 'the shells were bursting close in front
of the Brigade' — result, one wounded Hussar ! Whence this
avoidance of casualties so often noticed with the Cavalry?
The men on horses are the same brave fellows as their
comrades on foot, and when on patrol, they showed them-
selves coo! and daring even to foolhardiness. Tlte cause must
be sought in tlte training under lu/iich llie Leaders were fortned.
One heard everlastingly repeated the axiom that Cavalry
must not run the risk of incurring casiialties from fire prior to
the charge, it must, therefore, be kept in the rear ; this great
respect for Infantry fire, which, in itself, was quite justifiable,
had developed a timidity for coming to grips at all — -wc shall
find the same when we come to consider the Russo-Turkish
War — and ail the talk about 'the costly arm more difficult
to replace than the others' may also have contributed to this
ultra-caution. We should remember the construction which
General Carl v. Schmidt gave to this dogma, and which he
thus expressed: 'This arm is far too costly to have any
check placed on its employment' Principles, correct in
themselves, have also done harm through an exaggerated
stress being placed on them, particularly at manceuvres — see
Moltke's Report — and one should be thankful that our
Cavalry is now taught to attack and to come to close quarters J
with the other arms. I

"Another, and perhaps the strongest reason of all for the I
poor results obtained by the Cavalry on the battlefield, lies in
tlie characteristics of many Leaders. An attacking Cavalry
is like a shot which has been fired, the effect of which
cannot be foreseen, and, which, under certain circumstances,
might recoil on the firers. Many a Cavalry officer, per-

INTRODUCTORY 13

sonally brave enough, has shrunk from making up his
mind to a course of action, the result of which cannot be
determined in advance, and which may demand great, and
perhaps fruitless, sacrifice from his men. With the other
arms it is possible to break off an action ; not so with the
Cavalry charge — fate must run its course. With Cavalry,
everything depends exclusively upon the initiative of the
Commander, hence the immense importance of the personal
clement. Without his direct personal influence nothing can
be done. On the other hand it may, for instance, be quite
conceivable that a division of Infantry in a chance encounter
wins the day, entirely through the natural course of events
and the energetic action of the subordinate Leaders, without
the Divisional General having had anything whatever to do
with obtaining the result. The Leaders of bodies of Cavalry
attached to other arms, whose Commander is slow to make up
his mind, might, in such a case, be less inclined than usual
to order an attack to be carried out which they know to be
necessary. The Cavalry Commander, free from all respon-
sibility, would, no doubt, accept such an order gladly, and
carry it out with skill and energy. The celebrated charge by
V. Bredow at Vionville would probably have never been made
had a direct order not been received. Sometimes theory,
and sometimes practice is the chief factor in achieving great
results.

•' Cavalry must be educated up to a readiness to act, abso-
lutely regardless of consequences, and to a determination to
conquer. We must recognise that there is nothing out of the
common in the blood of a mounted man ; this arm must risk
casualties, as the infantry has often done before, without
losing its battle-value ; while exaggerated ideas must be
avoided, as, for instance, where the charge just mentioned
has been dubbed 'the death ride,' as though such an action
had never previously been heard of! Such an attack has
been made before with the same bravery and equal losses, as
also have many deeds of the other arms, without much fuss
having been made about them. The faults from which the

CAVALRY STUDIES

German Cavalry suffered during the war of 1S70-71 were
due, in so far as they have not already been dealt with, to
the personality of the superior Commanders^a question the
importance of which had been frequently emphasised, but not
altogether happily solved — more especially in the fact that
they avoided every opportunity of manoeuvring the Division
entrusted to them, so that, in consequence of this fault, many
of them would certainly and naturally have been found
deficient in self-confidence if they had been suddenly called
upon to command twenty-four squadrons combined. This
want of confidence, felt and apparent, to perform the duty
laid upon them, could be seen from the fact that the Divisions
were hardly ever manceuvred as a whole ; they worked with
three separate Brigades, each of which had its own orders,
and not infrequently the Divisional General rode apart with
his staff, taking no part in what was going on. So, for
instance, the 5th Cavalry Division, in its operations the day
after Metz, and the 4th in the advance from Chartres to
Coulmiers on the 9th November. Since one cannot imagine
that the senior officers at the head of these Divisions did not
know the value of concerted action, the explanation of this
phenomenon may be found above, while also the reluctance
to launch the whole Division to the attack may have had
something to say to it

" Another fault was, further, that when the war broke out,
not only -were tJte Divisions improvised, but to some extent
also the Brigades, Commanders did not know their staffs,
and had no knowledge of the capabilities of the subordinate
Leaders. This had the worst possible results, for in the case of
the most important duties, those detailed for them according
to seniority were often the least capable of carrying them out.
That the unavoidable friction caused by such improvisations
has far worse consequences for Cavalr>' than for the other
arms, and that misunderstandings arise which are difficult to
.smooth will be apparent to all ; clear, full tone can only
be got from a well-trained orchestra,"

The following extracts from some interesting articles which

my ^_
ich ^1

INTRODUCTORY

I
I

appeared in the Revue c/es Deux Mondes in September 1S89
express a commonsense view of the work of Cavalry :

" Of all the rdles of the Cavalry arm, that of participation
in the battlefield is the most discussed. Tiiere is no property
that has been more systematically denied it, although it has
never ceased for a single instant to reassert its claims with
ardour. It has been said or written, even to satiety, that the
indefinite improvements in firearms, the accumulated progress
of ballistics, would condemn large masses of Cavalry to
impotence, and would raise an insurmountable barrier to
the attack with the sword, the charge.

" But if we enquire thoroughly into the value of these
declarations we shall be astonished to find that they generally
rest on arguments of assertion, and rarely on an exact
analysis of facts. And, indeed, if we endeavour to deduce
from the study of campaigns the causes which at certain
epochs have extended or diminished the role of Cavalry we
find that these causes have no strict relation to the changes
of armament, but depend almost exclusively on the principles
which have governed the training and employment of the
arm — in a word, on the citaracter of those who have had
command.

" This lesson shines out clearly from one end of history to
the other. If it was otherwise, the Cavalry under Frederic
would have played a much more subordinate part than
under Charles V., and the squadrons of the First Empire
would have gained less brilliant success than those of
Louis XIII. or Louis XIV. In fact, the value of the arm
appears to be quite unaffected by the considerations habitually
brought forward by its detractors. It is not regulated by the
power of firearms. Cavalry is in jeopardy when it has no
Leaders who understand how to train it ; it recovers itself as
soon as at its head it finds chiefs who have a clear perception
of its role and proper mode of employment. Such were
Hannibal, Frederic, and Napoleon. Who ever raised Cavalry
higher than did the latter P And yet muskets carried further
and straighter in his time than in the days of Charles XII. or

i6 CAVALRY STUDIES

Gustavus Adolphus. But, anxious to make use of it, having
the same faith in it which it had in him, and thinking more
of its real use than of how it might be spared, he always
placed it where it could intervene with the best chances of
success, and put it under the order of Generals who were
competent to make vigorous use of it. Thus at Marengo,
Aspern, Eyiau, and Borodino it decided in an almost regal
manner the fate of the day.

" These examples are, however, somewhat distant, but there
are more recent ones in i865 and [870 which formally dis-
prove the theoretical common-place of the uselessness of
Cavalry. Custozza, Koniggratz, Vionville are at any rate
three modern battles. As an exception, and too rare a one,
it was decided to have resource to the Cavalry, and the results
were considerable and such as had not been hoped for. At
Custozza, two bodies of Austrian Cavalry, ridiculously out of
proportion — viz., fifteen squadrons on one side and only one
on the other- — threw themselves on the heads of the columns
of the 3rd Italian Corps at the moment of their debouching
on the field of battle. The moral effect, the shock produced
by their impetuous charge, was such that the whole corps
which was commanded by I'rince Humbert was disorganised
and paralysed for the rest of the day (compare page 319).
Sixteen squadrons rendered 25,000 immobile, and diverted
them from the field of battle. At Koniggratz the Austrian
Cavalry divisions, unskilfully massed in rear, were unable to
intervene either in the opening scenes or in the course of the
battle. But towards the close, when the Austrian Army had
been irretrievably beaten, it was decided, all too late, to
employ them. Two divisions hurled themselves against the
victorious Prussian columns, and by their heroic devotion
prevented the retreat being turned into a disorderly rout.
At Vionviile the charge of the six squadrons of v. Bredow's
Brigade cut short the movement of the French 6th Corps,
and enabled the Prussian General Staff to bring fresh troops
into line. V. Bredow's Brigade was worsted, it is true,
but not until it had saved its own Army from imminent

INTRODUCTORY 17

danger, and re-established the equilibrium which had been
disturbed.

" Here then are three deiinite facts which are opposed to
the didactic subtleties which people are wont to express
so Hghtly. Here are three modern battlefields on which
at three different moments — viz., the commencement, the
middle, and the close of the day — the Cavalry intervened with
incontestable success. By its audacity it prepares a victory,
by its devotion it wards off a disaster. In short, it produces
tactical results of the first order."

The securing taclical results, the fulfilment of its mission,
is the sole criterion of the real value of any arm considered
as a fighting instrument. And it is this very truth, although
an elementary one, which the majority of those who set them-
selves up as judges over the Cavalry have not been able or
willing to comprehend. Have we not all read, and not
without disgust, those strange statements, those wonderful
statistics, in which a comparison of the losses caused by
bullet and sabre is used as a text for extolling certain
particular tactics of the Cavalry? It is fortunate if the
conclusion is not positively arrived at that Cavalry is
altogether effete and useless. But who can possibly enter-
tain such a narrow and primitive idea of the principles of
war as to imagine that the role of Cavalry is gauged by the
number of losses inflicted by the sabre ? The 5,000 Cuira.ssiers
who charged at Aspern, the forty squadrons which hurled
themselves on the centre of the Russian Army at Eylau, the
floodsofallied Cavalry which inundated the plains oiWaterloo,

!v. Bredow's six squadrons which were decimated at Vionville —
did they produce really sensible losses by their shock?
Certainly not, and it is of very little consequence whether
they did, since they produced important tactical results.

In doing this they gathered in a few moments the fruits of
long-continued efforts ; they saved their Armies from making
other sacrifices.

The true conclusion seems to be that even as a battle is
only an incident in many months of campaigning.so a charge.

i8 CAVALRY STUDIES

though a very prominent part, is only one part of the function
of the Cavalry, and efficiency in the use of the rifle is
absolute!/ essential, as it will be in more frequent use. On
the other hand, now as formerly, all great successes can only
be gained by a force of Cavalry which is trained to harden its
heart and charge home.

The role of Cavalry, far from having diminished, has
increased in importance. It extends to both strategy and
tactics : it alone is of use in the service of exploration, and
it is of capital importance in a general action.

Let us sum up in a rapid resum^ the services which this
arm ought to and can render. During the period of con-
centration it conceals and protects the strategic front of the
Armies ; it threatens and disturbs the adversary's base and
communications ; it indicates to the Commander-in-Chief the
point where he ought to strike, and points out to him the
■objective. During the march of approach towards the enemy
it surrounds the columns with a vigilant network : it clears
their path, raises and tears away the veil spread before them.
On the field of battle it surprises the hostile Artillery and
reduces it to silence : it protects the head and flank of its
own Army, covers its deployment, disturbs or retards that of
the enemy. A little later it prepares the ev^nement and takes
part in the assault ; in a few seconds it gathers the fruits of
a long contest. Lastly, it completes the victory, or averts
disaster: it undertakes the pursuit or covers retreat. In
short, it intervenes in the prologue, in the principal act, and
in the denoAmetit. It both introduces and consecrates success.
But in all cases the combat with its proper rival is its
inevitable prelude.

Its field of action is proportionate to the dimensions of the
wars of the present. Its objective has increased — the means
of attaining it must increase in proportion. It is no longer
economy to starve the Cavalry arm. The extent of the
objective calls for extended methods of procedure. Numbers,
in modern Cavalry, do not constitute merely a material
force — they are also an element of moral superiority, an

INTRODUCTORY

Kb.

essential condition of energy and success. Concentration to
the highest degree, combined action of the whole, decisive
tactics are a necessity. Everything else is vain, uncertain, or
harmful. In a single formula wc may sum up its r6le and its
future. T/i£ ivar of masses necessitates mass tactics. And the
organisation and training of Cavalry must have this precept
as its basis. But as already emphasised, in Cavalry work it
is Leadership that tells ; and it is the power of rapidly
grasping a situation, of being able quickly to come to a
decision and at once issue clear and easily executed orders,
that, more than the possession of any other faculty, brings
success to a commander in the field.

The development of this faculty ought to be the main
objective of the training of combatant officers in peace, and
close attention should be paid to all exercises which tend
to develop a power of decision and skill in quickly drafting
orders.

Certainly a knowledge of Military History is all-important
for an officer. In studying it we see the "great masters"
at work : we learn from their experience, and become
acquainted with the difficulties to be encountered in applying
principles. But such work contributes little towards deve-
loping our power of decision.

On the other hand, " War Games " and " Staff Rides "
should be framed chiefly with the latter object.

In the following pages an attempt is made to put before
the reader various situations with the object of accustoming
him quickly to make up his mind, and then to interpret his
decision into clear orders which can be easily executed.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY

DIVISION.

IN these Studies the Cavalry Division is composed of
three or more Brigades. The detail of a Cavalry
Brigade (Indian) is that given in the Indian Field Service
Regulations, corrected to May, 1906, and is shown in the
tables on pp. 21 and 22.

In all the Studies the strength of the enemy s Cavalry is
assumed to be :

UnitB.

Officers.

Non-Com missioned
Officers and men.

Guns.

Staff . . ....

I Brigade of 2 Dragoon Regiments

I „ of I Dragoon and i Cossack
Regiment

I Horse Artillery Division .

7
74

63
12

22
1,840

1.809

345

...
...

•••
12

Total ....

156

4,016

The fighting strength is 3460 sabres and 12 guns.

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 21

~»on.,u-i"«i| "'S, S£ SS *'S|-a

™p.,w..c| '"ft ■M 3J «. :§ 1 S.

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UMBO »«H"N

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■«.^| ^ «o „„ - ; : j «

Staff etc

Attached to Staff .

1 British Cavalry Regiment ,

2 Native Cavalry Regiments .

i British Field Hospital
I Native Field Hospital .

Column ....
a Field Post OfBces, lat class
Brigade Supply Column .

CAVALRY STUDIES

I 5

cm t.

b "^

■npnPA

■' R

-sapiD iqfaua

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SIT, etc

Attached to Staff .

3 Brigades

3 Horse Batteries— 18 guns .

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 23

Organisation of the Staff of the Division.

The duties of the Divisional Staff s

divided as follows :
I.

Operations. \

Intelligence. |

Orders, etc.

Higher Organisation.

Field Telegraphs and Sig-
nalling.

Censorship and Press Corre-
spondents.

II.

Organisation of units.

Hospital and Sanitary arrange-
ments.

Casualties.

Discipline.

assumed to be

Chief Staff Officer,

or
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-
General.

Supplies of all kinds, ^

Transport. | .Assistant Quartermaster-
Accommodation and Camps. T General.
Remounts, j

In practice, it is almost impossible to maintain strictly this
division of duties, but some such definition of the respective
responsibilities is essential until the staff machine is in good
working order, and the various officers have had time to
discover by experience the most convenient mutual arrange-
ments. This is, of course, all the more necessary in dealing
with a unit which has no permanent peace organisation.

The following additional divisional staff would be required
to be found by the Brigades ;
S.M.O.
Provost Marshal (only if necessary).

tT bupply. ^^M
franspoit. ^^H

24 CAVALRY STUDIES

Chief Supply and Transport Officer.

Assistant to Supply and Transport Officer for S

» >. n .. J. n Transport

Staff of a Cavalry Brigade —
Staff allowed —

Brigade Major.
Orderly Officer.
Native Staff Officer (for Quartermaster-General's duties).
Attached to Staff-
Signalling Officer.
Veterinary Officer.
Attached to Staff when required by the nature of thel
operations —

Intelligence Officer.
Supply and Transport Officer.
Detailed in Brigade—
S.M.O.
Provost Marshal (under special circumstances).

Brigadiers should get accustomed to working with the
first three only, for as casualties occur on service there will
always be difficulties about finding sufficient officers to fill
the remaining posts.

Organisation of Services with the Division.

Transport and Supply.— ^"Yhc organisation assumed to bc.l
employed is as follows :

First or Fighting Line Transport.
{a) S.A. ammunition (on mules).
{b) Signalling equipment (on horses),
(c) Entrenching tools and explosives (on mules).
(rf) Picketting gear, lanterns, buckets, cooking pots (foi

horses per squadron or one per troop),
(f) Medical appliances, saddle crutches. Brigade riding

ambulance transport.
NM. — Attached to the ist Line Transport when action

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 25

imminent — (a) other led horses, e^. officers' second chargers ;
(i) farriers.

A. 2nd Line Pack. — Field stretchers (until saddle crutches
adopted).

Pakhals. — When required by nature of operations (sixteen
mules — i.e. one per troop).

One blanket and waterproof sheet per man.

Two days' rations (one day tinned meat for British troops).

Two days' grain.

One shoe with nails per horse.

B. 2nd Line Wheel. — i. Kits,

2. Armourers' tools.
Saddlers' tools.

Horse-shoes and shoeing requisites.
Stationery.

3. Cable carts (until light-cable horses or mules equipped).

Intercommunication. — Besides the mounted man (on horse or
bicycle) there are four means of obtaining intercommunication
—telegraphic, telephonic, wireless, and visual ; and, assuming
that al! are available, the selection of one or more for use is
dependent not only on the weather, but also on the character
of the country. Thus in the Medak district, the theatre of the
fourth Study, and where contact squadrons and patrols may be
distant from seventeen to twenty-four miles from Brigade head-
quarters, and cover a frontage of over fifty miles, the country
in which the operations commence is unsuitable for visual
signalling, and consequently communication between contact
squadrons and their Brigade headquarters can be rapidly and
successfully carried on by means only of field telegraphs and
telephones.

In the fifth— the Attock Ride— the helio plays at the
commencement an important part, owing to the existence
of high ground — viz. the Ziarat Hill near Hasan Abdal,
affording a commanding view ; but later on, in the low-lying
ground on the banks of the Indus, it must necessarily give
way to wire communication.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Despatch riding is always a poor substitute, and entails"
great waste in horseficsh, whilst in all Cavalry operations time
saved is of incalculable and incontestable value.

The present system of field telegraphs in India is as follows:.

There is one section with each of the three corps of Sappers

and Miners ; each section consists of:

2 British officers.

4 British non-commissioned officers.
32 native rank and file.
These, however, are for construction and maintenance only.
For field service and manceuvre, the signalling staff — t.e. British
military signallers^are drawn from the Government Telegraph ]
Department. The equipment for each section consists of:
20 miles of air line.
10 miles of cable.
6 offices.

This is its "first-line" equipment, which always accom-
panies the section on sixty obligatory mules. With the
baggage there is another fifty miles of air line, twenty miles '
of cable, and certain offices from which the " first-line " equip-
ment is replenished daily. A section can furnish two air-line
parties and two cable parties, all capable of working simul-
taneously. Air lines can be erected at one and a half miles
per hour per party over good open country, and cable can
be laid out at four miles per hour, communication being
maintained with a stationary office in rear.

The instruments carried are field-service sounders, vibrators I
with microphone attachments (so that both telegraph and
telephone attachments can be used at willj, and two patterns
of telephones — one for ordinary use, and one for sending out
to tap e.xisting lines. The latter is provided with a signalling
key for Morse work if necessary.

For air-line work the bamboo posts are in three pieces,
each post weighing 8 lb. The wire is of phosphor bronze,
and weighs 5 lb. per mile. The cable used is Siemen's 0-33^
weighing ^y lb. per mile.

r ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 27
The main principle is to "fan out" cable lines whilst the
air lines are being erected on the main line of advance.
When operations cease for the day Morse instruments are
put on to the air lines, which have probably reached head-
quarters, whilst the cables are rolled up and preparations
^^ made for carrying on in a similar way the next day.
^^U But important as is rapid intercommunication in the

^H Division itself, of equal importance is it that means for
^^B similar communication between the Division and the Army
^^H of which it forms a part should be provided.
^H Mounted Sappers. — It is a vital necessity for Cavalry that
^^1 they should be accompanied in the field by mounted and
^^1 mobile detachments of Engineers. The strength of a section
^^B of Mounted Sappers is :

^^B Officers . .1 Chargers 2

^^1 N.O.'s .1 Riding horses . 45

^B British N.-C.O.'s . 1 Fack horses . . 6

^^F Havildars . 2 Equipment mules 10

^H Naicks . .4 Riding camels 2

^H #■ Sappers. . 32 Grass mules . .15

H Syces

^^1 |i Trades of the Sappers:

^^H Smiths or Fitters ...... 8

^^H Carpenters . S

^^H Saddlers 2

^^f . Masons 4

^H Telegraph Linesmen 4

^H Telegraph Signallers 2

^^B Engine Drivers ...... I

^^H Plate-layers ...... 3

^^1 With each Brigade one section is necessary. Its duty is
^^B to carry out work beyond the power of the Regimental
^^p Pioneers to undertake. The amount of demolition stores and
^^B explosives with Cavalry Regiments on service is sufficient

28 CAVALRY STUDIES

to effect only very small and easily repairable damage.
When a force as large as a Brigade makes a raid on an
enemy's line of communications, or penetrates for a short
time an enemy's Cavalry screen, it is necessary to carry out
some reaUy serious damage, so that the effects of even a
mere temporary success may be a serious and lasting in-
convenience to the enemy. Owing to the small regimental
equipment and the generally slight technical knowledge
available in the regiments, no large demolition schemes can
be attempted, such as — (i) the lasting injury to large bridges ;
(2) the real confusion of a telegraph system, not by destroying
wires and instruments, but by mixing them up ; (3) destruction
of water supplies and power station ; (4) rendering useless
the armaments of works which may have been surprised.
All the above require — (1) technical knowledge, both in the
officers who decide what to do, and the men who have to
■carry it out quickly ; and (2) a certain quantity of special
stores and tools not carried in the regimental equipments.
Rapid bridging and the provision of water supply and
making arrangements for the distribution of the water are
also part of the work of the section. But in all cases it must
be only work that can be rapidly executed, since the mounted
sappers cannot carry enough stores for anything more.

As the purpose of the Studies is not merely to illustrate hoW-fl
certain strategical and tactical situations may be dealt with, M
but to lead readers to think out for themselves, not merely ,
the solutions, but, so far as possible, the details of the work,
some remarks will now be made with regard to Orders.

In ail military operations, the preparation of proper orders
in proper form is of paramount importance. These orders
arc of three classes : Operation Orders, Routine Orders, and
Standing Orders. It is only the Standing Orders that can
be regarded as of any permanency during an operation, as
the others must be framed to meet the requirements of
the day, and in the case of Operation Orders even of the
moment. In a Cavalry Division there must be Standing

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 29-

Orders for both the Division and the Brigade. A specimen
or example of Divisional Standing Orders is now given.

- Commanding

. Parade si

s will l>e furnished by Brigades every Monday before n

Rtgimo

(« Nm

the Deputy Assistant A djulmit- General, showing —
Btilish Officers, effective.
Brili-^h Rnnk nnd File, effective.
Native Ranks, eifecllve.

Transport animah.
On the back of these returns will be noted ;

On man izo^

RegiinenUt Reserve . . . lSo| (^j ^mp,,

Ammnnition Column . - 175 1

Field Park 225]

SlipJ-lie!.
On man and horse — Balance of previous day's

ration, emei^ency return, and 6 lb. grain.
and Line A (pack) — Two days man and horse.

.. ., B (wheel) Ditto, ..m.ma.g ,„ „.ui>,.

Supply Column — Three days fur man, one day
for horses.

(0 Whelhet any craei^ency rations have been consumed.
3. Twice a week Commanding Ofiicers wilt report to Brigadiers the number
of men and horses disabled through any cause.

3. Brigadiers are responsible for the sanitary condition of their bivouacs.
When two or more Brigades arc bivouacked together the Provost Morshat
accompanied by the Quarlermasleis will inspect the bivouacs daily.

4. No Datives, except authorised followers, will be allowed within the limits.
of Ihe bivouacs without a pass signed by one of the following officers :

The Brigade- Major.
The Provost Marshal.

5. No followers will leave the limits of the bivouacs except on duty and under
supervision.

6. (a) Brigadiers will make evety effort to replace daily, as br as possible,
Ihe consumption of supplies by requisition on the inhabitants.

Supplies purchased in the country will be paid for at rales published from

{6) All foraging parties will be accompanied hy an officer.

(i ) The scale of rations for men and horses will be in accordance with regula-
tions unless otherwise ordered by the General Officer Commanding the Division,
or br General Officers Commanding Brigades when detached.

CAVALRY STUDIES ' ^^^^^|

7. (n) All reconnoitring detachments ihould keep an itinerary of their niille^^^|
showing the time they passed imporlant places and the action Ihey took, thus : ^^H

FU«.

Time.

Action takEa.

Renurki. ^^M

(*) A diary, in the followine form, of dwpatches sent and received, should be ^^M
Officers Comnianiiing Brigades ;

Number of meBsage

, Hour of receipt
I ud pl««. "^

From whom
■odplue.

ContsDti.

AetioD

(<:) Heads of Departments must early tnfann the Assistant Quartermastei-
General of any special information they may require, in order to avoid more than
one patrol being sent in the same direction.

8. In bivouac. Medical Officers will designate the wells allotted to drinking
purposes, and a sentry will be placed over each of these welts.

9. The 3rd Brigade will detail a mounted signalling unit to accompany
Divisional Headquarters permanently.

of baggaee for each rank and unit are not exceeded.

II. Marauding will be Very severely dealt with and men will be cautioned ^^^
in Regimental Orders against entering the house of an inhabitant on any pretext .^^^H
whatsoever, without proper aulhorily. ^^^|

la. Time will be reckoned from to 23, □ being midnight and 12 noon. ^^^|

13. The day and hour of despatch of mails will be notified in orders. ^^^

14. The 4 miles lo 1 in. map will be considered the slalT map and will lie the
one referred lo in orders and reports, when no other is specially mentioned.

As regards Brigade Standing Orders there is probably ^^J
considerable divergence of views as to how these orders ^^|

^^^^H

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 31

They should be issued with Divisional Standing Orders
(C. T., Chap. I. 4). Standing Orders should be as short and
concise as possible, and should avoid the repetition of service
regulations, etc., unless the latter require modification to
meet existing conditions.

The following headings are given by way of example ;
a selection can be taken from them as may appear necessary,
or additions can be made :

1. Special attention should be called to certain Divisional

Standing Orders ; any Brigade Orders required with
reference to these or in amplification of them.

2. Brigade duties.— 1\\z ro.ster of units for Brigade duty,

which should be automatic. The regiment for duty
to come on in succession at a certain hour for 24
hours. This regiment to find all Brigade duties,
including inlying piquet, advance guard, flank guard,
special patrols, any detached squadrons required from
the brigade. It should go on rear guard next day
(or march in rear of the Brigade if not required on
rear guard),

3. Hour of march. — Troops to be ready to march at I hour

after sunrise in cases where delay has occurred in
the issue of Divisional and Brigade Operation Orders
(unavoidable delay will frequently occur in the issue
of these, when intelligence reports, etc., have to be
awaited).

4. Operation Orders. — Any particular methods, formations

or precautions to which attention should be directed
with regard to the character of the enemy, his tactics,
nature of the country, etc.

5. Camps and Bivouacs. — The standard form of camp (if
desired) giving the spaces to be allotted to the various
units whenever possible. The perimeter to be made
defensible or entrenched ; any special orders with
reference to Alarm Posts, strength of inlying piquet,
men for duty in horse lines and transport lines, etc.
The alarm signal by day and night.

CAVALRY STUDIES

6. Provost Marshal. — Provost Marshal's regulations,

required in addition to those in Divisional Standing
Orders ; disposal of prisoners, arms and horses
captured ; daily search to be made by the Provost
Marshal's men for articles left behind in bivouacs after
the troop's march, and disposal of the same. If it is
necessary to detail a considerable number of men
for duty under the Provost Marshal, a particular troop
or squadron should be detailed (a squadron was some-
times so detailed in columns in S. Africa).

7. Discipline. — Men to be cautioned as to committing

offences against inhabitants, etc. (with reference to
Divisional Standing Orders) ; Courts-martial : it will
perhaps be found convenient to adopt a system under
which officers would be detailed in Brigade Orders
to form a Court, which would be on duty for a week
and which would try ail offenders sent for trial during
that week : C.O.'s would inform the President if they
had a prisoner for trial, and the latter would then
order the Court to assemble.

S. Disposal of spare arms and equipment — e.g. in the case
of men admitted to hospital.

9. Baggage. — A small flag to accompany the transport of
each brigade facilitates recognition, C.O.'s of units
to be held strictly responsible for any excess of
authorised scales of baggage. (This is generally
necessary, although it is a service regulation.) Any
special powers delegated to the Brigade Transport
Officer. Strength of guards to be furnished by units.

10. Signalling. — A permanent unit to be detailed to Brigade

Headquarters, and to camp with them. Telephones,
if any, the station to be near Headquarters when
not marching. Appointment of a Brigade Signalling
Officer, if not already detailed.

1 1. Intelligence. — A Brigade Intelligence Officer to be

detailed, if not already appointed ; any special orders
re personnel and duties.

ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 33

12. Orderlies. — Permanent orderlies required for General
Officer Commanding Brigade. These should live with
Brigade Headquarters.

13. Medical. — Any instructions tending to safeguard the

health of the troops. (Particular attention has been
directed to this with good results in the Japanese
Army.)

14. Foraging and Supplies. — System of collecting local

supplies. The Brigade Supply Officer should accom-
pany the Brigade party detailed to collect them ; the
foraging party should be under a Regimental Officer.

15. Poslal.—ltcms of news, intelligence, routine orders, etc.,

should be posted daily for general information outside
the tent of the Brigade- Major, or at some other con-
venient spot.

16. Horsemastership. — Nature of local supplies of grain and

fodder obtainable ; any special instructions regarding
precautions to be observed in accustoming animals
to peculiar forage or change of same ; issue of green
fodder; bhoosa should be cleaned, especially when
horses are not accustomed to it.

17. Miscellaneous.— \ln\es'i otherwise ordered, Officers Com-

manding units should ride near the Brigadier when
contact with the enemy is imminent, leaving unit under
second in command ; this facilitates immediate action.

18. Difficult Com «/r)'.— Messengers and orderlies despatched

to any distance should be sent in pairs ; the rear

guard to prevent all lagging.

In following the Studies it is well for the reader to recall

to mind the multifarious duties which fall to a Stafif Officer in

the field. The following among them are brought to notice :

Before an action —

To make sure — (a) that unfit men and horses, a proportion
of farriers, etc., are left with the ist Line Transport
at some known point which is communicated to
commanding officers of regiments, and to squadron
commanders if possible.

CAVALRY STUDIES

(^) That the reserve ammunition is forthcoming, and that
second bandoliers are filled up,

{d) That all men are warned that if dismounted, or falling
out, or separated during the course of the expected
action, they are to rally on the ist Line Transport.

During tlie action —

(«) To assist the G.O.C. in every possible way.

ip) To keep notes on the course of the action and the
genera! distribution of units.

if) To see that a responsible officer is always at the place
appointed by the G.O.C. for the receipt of messages.

(t^ To see that a watch is kept in directions where danger
may not be expected — e.g. in a retreat towards the
head {cf. Sannahs Post).

After an action —

(fl) The first and most important duty is the issue of
further " operation " orders— i.e. pursuit, retreat, etc., or
outposts ; in the event of "halt orders" being neces-
sary, to make arrangements to maintain touch with
the enemy.

{b') The transmitting at once and direct to the Chief
Intelligence Officer information likely to be useful
to the G.O.C. the army in the rear.

{c) Getting up the 2nd Line Transport, with food, ammuni-
tion, etc., as required to refill ist Line.

ifT) Collecting from units and preparing immediate reports

(i) Own casualties, men, horses (killed, wounded, missing).
(ii) Requirements to complete —

Ammunition, men, horses, equipment, rations.
(iii) Captures {usually the Provost Marshal's work) —

Prisoners, horses, equipment, baggage, transport
{i) Arranging with S.M.O, for care of wounded and for

organising search parties.
if) Collecting ambulance transport, etc., impressing in-
habitants if necessary, and also carts, etc.

' ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 35

) Despatching to nearest base such wounded as are fit to
be moved, and arranging necessary escorts.

^m In connection with the work of a Cavalry Division in India,

^^ there are two other matters which it is desirable to mention.

■ The first is the presence of a native Staff Officer (for

Quartermaster- General's duties) on the staff of a Cavalry

Brigade. Native officers know little concerning the welfare

»of any higher unit than a troop, or of the organisation, etc.,
of the other arms ; but it is very remarkable how quickly
and readily the more intelligent can be taught.
Native Cavalry regiments should, therefore, carefully select
and train a few native officers in the duties which usually fall
to the Deputy Assistant QuartermasterrGeneral of a Brigade.
Such officers would, of course, be brought into constant
contact with British troops, and should be encouraged, there-
fore, to acquire a good colloquial knowledge of English, and,
if possible, to write it. An ability to write Urdu in the
Roman character simplifies communication with British
officers who can speak, but cannot read, the vernacular,
though the obligation to learn should in this case be'
rather on the British than on the native officer.

!n certain matters, such as Supply, the native officers are
by nature experts. The advantages obtainable from a free
use of their knowledge and experience should not, in a
Brigade, be confined to native units.

I For intelligence duties, under the Brigade Major or
Intelligence Officer, Pushtu- and Persian-speaking native
officers are likely to be in great request in any trans-
frontier campaign, and should receive such regimental
instruction from time to time as may better fit them for
this class of .staff work.

The other matter is the employment of Imperial Service
Cavalry with our Cavalry units.

The contingents are furnished from States, and they vary
I in strength from regiments of four squadrons to detachments
I of one, two, or three squadrons. The squadron leaders are

CAVALRY STUDIES

natives, and it is improbable that on mobilisatkm being
ordered, more than one, or at the outside, two British officers
would be sent with each regiment of four squadrons, or its
equivalenL For the above reasons it would appear best
to attach a certain number of squadrons to each brigade,
brigadiers in turn attaching these squadrons for discipline, etc,
to nati^'e Cavalr}' regiments, as far as possible by contingents.

The men composing these troops are. as a rule, good riders
and horsemasters, and arc well mounted. They are fully
equipped in a similar manner to the regular native Cavalry
regiments, and their organisation and administration are on
similar lines. The men, however, speak a variety of dialects
not easily understood by those possessing even a considerable
knowledge of Hindustani. For this reason it would be
advisable to attach them to, and to employ them, as far as
possible, with native troops only. Whenever possible, a British
officer should be spared to assist in looking after them
tactically. They rarely obtain any training in Brigades, or
in conjunction with other troops.

Duties. — They could be most usefully employed on escort
duties, orderly work, baggage guard, posts on lines of com-
munication (with a stiffening of regular troops), carr>'ing
despatches from post to post, And on remount training duties
at advanced dep6ts and veterinary hospitals. They are well
trained and could be trusted in the fighting line.

Administration. — For purposes of administration they
should be immediately under their inspecting officers, though
it is doubtful whether on mobilisation the services of the
latter could always be spared

CHAPTER III.

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM).

Subject.

AN invasion on a double line of operations across a River
Frontier, and up to and including the first decisive
battle. The work of the Cavalry Division.

General Idea.

(Sec SkeUh I.)

\. TYic froHlier between two countries, called respectively
the Northern State and the Southern Empire, is represented
by the river Chenab, the river Indus (for about 50 miles), the
north-east border of Scinde, and the Baluchistan frontier.
Kashmir and Jammu form an Independent Neutral State.

2. {a) A European Power has recently acquired control
over, and has established garrisons in the Northern State,
making Rawa! Pindi its capital and their own immediate base,
A railway connects Rawal Pindi with the ultimate base in
Europe, but no other railways have as yet been built in the
Northern State.

{B) Lahore and Multan, connected by railway with each
other and with the bases at Delhi and Karachi, are the
frontier towns of the Sout/iem Empire.

3, Hostilities have broken out between the European Power
and the Southern Empire. The Asiatic inhabitants of the
Northern State remain neutral.

CAVALRY STUDIES

lut Multan. I

4. The strategical deployment of the Soutlurn I
take place as follows :

(«) On the left, the Third Army Corps— about J

In the centre, the Second Army Corps — about Jhang.
On the right, the First Army Corps — about Ramnagar.
{6) A force, independent of the three Army Corps,
consisting of the loth Infantry Division, is at J
Wazirabad, which is fortified, and is held by itsJ
own garrison, and is the terminus of the SouthernJ
railway system.

5. The 1st Cavalry Division (3 Brigades) belongs to thej
Southern right wing, i.e. to the First Army Corps, whosoj
concentration it will cover.

6. From information received from various sources, the J
dispositions of the Nortliem Force appear to be :

{a) Cavalry: holding the line of the Chenab river, and J

scouting beyond the frontier.
(J?) The remainder massed in three groups on the Jhelui

river t
(i) in the neighbourhood of Jhelum and Kharian.
(ii) „ „ Find Dadan Khan,

(iii) „ „ Khushab (opposite Shahpur)."

Each group is variously estimated at from 25,000 to 40,000,
but the total does not exceed loo.ooo men.

The general situation, as depicted in this general idea, will
now be considered (see also General Map, No. 1).

I. In each Army Corps of the Southern Force are three
Infantry Divisions. Each Infantry Division numbers 12,000
bayonets and sabres, and 34 guns (viz., 13 Battalions of
Infantry, 1 Regiment of Cavalry, 3 Field Batteries, 2
Mountain Batteries, i Heavy Battery of 4 guns, 2 Com-
panies of Sappers). The strength therefore of an Army
Corps is 36,000 bayonets and sabres, and 102 guns. The
total fighting strength of the Southern Force is then
approximately :

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

Guns.

3 Army Corps

108,000

306

I Infantry Division (extra)

12,000

1 Cavalry Division

4,000

124,000

358

2. The only information of the enemy received from
various sources is :

Hostile cavalry holds the right bank of the River Chenab,
whilst scouts have crossed to the left bank.

A group concentrated at Jheium and Kharian, another at
Pind Dadan Khan, and a third at Khushab, making a total
of, approximately, 100,000. But the respective strength of
each group has not been ascertained.

3. The country tiorih of a line drawn from Bannu to
Pind Dadan Khan and Lala Musa is very rugged, mountainous
and much cut up by nullahs. Roads in this zone, with the
exception of the Grand Trunk, which runs from Wazirabad
through Jheium to Rawal Pindi (the capital and railway
terminus of the Northern State), are mere tracks, and are
not suited for wheeled transport. Water and supplies are
scarce.

There are good flat roads along the valley of the Indus.
But military operations in this area can only be undertaken
by small forces, and so must be indecisive in character and
prolonged.

The country south of the line indicated above is flat and
without any marked features.

The only obstacles to the advance of Southern Army in
this area are the rivers Chenab and Jheium. Troops can
move across country without difficulty.

Below the point, where the Jheium joins the Chenab, only
one river need be crossed, the two States being contiguous.
Grain supplies in this area are plentiful.

For the foregoing reasons the Southern Commander should
seek to engage the enemy in the flat open country, and

CAVALRY STUDIES

should cross the Chenab immediately below where it unites
with the Jhelum.

4. The main objective must always be the destruction of
the enemy's Field Force.* The latter is concentrating on the
Jhelum river between Khushab and Jhelum — a front of about
100 mites.

By moving towards the enemy's capital, Rawal Pindi, the
bulk of the enemy's forces will probably be encountered.

The following are secondary objectives as compared with the 1
destruction of the enemy's Field Army, but they are steps |
leading towards that end : -' I

[a) A point of support on the right bank of the Chenab
close below its junction with the Jhelum, to facilitate
invasion of the Northern State,

ib) The ridges north and south of Jhelum town, to ensure
passage of the Jhelum, and to afford a secure
advanced depot within 50 miles of the enemy's
capital, and with a good road from Wazirabad
(the southern rail-head) to that capital.

{a) and {b) must form the secondary objectives in the jirst
p!iase of the operations.

The capture of the enemy's capital may be considered
the objective of the second phase, and the crossings of the
Indus about Attock might form the objective for a third
phase. But the thorough annihilation of the Northern Field
Army must be the main objective throughout, and must-
be striven for, when and wherever possible. I

5. There seem to be five courses open to the enemy : "
(i) To unite against the Southern Right Wing, which is

120 miles from the Centre, and 210 miles from the
Left.
(ii) To unite against the Southern Left, which is nearly

* See Nkpoleon's remarks lo Moreau after the atmpaignB m Ilaly, 1796^7 :

"There arc in Europe many good Generals, but ihey see too many things
Rl onrc : as for me, I see only one thing, ihe enemy's main body. I try to
crush U, confident that seiondary mallets will iheo settle themselves.'

^H FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 41

100 miles from the Centre, while containing the
remainder of the Southern Army.
(iii) To break the Centre of the Southern Army by an
advance from Khushab and Shahpur via Pindi
Bhatian upon Lahore.
(iv) To take up a defensive position to cover the capital,
(v) To retire without fighting.

Concentration against the Southern Right, i,c. the First
Army Corps, whilst it is isolated, seems to ofTer the enemy a
good chance of success, but it presupposes that the Northern
Army is the first ready for action, and that its Commander
has timely information of our dispositions. In this case
it would be the duty of the First Army Corps to manceuvre,
so as to draw the enemy on, without offering him the chance
of a pitched battle, unless in a very favourable position.
In the meantime the advance of the Southern Centre and
Left would soon make itself felt on his flank and Lines of
Communication. Even should he succeed in obtaining a
victory over the First Army Corps, it would only be to find
superior, or at lca.st equal hostile forces, standing on his flank
or Lines of Communication.

If the enemy concentrates against the Left, the same
arguments as given in the preceding paragraph apply.

The advantages to be derived from adopting the third
course, which is known as Strategical Penetration, seem
to be—

(n) One or both wings of the Southern Force become open

to flank attack.
{(>) It seems possible to carry the flank attack against
the First Army Corps to some point east nf Pindi
Bhatian so as to interrupt the communications
between Wazirabad and Lahore.
CO Given sufficient numbers, the Southern Force's detach-
ments about Wazirabad might be completely sur-
rounded.
To prevent the enemy operating in this manner, it is

42 CAVALRY STUDIES

essential that the Southern Forces be mobilised and con-
centrated on the frontier and ready for action before those
of the North ; otherwise, the initiative with all its advantages
is surrendered to the enemy. On the other hand, in the
event of the North being the first ready to move, the railways
of the Southern State should enable any faulty strategical i
deployment to be, in some measure, rectified.

This strategical penetration of the Centre seems, then, the ]
most likely plan for the Northern Commander to adopt.

If the Northern Army adopts the fourth course, and takes _
up a defensive position to cover the capital, it will at the
outset of the campaign have to meet our combined forces,
which outnumber his, and which, from the directions of their
advance, may be brought to bear on him in the most
effective way— />. by converging on him and enveloping him
on the battlefield.

Finally, a retreat without fighting means the surrender of
the territory which it is his business to protect, and probably
political trouble, seeing that the Northern Stale is only held
by force of arms.

6. The courses open to the Southern Force will now be
considered :

The Southern Commander can advance against the
enemy's Field Army in two ways :

{(i) on one line ;

(i^) on two or more lines,

(a) To advance on one line is doubtless the safest, but it is
the least decisive. If the whole of the Southern Force were
to invade ihe Northern State from the direction of Lahore,
then the enemy, directly imposing himself between us and Iiis
capital and covering his Lines of Communication, could check
us in a succession of positions in the hilly country south of
Rawal Pindi. If, on the other hand, the whole of the Southern
Army invades from the direction of Jhang and Multan, the
enemy can again interpose with his united forces, and we
should leave the important railway centre and town of Lahore
open to him. For political reasons we cannot risk an invasio"

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

of our territory, or even allow the enemy a merely temporary
success on our side of the frontier. We also need to deal
with the Northern Forces quickly, for they are connected
with Europe by railway from Rawal Pindi, and will certainly
hurry up reinforcements at the greatest possible speed.

(,b) An advance on two lines seems to possess the best
-chances of success in the present case, and it can be carried
out without unusual risks, for the following reasons :

We are considerably stronger than the enemy ; inter-
communication between the two lines exists, and can soon be
established also after crossing the frontier, for there are no
physical obstacles capable of barring communication ; the Left
and Centre, which will advance on one of the lines, arc
capable of dealing with the enemy's main forces, from the
latter being deducted the troops necessary to guard the Lines
of Communication, and those required for the containing force
to delay the Southern Right ; and lastly, the Right, on the
second line of advance, is strong enough to deal with any
force the enemy is likely to be able to detach against it —
such, for instance, as the group from Jhelum and Kharian.
Although the enemy is operating in his own territory, that
territory is his by virtue of force only, and he has therefore
to guard his Lines of Communication very carefully; more-
over, in this particular district, his movements will be impeded
to a certain extent by the rivers Jhelum and Chenab and
the Chenab Canal.

The advantages to be gained by the adoption of this form
of advance are very considerable. The Southern Force is able,
thereby, to cover its own frontier, the political necessity of
doing which has been already alluded to ; and the configura-
tion of this frontier is such, that an advance from the direction
of Multan or Jhang will threaten the enemy's communications,
and will even afford an opportunity of pushing him back
on neutral territory, in which latter case he would be as
thoroughly destroyed as if his whole Army were captured.
Lastly, questions of Supply are much facilitated by moving
the Army in two portions.

CAVALRY STUDIES

ler should '^^^|

7. For the above reasons the Southern Commander
cross the frontier on two lines, as follow

(a) The Second and Third Army Corps to unite and cross
below the confluence of the Chenab and Jhelum rivers,
subsequently advancing up the right bank of the
river Jhelum, threatening the enemy's Lines of Com-
munication and pressing him back, if possible, on
neutral territory. It is hoped that this movement
will have the desired effect of making the enemy
deliver battle, and that the threat on his communi-
cations will take from him all power of the " initia-
tive." Experience shows that an Army whose com-
munications are threatened will almost invariably
devote its whole attention to protecting them.

(d) The First Army Corps and ist Cavalry Division to adopt
a defensive attitude until the movement of the Left
and Centre is developed ; they will then cross the
Chenab, north of Lahore, somewhere about Ram-
nagar {receiving all possible support from the de-
tachment, the JOth Division, at Wazirabad), and will
move on to Jhelum.

In thus operating we comply with two fundamental prin*
ciples of war, namely :

(1) To lead the bulk of the Army by strategical com-

binations to the decisive points of the theatre of
action, and as much as possible upon the enemy's
Lines of Communication, without endangering one's
own.

(2) To manceuvre in such a manner that the bulk of one's I
own forces act only against detached portions of the I
hostile Army.

The dislike entertained by Napoleon against acting on ,
double lines of operations is well known. He absolutely
repudiated the idea of "operating from widely different
directions without intercommunication," on the ground that

I
I

FIRST STUDY fJHELUM) 45

it would be impossible for the columns to act in concert. He
expressed this opinion on several occasions, and left no doubt
about the importance he attached to it. It is the starting-
point of his whole strategy of operating with masses, which,
as a matter of principle, keeps the main force as closely con-
centrated as the roads and billeting will permit, and which
always has for its object the capabihty of striking with united
forces fractions of the enemy in succession.
- Of Napoleon's use of the single line, von Ciemmerer writes
as follows :

We must call Napoleon's exploils an almost unbroken chain of si
use of the interior line. The need of covering one's own tettilory againsi hostile
enterprises, which existed at all times and under all circumstances, bad caused
Ihe military art of the old monarchies to adopt a very broad from as a rule for
slral^cal deployment, and Na|Kilcan's principle, " to advance in mass," as he
himself colled It, was generally liest applied in selecting the centre of the hostile
inmt as the objecliie. Al the same time, when transmission of the intelligence
during Ihe operations was slill exclu^vely dtpendml en the capacity of a horsr, it
was permissible to reckon with certainly upon Ihe impossibility of really proper
co-operalion of widely separaleii army portions or corps. The news from one
side to the other, the orders hither and Ihilher, could in those dajfa hardly ever
arrive in time for acting in harmony with the constantly changing situations in
war. Napoleon himself said at the end of his career as a General : " Te oftratc
Jnim widely Hfferml direilions miihout inUrcommunicalian is a mistake which is
usually Iht cause cf anethtr. Tki delachtd column has BiUj ordirs for the first
diEy ; its aptrtUiims for Ike ruxt day depend en vihat has happened with the main
column, ft therefore either lasts lime in wailing for orders or Iruits te gead lad. "
And at another time, " // // an axiem to keep Iht columns of an Army always
united in such a mannerthal Ihe enemy cannot push between them."

As soon as Napoleon once got between two portions or corps of an Army, their
late was sealed as a rule. He deceived one of his adversaries by a weak Init
resolutely acting detachmcnl, and fell upon the other with united forces in such a
determined manner that the enemy was unable to resist. If this one was beaten,
he turned against ihe enemy whom he had hitherto only held in check.

Napoleon never initialed from Ihe outset a twofold envelopment or made use of
exterior lines, when he could shape things to some extent as he liked, because he,
like Jomini, considered the fundamental idea a mistake. When he acted con-
cenlricatly againsi Mack in the course of the operations in 1805, he did so because
[he favourable opportunity permitted him at that moment to aim at the capture of
Ihe neatest and very much weaker adversary. And when he occasionally acted
similarly, as at Preussisch-Eylau, at Landshut-Eckmlihl, and at Bautzen, he
merely took advantage of accidental circumstances in a manner which led most
rapidlj to an effective employment of the forces j he was, of cunree, far too much
a realist and loo little a slave of a definite form to let slip clearly tangible successes
for Ihe sake of that form.

CAVALRY STUDIES

But even in the days of Napoleon, some of the most
effective combinations of war were by forces acting on double
or exterior lines against an enemy moving on a single line of
operations. Thus, in 1S13 the converging attack by the
allies on Napoleon at Leipzig ; in the same year VVeiiington
and Graham conduct a similar attack, and with brilliant
success, on Joseph at Vittoria ; whilst in 181 5 Napoleon
himself falls a victim to Wellington and Bliicher, and his
life's work is brought to an end by the use against him of
the very operation he had always so persistently denounced.

And, at the present day, the danger of failure in the pre-
concerted action of widely separated portions of an Army, (
of Armies themselves, is reduced almost to a minimum by the
modern improvements in intercommunication enumerated in
the preceding chapter ; for. however completely the enemy
may have succeeded in placing himself between our Armies,
or portions of an Army, even in such a manner that no trooper
can move direct from one to the other, intercommunication
can be maintained from one to another along a telegraphic
arc of any length far away from any possibility of interference
by him. And therefore, when modern forms of outercom-
munication are available, exterior lines of operation will be
employed, because they facilitate greatly the movements of
large masses; they render combinations easy; they aid supply;
and they place the enemy in a position where its defeat will
be little short of destruction.

As regards the strategical deployment of troops on a given
frontier, it must be arranged so that the Army may oppose
the probable movements of the enemy, and also be able to
carry out its own general idea : which factor should pre-
dominate, it is impossible to say. If the Army is disposed
with reference only to the former, then the initiative is
surrendered to one's opponent : if without regard to it, we
invite surprise. The decision will depend chiefly on the
relative rapidity both of mobilisation and of transport to
the common frontier. But a carefully thought-out plan of
strategical deployment is the primary necessity in every

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 47

general idea for a campaign ; and for the execution of the
plan we must arrange beforehand to be able to concentrate
our troops ready for action, at any place or places, with the
utmost rapidity possible.

In this Study, a certain strategical deployment having been
assumed, the strategical offensive has been adopted, because
it is the " offensive " which alone can bring a war to a speedy
termination ; but this form of strategy is not possible unless
every preparation has been made for it in time of peace by
perfecting the military machinery. As pointed out by the
author of "Representative Government and War," prepara-
tion for war must run concurrently with peace strategy : ** It
is diflficult to differentiate between peace strategy and pre-
paration for war; between the work of the statesman and
the work of the soldier. These two are, in fact, so intimately
connected, that either one must break down if it lacks the
efficient assistance of the other."

CAVALRY STUDIES

on double ^^B
nite
: of
the -

But ^H

Conunencement of the Operatioa.

In accordance with the decision to operate on double ■
lines, the Centre and Left of the Southern Army will unite
and cross the River Jheluin close below the confluence of
this river with the Chenab. The united force, moving up the
right bank of the River jhelum as a first measure, wilt tl
seek the enemy's main Army.

The Right Wing will cross the River Chenab, somewhere,
near Ramnagar. In order to minimise the risk of operating
on two lines, the Right Wing will be at first " refused."
should the Left and Centre fail to bring about an eariy
decision, the First Army Corps must manceuvre against
the enemy in order to distract him and to cause him to
divide his forces.

Silualhn on the Right Wing of tlu Soittlum Anny on
the morning of tlu \Qth February :

(a) A body of hostile cavalry estimated at a strength of
about two brigades holds the right bank of the
Chenab river, from opposite Wazirabad to Kadira-
bad. A force of all arms, estimated at 26,000
strong, is occupying the ridges between Jhelum
and Kharian.
(i) The 1st Cavalry Division has just been detrained at
Chhinan and is directed to hold the line of the
Chenab river from Wazirabad (exclusive) to Vanike
(inclusive), about 15 miles south-west of Ramnagar,
in order to cover the concentration of the First Army
Corps, arriving from the direction of Lahore.

To comply with the directions in (^) the Commander of
the Cavalry Division issues the following orders:
J/ff. I.— Operation Orders — isi Cavalry Division.
Headquarters, Chhinan Station,

IW* February, 1904 (13 hours).
I. (o) Hostile Cavalr)' (slreoglh eslimaled al iwo Brigades) hold right bank of

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 49

(i) Troops of our First Army Corps to form Right Wing of Southern Aimy
are moving to concenlrale betweeo Ramaagitr and Wazirabad.
Our loth Inbiitry Division is at Waztrabad.

2. The isl Cavalry Division will be disposed to observe the lefl bink of the
Chenab from Waiirabad (exclusive) to Vanike (ioclusive}, with the object of
coveting the concentration of our Right Wing.

3. In the event of the enemy crossing the Chenab in force, the line of the
caiul will be held from neir Ruoneeke lo Futtehpooi as a pivot of maniEuvre ;
In&tttry from Wozirabad will operate as required on railway between this place
and the point east of Kamnagar. where the railway crosses the canal.

4. Brigades wilt be disposed as under ;

(a) First Brigade frooi Waiirabad lo Baraduiee near Ramnagai (both

places exclusive).
(fi) Second Brigade from Baraduree to Vanike.
(c) Third Brigade between Chhiran Station and canal as Reserve.

5. Headquarters will lie at Chhinan Station.
Dictated to Brigade Majors.

In accordance with the strategical situation the Right Wing
was at first held back, awaiting a success on the part of the
Centre and Left. The concentration of the First Army Corps
proceeded slowly, and the ist Cavalry Division retnained on
the left bank of the Chenab river, in touch with the enemy.

However, so early as the 2ist February, the Centre and
Left of the South gained a decisive victory in the neighbour-
hood of Khushab ; the Left pursued the enemy towards
Talagang and Chakwal in the direction of the Northern
capital, Rawal Pindi, and the Centre marched towards
Jalalpoor.

The Right was therefore ordered to cross the frontier at
once, in order to effect a junction with the Centre. It is
the intention of Southern Commander-in-Chief to employ
the First and Second Army Corps in crushing in detail that
portion of the Northern Forces which is believed to be still
holding the country to the south and south-east of Jhelum.

Directly information was received of the victory gained
by the Left and Centre, the First Army Corps made pre-
parations to cross the River Chenab, and the ist Cavalry
Division received certain definite orders, viz. :

(l) To cover the advance of the First Army Corps towards
Khewa.

CAVALRY STUDIES

(2) To open communication with the Centre Column,

which is due at Find Dadan Khan on the evening
of the 24th February.

(3) To reconnoitre the Jhelum river from Rasul to Malak-

wal with a view to finding the best crossing- pi ace

for the First Army Corps.
In addition to the above specific instructions, it has oneV
other duty for which no instructions are necessary, viz.'^
having once obtained contact with the enemy, never to lose
it, and to defeat the main body of the enemy's cavalry,
should the latter come within striking distance.

Previous to the advance of the Southern Left and Centre,
the 1st Cavalry Division was holding the line of the River
Chenab from Wazirabad (exclusive) to Vanike, with the
object of covering the concentration and strategic deploy-
ment of the Right Wing, The first condition of success for
a strategic deployment as well as for a concentration is seatrity,
and when two frontiers touch one another this is best obtained
by the employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions. In
the case of one Cavalry Division covering the front of two
or more Army Corps, its disposal would rest in the hands
of the Army Commander, and it would usually be sent
forward early into the enemy's country; but when the Cavalry
Division is with one Army Corps only, it would then ordi-
narily come under the orders of the Army Corps Commander,
as in the present instance. When the Second Army Corps
(Centre) and First Army Corps (Right) succeed in effecting
a junction, then it will probably be found advisable to bring
the Cavalry Division under the Commander of the united ,
Corps ; otherwise, as experience shows, the Cavalry Division I
will be employed in the particular interest of the First Army I
Corps, rather than in that of the whole force.

The following extracts from Bonnal's "Manceuvresde Jei
dealing with the dispositions of a Cavalry Division covering J
the concentration of an Army, are of interest :

During Ihe period ihat Napoleon »
cainpai^Q agaiiiBt Piussia (Jena) he ^

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 51

' FnlnVcit-Wald by Ihc tsl Corps and two exiia BriguJes of Light Cavaliy under
Lasalle and Milhaud.

Oa (be 3rd Oclober Napoleon ordered the Major-General (Berthier) to write
the following letter to Murit :

"The Rmpetoi orders your Highness to impress on Generals Lasalle and
Milhaud to ketp Ihiir Brigades ceHcenlrated, with picquets on the communicalions
to Cohurg. I am oidering Marshal Bemadotte (1st Corps) to scout the Leipiig
roul with his Light Cavalry.

"Generals Lssalle and Milhaud should send their tepods of all thai passes
on the frontier daily in duplicate to Marshal Benuidoltc. They viill tin their
iorsts as Utile as possible, and '.aill kiep Ikem ready la start."

Il seems thai the emperor in dictating this teller had foreseen the dissemination
of the Light Cavalry Brigades in the mountains around Kronach, und that he
wanted to counteract the tendency common to ordinary minds, which consists in
putting an equal importance on every dangerous direction, seeking security rather
in the strict guard of all the avenues by which ihe enemy can come, than in the
employment of active forces coming to the support of the point threatened or

We will see if Napoleon was mistaken.

After having reviewed, on the 4lh October, the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Divisions,
Prince Mural went on the 5th 10 Kronach, to inspect the Brigades of Lasalle and
Milhaud.

At midnight on the Jth October, hiving again returned to Batnberg, he wrote
Ihe emperor, beginning thus :

" I have just returned from Kronach.

"One has been obliged lo scatter the Light Cavalry of Generals Lasalle and
Milhaud in so many djiferent places that, in spite of the order t
having been given yesterday evening, ihia will not be possible until si
during the day to-morrow.

" I have therefore been obliged to come back without seeing them."

The phrase, " One has liien obliged lo nailer," etc., is very cleverly turned so
as lo avoid responsibility ; but is not the avowal significant ?

And now to return to the operation. The Commander
of the Cavalry Division has received certain specific directions,
with which he has to comply. He has, of course, already
been thinking out and preparing for the various lines of
action that may fall to his Division ; and these thoughts,
ideas, and conclusions, if put into orderly form and reduced
to writing, would appear as what is known as an " Apprecia-
tion " ; they would eventually run somewhat as follows:

I. From information received from various sources, the
enemy was, at the opening of the campaign, concentrated
in three principal groups, viz. at (i) Jhelum and Kharian,
(2) Find Dadan Khan, and (3) Khushab, aggregating

52 CAVALRY STUDIES

approximately 100,000, but the strength of each individual
group is as yet unknown — any one of them may number
anything from 25,000 to 40,000.

We know that the Northern Commander concentrated all
available forces to oppose our Left and Centre, and has left
a mixed force to contain the First Army Corps. The relative
strength of these bodies we do not know, but it is almost safe
to assume that he faced our advance from the south-west
with, at least, two groups, and possibly with a large portion
of group I also, if he had time to get it up. To be on the
safe side, however, we must work on the supposition that the
whole of group 1, say, 40,000 men, is in front of us.

The Southern Cavalry Division is stronger than a Northern
Cavalry Division by about 500 sabres and 6 guns. Con-
sidering the total number of hostile troops in the theatre of
war, their distribution, and the fact that most of the troops
have been concentrated towards the west, it is not probable
that the enemy is opposing us with more than two Divisions
of Cavalry, and probably not as much ; but we must be
prepared to meet this amount.

2. The mhsioH of the Cavalry Division is clear — («) to
conceal the advance of the First Army Corps, {b) to open com-
munication with the Second Army Corps and (f) to reconnoitre
a portion of the Jhelum and to find a suitable passage across
that river.

But before the Cavalry Division can proceed to the execu-
tion of these three missions, It must cross the River Chenab ; j
and in doing this, will have to reckon with the Northern j
Cavalry, either on the Chenab or after the passage.

At present our information regarding the enemy is scanty.
A careful scrutiny, however, of the configuration of this part
of the area of operations will give a clue to the enemy's
probable line of action. Kharian is by nature a strong
position ; we know that the enemy is holding it ; also that
his Cavalry faces us on the Chenab, and shows enterprise
in scouting across our frontier. From the Chenab as far
north as the Kharian-Rasul position, the country is flat and

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 53

without any marked features. If the front of the Northern
Cavalry on the Chenab is pierced, it seems likely that the
hostile Army will operate from the direction of Kharian,
using that position as a pivot of manceuvre.

The first objectives of the Division must therefore be —

(«) To probe the enemy's front along the Chenab so as to
discover the most suitable places for crossing the river.

(J>) To force the passage.

The right flank of the Cavalry Division will be protected
to a certain extent by the 10th Infantry Division, and it will
be necessary to get into communication with the General
Officer Commanding this Division and to ascertain his exact
intentions.

The most effective way to conceal the advance of the First Artny
Corps is to defeat t/ie hostile Cavalry, drive it back into the
Kharian position, and blockade it therein, or beyond the
Jhelum. This method of action also seems necessary before
carrying out the other tasks of the Cavalry Division.

Having crossed the Chenab, and before the Division can
march to strike the hostile Cavalry, time must elapse while
the positions of the latter are being located. During this
period the First Army Corps will be crossing the Chenab, and
the Division must be disposed to protect it. For this purpose
it will have to occupy a line sufficiently long to give space for
the assembly of the Army Corps on the right bank, and this
line must be far enough advanced to ensure that the passage
is not molested by any guns which the enemy may be able to
bring into action. It is improbable that he will have to
hand anything more powerful than field pieces.

The heavy battery of the First Army Corps will doubtless be
able to assist, if necessary, by its fire from the left bank.

This is a good instance of the necessity for an organisation
providing for " Protective Cavalry " in addition to the Strategic
Cavalry (Cavalry Division). A proportion of the former with

CAVALRY STUDIES

the rst Army Corps would have freed the Cavalry Division
from the duty of covering the Army Corps, and would have
enabled it to at once seek out the hostile Cavalry masses.

The Cavalry Division will, then, best carry out its mission
in the following manner :

(i) By crossing the Chenab and taking up a suitable

covering position :
(2} Sending out reconnaissances to discover the enemy's
main Cavalry forces, and then marching to defeat
them :

(3) If the enemy scatters his mounted troops, advance

in the genera! direction of the enemy's position
on the Kharian Ridge, driving back the enemy's
detachments wherever met :

(4) Special reconnaissances towards Find Dadan Khan, and

of the River Jhelum between Rasul and Malakwal :
and, incidentally,

(5) Arrangements for the rapid transmission of informa-

tion to the First Army Corps Commander, and for
communication with the General Officer Command-
ing loth Infantry Division.

FIRST DAY.

Monday, 22nd February.

The concentration of the Cavalry Division preparatory
to the passage of the Chenab River : crossing by the
Cavalry Division : disposition after crossing.

Situation on right iviiig of the Southern Army at daybreak,
22nd February :

(a) Bodies of hostile Cavalry, each 200 to 300 strong,
occupy Phalia, Helan, Mughowala, and Kunjah,,
with patrols along the River Chenab. Estimated
strength of enemy on the front Kadirabad-Gujrat
is 30 to 24 squadrons and iS guns.

I
I

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

((5) 1st Cavalry Division disposed as detailed in Operation
Order No. i (p. 48).

(r) Heads of First Army Corps reaching Akalgarh and
Chhinan : the loth Infantry Division marching
from Wazirabad towards Runneeke.

The arrival of the heads of the First Army Corps at Akalgarh
releases the 1st Cavalry Division from its covering duties on
the left bank of the Chenab : active and offensive action on
the right bank is now required. The following reconnaissance
report on the river, viewed from the left bank only, gives an
idea of the country :

Vtrial orders from Gineral Ogkir Commatidittg : " In confonnity with general
scheme of observalion of lefl bank of Chenitb, to reconnoilre Ihe livei from
Baiaduree lo Chunnee Jwaluh."

General nalure of country nn left bank open, flat, sanely wooded, few
villages : soil sandy and very heavy.

Ramnagar— walled village, targe, offering good cover from view and excellent
peinl d'affai, opposite catt ford to Sahanpal (South). Mounted troops can
move anywhere across country to river bank, crossing nullah A. A. A. west
of M on sketch at all points. (A': 5.— Sketch not reproduced.)

Stream — South portion ij to 1} feet deep, sandy boLlom, no quicksands where
the tracks lead through water. Plenty willing guides available. Cavalry should
cross in sections or iiles. Boats are reported north side of Sahanpal (South) :
not in use now : only in rains. Actual bed of river heavy sand, difficult but
passable for guns.

Right bank reported higher than left and seemed to be marked by line of trees
— I lo 3^ miles off from present bonk. No Artillery positions of any commanding
elevation on left bank, but doubtful if enemy could successfully oppose our troops
anywhere as far as seizure of " Bel.i " island is concerned. His shell fire would
be innocuous, ground being sandy : sandy bed is undulating and would give
coTer to parties crossing.

O. B. S. F. S., Ma/or,

Commanding ^i Hussars.

The main principles to bear in mind in crossing a river are:
First — threaten enemy at various points, to make him
uncertain of real point of crossing ; Secondly — concentrate
unobserved ; Thiriliy^—gGt foothold on far bank, and cross
to it as quickly as possible ; Fourthly — close co-operation
of guns and Cavalry essential.

It was decided to cross the division between the two

CAVALRY STUDIES

Sahanpals, and in order to mislead the enemy to detachl
one brigade to threaten down-stream, whilst the loth J
Infantry Division from Wazirabad demonstrated up-stream
from near Runneeke ; the remainder of the Cavalry Division
concentrates quietly and unobserved near, but not too near,
the selected point. The following preparatory order is
therefore issued first : i

No. 3,— Operation Order

1 Cavalry EHvUion.

IIbadquartbhs, Chhinan Station,

und February, 1904 (6 Anuri).

I. (a) Spies report Phalia, Helan, Mugbowaia, and Kunjah each occupied by

about 20O to 300 hostile Cavaliy. Enemy's patrol.'^ are active on

river line. His estimated strenglb on line Kadirabad-Gujrat is

20 to Z4 squadrons and iS guns.

(4) General Officer Commanding Soulhem I.eft Wing reports decisive

victory near Khushab yesterday, list instant,
(f) Our lolb Infantry Division concentrates near Runneeke at S hours
lo-day and advances 10 threaten Sunlpoor.
3. The Cavalry Division will concenlrale near Kamnagar preparatory 10
fordng the passage of the Cbenab this alterooon.

3. (a) The General Officer Commanding 3rd Brigade will detail a Regiment

to occupy by noon a position near Baraduree, in reaj' of which Ibe znd

Une Transport and all vehicles of the Division not required with

fighting line will park.

The Officer Commanding this Regiment, and OSicers in charge of Brigade

Transport to report lo Deputy Assistant Qu at term osier- General at Baraduree at

1 1 hoars for orders.

(i) The 3rd Brigade (less one regiment and 2nd line Transport) will march
so as lo reach the vicinity of Chunnee Jwaluh by II noon. The
Brigadier will Iben operate towards Moorecd so as 10 make the
enemy expect a crossing at that point-
er) I6t and 3Qd Brigades (less Jnd Line Transport) will concentrate near
Lahore- Wazirabad cross-roads near Ramnagar in readiness to march
at 15 hours, and covered by detachments from 3nd Brigade. Horses
to be watered.

4. Reports to Baradnree after 9 hours.
Telegraphed to Brigade Headquarters.

The reason for the order to water the horses beforehand
will be obvious. If the crossing has to be made under fire,
the first consideration will be to get quickly to the other side :
and nothing could be more undesirable than to halt to water.

By 14 hours, the effect of the preparatory order is apparent ;

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) $7

the enemy has divided his force to oppose the threatened
points, which are respectively 12 and 6 miles from the real
crossing, and iS miles from each other; and the Cavalry
Division can now advance with the certainty of being in
greatly superior strength to whatever portion of the enemy
may still be observing Sahanpal.

About 3,000 yards from the left bank is an island (the
" Bela"), which extends for a considerable distance above
and below Sahanpal (South), which lies on it : to reach it,
heavy undulating sand-waves and one narrow shallow ford
have to be crossed. Covered by the guns, if necessary, this
island will first be rushed, the tactics employed to do so
depending upon the strength and dispositions of the enemy.
After making this point it may be necessary to bring on
some of the guns before making the next forward spring,
though double-horsing would probably be necessary to get
these through the sand. The following orders are now
issued :

No, 3.— Operation OrderB.— uf Cai-alry Division.

IlBADtjUARTBKS, BARAIiURBE,

22«rf Fehruaiy, 1904 (14^ houn).
1. (<i) General Officer Commaniling, lolh Infantry Divi&ian, reports by wire at
14 houri that enemy has concentrated between 10 and 13 squadrons,
with two batteries near Sunlpoor.
ii) About 5 or 6 squadrons with guns are opposing the 3rd Brigade near

Mooreed.
(j-) Heads of ist Army Corps are near Akalgarh and Chhinan.
a. The Division will cross the Chenab near the two Sahanpali and then
operate so as to cover the crossing of lie First Army Corps.

3. (d) The isl Brigade will then advance on Sahanpal (North) andBoorj without

delay, detailing a troop to observe towards Khosut.
(^} The 2nd Brigade will support by operating towards Manga so as to

prevent (he enemy from Mooreed enfilading the Ist Brigade.
(<) The 3rd Brigade has been diverted on Raninagar, and will, for the

present, be in reserve.

4. Reports to first terry north of Ramnagar.

Verbally to Brigadien lt,l and 2nd Brigades i by cable to 3rd Brigade.

By 17 hours the Division had reached Boorj, the enemy
retiring north-north-west and north, pursued by contact

58 CAVALRY STUDIES

squadrons. The dispositions for the night are shown in
the following order :

No. 4. — Operation Orders. — isl Cavahy Dix'ishn.

Hbadquartkrs, Sahan'pal (North),

■and February, 1904 (17 kauri}.
1. (a) Paris of (wo Brigades of enemy opposed our passage of the rivet here
lo-day, and seem to have retired on Phalli and Helan, respectively,

(h) Our advanced patrols are in touch with the enemy on line Chak Mfmo,
Phiree, Dhul. Kadirabad Ie cleat.

(<■) Enemy (strength 1 squadron) marched east from Sadoollnhpoot at
9 hours iQ.day, and our tioops (I tioop from ist Brigade) now hold
that point. ^^

3. Brigades will halt to-night as follows, arranging for theit own security : ^H

(a) isl Brigade near Sanehwaluh. H

(b) 2nd Dhuboola. ^^
(■■) 3rti „ at Sahanpal (North) covering passage of transport. ^

3. Contact squadrons will be sent out as follows :
(a) By isl Brigade towards Helan ;

(i) By 2nd Brigade towards Fhalia ; for the purpose of keeping touch and
discovering enemy's strength at those places.

4. Hefldijuaiters at Sahanpal (North).

Sufficient information was not forthcoming by nightfall to
enable the Divisional Commander to decide then what would
be his plans for the next morning. Brigades were, therefore,
merely warned to be ready to march at a certain hour.

No. 5.— Oper

I. (a) Prisoners confirn

three Brigades (two Dragoon, 1
{*) First Army Corps will eommenc

Cavalry Dhiisisn. ^H

HEAIKjtIAKTEItS, SAHANPAL, ^^k

ii.nd February, 1904 <2o houri).
lemy held line Cujrat-Kadtrabad with
>ne mixed),
e crossing from Ramnagat at 6 hours

3. Brigades will be ready to march at 6 hours to. morrow.

During the night, up to 5 hours, the following information
arrives from different points :

I. From Contact Squadron — Phalia :

"About 6 squadrons enemy with battery marclied north-
north-east at 3 hours."

squa
the

I. (

(

2. B

3. C

4. H

Sui
enabl
be hi*
merel

I. (fl

2. Br

Dui

arrive

I. I

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 59

2. From Contact Squadron — Helan:

Force of Cossacks and Dragoons with guns still at
Helan at 3 hours. Estimated at 300 to 400 men."

3, From Contact Troop, which marched from Sadoolluhpoor
I to Mughowala, on hearing from Southern troops at Suntpoor
I that enemy had fallen back northwards at sunset :

■' At midnight Mughowala clear of enemy. Latter retired
north-west about 3i hours."

SECOND DAY.
Tuesday^ 2T,rd February.

1. Reconnaissance of and advance to meet hostile Cavalry
■ in open country. Cavalry mounted action. Pursuit.

2. Occupying the line of outposts, covered by obstacles,
ftctc, to contain enemy.

Orders are issued as follows ;

No. 6.— Operation Orders.— ii/ Cavalry Division.

. Keports received from our reconnoitring detachments during the night show
t the enemy baa fallen back N.-E. from Philia : Helan is still held, and ■
racentration of the enemy's detachments seems to be talcing place at some point
>Rh of Helan.

t. The Division will advance vi3 Helan on Dinga ready to engage the enemy.
I 3. (a) The 1st Brigade (less and Line Transport) will march at 6 hours (o
occupy Helan. The Brigadiei will push [econnaissances luwards
Dinga and ascertain where the enemy's column, which passed through
Mughowala at 31 hours last night, has gone to. Patrols will be sent
out towards Sohawuh to lind out whether there are any hostile troops
in that district.
(&) The ind Brigade (less and Line Transport) will march at 6 hours and

follow ihc isl Brigade as far as Chak Mano.
(/) The 3rd Brigade (with all laA Line Transport) will march \ik Jonake,
starting at 6} haurs, and holt at Chak Mano.
) 4. Reports after ^ liours to be sent to Chali Mano and thence along the rond
fewirds Helan and Dings.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Sketch 2.)^^H
iz reached^^^l

Situation about 8.30 Iwurs, i^rd instant. (See Sketch

{a) Divisional headquarters and ist Brigade hi

Helan. Reports indicate a large concentration of

enemy's Cavalry taking place 6 or 7 miles to the front.

{J>) Heads of First Army Corps are commencing to cross

the Chenab river.
The question now arises, how shall the Cavalry Division act ?
First, what is the general situation ? It is now known
that the strength of the enemy's Cavalry, holding the line of
the Chenab until yesterday, was three Brigades^ — i.e. approxi-
mately 5,500 sabres with 12 to 24 guns. He may or may
not have been reinforced since. It seems probable that the
whole of this force is now concentrating about 6 miles north
of Helan and only about 14 miles from the point where our
First Army Corps is in the awkward situation of crossing a
river — a difficult obstacle in this case, rather on account of
the broad expanse of sand than the depth of water. In rear
of the enemy's Cavalry there is said to be a force of all arms
numbering about 26,000, which had reached the ridges between
Jhelum and Kharian at least twelve days ago, and of whose
present position practically nothing is known. Between the
First Army Corps and the enemy's Cavalry is our ist Cavalry
Division, in strength about equal to the latter, and acting
as " independent Cavalry." Now what are the duties of the
independent Cavalry ?

1. To reconnoitre and leport on ihe country and on routes of advance. ■

2. To oppose and dejeat ihe enemy's korsemtn and to cover Ihe Army so as tO'J

prevent the enemy gaining iiifartnation regarding its movements.

3. To ascertain and report the strength, numbers, ntid disposition of tlie hostile

tbrces, interrupt their movements, and undertake entetprisei against tfaeir

Again :

An enemy awaiting attack in a defensive position may have pushed to the
front his Cavalry and Horse Artillery, possibly .supported by mounted Infantry, in
order to force his adversary to an early deployment, to delay his march, and to gain
information. Against these troops the iodepencient Cavalry will art iiiillt vigour,
endeavouring to drive Ihem back behind the outposts which cover the enemy's
main body, and to moke prisoners. (" C. T." I9d5, chap. vi. sect, iii, para. 5.)

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

With these principles in view there can be no question as
to how the 1st Cavalry Division should act. Its commander
at once decides to engage the enemy's Cavalry. Until the
latter are defeated it will be impossible for him to attempt to
carry out any of the duties enumerated above ; moreover, the
forces being about equal, " he stands a reasonable chance of
gaining his object." — "C. T.," chap. vi. sec. 109 (2).

The Divisional Commander having decided to attack, his
6rst thought will be to concentrate eveiy possible man under
Jiis own hand in order to give himself the best possible chance
of being superior in numbers when striking the tactical
blow — the ultimate aim of all strategy and tactics. In
order to have the whole strength of the Division concentrated
under its own leader, directed by one master mind and with
one common object, all detachments should, then, be recalled
so soon as the fight Is imminent. In practice, it is usually
dif^cult actually to recall detachments ; it is, therefore, the
duty of every Detachment Commander to watch the course of
events, and to rejoin 0/ his own accord so soon as his special
task is finished, and the decisive collision is about to take
place — a duty, however, involving insight which will only be
gained by proper training in peace. Next, having concen-
trated, the Divisional Commander advances, and as the
situation develops he must form his plan. If half the victory
depends on determination, the other half depends upon the
leader adopting a sound tactical plan.

Now, the only fads which the reconnoitring patrols can
report with certainty are the approximate number of the
hostile squadrons and batteries, and the nature of the inter-
vening ground.

The General Officer Commanding has thus to form a plan
based on these three elements — viz. the enemy's squadrons,
his artillery, and the ground.

The ground is the mould into which the plan of attack
must make the troops fit. The report of the Prussian
Cavalry of 1841 (see Kachlcr) makes this quite clear. " It
is impossible to lay down precise rules for the formation,

CAVALRY STUDIES

deployment, and attack of Cavalry. The physical and moral
strength of the enemy and the configuration of the ground
will always determine in a different manner how a mass of
Cavalry should be handled."

When the moment of combat approaches,
with large bodies becomes impossible and, if adopted, must]
mean defeat in detail. Coin bal patrols ^\io\AA be used to show
the exact positions of the enemy, ground scouts to prevent
squadrons being entrapped in bad ground. Sometimes, as
possibly to-day, reconnaissances sent forward must proceed
with the greatest caution so as not to disturb the enemy and
rouse him to activity. The^e reconnoitring detachments may
consist of an officer, accompanied by a few intelligent despatch
riders to bring back information gained ; but, as the distance
between the opposing Cavalries becomes less, officers in pairs
may be usefully employed, so that one may return with a
verbal report which time does not admit of being put in
writing.

The country must be reconnoitred sufficiently far ahead
and in ample time to enable the main body of the force to be
directed in accordance with the results of such reconnaissances,
and to prevent brigades being launched to the attack over
impassable ground. Ground scouts are of no use for such
purposes, as they are too close to their respective squadrons
and are only really useful after the plan of manceuvre has
been decided upon.

One, or more, specially trained officers should be entrusted
with this duty ; it cannot be entrusted to combat patrols.
They already have a sufficiently difficult task to discharge.

Officers with special topographical aptitude should be
chosen from the Brigade or Divisional Staff, and they should
carry out this work as far to the front as possible.

Possibly the most convenient form for their report is a
rough enlargement of the map, executed before setting out, on
which obstacles, or favourable ground, can be quickly entered.
But nothing elaborate should be attempted ; only the points
essential for the General Officer Commanding to know should

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

be indicated. Sometimes one or more squadrons sent to the
front or flanks will ensure a more or less protected zone by
driving back hostile patrols and will thus facilitate the work
of the patrols under consideration. Squadrons must some-
times aiso be employed in this way to conceal the march,
circumscribing the ground, as it were, by occupying some
point or points of tactical importance. In order not to be lost
to the division they must, however, rejoin the moment their
task has been accomplished, or in any case must always join
in the fight by rallying on some neighbouring corps.

Should the enemy appear, contrary to expectation, on the
flanks, it is essential that the Commander should have the
necessary time in which to alter his dispositions. One or two
small patrols should therefore move about lA to 2 miles on
each flank in order to guard against surprise.

Combat patrols have consequently two distinct charac-
teristics according to their duties, offensive or defensive ; —

(a) Patrols sent in the direction in which one expects to
find the enemy.

(/i) Patrols sent to guard against surprises where one does
not e.xpect to find the enemy.

/« forming the plan the main points to bear in mind are :

(1) The advance must be concealed, by moving from shelter

to shelter as concentrated as is compatible with power
of rapid deployment:

(2) The actual attack must be in the nature of a surprise ;

(3) Rapidity is essential :

(4) The whole force must be simultaneously hurled at the

objective (either in a parallel or converging direction)
with one common object — i.e. a display of irresistible
superiority, at threat of which the enemy will
probably decline contact.

In carrying it out :

(l) Try and foresee the point at which collision will take
place. The nature of the ground will possibly
admit of small fronts only.

64 CAVALRY STUDIES

It is sometimes advisable to deploy at a halt, concealed
by ground.

(2) Select a pivot for one flank according to the ground ;

the enemy can then only threaten the other.

(3) Deceive the enemy as to intentions by —
Intelligent use of artillery:
Misleading action of advance guard or independent

squadrons across his front r
Rapid unexpected formation to a flank, in direction of

the enemy :

Not permitting words of command or noise, but using

instead the"follow-my-leader" system. Therefore be

able to deploy by signal ; always take the shortest

route; change the direction of heads rather than wheel.

Bearing in mind these principles, the Divisional Commander

commenced to approach the enemy with his Division disposed

as follows :

(a) As soon as the enemy was reported to be within
striking distance — i.e. at about 8^ hours — the Division was
ordered to march concentrated ready to deploy for attack.

(d) The bulk of the contact squadrons rejoined their
Brigades, leaving combat patrols to continue to gain infor-
mation and to point out the exact position of the enemy.
Reconnaissances with larger units were now impossible, for
they would risk defeat in detail.

(e) The system of protection at this time consisted of
combat patrols and an advance guard (of one squadron)
moving along the road to Dinga in support of the patrols in
its front.

(d) The Divisional Commander, with Brigadiers and
Officer Commanding K.H.A.. rode near the advance guard,
advancing from cover to cover, the Division following the
latter at a steady trot and conforming to its movement.s,

(e) Specially trained officers were sent out in front to
report on the ground tactically. Ground scouts do not move
sufliciently far out for this, nor have they the necessary
tactical knowledge.

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

The Division on its march thus presented the form of a
head (the advance guard), a body ("the ist Brigade), and
two wings (the 2nd and 3rd Brigades). Each Brigade in
mass, with intervals only for air and elasticity. (See Sketch
No. 2.)

The Artillery grouped now under Officer Commanding
R-H.A, marched on the road until the advance guard was
checked ; it then deployed.

1st Line Transport grouped 2 or 3 miles in rear of the
Division, moving fiom shelter to shelter,

2nd Line Transport parked in safety at Chak Mano, about
12 miles from the eventual battlefield ; if allowed to follow
at the heels of the Division it would certainly interfere with
the latter's freedom of manoeuvre when in such close contact
with the enemy.

Situation about lO hours.

1, 1st Cavalry Division (less 2 squadrons and section
R.H.A. with 2nd Line Transport at Chak Mano) moving in
concentrated formation near and to south of Rusoolpoor.

2. Advance guard (1 squadron) checked south of Sandan-
walah by enemy in superior numbers holding that locality,

Lushkuree also held by enemy. Mass of Cavalry near
Chuk Shekoo, and a still larger body, probably 14 or 15
squadrons, halted and dismounted near Siveeuh,

About two miles now separate the opponents. With
the exception of the villages, which mostly are on raised
sites, the country is flat, with trees and scrub impeding the
view, so that even at from 1,500 yards to a mile distance,
it will be impossible actually to see what the enemy's dis-
positions are. However, our final dispositions, based upon
the reports of the reconnoitring officers, must be decided
upon at about this distance.

The only sound plan Is to make use of suitable ground as
A pxvot ox point (Tappiii (or one f^a.n\i. Then it becomes clear
which flank the enemy can threaten. It is the nature of the

ition of^l^^H
ding havin^^^l

66 CAVALRY STUDIES

ground which will determine the actual disposition i
Brigades.

The Combat. — The General Officer Commanding having"!
brought forward his Brigades must combine their attacks,
in accordance with a general plan, upon some common
objective, which should be struck as nearly simultaneously as
possible by the whole.

It is the duty of each subordinate, once this objective has
been clearly indicated, to lead his command into the fight
in the formation most advantageous as regards both the
ground and the special military situation.

The encounter should not be broken up into a series of
successive episodes, but should be the simultaneous action
of all the Brigades (except the Reserve) with one common
object, either in parallel or converging directions, each unit
fighting on its own account but always keeping in mind the
common object in its individual action.

Nor should the combat resolve itself into a mdie which can
bring about no decisive result. It should, on the contrary,
come about with the violence of a released spring, with the
force of moral ascendency, at the threat of which the enemy
saves himself by flight. This known physiological fact,
namely, that the physical shock hardly ever takes place,
should help to determine the conduct of Cavalry. Only
combats unscientifically entered into end in a mcUe.

How should the Arliilery be empbyed? — The Artillery is
the instrument of preparation for the Cavalry attack. The
guns and the Cavalry form one unit ; both arms must co-
operate in attaining one common objective.

The ideal to realise is to fire the longest time possible, not
by beginning soon, but by continuing late. With this intention
it is necessary to give a direction of fire more or less per-
pendicular to that of the attack, and ,in order to ensure sucl
fire, the Artillery must not be glued to the Division oi
Brigade, but must be detached ; or perhaps the latter cai
more ea.siiy seize the opportunity to detach itself. The^
objective of the Artillery is either the hostile Cavalry i

1
t

s
i

r
J

s
r
s
c

t;
g

B
ir.
ol

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

I
I

Artillery, whichever at the moment is producing the tactically
greatest effect. The Artillery must be protected either by
natural obstacles or by the rifles of dismounted men or
machine guns. Inversely, it may sometimes be worth while
to launch a detachment to silence the hostile guns. The
perfect condition would be to render one's own guns in-
accessible, to silence those of the enemy by a charge, and to
be able to direct the whole of one's own fire upon the enemy's,
squadrons until the last moment.

In order, then, not to lose the few precious minutes which^
are available for the Artillery to produce an effect, it must
place itself in a flanking position from which it can fire
accurately and for as long a time as possible.

As a general rule the Artillery should direct its fire upon
the enemy's leading line, but occasions may arise when by
suddenly opening surpri.se fire upon the enemy's guns the
Artillery may, by disabling the hostile batteries, support its
own Cavalry more efl'ectually.

The mo?t unsatisfactory method of using the Artillery is to
keep it until the last moment at the head of the column of
march. Such a disposition induces premature employment
of the guns, and straight to the front, /'.c. in the direction in
Avhich the Division or Brigade must eventually deploy. The
squadrons then paralyse the action of the Artillery by almost
immediately masking its fire,

Necessily for retaining a Reserve. — Once the Division is
deployed, the General Officer Commanding is powerless to
modify his plan, should he find that the enemy is still
manoeuvring. To send out gallopers at such a moment
, would merely cause confusion at a time when success depends
upon determination on the part of subordinates, and good
order and cohesion in the ranks. Hence the importance for
the General Officer Commanding to retain a Reserve to guard
against the unforeseen.

To return to the present situation.

CAVALRY STUDIES

The Fight.

1. Between Rusoolpoor and Sandanwalah the role of the
advance guard changed from one of " protection " to one ol
" manffiuvre " ; its Commander now held Jhanda Choohan

a pivot of manceuvre, disposing three troops dismounted, am
keeping the 4th troop out as patrols in observation. It is
often useful to post the machine guns with the escort to the
guns. They can, by their rapid fire, materially aid the escort
in beating off any sudden attack on the guns.

Opportunities for intervening effectively in the main action
may also present themselves.

2. Under this protection the Divisional Commander was
able to complete his plans, in conjunction with his Officer
Commanding R.H.A. and Brigadiers, thus ensuring one
objective and convergence of attacks.

Concentration should not, however, be allowed to produce
a series of narrow, parallel and successive attacks, which
would interfere with one another, but rather a convergence
of simultaneous efforts, by Brigades, starting from different
points towards a common centre,

3. The Artillery was now detached from the Division and
moved to a position near the advance guard, but with strict
orders not to open fire prematurely. In war, and especially
in advance-guard operations, "silence is often golden."
Compare Colonel Henderson's remarks on the action of
Stuart's Cavalry at the Evelington Heights, 3rd July, 1862 ;
also Weissembourg, Vionville, and Gravelolte, all of which
began with a useless surprise.

As pointed out above, by all means get in as many shells
as possible, but do not fire until the enemy has deployed and
is fully committed to an attack in a certain direction. Fire
which is opened too soon, aiid before the enemy has deployed,
enables him either to refuse combat, or to manoeuvre in such
a way as to avoid, or cause the opponent to mask, the guns
at the really critical moment, i.e. just before the actual
contact.

ial^

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

Much practice is necessary to ensure true co-operation
between the two arms in situations such as this.

4- Using Jhanda Choohan (held by the massed guns and
I squadron) as a pivot of support, the Division obtained the
initiative and manceuvred north-eastwards towards Lushkuree,
thus drawing the enemy across our guns and causing him
to masli his own, which had taken up a position near Shekhoo,
and had already displayed their position by firing prematurely
on our column at a ranye of about 6,000 yards, so soon as
the latter appeared to the east of Rusoolpoor.

The Southern Cavalry Division was entirely successful in
the fight which ensued ; and the enemy's Cavalry broke, and
fled in great confusion northwards, being pursued by the
1st Brigade, whilst the other two Brigades rallied in rear.

As regards pursuit, Warnery has written: "Only a squadron
in disorder can gallop as fast as another in disorder!" So
the squadrons most engaged should pursue at top speed.
There can be no middle course — either pursue at top speed,
or rally at the halt. Squadrons pursuing in this manner,
however, are lost should some fresh hostile squadrons come
upon the scene : a reserve is consequently indispensable
during a pursuit

Situation on evening of i^rd Februaiy, (See Sketch 3.)

r. Enemy's Cavalry was decisively beaten near Sandan-
walah about noon.

3. 1st Brigade, picking up many prisoners, pursued north-
wards past Dinga towards Khoree ; the latter point was
found to be held by Northern Infantry entrenched.

The pursuit was checked by enemy holding line of piquets
from Khoree W. to Khokra, and Rasul, on river Jhelum, and
N.-E. towards Kharian.

Headquarters ist Brigade bivouacs at Noor Jemal.

3, During the afternoon 2nd Brigade was ordered to occupy
Cheeleeanwala and Moong, with the object of driving back
enemy's patrols into the Kharian position, and to push up
into touch with enemy's outposts.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Patrols confirm the report that enemy's right is at Rasul.
The right of 2nd Brigade outposts is opposite Thay, an^
in communication with left of 1st Brigade.

4. 3rd Brigade and Divisional Headquarters at Dinga,

5. 2nd Line Transport reaches Dinga between 18
20 hours and halts.

In view of the new situation, how should the Cavalry Divisi<M\
act? The enemy's Cavalry having been defeated, the*
initiative now lies with our Cavalry Commander, who, how-
ever, must constantly bear in mind the main strategical plan.
Now the intention of the Southern Commander-in-Chief is
to effect a junction between the First and Second Army
Corps with a view to crushing in detail that portion of the
enemy's forces operating near Jhelum ; and in accordance
with this intention the original instructions to the Cavalry
Commander were— (a) to cover the advance of the First Army
Corps towards Khewa ; {b) to open up communication with
the centre column, due to reach Find Dadan Khan on the
24th February ; and (f) to reconnoitre the Jhelum river from
Rasul to Malakwal, with a view to finding the best crossing-
place for the First Army Corps. It was only the appearance
of a large hostile body of Cavalry which temporarily interfered
with the direct execution of these orders. As one of the
results of success, the situation clears at once: and it is now
definitely known that the enemy's force of all arms, of whose
movements so much doubt existed previously, is at present
occupying a position along the Kharian ridge. Conversely
from the enemy's point of view, the situation is suddenly
lost in obscurity. The whole of their system for the collec-
tion of information must have been thrown out of gear,
and it is improbable that anything is definitely known as
to the actual subsequent movements of the First Army
Corps, which, in the morning, was presumably reported to
be crossing the Chenab river from near Ramnagar, The
General Officer Commanding ist Cavalry Division decides,
therefore, to conceal the advance of our Infantry columns by
occupying a line of outposts, covered by obstacles, etc., so as

FIRST STUDY QHELUM) 71

rto seal up the enemy within his own outpost line and to
force him to remain in his defensive position.
The following results will thus be obtained :

(a) The advance of the First Army Corps will be concealed.
{&) Communication with the Second Army Corps can be

opened and maintained without difficulty.
(c) The banks of the Jhelum can be reconnoitred for a

suitable crossing-place.

The following orders are accordingly issued (see sketch 3) :

No. 7.— OperHlion Ordera.— u/ Cavalry Divhwit.

Headquartbrs, Dinga,

i%rd February, 1904 (20 knurs).
, (a) The enemy lost II guns aod mmy killed and wounded in the action
lo-day. The remains o( his Cavalry are now enclosed in the Rasul-
Khsrian position by our outposts.
{b) The leading troops of ihe First Artny Corps are to march to Jonake-
Suleman this afternoon, and at daylight 10-tnonow will march to
Sohawuh. The loth Inbnlry Division has reached Mughowala.

2. The isl Cavalc)- Division will continue to blockade the south-western flank
of Ihe Rasul-Kharian position, and ai the same time will pcepare to cross the
Jbelum.

3. (a) The 3rd Brigade, l<^ether with the 2nd Line Transport, will maich at

midnight to Cheeleeanwala.
(£) The detachment of the md Brigade now at Cheeleeanwala will, as soon
as relieved by ihe jid Brigade, march 10 Moong.
These moves must be completed before daylight.

4. The General Oflicer Commanding znd liiigade wilt have the Jhelum recon-
I noilred from near Rasul to a point opposite Syadpoor, with a view lo the passage
[ of the river by Ihe Cavalry Division and First Army Corps. As many boats

u posrible to be secretly collected, and all necessary arrangements mode for
uossing.

5. Headquarters match al midnigiil to Cheeleeanwala.

Note. — With a view to opening up communication with
the Second Army Corps a special detachment capable of
division into two patrols after crossing the river, consisting
of I officer, 1 N.C.O., 4 men, and 6 horses, carrying mussacks
and rope for making a raft, was sent off from headquarters
at Dinga after dark on 23rd instant with orders to cross the
river Jhelum near Haranpur.

72 CAVALRY STUDIES

THIRD AND FOURTH DAYS.

Wedvesday, 24IA, and Thursday, 2^tli February.

Passage of River Jhelum : Dispositions after Crossing.

(See Sketch 4.)

The situation on the morning of the 24th is most interest-
ing. The leading: troops of the First Army Corps will reach
Sohawuh in the evening, and should be able to reach the
left bank of the Jhelum river and be ready to comi
crossing by midday the following day. The leading troops
of the Second Army Corps are one march west of Haranpur.
But everything depends upon the successful handling of the
Cavalry. If the enemy discover the move towards Khewa,
he may either rccross the Jhelum river and occupy the hills
covering the crossing at Khewa, or he may attack our
Infantry whilst on the line of march, or engaged in crossing
the river ; in both cases threatening their line of communi-
cations. The r61e of the Southern Cavalry Division is then
a double one;

(fl) To deceive the enemy as long as possible into expect-
ing an attack from the direction of Dinga, simul-
taneously concealing the march of our Infantry
towards Khewa ;
(^) To cross the Jhelum river and seize a covering position
on the right bank, so as to insure a safe and rapid
crossing for the Infantry columns in rear.
The Brigadier Commanding the 2nd Brigade has the
whole of the 24th in which to reconnoitre the river and to
make preparations for crossing, but in order to prevent any
delay lo the Infantry columns in rear it is most important
that the hills north of and covering the Khewa-Jalalpoor
crossing should be occupied before the morning of the 2Sth.

It is decided that the 2nd Brigade shall cross during the
night 24th-25th to a point near Syadpoor, and the following
orders are therefore issued 1

' FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 73

No. 8.— Operation Orders — isl Cavalry Division.

llEADi^UARIBRS. CHBELGEANWALA,

24/4 February, I904 (13 jmrsj.
I. (a) Enemy siill holds ihe Raaul-Kharian posllion in Ibicc, aoi] seems to
expect 10 be ullacked iheie.
(A) The leading division of Firil Army Corps, wilh ponloon section Rojal
Engineers, will reach Sohawuh to-night. The loth Inbnlry Division
will reach Dinga.
3. The hlockade of the enemy's position will be mainlaineil by one brigade of
the Cavalry Division, while Ihc rest of the divisinn ci05ses the river Jhelum
lo-nigfal opposite Syadpoor.

3. (ii> The General Officer Commanding iil Brigade, sirenglhened by the

Divisional Cavalry of the 10th Divisioo, will take over all the outposts
nl 17 hours, and at daylight to-morrow will keep up a brisk lire along
the whole line and bombard the enemy's position at some point north
of Khoree ihroughuul the day.
(A) The 2nd Brigade will leave Moong about 19 hours (after dark), taking
all appliances which have been prepared there fat crossing the river,
and proeecil to point chosen opposite Syadpoor.

!r will lie crossed without delay, and the hill north of Jalalpoor
jt be occupied as soon as possible.
Scouts should be sent towards Jhelum and also towards Domeli to
'n what forces the enemy has in those directions.
(0 The 3rd Brigade and all and Line Transport will march from Chee-
leeanwala »l 19 hours to Khewa, where the and Line Transport will
be parked under escort of the nth Hussars (Coips Cavalry) which
will arrive there at nightfall.
The 3rd Brigade will then fullow the and Brigade across the Jhelum,

4. Reports 10 be sent to Moong until dark, then 10 Khewa where a connecting
post and signal station will be established by the and Brigade.

Copies sent by orderly to i5t and 2iid Brigades at 12 hours; verbally to
General Officer Commanding, 3rd Brigade.

Now, the crossing the river has to be considered.

The main stream of the Jhelum varies from 150 to 300
yards in width, utifordable, and flowing about 2 miles an
hour: sandy bottom : banks generally steep and about lO
feet high. The spot selected for the crossing is shown in
sketch 4. The Cavalry Division has no pontoons, but,
according to reports from patrols, the following material
might be collected during the afternoon of the 24th
instant : —

(a) Rafts ("tSlle") of 400-500 sleepers carry a weight of
100 maunds — approximately 35 tons.

'4 CAVALRY STUDIES

(d) "Sarnai" rafts — large goat-skins filled with air lashed 1
under ordinary charpoys or any suitable wooden [
frame, such as tent-poles lashed together,
three men to each charpoy. There were plenty. I
of goats about, and native troops would be expert. I
in skinning them rapidly,

(/) "Ghurrah" rafts — made of empty ghurrahs lashed I
mouth downwards under ordinary country charpoys, •
guided over by two swimmers. Seven to eight I
ghurrahs should support two men.

(d) Kerosene oil tin or "peepe" rafts. Similar to above. I
Seven to eight tins with mouths sealed up should T
carry four to five men.

(/) Buffaloes, herds of which graze regularly on the I
"Bela" or islands amid stream, could be collected
under their native herdsmen. Each buffalo could I
swim with one man on his back, or holding on to i
his tail.

(^) Guides for tracks to fords and ferries available in every I
village ; necessary on account of quicksands.

(A) Swimmers owning their own " sarnais " : always one or I
two experts in each village. One swimmer with |
bundle straw, " charrie," etc., under his chest can
always take one man over on his back.

(A) Supplies of country rope always procurable in a few !
hours from villages, e.g-. from off the wheels of 1
Persian wells.

(/) Country boats can be worked by three men for con-
tinuous work. Five rowers required. Should carry
300 maunds safely : say loo armed men and
saddlery, or i gun, t limber, or 8 horses.

(tn) Lastly doors and lintels from houses, wooden parts c
wells, roofing timbers, rough native tools, countr
carts, etc., could be requisitioned and applied
purposes required.

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

Reports of reconnaissances of the river for
show at a glance-
Points where boats )

ferries Y exist,
fords J

where horses and transport can be swum
across.

No river should be considered as impassable to Cavalry,
and if they cannot find fords or ferries they must swim and
get across somehow. Much assistance can often be derived
from the local riverain population, but too much reliance
should not be placed on native statements. Reconnoitring
officers before reporting should themselves actually test all
likely fords and crossing-places.

Once the crossing-place has been decided on, what are the
duties of the staff? At least three officers will be required
to be specially detailed :

No. I officer to be in charge of the working parties on
the near bank, (a) for collecting materials, (6) impressing
inhabitants, (c) control and direction of the actual work,
(ef) clear marking out of the fords by means of stakes,
brushwood, lines of rushes, etc., or by posting natives in the
water, (e) clear marking out of points of entry to, and egress
from, the water.

No. 2 oflficer on the near bank — to control the approaches
and the order of the units crossing.

No. 3 officer on the far bank — to point out the covering
position to the first party over, to control the despatch of
units as soon as collected, and to prevent confusion and
unnecessary loitering about.

These last two officers should be in constant signalling
communication with each other.

It is desirable to post boats down-stream when available
for the rescue of men and horses in trouble. At night,
arrangements should generally be made for lighting the
crossing- places. These lights should be as few as possible,
and should be arranged so as to be invisible to the enemy.

76 CAVALRY STUDIES

The actual detail of the dispositions decided on, in the case
under consideration, is best shown in the sketch, but the \
following points should be noted :

(i) Since the crossing is to be carried out by moonlight,
the difficulty of giving orders to units at the point of crossing
should be thought of. Units must be kept together, and
Regimental Commanders must be ■ told before the Brigade I
marches from Moong exactly what the task of each one will
be on reaching the point of crossing: and what appliances-
will be provided, and where : boatmen, guides, etc., should
also be told off beforehand, and a careful watch should be
kept over them to prevent them slipping away or getting lost
in the darkness.

(2) The first objective must be to get a covering party of \
dismounted men across to the farther bank. For this a whole
regiment might be told off, the commanding officer with
three squadrons di.smouiited men to embark at once in boats:
the remaining squadron to remain with the whole of the J
horses of the regiment, the latter being linked in charge -I
of one or two men per troop.

Having obtained a foothold on the far bank, a complete
regiment should next be crossed -iS-'itk horses. The first
objective, after gaining a foothold on the right bank, should
be to seize and entrench a position on the Jalalpoor ridge to
cover the point selected for throwing the bridge from Khewa.
For this purpose, as soon as the first mounted squadron
is safely across, it would be sent off as an advance guard, ,
preceded by patrols, to gain the ridge above Jalalpoor. The |
remaining regiment and guns to follow with the Brigadier

Lastly the horses and fourth squadron of the covering^.!
regiment to cross, and also the 1st Line Transport.

The 2nd and 3rd Brigades having safely crossed, the^l
next difficulty is again to concentrate, i.e. to withdraxv thej
1st Brigade towards the point of passage, whilst continuing*
still to show a front towards the Rasul-Kharian position,]
and to " mystify and mislead " the enemy there as lon^
as possible.

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) ^^

The following order is, accordingly, despatched :

To General Officer Comnanding Isl Brigaiic, Noor Jemal.

Hkadquariebs. Svadpook,
Thursday, syi Fehrnary. 1904 (7 Aaun).

1. (a) Our 2n(l Brigade holds hills north of JaUlpoor. The 3rd Brigade is

now crossing.
{ fl) Engineers begin 10 throw bridge across Jhelum near Khewa at dajrlight
and hope to complele work by 14 hours.

2. CoDtinue to hara<s5 enemy until dark, then withdraw to Khewa and cross
river about midnight. The bridge will be reserved for you 10 cross at thai hour.

3- Divisional and Line Transport now at Khewa will follow you 10 Jalalpoor.

4. Report progress of your match 10 Geneial Olhcer Commaading First Army
Coipt, at Khewa, as well as to me at Jalalpoor, where Headquarters, isl Cavalry
Division, are to-day.

Situation at sunset on Thursday, z^th February.

1. 2nd Brigade began crossing near Syadpoor at 22 hours
last night (Wednesday) ; finished at 4 hours (Thursday) to-day.

Opposed by about 250 Cavalry covering a line Jalalpoor-
Haranpur. Enemy fell back north-east and north-west.

Brigade now holds : Pass to Asnot on left ; centre holds
pass on road to Vang ; right holds road to Chackri.

Reinforced at 8 hours by battery of mountain Artillery
which crossed on raft at Khewa.

Hostile patrols met on Boonhar river.

2. 3rd Brigade crossed at Syadpoor, beginning at 4 hours
on 25th ; finished at ro hours, and was joined by another
mountain battery.

Advanced squadrons at Kotera, Headquarters — ^Meriala.
Connects with right of 2nd Brigade and left of 1st.

3. 1st Brigade finding enemy withdrawing from Khoree
about 14 hours, presses him, but Is checked by works in pass
on road to Fooran.

Brigade then concentrates on Moong, ready to cross to-night
(Thursday) with 2nd Line Transport.

4. Divisional Headquarters at Jalalpoor,

J. Leading Division of First Army Corps guarding bridge
about Khewa and Jalalpoor, and still crossing, rear of First
Army Corps at Mangut.

CAVALRY STUDIES

6. Centre of Southern Army — i.e. Second Army Corp^^
approaching Haranpur,

7. General Officer Commanding enemy's troops around 1
Jhelum heard at noon, when on Kharian ridge, of Infantry I
crossing near Jalalpoor.

Southern patrols on right bank of Jhelum are in touch with J
his (enemy's) mounted scouts on Boonhar river.

FIFTH DAY.

Friday, 26th February.

Cavalry operating in Hilly Country to delay
Enemy's Advance.

The vigorous action of the Cavalry Division on Wednesday '
afternoon and that of the ist Brigade yesterday (Thursday)
succeeded in its object, and it was not until noon yesterday
that the General in command of the enemy's forces realised
that his position had been turned, and that he must fall back
at once behind the jhelum. The report from the detachment
of Cavalry watching the line Jalalpoor-Haranpur, who were
driven back by the 2nd Brigade in the early morning yester-
day, must have reached hostile headquarters by about eight /
hours ; but it was only the news of the arrival of the Infantry 1
columns at Khewa, and of the construction of a bridge there,
which finally removed the expectation of any serious attack
being made on the Rasul-Kharian position. A portion of
this hostile Cavalry detachment was reported to have retired
north-west; it is at present not quite clear why t^is direction ^
was taken, but the point must be borne in mind.

The hills to the north of the Jhelum river, although only
from 2,000 to 3,000 feet in height at their highest points, form
a difficult obstacle. The slopes are mostly very steep and
irregular, and the valleys between the hills are broken up.*
by deep and often impassable nullahs. Only three roads lead J

ad ^H

f! C PmV At Xfimming tiortti ami wmlf.
C- Capf Tq bt i*<ztii tiy coir.'nj party

KR- Ifat to teai*.

FIRST STUDY fJHELUM) 79

hrough or round the spur running down between Boonhar
Band Jhelum rivers, viz. :

(fl) Via Asnot to Domeli ;

{d) From Jalalpoor, the main road, via Chackri to Jhelum;
(c) Via Meriala and Darapoor, along the right bank of
the river to jhelum—
I practicable for wheeled Artillery. There is also a difficult
' path via Kookar to Asnot.

By the evening of the 25th instant the Cavalry Division
have occupied these defiles, and received instructions to hold
them until relieved by the Infantry of the First Army Corps
still crossing at Khewa. The latter are not expected to reach
the northern exits of the defiies until the afternoon of the
next day, the 26th instant. On the evening of the 25th
I the following orders are issued :

No. 9.— Operation Orders.— ij/ CtiraJry DivisinH.

Hkacijuartbss, Jalalpoor,

25/4 fei-ruary, 1904 (22 hours).
I. (a) Oar scodIs report large columns of enemy moving from the Kbaiian
ridge ihis afternoon towards floating bridge ni Sangoi. Their Cavalry
is in touch with our outposts near Darapoor and on Chackri -jaloipoor

( 6) Our First Army Corps is still on left hank of Jhelum, except one brigade
covering bridge head. Our Second Army Corps is at Huranpur
to-night.
3. The DiviiioD will be disposed to hold the northern exits of the defiles on
the roads from Jalalpoor to tbe Boonhar river until our Infantry can
come up.

3. (d) The 3nd Brigade will concentrate and be disposed so as to secure the

north exit of the main deiile about three or four miles south-west of

(it) Tbe 3rd Brigade will hold a position near Darapoor and connect with
the 2nd Brigade.

( f ) The General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade will detail one squadron,
to hold the head of the pass on the Jalalpoor- Asnot road, and, with
the remainder of his brigade, will take up a position of readiness neat
the road to Chackri from which he can supp;>rt the three positions ns
required.

4. The 2nd Line Transport remains with 1st Infantry Brigade near Jalojpoor.

5. Signalling communication to be opened by the headqnarteis of brigades with

the station on Mangaldeo point on hill north-west of Jalalpoor.
A connecting pbst is at Dak Bungalow, Jalalpiur.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Situation, Friday, 26th.
{16 /wuis.)

1. Advance of Northern troops checked by the Southerfl

Cavalry Division holding line Darapoor — Jo<
Dhok, but strong columns can be seen moving \XpM
in support from the direction of Sangoi.

2. {a) Leading troops of First Army Corps — just arriving:]

at the positions held by the Cavalry, and taking!
over outposts.
{b) Leading troops of Second Army Corps — reach ]
jaialpoor at sunset.

3. Cavalry Division — halts in the hollows between Noorpoor '
and the main ridge, getting water in the stream
which runs from Vang past north end of main
ridge opposite Find Serika.

By Friday evening the Cavalry Division is badly in need
of rest. Operations have been continuous during the last
five days : two rivers have been crossed, an action fought
followed by a pursuit, and a great deal of country has been
covered both by night and by day in reconnaissance and pro-
tective duties. Moreover, judging from the situation, hard
fighting may certainly be expected to take place the next
day. As early as possible, therefore, on the Friday after-
noon — i.e. as soon as the Infantry have taken over the position
and outposts— the Divisional Commander concentrates his
Brigades in a safe position behind the Infantry outposts, the
latter now in touch with the enemy for the first time. In
selecting this position he is, however, careful to bear in mind
the tactical situation, and to anticipate as far as possible
where the Division will be most favourably situated for
co-operation in the battle expected to commence next
morning.

The question may here be considered. Should Infantry ever
be attached to a Cavalry Division ? This point was raised

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM) 8i

after the war of 1870-71, when a great deal of military
literature was published on the subject, some writers saying
that there ought to be Infantry with the Cavalry, and others
that there ought not. In the year 1889 it was considered
desirable to sum up the discussion, and a long article
appeared in the Militdr-Woclienblalt, in which the writer,
who dealt with the 4th, 5th, and 6th Cavalry Divisions in
the second period of the war, came to the conclusion that
there ought not to be Infantry.except under very exceptional
circumstances; that, if there are Infantry, there must be a
great number of them to be of any use, and then the result
is that mobility diminishes. But he did not go into a later
period of the war after the battle of Le Mans, In January,
after that battle, a large force with the 4th Cavalry Division
went towards Alen^on. The 4th Cavalry Division was on
the exposed flank. They got into close country, and the
Division did not know whether it was likely to be attacked
from the west, the north, or the east. The men were
employed all day long in reconnaissance in this difficult
country. At night they had to put out strong outposts,
and the consequence was they were working by night as
well as by day, with the result that the men, not the horses,
were knocked up. The General sent back for a battalion of
Infantry (the 44th Regiment), and when these came up the
outpost night work of the Cavalry ceased. The Infantry
were employed simply and solely for outpost piquet duty
at night.

Infantry, not Mounted Infantry, be it noted. They were
very short of forage in that country, and wanted only men —
not 600 additional horses also. The Infantry were, on this
occasion, brought up in waggons, four horses to twelve men, or
in carts with two horses to six men. In certain situations,
then, the desirability of attaching an Infantry battalion to the
Cavalry Division should certainly be borne in mind.

82 CAVALRY STUDIES

SIXTH DAY.

Saturday, 27//; February.

Cavalry co-operating in the great Counterstroke :
the Pursuit.

Situation at 1 1 hours.

1. The Northern Commander has taken the offensive I
towards Jalalpoor in the hopes of defeating the First Army ]
Corps before the Second Army Corps can arrive to assist it.

At daylight he succeeded in capturing the line of \
from Naka on his right to Badiala and Darapoor on his left.

His main effort is being made against the Darapoor ridge
supported by guns of position from Rasul.

2. The First Army Corps has been driven back across the
Darapoor nuliah, but still occupies a line from about Joome-ki
Dhok to Kotera.

3. The Second Army Corps is coming up on the left of the
First Army Corps, and the Southern Commander decides to
make a great counterstroke with over half his strength, i>.
with the whole of the Second Army Corps and the Cavalry
Division, pivoting on Joome-ki Dhok as the right. Divisions
in succession move down the Chackri nullah and form 1
their right, so that a line of Infantry and guns is quickly j
formed from Chackri to Joome-ki Dhok.

4. The Cavalry Division is ordered io support the move-
ment on the outer flank from near Haripoor.

At dawn the division was still in its position of readiness J
behind the Noorpoor ridge, and until the moment for the I
genera] assault arrives, it would probably remain there^ J
careful not to scatter in detachments, nor to wear out horses I
with unnecessary galloping. This state of semi-repose does \
not imply a lack of "activity," but is only the necessary 1
preparation for action. A body of Cavalry which rushes J

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

hither and thither without any definite objective, and without
any tactical idea, knocking up against positions strongly
defended, and wearing out its strength to no advantage, is
not "active" in the true tactical sense of the word. Activity
must be effe^/h'e, depending first on the tactical plan, and then
on determination to carry through that plan.

Whilst wailing in the position of readiness, helio or other
communication must be maintained with the General Officer
Commanding the Southern Force. Protection patrols would
be on the look-out, one squadron probably being sent across-
to the far side of the Boonhar river for this purpose:
presumably, reconnaissance of the ground was completed.
yesterday. In addition, three or more specially trained
officers would occupy points of vantage whence carefully to
observe and report on the course of the main fight — a most
important duty, for on their information the Divisional
Commander may often have to act on his own initiative,
seizing an opportunity to co-operate, or support, and without
necessarily waiting for orders.

So soon as the great counterstroke commences, as stated in
the situation above, the ist Cavalry Division moves out
towards Chackri. At this period two points should be borne
in mind — (a) whilst the counterstroke develops, care must be
taken to prevent the hostile Cavalry from attacking our troops
on the exposed left flank or in rear : from the nature of the
situation the enemy's Cavalry arc more likely to be operating
on their own right, t.e. against our left, than elsewhere, and
this danger must be foreseen and guarded against ; (6)
as many squadrons as the ground can accommodate, and no
more, should be detailed to co-operate with the Infantry
in the stroke itself: the remainder acting as reserve or flank
guard : excess in the attacking line will merely cause
crowding and disorder.

Accordingly, the 3rd Brigade is detailed to push on to the
attack in close co-operation ivith the left of the Infantry.

But close co-operation docs not imply the adoption of
Infantry tactics, e^. a line of dismounted skirmishers pro-

84 CAVALRY STUDIES

longing the Infantry firing line and crawling with it from 1
cover to cover. The direction of the advance is from west to |
east, i.e. at right angles to a series of knolls and spurs running
south and north down from the main ridge to the Boonhar
river. The general disposition of the Brigade is, then, in
several lines behind the series of folds in the ground.
Mounted and dismounted action are combined: sometimes,
a few men may advance on foot to gain a point ; at other
times, detachments will be able to gallop forward and to seize
successive positions, holding them until the Infantry can get
forward in relief. The other two Brigades, stealing from
cover to cover, are on the left rear of the 3rd, and as far as
possible concealed, but ready to deal with the enemy's Cavalry
should they appear, and also to lake part in a final attack so
soon as the Infantry counterstroke shall have produced its
effect.

As to formation and pace, the Division started in mass,
but mass is only suitable as a formation of assembly, or of
approach outside the zone of fire. Over 1,500 yards range,
squadron column, or open column of squadrons can be used,
preferably in echelon. Under 1,500 yards, single rank should
be employed, squadrons being extended to the extent com-
patible with the maintenance of effective command. To
cross ground swept by fire, Cavalry must spread out and
the pace must then be the fastest possible ; but the horses
must be spared by halting in folds of the ground whenever
opportunity offers. ■

Situation at midday, Saturday.

The Cavalry after supporting the movement on the outer
flank from llaripoor complete the victory by charging
towards Bijwala and Naki.

The enemy retreat towards Sangoi.

The Cavalry Division operates by brigades in succession
on the enemy's western flank to interrupt his retreat.

Infantry press the enemy directly in rear.

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

mprises three acts — the approach,
list be governed by the following

The Cavalry attack itself cc
the chaise, the rally : these n
principles :

The attack by Cavalry is, in its effect, more moral than
bloody ; and this moral effect depends largely on surprise.
" Surprise transfixes troops to the ground, and turns the most
modern of rifles into harmless pitchforks."

Now facility of surprise depends on the state of demora-
lisation into which troops may have been thrown by fire of all
kinds. Infantry which has been many hours under severe
shell fire is ripe for .surprise, and it is not necessary for Cavalry
to start so very close to the enemy in order to achieve success.
On the other hand, a body of Infantry, which is unshaken,
must actually be surprised in the narrowest sense, for the
moral effect of a surprise on troops which have not been
demoralised by a preliminary bombardment is very fleeting,
and it is then of vital importance that the attacking Cavalry
should reach the Infantry before the psychological moment has
passed.

Infantry can usually fire straight only to its front. Towards
the flank or rear, there is always the risk of shooting one's
own friends. The enemy's flank or rear should therefore be
attacked, but preferably the flank, because if the rear is
attacked the attacking squadrons will quickly traverse the
leading lines, and will then run the risk of being shot in the
back by them. The ground must decide which flank should
preferably be attacked.

The ra/fy after the attack. The attacking Cavalry should
rally towards the front, because by falling back to rally, the
losses in retreat are very great. Often it may be best for
the Cavalry to scatter after the charge, and then to seek
refuge round the flanks for .some spot in which to rally — but
such action requires careful explanation beforehand, and
a very close understanding between leaders and led. As
a rule, it is less costly to ride straight through and away,
than to attempt to rally under fire.

The successful charge must be followed by a vigorous pursuit

86 CAVALRY STUDIES

Horn slwiild t/ih pursuit be carried out? — Hemmed in
between the river and the hills, the enemy naturally retreat
in the direction of Sangoi and Jhelum.

The reserves of the Northern Army would presumedly be
somewhere between Bijwala and the Jhelum river, with
probably some troops near Pambar. These for a time are
likely to delay pursuit.

Rather than suffer delay by engaging the enemy's troops
in this part, where moreover they presumably would be the
freshest, it would seem to be more effective for the Cavalry
Division to move upon the enemy's north-west flank — by
the Chackri road if open ; if not, vii Chak and Hoon and the
base of the hills — so as to anticipate the enemy reaching'
Natoala, Sangoi or Naoaran, and then to attack from the
flank, either mounted or dismounted, according as the ground
permits. Possibly the difficulties of ground near Hoon might
prevent whole Brigades being employed in masses. Their
Commanders must then indicate the points to be reached,
and leave to regiments and squadrons a free hand in the
matter of following up the enemy.

Meanwhile the Infantry and Artillery press the enemy
directly in the rear. But this immediate pursuit cannot
produce decisive results ; it must be completed by the
employment of every available man of the troops which took
part in the battle, and before such a pursuit by the bulk of
the Infantry and Artillery can be organised, some lime will
probably elapse. Units will, in many cases, have to be
reformed : ammunition filled up : rations and forage drawn
from the rear, etc. The Cavalry are, however, responsible
tiiat touch is maintained, and if the whole of the Cavalry
Division is to be withdrawn in indirect pursuit, some system
for the maintenance of direct pursuit must at once be
organised by making use of the squadrons of Divisional
Cavalry. In certain cases several pursuing columns might
be necessary, according to the number of object!
every case, however, must be remembered the vast import-
ance of information of the situation being regularly sent back

rt- ^
ck ^H

FIRST STUDY (JHELUM)

87.

to headquarters, so that the General-in-Chief may direct the
march of his main columns in the most effective direction.

If doubt exists as to the road taken by the enemy's main
forces (this was the case after Ligny, Koniggratz, Worth,
etc.). the freshest horses must be sent on patrol at once, and
reconnoitring be carried on \ndely along every possible road by
which the enemy can have retreated, or some railway junction
or other important centre on his line of communications must
be aimed at It is better to delay a little, rather than to r
launching the Cavalry in a wrong direction, because it may
only have to retrace its steps, and would then probably fail
altogether in catching up the enemy.

The pursuit must be pressed without rest by the whole of
the Cavalry, and without regard to sparing the horses or men.
It would probably be sunset before Sangoi could be reached.
The pursuit must, however, be kept, up with the same vigour
by night, in spite of tired horses.

After a victory, an Army can dispense with its Cavalry,
provided the fruits of victory have been reaped.

To quote from Count von Wartenburg (" Napoleon as a
General ") :

It is indeed a chimcteiislic noticeable in the strategy of all the grealeit
Generals that they knew how 10 utilise iheir Civalry to the best adTmnttge.
it 1> this arm, designed for a wide Held and rapidity of movement, which requiret
superioi officers of exceptionally large grasp and quick resolution, who, keeping
only the great aims of a war in view, are able to set aside objects of seeondwy
.'y losses also ; for Cavalry ei

without

large area tnusi of:en gel into silualions Tri:
sufTciing them.

Napoleon himself said:

'' The use of Cavalry demands boldness and ability j above all it should not be
handled with any miserly desire lo preserve it intact."

And again :

" I do not wish the lioises to lie spared if Ihty can calih mtn. . . . Take no
heed of the complaints of the Cavalry, for if such great objects may be attained H
the destruction of a whole hostile Army, the Stale can afford lo lose a few hundred
hones fronieihausiion."

88 CAVALRY STUDIES

This was Gneisenau's conviction, and as to what was
effected by the Cavalry of Lee's army, we need only mention
the name of Stuart.

As an instance of the errors (in this case, fatal) that may
ensue if the main Cavalry force is launched in pursuit in the
wrong direction, and before steps have been taken to ciear up
the true direction of the enemy's retreat, the following notes
taken from Hyde Kelly's "Battle of VVavre" may be of
interest (see Sketch 5) :

During ihe night following their defeat at Ligny (16th June, 1815), the
Prussians withdrew iheir right and centre corps ilue north towards Wavre, viS.
the Tilly and Gentinncs roads, leaving Thieleman's corps (111.) at Sombreffe to
cover ihe retreat.

Thieleman retreated viS Gembloux (wheie he halted and rested for 10 hours !),
his rearguard moving from Sombreffe about 4 a.m. This corps then turned
north also towards Wavre.

Grouchy (commanding the detached force detailed to [lursue the Prussians)
received orders about 1 1 p.m. on the l6lh to send the and Cavalry Corps of Pajot
and Excelmans at daybreali in pursuit of the Prussi.ins. //<r wai itel told in what
dirtclian U funue, er whelktr to pursue Thielinian only.

Accordingly, when Pajol started at 4 a.m., there were no signs to show in what
direction Thieleman had retired (no signs iiaving been sought for). Takii^
Soult's Division of Light Cavalry, Pajol started ofT from Balalre and made his
way across lo the Namur road undtr the impression that this was Ihe true line of
retreat. He sent in a despatch from Balatre, staling that he was " pursuit^ the
enemy, who were in full retreat towards Li^e and Namur," and that he had
already made many prisoners. Shortly after striking the Namur road he came
across a Prussian Horse Battery, which had somehow failed to fall b with the
Prus^an columns.

This battery Pajot captured, and it tended to increase his belief that the
Prussians were making for Namur. But advancing some three miles beyond Le
Mazy without coming across further traces of the enemy, Pajol began at last to
suspect that he was leading a wild-goose chase.

Accordingly he halted at Le Bouquet, and sent out reconnoitring parlits. At
midday (I71h), while Thieleman was resting at Cemhloui, he started for Si. Denis,
with [he object of taking the Louvain road. . . ,

Meanwhile Eicelmans fared little belter. Berlon's Brigade of Dragooni
started off to follow Thieleman's reai^uard. Bui Berlon followed down the
Namur road behind Pajol. What good could he do here ? It is hard lo suppose
that it was not known which way Pajol had taken.

Bcrton, on reaching Le Mazy, was told by peasants that the Prussians had
retreated by Gembloux. He therefore halted and waited for orders. Orden
arrived, and Bcrton was sent on lo Gembloux.

Here, at 9 a.m., he found the Prussian outposts, and descried oQ the fiu' side of \
the village the whole of Thieleman's corps resting. Excelmans arrived s(

SKETCH 5.

% ^
%
«
1

e^Waterloo

\
\
\
\

\
\

1 /

pS^ Denis

I
\
I
I
I

I ije Bouquet \

\ .jf Miles

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CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Division^
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain i
intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study tlie Independent Cavalry Division
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day. when
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importance
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre-
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account will
now be given of the organisation and actual employment
from the Sth to the iSth August, 1870, of the large mass of
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and of
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkable
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Metz
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and the
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast in
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the three
German Armies was identical, but with that of the Second
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

With this Army were ^j regiments, distributed as follows:

Eleven regiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse
Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard
Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the
Saxon (12th) Corps;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-
attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-
attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the
i6th July. The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already
with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and
Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the Jth and 6th
Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which
had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various
so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not
made until the 35th July. The transport to the frontier did
not commence until the 24lh, and for some days the mass
of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical
deployment- But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are
to the front, and on this day we find a trace of " Independent
Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised
body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander
for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole
field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Com-
mander of the Second Army to send forward these two
Divisions, under the command of Genera! v. Rheinbaben, the
Commander of the 5th Division. "This body of Cavalry was
to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German]
side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant
enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments,
to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and
keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions^
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain i
intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division!
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,]
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander o
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one:l
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day, when I
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the DivisioaJ
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importancej
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in ordefl
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre-T
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account will I
now be given of the organisation and actual employment!
from the 8th to the iSth August, 1S70, of the large mass of]
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and ofl
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkablej^
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Metzfl
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and th<g
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast tni
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the threj
German Armies was identical, but with that of the Second!
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

With this Army were 37 regiments, distributed as follows:

Eleven raiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse
Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard
Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the
Saxon (l2th) Corps;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-
attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-
attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the
16th July. The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already
with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and
Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which
had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various
so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not
made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did
not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass
of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical
deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are
to the front, and on this day we find a trace of " Independent
Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised
body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander
for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole
field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Com-
mander of the Second Aimy to send forward these two
Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the
Commander of the 5th Division. " This body of Cavalry was
to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German]
side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant
enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments,
to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and
keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Division)
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain i
intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day. when
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importance
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order''
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre-
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account will
now be given of the organisation and actual employment
from the 8lh to the i8th August, 1870, of the large mass of
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and of
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkable
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Metz
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and the
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast ii
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the thre
German Armies was identical, but with that of the SeconfJ
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

SFXOND STUDY (DELHI)

s follows :

With this Army were 37 regiments, distributed ;

Eleven regiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse
Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard
Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the
Saxon (i2lh) Corps;

Nine regiments forming the jth Cavalry Division (un-
attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-
attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the
l6th July, The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already
with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and
Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which
had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various
so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not
made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did
not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass
of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical
deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are
to the front, and on this day we find a trace of " Independent
Cavalry " properly so-called, that is to say. an organised
body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander
for Strategic Reconnaiss.ince in the interests of the whole
field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Com-
mander of the Second Aimy to send fonvard these two
Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the
Commander of the 5th Division. " This body of Cavalry was
to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German]
side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant
enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments,
to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and
keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions,
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain it^fl
intentions and its nnovements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day, when
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division ^
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importance
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order!
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre«J
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account wil]
now be given of the organisation and actual employmentj
from the 8th to the i8th August, 1870, of the large mass on
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and <
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkablq
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Meti
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and tin
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast ii
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the thre
German Armies was identical, but with that of the SeconGQ
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 91

With this Army were 37 regiments, distributed as follows:

Eleven regiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse
Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard
Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the
Saxon (i2th) Corps;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-
attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-
attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the
l6th July, The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already
with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and
Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the Sth and 6th
Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which
had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various
so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not
made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did
not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass
of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical
deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are
to the front, and on this day we find a trace of " Independent
Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised
body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander
for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole
field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Com-
mander of the Second Army to send forward these two
Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the
Commander of the sth Division. " This body of Cavalry was
to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German]
side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant
enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments,
to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and
keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions,!
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain i
intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day, when
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division -,
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importanci
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order!
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre*J
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account willl
now be given of the organisation and actual employment '
from the 8th to the i8th August, 1870, of the large mass of
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and of
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkable
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of MetE
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and the
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast ioa
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the thre
German Armies was identical, but with that of the Seconiq
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

FIRST STUDY QHELUM) 89

the rest of his Cavahy Corps, but neglected to send back word to Grouchy at
once. Although he had 3,000 Cavalry and 12 guns, he made no attempt to
harass the Prussians.

So slack and unenterprising were Excelmans' moves that
it was not till nearly 10 p.m. that he knew with comparative
certainty that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre. And
even then Grouchy writing to Napoleon failed to convey the
idea that the whole Prussian army had gone in that direction.

CHAPTER IV.
SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions,
to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain its
intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division
was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations,
acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of
the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one
of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day, when
a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division
passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importance
of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order
to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a pre-
liminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account will
now be given of the organisation and actual employment
from the 8th to the i8th August, 1870, of the lai^e mass of
Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and of
the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkable
similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Metz
and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and the
Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast in
the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the three
German Armies was identical, but with that of the Second
Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

>nd ^H

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 91

With this Army were 37 regiments, distributed as follows :

Eleven regiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse
Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard
Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the
Saxon ([2th) Corps;

Nine raiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-
attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-
attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the
16th July. The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already
with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and
Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which
had 6rst to be collected ; and the assignment of the various
so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not
made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did
not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass
of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical
deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are
to the front, and on this day we find a trace of " Independent
Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised
body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander
for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole
field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Com-
mander of the Second Aimy to send forward these two
Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the
Commander of the 5th Division. "This body of Cavalry was
to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German]
side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant
enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments,
to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and
keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

92 CAVALRY STUDIES

each of two Corps was to follow as support. This force went
forward, and the Commander of the Second Army, in accord-
ance with recommendations from the Royal Headquarters,
had intended to throw forward on the 6th August a large
body of Cavalry from these Divisions for a raid on the
Saargemiind-Bitsch Railway.

But the battles of the 6th, practically initiated by individual
officers in the First and Third Armies, were not in the scheme
of the general plan of operations, and, although they were
victories for the Germans, they completely disarranged the
original plan, for which a new plan had to be substituted.
And as regards Ihe part to be played by the Cavalry Divisions
henceforth, this was left, almost without exception, entirely
in the hands of the Army Commanders, the Supreme Com-
mander mainly restricting his action to giving them general
recommendations of a most elementary character, apparently
not always unnecessary.

The new plan now to be adopted was a general wheel of
the whole force to the right, the First Army about Forbach
acting as the pivot, and the Second Army being in the
centre of the line.

The Commander of the Second Army had at his disposal
four Cavalry Divisions and one Brigade. Two of the
Divisions and the Brigade he left with their own Infantry
units ; the 6th Cavalry Division he attached to the Third Army
Corps, one Brigade of the 5th Division he attached to the
Fourth Corps, the two others to the Tenth Corps, these Corps
being the first line of the Army ; so now, just as the advance
was commencing, and when strategic information obtainable
only by masses of Cavalry was ail-important, there remained
no " instrument of exploration " in the hand of the Army
Commander, still less in that of the Supreme Commander.
There was merely an enormous Divisional Cavalry, and a
still more numerous Army Corps Cavalry.

There was no real pursuit after the battle of Spicheren, and
on the 8th August the Second Army was taking up
positions for the new advance.

ind ^^
it»^^

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 93

On the 8th August the front of the Hne of the Second
Army extended from Forbach (Third Corps), by Saargemiind
(Tenth Corps) to Rohrbach (Fourth Corps).

The 6lh Cavalry Division is at Morsbach, 3 miles in front
of Forbach. The 5th Cavalry Division was from 4 miles
on the right, to 8 miles on the left, in front of their Army
Corps. On the 9th there was practically no material change
in the positions of the Cavalry Divisions or of the Army
Corps in rear. Reconnaissances have been carried on to
the front. The reports received formed the basis for the
following Royal Headquarters' order of the 9th : —

SAAkBKrcKEN,

9M August, S p.m.

Rep-jrts i;eceived lead lo llie su|)pusltlijii that the enemy has withdcawn behind
the Moselle or Srille.

All three armies will follaw this movemcni. The Third Arm; takes the road
Saaninion-Dieuze and those south ; ihe Second Army the riuid St. Avold-Nutneny
and (hose south ; Ihe First Anuy the road Saarlouis-Boulay-Les Etangs and those

In order lo imier ihi marth the Cavalry ii to ht sent forward to a cmisidetahle
dhlanee, ami is to be suppirted by advanee guards thrown out well to ihe front
■o thai, should the necessity arise, each Army may have lime to close up.

Any deviations from these lines of march will be ordered by His Majesty as the
position or movement of Ihe enemy may demand.

The lOlh August may be employed by the First and Second Armies in giving
the Itoops resi, ot in placing them on the roads designated for Ihem.

Ai the left wing cannot reach the Saar until the 12th, the corps of the right
wing will have comparatively short marches (j/idi p. 263 of German OfBdal
History, English translation).

It should be noted that this order only assigns to the
Cavalry a role of protection 1 its action was to be defensive
and passive! This rt*le is in keeping with its distribution by
detachments to the several Army Corps, but it is certainly a
surprising one in view of the lack of definite information at
Royal Headquarters as to the enemy's doings at this time.

From the 7th to 10th August the Cavalry marched 25 miles,
or an average of 6J miles a day. In the First Army the ist
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were still in rear of the Infantry.
Indeed, the Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division con-
sidered it imprudent to risk his command in front of the

CAVALRY STUDIES

Infantry, his reason being that the country in front wasj
mountainous and wooded (an incorrect estimate of the ]
country). Hence complete ignorance prevailed in the First |
Army regarding the movements and intentions of the enemy, ^
This was confirmed by the following extract from the official 1
account of the war (p. 283) :

Ae Lhe Cavalry Divisions of ihe First Armj were not in first line, the in
Conlact with Lhe enemy on [his side haj! ahnoat entirely ceased. From thv f
advance guard of the Seventh Army Corps was the report from Captaii
Scbuli, Sih Hussars, alone received in the afternoon, to the effect thai hostile J
corps were to the west of Fouligny.

On the loth August the main bodies of the Sth and 6th
Cavalry Divisions march 12! miles. Their reconnoitring
detachments ascertain that the French had halted behind the
French Nied ; they had been halted there since the 9th. ■

This information reached Army Headquarters on the J
nth August, and, as a consequence, the following orders
were issued to the Commanders of the First and Second
Armies (p. 286) :

St. Avold,

7 p.m., iiM Augusl, i87t).
It is not improbable ibat there is a coiuiderable hostile force in front of Metz,
on the left bank of the French Nied. A closer concentration of the First and
Second Army Is therefore necessary. His Majesty the King orders as follows :
The Third Army Corps at Kaulquemonl will form the Paint dapjnii for this

The First Army will move two corps early lO'inorrow into Ihe line B
Maratlge, and one to Bouchepom.

The Second Army will advance the Ninth Army Corps to Longeville w
St. Avoid : the Second Army Corps will, in so far as it may be available, clo«» I
up to the Utter place. The Tenth Corps will follow after the Third.

The Gaard, Fourth and Twelfth Corps are to be brought forward lowaids the J
left wing of the indicated position, so that they may either dose up to it or con-
tinue their march in the direction of Nancy, as occasion may demand.

(Signed) v. Moltke.

These orders indicate that considerable doubt and uncer*
tainty existed at the Royal Headquarters about the move-
ments of the French, and they affect most closely the role
which the Cavalry ought to have been playing with a view to

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

clearing up the situation. Yet no mention is made of that
arm.

In the night between the nth and i3th August the French
resume their retreat upon Metz. News of these movements
reaches the German Headquarters on the I2th, and the
following orders (p. 293) are at once issued :

St, Avold,

4.30 p.m., 12/4 August
So far as oui ioleltigence enables us to perceive, the enemf's main forces are in
tbe act of retiring through Melz over the Moselle. His Majesty comnvands ;

The First Army lo advance to-morrow, the ijlh, towards the French Nied ;
main body on the line Les EiangE-Punge and to hold Ihe railway station at
Courcelles ; Cavalry to reconnoitre in the direction of Mett and to cross the
MoieDe belon it. The First Army will thus cover Ihe right flank of the

The latter to march on the tine Buchy-Chalcau Salins, push its outpostt to the
Seille, and endeavour it pmsible to secure ihe passages of the river Moselle at
Ponl-i-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbaehc, etc. Cavalry le rtconnoilri btyond that

ivance towards the line Nancy- Lunevilie.
(Signed) v. MotTKE.

The idea apparent in the order of the i ith that the French
mitiht fight on the east of Metz has been given up, and the
forward movement is now to be continued under the pro-
tection of the First Army, which is brought to a halt as a
flank guard opposite Metz. The Cavalry of the Second
Army is to "reconnoitre beyond the Moselle" merely as a
protection to the columns which are marching upon the
bridges over that river south of Metz.

On the 11th the French halt in and on the east of Metz.
News of this reaches the Royal Headquarters on the 13th at
Herny, and the following orders (p. 299) for the 14th are
then issued :

9 p.ni

From intelligence received coniiderable hostile forci
halting at Servigny and Bomy. this side of Meti.

His Majesty oidets that the First Aim; will remain to-morrow, the 14th, in its
position on the French Nied, and will observe, by pushing forward advance
guards, whether the enemy retires or advances to the attack. To meet the latter
evcntnality the Second Army tu-morrovr will advance the Third Corps at first

CAVALRY STUDIES

only abreast of Pagny, the Ninth Corps to Biichy, where, at a distance of 5 mile^^
they will be prepared by a well-tinned march 10 take part in a serious action befoTC^
Melz. On the other hand, the First Army will be in a position 10 prerent Iheil
advance of the enemy southwards by a tlank atlaclt.

The remaining corps of the Second Army vrill continue their advance towudhl
that part of the Moselle between Pont-a-Mousson and Marbache. The Tentbg
Corps will take up a position in advance of Pont-^-Mousson.

The Cavalry oOoti nnnies to push forward ai/ar as faiiiile, and to molest «i
retreat of the eaetny along the road from Metz to Verdun.

(Signed) V. MOLTKB.

Here at last is the order for the Cavalry to " advance as 1
far as possible." It will be noticed how, as each day more I
definite information became necessary in order to enable
the General-in-Chief to direct the Armies, so each day a little
larger demand is made upon the Cavalry. Indeed, owing to
want of precise and timely news of the etiemy, the Com-
mander-in-Chief found his freedom of operation restricted,
and he was forced to direct the Armies from day to day just
as if he was dealing merely with small tactical bodies.

Again, the want of a properly constituted flank-guard
to ensure to the Army its liberty of action towards its right
flank, led to the fight at Borny on the 14th, and caused
three Army Corps (the Seventh, First, and Eighth) to be
thrown into a state of alarm: and. if the attack had not
taken place so late in the evening, this alarm must also
have necessitated the deployment of the Third Corps.

The Army Order of the 14th (for the operations of the
15th) had been issued before news of the battle of Bomy
had been received. By these orders the Eirst Army and
three corps of the Second (viz., the Third, Ninth, and
Twelfth) were still retained before Metz.

The situation, however, was modified by the battle of
Borny, and it was decided on the 15th to push forward
four corps to the Moselle, and three to the Seille, and to
leave only the three corps of the First Army facing Metz,

with the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Cavalry Di

t screen for observ;

disposed as

The Army

at ion purposes.
Order of the 14th

August issued at Herny J

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 97

at 6 p.m. prescribed the following movements for the next

<iay (p. 339) :

On Ihe right wing of the Swond Army, the Third, Ninth, and Twelfth Army
Corps were meiely to close up their columns and (o cook betimes ; the Second
Corps was to continue its foiwaid movement. The first line of the First Army,
the First am! SevenlEi Army Corps, was also to retain ils present position ; the
Eighth Corps, however, was to draw forward to Baioncourt, as a prelude to the
projected movement of this Army to the left, and to a clo.ser connection with
the light flank of the neighbouring Army. With a view to shedding light upon
the adversary's movements, inslructioos were given to Ihe Second Army to smd
Jbrward tbi cnlirt/arci of Cavalry availabli on the lift bank eftke Mastllt ogatHSt
lie entmys communieatiaHs iitwten Melt and Verduit, supporting i! in the
directions of Gorze and Thiaucouit by those corps which should fiist pass the
river. For this purpose the Third Corps was also to make preparations on
the I51h for throwing a bridge below Ponl-i-MousiOli.

The foregoing Army Order, the fifth in five days, indicates
the real objective which ought in the orders of the 9th August,
8 p.m., to have been assigned to an " independent " force of
Cavalry, namely, to move " against the enemy's communica-
tions between Metz and Verdun," to clear up the situation,
and, having gained touch with his columns, to operate so
as to impede their march should they be retreating.

This mission, so tardily expressed on the I4lh, had already
been outlined by Prince Frederick Charles on the I2th of
August.

The following very remarkable order was addressed by
him to the Officer Commanding the Tenth Corps :

The enemy having evacuated his position behind the Nied, your Excellency
ii requested to send forward this very day General Rheinbaben with his two
Cavalry Brigades to Pont*^-Mousson and Dieulouard on the Moselle. Bredow'i
Cavalry Brigade will also be sent 10 join him as soon as possible. General
Rheinbaben will cri^s the Moselle, advance on to the plateau between Ihe
Moselle and the Meuse, and push forward in a north. westerly direction towards
the road Metz- Verdun in order (o ascertain without de!ay whether the enemy
is leaving Metz by that road.

If, as we have reason to believe, the Cavalry Division of the First Army is
operating in the same manner below Meir, the communications of the French
Army at Mete with France will be cut in three 01 four days.

Your Excellency is requested to be goofi enough to impress upon General
Rhrinbalien the great importance of the operation with which he is now entrusted.

A division of Infantry should he sent forward as early as possible to-morrow
morning to Pont-^-Mousson, preceded as quickly as possible by an advance

98 CAVALRY STUDIES

guaid, with Ihe object of occupying Ihal ii
commnnicfllion wilh Geoeial Rheinbaben.—
lllh Hussars.")

Unfortunately this order had to pass through the inter-
mediary of the Tenth Army Corps, so that it was the
15th August before the 5th Cavalry Division began to
execute it. If, on the other hand, this Cavalry had been
directly under the orders of Prince Frederick Charles, Com-
manding the Second Army, it would certainly have been
able to scout sufficiently far ahead to gain such definite
news of the enemy's movements as would have ensured to
the Armies their entire liberty of action with a view to inter-
cepting the French retreat.

Instead of carrying out this great strategical mission, we
find this 5th Cavalry Division crawling painfully along at
the head of the Tenth Corps — the sole Cavalry Division
which preceded the Armies until the 16th August.

In five days, from the 11th to the iSth, this Division
covered 56 miles, or about 1 1 miles a day — the pace of
indifferent Infantry.

On the 15th August the reconnaissances made by the
Sth Cavalry Division only reported, to the south of Rezon-
ville, a camp of about 20,000 men. In reality the whole
French Army was in the vicinity 1 10,000 strong (ten Divisions
of Infantry with four Cavalry Divisions).

Indeed, the information sent in by the 5th Cavalry Division
was so meagre and inaccurate that at noon next day (the
i6th), when the battle of Mars-la-Tour was at its height,
Prince Frederick Charles issued orders for the march of his
army towards the Mcuse !

Yet this Division, as evidenced by its deeds at Mars-la- I
Tour, lacked neither dash nor bravery. But its wings were
clipped. Instead of operating under the direct orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, the only officer whose interest it was
to employ it independently, the Division marched along
at the head of the Tenth Corps, to which it was tied as it
were by a string.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

On the morning of the i6th August, the 5th Cavalry
Division was sent by the Commander of the Tenth Corps
to reconnoitre from Vionville to Rezonville, a distance of
2h miles ! Then, shortly afterwards, the 6th Cavalry Division
debouched from the Gorze defile at the head of the Third
Corps. The details of the surprise of the French camps by
the German Cavalry are well known. It has been well
likened to the overturning of a bee-hive by some thoughtless
schoolboy. The sound of the guns roused the French
Army, which stood to arms: and the German Army ran the
greatest risk of a disaster to two of its Corps, from which
it was only saved by the incapacity of the higher leaders
of the French forces to take advantage of their good luck.

Under the circumstances, a cannonade, which brought
a force of 135,000 Frenchmen against the heads of the
scattered German columns, must be considered a grave
mistake.

Mars-la-Tour was indeed a repetition of the strategical
error of Spichcren, If the ith and 6th Cavalry Divisions
had been organised as Independent Cavalry in the hands
of the Commander-in-Chief, and entrusted with the mission
to reconnoitre the French Army, such a mistake could
scarcely have occurred. Their imprudence was due to the
fact that they were actin^f as mere advance guards ; the
Divisions were, in fact, isolated in front of two different
Army Corps, and were acting under the orders of the leaders
of these Corps, who were so badly informed of the general
situation, so full of peril, of the two opposing Armies, that
they believed that there was only a hostile rear-guard id
their front.

Having gained touch with the enemy about Rezonville,
the two Cavalry Divisions should have sought to discover
where his main body was, by moving via Doncourt upon
Aubou^, and sending reconnaissances as quietly as possible
eastwards to ascertain the extent of the enemy's position.

But it seems only natural that the 5th and 6th Cavalry
Divisions should, on this occasion, have behaved like ordinary

loo CAVALRY STUDIES

Divisional Cavalry, since they were acting as parts of different
Army Corps, and only in the zones of action assigned to
these Army Corps. No matter how numerous a body of
Cavalry be attached to an Infantry Division, or to an Army
Corps, it is only human for the Commander of that unit to
employ the Cavalry under his orders solely within the narrow
limits of his own sphere of operations, for the furtherance
of his own personal aims, and not for the general benefit
of the whole Army.

Only the Commander-in-Chief who can view the Divisions,
Army Corps, or Armies as a whole, and can consider in
proper perspective the probable development of the main
operations as regards "space" and "lime," is in a position
to indicate to the independent Cavalry what should be its
mission.

The truth of these principles is to be found demonstrated
in the operations of Napoleon. During the long years of
peace which followed they lay forgotten, until the neglect
of them in 1870 caused their re-discovery.

On the 17th, the German Arnay concentrates. Seven
Army Corps bivouac on the south of the Metz-Mars-la-
Tour road. Contact with the French outposts, however,
is only kept up in front of Gravelotte.

The Sth and 6th Cavalry Divisions are withdrawn to
the rear of the Infantry, and only the Divisional Cavalry
regiments remain in the front line, but without displaying
any great activity.

The withdrawal of the 5th and 6th Divisions seems only
natural after the fatigues and losses of the 16th. But there
were three other Cavalry Divisions available on the left
bank of the Moselle, namely the Guard, the Saxon, and
the 1st Cavalry Divisions.

At this time information as to what had become of the 1
French Army seems of the very greatest importance to the I
Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies. His enemy
had every opportunity open to him for escaping towards
the north by Briey and Audun-le-Roman. Would the

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) loi

French take advantage of it and march, or did they intend
to stand fast where they were ?

Von Moltke found next day, on the i8th (Battle of
Gravelotte), the disadvantage of not having had these ques-
tions answered earlier. At 10,30 a.m. on that day he was
still unaware how far north the French right extended.
Yet, had the six Cavalry Divisions been grouped as Inde-
pendent Cavalry, this want of information could scarcely
have existed. For, setting aside the two Divisions already
stated to be unfit for work on the 17th, and the 3rd Division
which remained as a screen on the south-east of Metz, there
were stil! three Divisions available for this task, and had
they been grouped as suggested, the dispositions of the
French Army would assuredly have been ascertained by
noon on the 17th.

An examination of the operations of the German Cavalry
at this period leads to the conclusion that the reason why
it furnished so little information of real use to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, lay in the fact that it was broken up and
distributed amongst the several Army Corps. The Com-
mander-in-Chief had no body of Cavalry, suitably organised,
for carrying out the strategical duties of the Army,

Spicheren and Rezonville were two surprises, due to want
of information : the result of the want of a body of Cavalry,
organised as an " instrument for gaining information." For
the same reason, during the days under consideration, Moltke
lacked both strategical and tactical " liberty of action,"
though the inactivity of the French rendered the want of
"time" and "space" for manoeuvring the German forces
less noticeable than would have been the case had the
Germans been opposed by a vigorous Commander-in-Chief
at the head of a well-organised Army.

The organisation adopted by the Germans for their Cavalry
in 1870 is directly opposed to the principles upon which
Napoleon organised his Cavalry. In order to get full use
of it as a strategical instrument Napoleon organised his
Cavalry into large units. Each Corps d'Arm^e had a Brigade

102 CAVALRY STUDIES

or Division attached to it for purposes of protection and!
advance-guard duties ; that is to say, the r6!e of this bodjr
was mainly a defenswe one. At the same time he retained *
under his own command a " Cavalry Reserve," which included
a mass of Light Cavalry. This latter was employed as " Inde-
pendent Cavalry " for extended reconnaissance ; its r61e was
thus essentially offensive. fl

Many important problems were offered for solution by ^
the Cavalry in 1870 and they demand close study, because
problems of a like nature, though under different circum-
stances, will certainly be met with again. The success which
everywhere followed the Germans in that campaign has
blinded many soldiers to the errors which were often com-
mitted and passed unpunished. Hence military professors
have, as a general rule, held up the doings of the Prussian
Cavalry as examples worthy of our closest attention. They
forget that the French Cavalry was morally absent, and that,
in reality, the German Cavalry Divisions were unopposed,
so that what was suitable and successful in 1870 might well
spell disaster if attempted in the presence of a determined
Cavalry skilfully led. It matters little how greatly troops
are scattered for reconnaissance, if their rival is absent and
is unable to take advantage of siich dissemination.

The foregoing account contains statements of fact taken
from the Official History. A few commentaries have been
added, collected from various sources, but chiefly from an
" Essai sur I'Emploi de la Cavalerie," by Colonel Cherfils,
published in Paris in 1899. These criticisms are based on
actual /rtrf^, so far as it is possible to arrive at facts in war
histories, although they are said to be somewhat harsh and
improper, in view of the successes which resulted. However,
we must derive our principles from the experiences of the
past, and to this end it is essential to ascertain the whole
circumstances of the Cavalry in 1870, so that our conclusions
may be sound. It will not, therefore, be out of place to
quote from a German writer of undoubted authority (Hoenig),
in order to make clear the real state of organisation, training,

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 103

and leading at the beginning of the 1870 campaign. To
quote from his pamphlet, " Tactical Guides for the Cavalry
Division " :

Twenty-four or (hirty-ain squadrons were plued under the command of one
man : but was it right ? Hud they been trained up to it ? Not at all. These
masses of Cavalry were in no way tactical, but only numerical bodies. Their
eommandera, tcpo, were no tacticians, but merely " drills."

By glancing at the post on this subject I shall best illustrate the reason why
wrong conclusions, unjust verdicts, and false principles about the fighting
•ction of Cavalry have frequently been formed. I will not mention any names.
When the war in 1870 broke out. new commanders were suddenly appointed to
the higher units (except Cavalry) ; the rapidity with which this important step
WIS effected, and the admirable composition of the higher stalfs, both for
carrying out the command and also as regards the mutual personal relations
between the general and his chief of the staff, show clearly with what care
the various impurlani requirements had been considered : and what was done
in this way was far from being the smallest factor in the secret of our grand

From this it is quite evijunt that the question of the generals and the com-
position of the staffs had been long previously considered, that an exact estimate
had been formed as to the value of the individual, and that by disregarding
questions of seniority the right men were put in the right places. This was
the triumph of great over pEiiy interests. The services done by the supreme
direction of the Army have not been properly appreciated in this respect.

But what was the course taken in making the Bjipointments to the commands
of the Cavalrj' Divisions? Here seniority was strictly adhered to, and thus
an instrument, about which there prevailed no consensus of opinion, nor ideas
H regards its composition, the part it had to ptay and its general task, was
put into the hands of " persons."

The tactical body was a new one, and the units composing it continued to
be quite independent of one another. It had not been possible for a tiKtua!
blending to take place, liecause the necessary conditions for this had not b«n
practised in peace. But even if these conditions had been fulhlled, it would still
never have been possible to place any great hopes on the lighting action of the
instrument, because we could not, and dared not, ask or expect much from those
who were then the leaders. However learnedly this man or that man might
discourse about war and warfare, it is, at all events, certain that in the important
Cavalry posts there were wanting the men of action, of decision, and of tactical
ability. In addition to thi;, even the stalls in the new formations were quite
strange to one another. The Commanding General and the Staff Officer of the
Cavalry Division very frequently difiered in their views ; their time was spent in
iialding councils, in pondering and in deliberating, and they seldom came
to any action, or when they did, it was then, as a rule, too late. It was one
perpetual weighing of ftvs and coh!. The slate of unreadiness of the arm and
of the organisation ; vagueness as to the part it had 10 play ; uncertainty as to
what should be required of the Cavalry by reason of its power of execution and
■peed ; deficient tactical training and narrow tactical methods ; faint-heartedness

CAVALRY STUDIES

in fhe upper, and impetuosity i

n the lower ranks; ar

1 absence of

the principles; and the inslnti

mcnt itself without u

letical iiislnii

cohesion in its organisation — si

ach were the condilii

ms under wl

Much has recently been done by Lorti Kitchener to ita^
prove the organisation of the Cavalry in India: but a greaq
deal still remains to be done, and Cavalry officers must assist
by systematically thinking out for themselves what are the]
requirements of a Cavalry force in the field besides officers,!
men, and horses: such things for instance as transport
supply, means for communication, and Royal Engineeq
services generally. Again, to lead and rightly to emploj
Cavalry it is indispensable that there should be a cleai
understanding as to the part it has to play. Now the best
and only way to arrive at a more or less unanimous opinioni
as to the principles of our action is for officers to study thra
past and then try to apply their conclusions to actual
situations of to-day. The opportunity afforded to so many^
Cavalry officers from different stations in India to met
together to consider such matters is one of the greates
uses of the Cavalry staff rides. Having decided on
principles of action it is possible then to determine the most
suitable tactical formations and to perfect our instructionj
as leaders at camps of exercise, and in the field.

SKETCH £,

f
t3

• if

SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE^ -i-jsv
OPERATIONS OF THE
GERMAN CAVALRY,
AUGUST, 1870.

4 S 2 1 o
I I I I -4-

Approximae SoaU ^^

■4-

10
-4-

isMOee

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

General Idea.

(See Sketch 7, and General Map No. 2.)

I.' The Ganges represents the frontier between two hostile
States called "East" and "West." Bareilly is the capital
of the Eastern State. Ajmere and Bhiwani (70 miles west of
Delhi) are the bases of the Western State. The country roads
and railways, etc., are to be considered exactly as they exist.
Delhi is an entrenched camp with limits roughly as
follows :

Wuzirabad on the north — thence westwards to Azadpur —
thence south to near Chankri— thence south-east-
wards through the positions west of Nurhaula to
Nurhaula, and on to the Jumna, the latter from
this point northwards to Wuzirabad forming the
eastern boundary.
Perimeter— about 25 miles,

2. The Eastern forces have crossed the Ganges and gained
a decisive victory over the Western troops near Garhmuktesar.
The latter have retired on Delhi.

3. On Sunday, February 26, Ghaziabad is occupied by
Eastern mounted troops. The Western rear-guard holds the
right bank of the Hindan river about Arthala.

Note. — The Easiern Aimy conaisls of three Anny Corps, each comprising
three Infiuitiy Divisions and n Brigade of Corps Cavalry as below :

!_ Corps Cavalry Brigade '

Second Army Corps .

4lh Infantry Division.

Corps Cavalry Brigade '
71h Infantry Division.

(_ Corps Cavalry Brigade '

lo6 CAVALRY STUDIES

In addition, the Ensletr Commmder- in-Chief has under his own orders a Force '
cf Independent Cavalry of iwo divisinns, viz. :

it Cavalry Division 1 j

CS Brigades) 1 l^

I 5th

id Cavalry Division j .
13 B'iS'de.) \ ^,h

Each Brigade has with it a Battery R.H. A.

The Brigades of Corps Cavalry are formed, as was Eimilarly done in South
Africa, by concentrating into Brigades the Divisional Cavalry R^nients, which
-detach to each Infantry Division one Troop for Orderly duty and the service of |

Special Idea.

(See Sketc/i 8.)

(i) On Sunday afternoon, February 26, the heads of t
Eastern Infantry columns reached the Fatehpur Branch of
the Ganges Canal, and the Army Corps are disposed
generally as follows :

First Corps — On north of Hapur-Garhmuktesar Road.
Second Corps (less pontoon train) — On south of that road.
Third Corps {less pontoon train) — About Garhmuktesar.
1st Cavalry Division :

1st Brigade — Ghaziabad.
2nd Brigade^ — Dehra.
3rd Brigade — Dadri.
4th Brigade— Si kandarabad.
5th with Divisional Headquarters, Dasna ; also pontoon
train of 2nd and 3rd Corps.
The 2nd Cavalry Division is about Muradnagar.
Army headquarters — Garhmuktesar.
(2) About 13 hours on February 26 the General Officer
Commanding ist Cavalry Division received the following ,
" Army Operation Orders " for February 27 :

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

Operation Orders.

I. Reports received lead to the supposition Ihat the enemy has withdrawn
beliiDd the river Jnmna.

3. The Army will follow the enemy and cross the river Jumna on the south of
Delhi near its junction with the Hindan river.

3- The General Officer Commanding First Army Corps will cover the right
flank of this movement. For this purpose he will send forward as early as possible
to-morrow one Division with the bulk of his Corps Cavalry to act as a flnuk
£usrd and to hold the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal ; ihe remainder of the
■corps will be disposed near Ghaiiabid to mask the fortress of Delhi.

4- The General Ofhcer Comtnandiog Second Army Corps will also send
Airward one Division with his Corps Cavalry ns early as possible to act as
.an advance guard and seize the crossing! over the Jutnna from near Kaipur on
*be north 10 the vicinity of Amipur on the south, and prepare for the passage of
Ihe Army. The remainder of the corps will move on Nagia on the llindan.

5- The Third Army Corps will march on Dadri.

6. (a) The General Officer Commanding isl Cavaliy Division will cross the
Jutnna as close as possible (o Delhi, taking due precautions for the
protection of his Hank in the direction of that fortress, and will operate
so as to discover as quickly as possible the line of march or the
positions of the Western Forces. If Ihe enemy is retreating he will
operate so as to hamper his inarch ; if the Weslern Army is still about
the fortress, he will prevent its escape.
The communication of the Division will be by Ni^la-Dadri-Hapur.
(*) The 2nd Cavalry Division will operate on the north side of Delhi with
the object of cutting Ihe enemy's communications in that direction.
As soon as the General Officer Commanding has reached the right
bank of the river he will try and join hands with the 1st Cavalry
Division and act in combmalion.
During the first period of this operation the znd Cavalry Division will
connect with the Corps Cavaltj- of the First Army Corps ("A "Brigade) and will
with Army Headquarlers by that means.

Notes on the Situation.

The Army Order of February 26 directs the Eastern
Forces to cross the Jumna south of Delhi. With this in
I -view, it is necessary —

(a) That a large body of Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division)
should precede the Army and discover the where-
abouts of the Western Forces.
(i>) That another body of Cavalry (2nd Cavalry Division)
should mask the fortress of Delhi ; and, turning it on

io8 CAVALRY STUDIES

the north, unite with the ist Cavalry Division in thi
event of the enemy allowing himself to be shiM

up in the entrenched camp.

The enemy has retired behind the river Jumna, perhap!
intends going further west. The ist Cavalry Division miu
search out and get touch with the enemy wherever !
may be.

Meanwhile, while the Army marches towards the Jumn^
to the south of Delhi it may be attacked from two directions-
in front, or on the right flank. It is necessary, therefore, tol
provide two instruments to ensure to it liberty of action, a^l
follows :

r. In the direction of Delhi (on its right flank) a flanlj

guard consisting of Corps Cavalry Brigade "A"

one Infantry Division First Corps.
2. Toward thrt'ront, an advance guard consisting of C

Cavalry Brigade " B " and one Infantry Division <

the Second Corps.

The Army Order of 26th reachpd the headquarters of thel
rst Cavalry Division at Dasna at 13 hours on the same day, 1
The Cavalry Brigades had already marched certain distances, 1
so that the Division, as a whole, cannot move forward again!
till next morning — 27th. But in view of the necessity for]
gaining early information, some reconnoitring force must befl
sent forward without delay.

This reconnoitring body will, in the course of its operationsij
be at least a long day's march in front of the rest of thel
Division, and in view of its independent role, and thel
"unforeseen" which characterises its mission, it should have!
a " central mass " of some strength. This mass must be able^l
according to circumstances, to send out several sets ofl
reconnaissances in different directions, and either to support^
them directly, or to send detachments of sufficient strengthl
to their support.

For these reasons a Brigade charged with the ful
responsibility of clearing up the situation — the 4th is thi

r k

■ 4

it, the oommencement
nd Study)

D9
he

:iiraidn*^%r

ids
as

hi.

•sts
la-
Ihi
ect
:he
es.
wy
er,
Ihi
:h.

cting^
des.

ig^ade
sible
own
•n.

'halt
a.

and
• or-

Dankaur

io8

Thi

intenc
searcl
may

Me
to the
in fro
provic
follow

I. 1

Th€
1st Cs
The C

so tha
till ne
gainin
sent fc

Thi:
be at
Divisi«
" unfoi
a " cer
accord
reconr
them <
to thei

For
respon

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 109

most conveniently placed — may well be sent forward to the
Jumna (near Dankaur) on the 26th.

Sikandarabad to Dankaur is about [2 miles.

Based on the above considerations, 1st Cavalry Division
Order No. i was issued ; and, as time is of importance, a
telegram (No. i ) was sent to the General Officer Commanding
4th Brigade, at Sikandarabad.

No. (.—Operation Orders. — Irf Cavalry Divisian.
Headquarters, Dasna,

a6th February, 1905 (14 hnurs).
I. (a) The enemy hu tetited behind the Jumna. Spin report that he intcods
retreating furttier weslwiirds.
{h) Tlie 4tli Cavalry Brigade has been ordered to reconnaitre as soon as
' possible the routes leading From Elelhi towucils Ajnif re and Bhiwani.

(f) The Army will move to cross the river Jumna on Ihe south of Delhi,
near its junction vilh Ihe Hindin rivet.
I. The objective ot the ist Cavalry Division is to gain a position of readiness on
the «aulh-west of Delhi with a view to prevent the enemy's escape.

3. (a) The 1st Brigade will march at daylight and take up a line of outposts

from Ghoiiabad to Okhla (on the Jumna) along the line of the Knila-
Chilla canal, with the object of resisting any movement from Delhi
against Ihe Bank of the Division. Okhla will be held with the olijecl
of covering the passive over the Jumna there, and of regulating the
flow of water iti the Hindan and Jumna rivets by means of the sluices.
(b) The remaining Brigades will inarch in accordance with the itinerary
attached and will tnake a long halt in Ihe vicinity of the Hindan river,
each fronting towards Delhi. When probability of an attack from Delhi
is past, further orders will be issued for the continuation of the march.

4. The General Officer Commanding will march with the 1st Brigade.

Itinerary

3F March for

7TH insta:<t

(First Part).

»t Brigade.

Ith BHguie.

tnd Brlgadi.

PontooM allBriiad«.

Llo.of

mBreh

je.«. M.k.n-

Diih,. Gh»iib>d
and follow In

Rude to Sudal-

DmJri, Suraj-
pur. Naela.

Each Brig^dr
laiesponmble

HoaroT
martA

Crot. Hindat,
ri Mr 6 hour..

Hiraion Bridgir,

S houra.

>'—

Loot halt

Sudalpul . .

Sarai Sadar .

Na[la . .

Ltngth of till t

port

Hitrk 10 Ghi-

Vii Chaprauk tu

Dadri. Najla

Surajpur .

Will park and
"era.

CAVALRY STUDIES

X. S. Telegram, No, i.

From— The Aasislanl Adjutaot-General, 1st Cavaliy Division, Dasna.

To — The Geneial Officei Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade, Sikandambad.

Time — 14 hours. Dale— February z6, 1905.

No. r. Enemy believed 10 have retired to right bank of Jumna. Our army
will follow enemy and cross Jumna south of Delhi near its junction with Hindan
river. Objective of 1st Cavalry Division is to gain position of readiness near
Mahrauli with view to prevent enemy's escape. To enable these operations to be
carried out, early information of what is taking place weat of Delhi is most
neccisary. In order to clear up situation you will match at once on Dankaur and

enemy are takii^ place between Delhi and Ajmere and Bhiwani and interrupt
hb communications with those places. Divisional Headquarters march towards
Raipur to-morrow, but until further orders you should communicate with me
through Dadri, to which place you should send your unfit men and horses.

FIRST DAY.

Motiday, February 37.

Commencement of the Strategical Reconnaissance by
the Cavalry Divisions.

The Brigades — except the 4th— marched as directed in the J
foregoing order, and reached the stations prescribed for the I
long halt as under —

1st Brigade at ..... . 9

5th „ „ 9—10

2nd „ , 10—11

3rd „ „ S— 9

All Brigades on halting fronted towards Delhi. During this
halt, information was received from the 5th Brigade that the
fords of the Jumna below Okhla were impassable owing to
flood. As the Hindan had turned out to be fordable any-
where, the pontoons were pushed on rapidly towards the
Jumna. Constant reports came in from the rst Brigade |
showing that the enemy's forces were still filing into Delhi 1
over the railway bridge, that the rear -guard at Shahdara wa»
stationary, and that no indications of a hostile movement
southwards were discernible. At 14^ hours the General

^^^^^|p SECOND (DELHI) lit ^H

Officer Commanding ist Cavalry Division, judging that the ^^M
enemy had no intention of moving against his right, gave ^^M
orders for pontoon bridges to be thrown over the Jumna ^^H
at Raipur and Karauli and for the march to be continued ^^H
at 15 hours in accordance with Divisional Order No. 2 ^^M
below ^M
No. i.— Operation Ordera.— u/ CaialTy Division. ^^H
Hraihjuarters, Gharauli, ^^H

17/A Flbruar,, 1905 (Hi ktmrs). ^^1

I. The 191 Brigade holds the line of Ihe KuU-ChilU canal with detichmeols ^^|

guaiding the canal works al Okhla. ^^H

3. Wilh reference to paragraph 3 («) of the Divisional Order No. I, dated ^^1

26th Fehruary, 1905, the Division will ■! 15 hours continue its march in- ^^H

BCGordance wilh the attached ilinetary. ^^H

isiBriEide.

SU. Brigade.

>Dd Brieade. jrd Brigade.

Notes afrecting ^^|
all B.lEad.., ^H

LiMoT

Chile ri,
Madupur.

Baipor.Tugh.

Amadpur.

own ^^H
prelectloD. ^^H

Bivinae

Uadupar..

TDghlakabad

A».dpur.

■

Oulp«t.

robemiinlaiDcd

|£Si^

Brigade, ar- ^H
protEcllim. ^^H

ind Line

Par* lo Saidat-
pur, Wh.,1 to
ftaipur.

Pur* lo
Madnnpur,

Si"

Pa^k .<. Tugh-

ttoD, ' Whul
to Raipur.

Mangraulj,
Ara"dp'«.

Divisional Headquarters al Raipur. Communicalion by lamp. Telegraph line ^^^|

The crossing of the Jumna was effected without inter- ^^|
ruption, and nothing was seen of the enemy beyond a few ^^|
patrols, amounting in all to about one squadron, which ^^|
retired westwards over the Tughlakabad ridges. During the ^^|
afternoon the " A " Corps Cavalry Brigade commenced to ^^|
arrive and to take over a portion of the outpost line of the ^^|
1st Cavalry Brigade. The Commander of the latter pushed ^^|
forward two squadrons on to the ridges 2 miles west of ^^|

112 CAVALRY STUDIES

Okhla in order to secure his passage of the river on th#
morrow, The following order was issued at 19 hours:

No. 3. — Operation Order

y Division.
Headquarters, Raipur,

^^lh Fibrvary, 1905 (19 Ansri).
it Cavalry DiviHon was unopposed, except by^
all lo about a squadron ; they retired »

1. (fi) The crossing of the 1:
few hostile patrols, amounting in
<iver the Tughlakabad ridges.

(*) Outposts of Eastern Cavalry on general line Okhla station, Tughlakal;
and ridge running southwards,
(f) Brigades bivouac as follows :

Tsl — holding line of the Kaila-Chilla canal, with Its head;)ua

and line A (pack) at Okhla.
5lh — at Mandanpur, with and line A,
and— at Tughlakabad station with 2nd line A.
3rd — at Amadpur, transport complete.
2nd line B (wheel) of ist, znd, and 5th Brigades is at Raipur.

2. Brigades to be ready to n,arch at j hours to-morrow,

3. Pontoons at Raipur to be left under escort from znd Brigade ; those at
Karauli to be protected by detachment 3rd Brigade, till Corps Cavalrj' comes

4. DiviBional Head (juar lets at Raipur.

Remarks on the First Day's Operations.

The objective of the march was to reach the Jumna, but
the Division had to move towards the passages over the
river at a safe distance from the enemy's forces which hold
Delhi. It was necessary therefore to detail a Brigade to flank
the march of the Division in order to secure tactical liberty
of action in the event of having to co-operate against any
attempt of the enemy from Delhi.

This Brigade was posted along the line of the Kaila-Chilla
canal, in order to close the plain to the enemy until the
28th instant, when the " A " Corps Cavalry Brigade might
reasonably be expected to relieve it.

The first stage of the march of the Division under these
conditions terminated at the Jumna r beyond that river the
country is rocky, and the road via Tughlakabad to the
Rajputana Railway constitutes a defile. Until the 28th
instant, however, all danger and interest centred towards

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

113

Delhi. If the flank guard were threatened by a sortie of
hostile Cavalry from Delhi, the Division would have operated
so as to support it, because if this enemy's Cavalry were
successful they would be able, not only to jeopardise the
safety of tlie 4th Cavalry Brigade near Dankaur. but also
to attack and delay the heads of columns of the Infantry
Divisions further to the rear. The task of the flank guard
was to prevent any such success being possible.

On the 28th instant the ist Brigade (acting as flank guard),
when relieved by Corps Cavalry Brigade " A," will rejoin its
division.

The 1st Cavalry Division then finally abandons all idea of
action on the left bank of the Jumna, and advances to gain
the ridges beyond that river.

Thus the special character of the march of the Division on
the 27th instant was based on the disposition of the flank
guard to cover it toward.s Delhi.

Now for the detail of the execution of the march. The
Ist Brigade held on its right the passages over the Hindan
River about the East Indian Railway bridge, and those over
the Kaila-Chilla canal to a point beyond the Jumna near
OkhJa. The latter point, with its sluices and the bund over
the Jumna and the main road to the south, were seized and
strongly held as a bridge-head as soon as possible. The
main body of the Brigade remained in a position of readiness
near Gharauli.

The march of the three other Brigades was as follows :

Sth Brigade, Dasna to Saadatpur, arriving between 9 and

10 hours.
2nd Brigade, Dehra to Sarai Sadar, arriving between 10

and II hours.

3rd Brigade, Dadri to Nagla, arriving about 8 hours.

There are usually several fords over the Jumna between

Raipur and Karauli, but owing to a heavy fall of rain the

river became unfordable, so the pontoons, which are available,

were required.

114

CAVALRY STUDIES

During the whole of the 37th instant, whilst the danger was
on the side of Delhi, the Division could on no account settle
down to bivouac on the river, until reports from the flank
guard made it clear that no offensive movement was coO'
templated by the enemy moving south-east from Delhi

The Division therefore remained in a position of readiness
during most of the day, so that Brigades could operate north-
wards if required, and the transport could be closed up.

During this halt of Brigades in positions of readiness, the
General Officer Commanding the Division was with the flank
guard. In principle, the General Officer Commanding marches
wherever the tactical interest lies ; and usually, therefore,
with the advance guard. In this case he will be best able
to judge of the situation if he is with the flank guard.

Only when all probability of an offensive movement from
the direction of Delhi was past^ — say about 15 hours — and
when the western movement of the enemy over the railway
bridge appeared to be continuing unabated, could the Cavalry'
Division move on towards the Jumna.

The interest of the march now changed from the flank tOi
the head, and the advance guards assumed an important
tactical role. How far ahead should they march?

They should march sufficiently far ahead to give usi
possession of the exits of the defiles across the Jumna.
That is to say, the advance guards should be in possession
of the canal and ridges west of the river, before the main
bodies of the Brigades begin to cross.

Brigades halted on evening of 27th instant as follows ;

2nd Brigade near Tughlakabad station.

5th „ „ Madanpur.

3rd „ „ Amadpur.

ist „ on the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal v

its left at Okhla.
4th I, on reconnaissance.

And now to return to the 4th Brigade (see Sketch 9).
This Brigade was ordered forward on Sunday afternoon,

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 115

26lh instant, to Dankaur, 13 miles from Sikandarabad, thence
4 miles to Atta, on the Jumna, charged with the full responsi-
bility of clearing up the situation on the west of Delhi.

On Sunday night, certain reconnoitring detachments were
pushed across the Jumna to scout over the roads and railways
leading west and south-west from Delhi, and to examine
tactical points where traces of the enemy are likely to be
found.

What localities in the di.strict in question should be recon-
noitred ? Two reconnoitring detachments might be sent out,
one towards Nangloi station, the other in the direction of
Gurgaon to scout to Bahadurgarh.

These parties will then cut all the routes of importance.
They would be provided with signalling equipment for day
and night, telephone or carrier pigeons if possible, and with
means for tapping telegraph wires.

Transmission of Reports. — No telegraph lines run direct.
But a branch line of wire might have been run out at once
from Sikandarabad to the Jumna at Atta, and even led across
the river. Sufficient wire might even be available south of
Sikandarabad station on East Indian Railway to run an air
line to Dankaur and Atta. Probably, however, helio, lamp,
telephone or cable, pigeons (from some frontier post), native
runners, or motor-bicycles would have to be used. Early
information is of first importance to the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, because the great operations depend
upon his decisions, and his decisions depend upon his
information.

It may sometimes be convenient to send messengers along
roads in carts or ekkas ; three or four horses per troop should,
therefore, be trained for harness.

Sometimes, again, it is possible in civilised warfare to
support the patrols with one or two detachments, or relay
posts, whose presence midway lessens danger and distance for
patrols and despatch-riders.

What should the strength of these two :
detachments be ?

ii6

CAVALRY STUDIES

Their role is not to fight, so they should be as weak as |
possible, commensurate with the requisite number for scouting,
for examination of the country, for demolition work and I
despatch-riding.

(a) Take the first case, that of the patrol towards Nangloi
station — for actual scouting say one officer and four to
six trained " regimental scouts." Reports will probably
be sent back from the following places : (i) Faridabad
— whether signs of enemy have been found on the
Agra road and railway. (2) Somewhere near Tughia-
kabad or the Ku tab— reporting if ridges are held or
not, and whether there are any signs of enemy on the
main Delhi-Gurgaon road which passes the Kutab.
(3) Palum station — stating what is going on upon the
Rajputana-Malwa Railway and the Delhi-Gurgaon old
road which passes Philadpur. (4) Naiigloi, on the
Southern Punjab Railway and road to Bahadurgarh,
Total as above eight messengers .... 8
Signallers with helio, lamp, and appliances for

tapping telegraph lines . ... 4
Pioneers with demolition material . . .2

Spare 6

Say I officer and 20 men with 26 horses (that is to say, a
troop with its weaker elements withdrawn).

But to facilitate the transmission of reports to Brigade
Headquarters and to act as a feeder for patrols, some larger
body should be provided on the Tughlakabad line, especially
as this patrol will be working nearer to where the enemy is
known to be (Delhi) ; so a whole " contact squadron " should
be charged with the mission towards Nangloi.

As regards the use of the contact squadron for supplying
more patrols when the situation demands, it should be noted
that once definite traces of the enemy's whereabouts have
been found, the reconnaissance enters on a second phase. The
numbers of scouts and patrols must then be considerably
increased so as to develop and augment the information. A

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) ri?

true picture of the enemy's disposition can only be obtained
by probing his front at numerous points, and collating the
several threads of information thus gathered.

(p) As regards the strength of the patrol towards Gurgaon,
allow an officer and 6 scouts for actual reconnaissance
work ; and for despatch-riding from —
(i) Ballabgarh, on Agra road and railway ;
{2) Ridges beyond Pali, where the road passes through
the hills ;

(3) Near Gurgaon, on main direct road and rail to Ajmere ;

(4) Najafgarh or Bahadurgarh ;

that is four messages — i.e. 8 despatch- riders.

Signallers and pioneers, as for No. i patrol, make a total of
I officer and 20 men with 26 horses. Say a " contact troop,"
as calculated for the actual reconnoitring detachment of the
first reconnaissance.

But in this case it seems unnecessary to increase the
detachment to the strength of a squadron because —

(i) The Brigade will move via Pali to Gurgaon — i.e. in rear
of this patrol — and will itself act as a haven of refuge for
messengers and as patrol " reservoir."

(2) It is necessary to avoid, until the last possible moment,
attracting attention to the direction in which the Brigade
proposes to march. A contact troop is less likely to attract
observation than a whole squadron.

(3) Rapidity is essential ; one troop marches faster than
four troops.

The detachments detailed for these two reconnaissances
should be pushed across the River Jumna with as little
delay as possible.

But it seems unnecessary to send them forward at once
from Sikandarabad. Some advantage will be gained by keeping
them in rear of the advance guard of the Brigade until the
Jumna is reached ; for their horses will thus be spared a
certain amount of reconnaissance work, whilst but little time
will be lost. The detachments would, however, march at the

ii8 CAVALRY STUDIES

head of the main body, and the bridging appliances in rear of
the guns, so that there should be as little delay as possible in
getting them across the Jumna. Some reconnoitring patrols
will already be out near the Jumna, as the Brigade would
have been halting at Sikandarabad in the ordinary course of
events.

The characteristic of the reconnaissance is rapidity. How
is rapidity to be combined with the numbers required in the
central mass ?

The unfits of each unit sent forward must be left to come
on at a slower pace with the main body, or be sent back to
the nearest depot on the communications. It seems better
to select units in this manner than to select fit men and
horses, and then to organise a special body on the spur of
the moment, as has been done upon occasions.

As regards tapping the telegraph wires, the object is to
take the place of the Delhi signallers and to receive messages
from Ajmere, Bhiwani, Rewari, etc., etc., before the enemy is
aware of what is being done.

What should be the nature of the inslructiom given to the
contact squadron and to the reconnoitring troops sent forward
from the 4th Brigade at Atta?

Their objective is to examine the roads and railways which
lead from Delhi towards Ajmere and Bhiwani, the bases of
the Western State, so as to discover whether the hostile Army
has left Delhi, or has been joined by reinforcements from
either ba.se.

Avoid laying down an itinerary for such reconnaissances or
prescribing the exploration of a particular zone of country.
To examine a specified zone of country, the scouting party
must move by zig-zags ; thus more than double the work is
thrown needlessly on the horses.

The answer to a reconnoitring problem will often be found
only by making use of indications discovered as one goes
along, and by acting as the circumstances of the case demand.
Thus the point made for by a patrol may frequently change
during its day's march. The axis of one reconnaissance

Tiand. ^^J

lange ^H

will ^^H

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 119

in this case be Tughlakabad-Nangloi stations. The axis
of the other reconnaissance will be Ballabgarh-Gurgaon-
Bahadurgarh.

In the former there seem to be six important knots of
communications on to which "soundings " should be dropped,
namely :

1. Cross-roads, north-west of Tajpul.

2. „ „ Mahrauli.

3. „ „ north-east of Philadpur,

4. Palum railway station.

5- Nangloi station and high road.
6. Badii „ „ „

In the second case there are three, namely ;

1. About Gurgaon,

2. „ Najafgarh.

3. „ Bahadurgarh.

The officer in charge of each reconnaissance will go from
one point to another as he judges best. If on the way he
gets any important information of the enemy, he will split up
his patrol. He will himself follow the enemy, and send on
detachments, so as to cut all roads up to the last one. An
important point : remember that every detachment must be
informed as to the march of the Brigade, in order to be able
to send back despatch-riders direct with reports.

The reconnoitring orders issued to the Brigade at Sikan-
darabad might, then, read somewhat as follows :

No, 39.— Operation Orders. — 4/j Cavalry BrigaA.

Headquarters, Sikandarabad :

itih February, 1905 (i4i Aaars'i.
t. (o) The enemy is belie\ed to have telitcd 10 the right banit of the Jumna

{*) Our Army is foUowinfi him up.
3. The objective of the 4lh Cavi\1ry Brigade is to clear up the
weal of Delhi and to inleirupt the enemy'
lo hia bases at Ajmeie and Bbiwam.

I20 CAVALRY STUDIES

3, The roarch will be continued to-day vii Dhaokanr to Atla at 15 hour*, t

which hour the head of the msin body will cross the Dadri-I'

high road : —
Advaocc Guard. — i Sqiiadrou, 7th Hussars.
Main body. — 7th Hussars (less I squadron).
" D " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
Bridging dclachmenl.
1 2th Cavalry.

lOth Lancers (less 1 troop).
1st Line Transport in order of units.
and Line Transport.
Rear Guard. — One Iroop, loth Lancers.

4. The Officer Commanding 7th Hussars will detail the following u
special reconnaissance duly. The oflicers detailed will report at Brigade Head- |
quarters for orders without delay. Three days' supplies on pack c

(a) One squadron.

(i) One troop with signalling parly and squadron materials for demolition. !
Six regimental scouts to be attached.

5, Ail unfit men and horses will march from camp at 15J hours under orders of '

Captain X., tolh Lancers, to Dadri, where he will report to OEcer
Commanding Detachment, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, for instructions.

6. Reports to be sent (o main guard of advance guard.

Xb/e.—The »qUBdron ordered in 4 (a) includes signallers and pioneers with
materia! sufficient to damage the railways and wires. The instnimenl and tele-
graphist for tapping wires must be attached from Brigade Headquarters or fron
telegraph company Royal Engineers.

Unless some boats or pontoons had been available, the
passage of the mam body of the Brigade over the Jumna
would present considerable difficulties, as the river was unex-
pectedly found to be unfordable.

As regards the direction of march to be taken by the main
body of the Brigade, the Tughlakabad pass is only some ten
or eleven miles from the Delhi forts, so the Brigade should
take a more southerly route, say, by the north side of Bal-
labgarh to Pali. The latter place is sixteen miles from Atta,
and should be reached by noon on Monday, 27th instant.

The pass about six miles east of Gurgaon and south-west
of Ghutorni village, and over which the main Delhi road to
Rewari and the south-west runs, is some twelve miles farther
on. The Brigade should be able to occupy this pass, and the
hills to the north of it by Monday evening, February 27. '

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 121

These hills afford a very strong position towards north-west
and east.

Supply of i,th Brigade. — Only pack transport, on account of
the difficulty of getting carts over the Jumna near Atta, and
also on account of the nature of the country from Pali north-
wards.

As wheel vehicles became emptied they should be sent to
fill up, and to remain with the Divisional Supply Column,
which is on its march towards Raipur, until an opportunity
for rejoining arises (see p. 135).

The reconnoitring Brigade thus leaves Atta on Monday
morning with three days' supplies (i on man, 2 on pack), i.e.,
it is rationed till Wednesday night, March 1.

For any special operation of this sort it seems essential that
the transport of a Cavalry Division be so organised that it is
possible to allot an extra allowance of pack animals as cir-
cumstances require to any particular Brigade.'

The Brigade will now have learnt from the reconnoitring
parties that there are no movements on the roads from Delhi,
and that the enemy is still at Delhi. Should the patrols
already sent out be now ordered to move upon Delhi? Or
should we send out fresh ones ?

Send out fresh ones, because —

(a) Time would be lost in recalling the first lot : and

(J)) They are already fatigued.

We now enter on a fresh phase of the reconnaissances.
The objectives of the first reconnaissance were to find
traces of the enemy and to locate his whereabouts. Now,
however, that we have located his positions approximately,
our next objective is to ascertain, without delay, the roads by
which the enemy proposes to leave Delhi ; to signal his
approach along them, and immediately to launch as strong a
force as possible upon his columns.

Therefore as many reconnaissances must be sent out as
there are roads available for the enemv.

• II is l^lieve"! thit the S. and T. Officer al
power DOW of Iranstemiig triiiispon.

nal Headt|uarter5 h

122 CAVALRY STUDIES

There are four roads, not counting those leading directly^^
south, which the ist Brigade detachment on ridge west of I
Okhla guards, viz. :

1 to Gurgaon.

2 „ Najafgarh.

3 „ Bahadurgarh.

4 „ SonepaL

The 2nd Cavalry Division will by Tuesday night or Wed-
nesday be in occupation of this last road. So it seems
sufficient to hold the three remaining; three patrols will
suffice in this case. The presence of British officers with all
these patrols is not so important, except upon the first two
roads, because simple observation, not tactical deduction, is now
required. Each of these reconnaissances will advance to
some suitable position of observation from which scouts will
be sent further forward to gain touch. So the strength of
these patrols should be at least 6, viz. 4 to hold the post
of observation and 3 scouts out in front.,

Touch must be continuous, and the posts must not be
allowed to be brushed aside by any counter-move of the
enemy. The patrol must consequently be closely supported.
For this purpose squadrons must be sent forward in their
rear, either to hold tactical points or to act offensively against
any hostile reconnoitring parties.

On Wednesday, March i, the 1st Division will have come
up to its reconnoitring Brigade, and all will be concentrated
in a position of readiness near Najafgarh.

The supporting squadrons and patrols sent out on the 27th
must be relieved on the 28th, to save horses and men excessive
fatigue.

Communication by telegraph, or otherwise, should be
established between the several parts of the Division, and
towards the crossings on the Jumna.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 123

SECOND DAY.

Tuesday, February 2ii.

Cavalry prevent Escape of Enemy's Main Army.

At 20 hours last night, February 27, information was
received from the 4th Brigade that they had cut the Delhi-
Agra railway line near Ballabgarh and had opened up tele-
graphic communication between that place and Tughlakabad
station via the railway telegraph line. The following orders
were then issued :

--Oprr

-11/ Cavalry Division.

GHLAKABAU STATION:

3.%th Fibruary, 1 905 (3 hsuri).
I is slill in ihe entrenched omp of

I. (o) Our scouls report Ihat Ihe enemj
Delhi.

(4) The 4[h Brigade hailed near Uui^aon lasl evening with delachmenls
reconnoitring all routes from Delhi leading towards west and south-
west. It marches at daylight on IJahadui^arh.
3. The Division will niBrch nt daylight, via Mahraali on Najafgarh to support
Ihe 4lh Brigade in preventing Ihe enemy from moving westwards.

3. Brigades will march in the following order to the Kajputtna'Malwa railway,
and will holt in that vicinity until the transport has come up to the tine —

(a) The and Brigade (less ind Line Transport) will leave Tughlakalad at
6 hours and take up positions between the Kulab and Amadalpur with
Ihe object of opposing any hostile movement from Delhi against Ihe
right flank of Ihe Division.

{b) The 5lh Brigade (less and Line Transport) will follow the 2nd Brigade as
far as Mahrauli, whence it will march on Shahabad with the object of
covering ihe head of the Division from the west and south.

(0 The 3rd Brigade (less and Line Transport) will march neiit as far a*
Maaudpur, where it will concentrate in a position of readiness.

(f) Theznd LineTiansportof Brigades will march al timesetated on attached
table viS Mahrauli and Sukhrali to the vicinity of Alawirdi (3 miles
north of Gurgaon), where it will halt and oulspan,

(0 The General Officer Commanding, 1st Brigade, will detail one regiment
with a section Royal Horse Artillery, to reach Tughlakabad by 7 hours
and hold a position in that vicinily to cover the passage of the trans-
port. This detachment will Ihen follow as rear guard. The remainder
of Ihe Brigade, after being relieved by Corps Cavalry Brigade " A,"
will concentrate at Okhla and march v\k Mahrauli to Alawirdi.

4. KeporU will be sen! to Mahrauli.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Itinerary foi

Tuesday,

2%th.

.Dd BiiEide.

5th BriBid..

3rd BrigidB.

ist Brigiirf=.

*dlBHgrf5lK

Line of

Tughlakabad

Madanpnr

Amadptir

Okhla.

]

nmrcli

Mahriuli.

Tughlakabad

Tughlakahad

Mahrauli .

Masudpur .

Mahrauli.

Masudpur .

Thence across

Shahabad .

country to
Alawirdi.

Hour of

6 hmira

5 hours

As soon as

suming

the Brigade
trated.

ixine

OQline KuUb

Shahabad .

Masudpur .

I regiment

Orderswillbe

halt

to Amadal-

and section

issued wheiv

par.

Royal Hotse
Artillery to
Tughlaka-
bad, then

port as rear

the further
tinued.

3nd Line

PackatTogh-

Concenltaie

Maich at 7

guard.
Concentrate

Trans-

lakabad by

by 7 hours

hours to

at Tugbla-

port.

5.45 bo"".

al Tughla-

Tughlaka-

kabad sta-

then follow

kabad sta-

had station,

and follow

in rear of

tion, thence

thence by

3rd Brigade

al7.30vii

Sth Brigade

to Mahrauli,

Mahrauli

and in rear

thence rii

to Alawirdi

of lEt Bri-

Sukhrali 10

gade trans-

Alawirdi.

leiv ■

The znd Brigade was in position on the line Kutat^
Amadalpur by 9 hours, the sth Brigade was posted
Shahabad watching the left flank of the Division, by 13 noon.
The 3rd Brigade at same hour was in a position of
readiness about Masudpur, The relief of the ist Brigade by
the "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade was completed by 6 hours ;
1st Brigade left Okhla at 8 hours and reached the Kutab by
13 noon. The flank guard, referred to in Divisional Order
No, 4, paragraph 3 (c) above, remained in position south of
Okhla station till 14 hours. The rear of the column of
transport left Tughlakabad station at 1 1 hours and reached the
Kutab at 14 hours. Reports that hostile Cavalry had crossed
the Jumna near Raipur yesterday seem to have reached

SXETCifSL

4lli Gil. Brigade from SikudinM

route of No. 1 and 2 roconnaissanoaft,
^®- ^ laft bank of Jumna near Atta.

h^ ky 4th Btf«. ita«ir.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 125"

Delhi, as the Western Commander sent out a force of about
one Cavalry division, apparently with the object of clearing
up the situation towards the Kutab and Tughlakabad. An
engagement took place on the front Kutab-Okhla between
this reconnoitring force and the Eastern Cavalry. The latter
dismounted, held the ridges, and made a counter- stroke, driving
the Western Cavalry detachment back upon Delhi. During
the afternoon, information was received that the 4th Brigade
was at Najafgarh with reconnoitring patrols, supported by
squadrons, on the routes which leave Delhi on the west,
namely, to Najafgarh and Bahadurgarh, both inclusive. On
this the following order was issued at 17 hours :

No. s, — Operation Orders.— 11/ Cnva/ry Divishn.

Hkadquahtbrs, Mahraoli;

i&lh Ftbniary, 190S (17 hours).
1. (a) The enemy's army 1; nlioul Delhi. About four of his regiments of
Cavalry *ilh guns which advanced southwards lo-day were driven
back into Delhi sviih severe lo&s by our I.sl, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades.
i/i) The 4ih Brigade is near Najafgarh with a detachment near Nangloi

(() The " A " Corps Cavalry Brigade has occupied a position on the ridge
about one mile west of Okhla.
z. The Division will bivouac aa nnder and will lie ready to oppose any attempt
of the enemy to break out of Delhi^

5th Brigade near Palum station.

and „ „ Philadpur.

3rd „ ,, Rajokhri with a detached troop near Mahrauli lo-

connect with the " A " Corps Brigoiie.
1st ,, „ Cut|[8Dn Station.

3. Divisional Headquarters will be at Gurgaon Station.

Late in the day our scouts reported that a large body of the
enemy's Cavalry had at about 14 hours to-day settled down
in bivouac near Chankri — strength about 20 to 30 squadrons
with guns. The following order was issued at 19 hours :
No. 6,— Operation Orders.— 11/ Cavalry Division.

IlEADrJUARTBRS, GlTRGAON RATLWAV STATION ;

i% h F in ary 905 ( 9 * nri).

I. The situation is unchang'd e ep ha scout ep rt h a 1 ), body oi
'Western Cavalry settled down n b vo a a abou 4hurs odyna Chankri
on the west nf Delhi. S ngh sone ao 30 quad ns h guns

]. Brigades will be r ady o ma h a 5 ho n Ma h

CAVALRY STUDIES

THIRD DAY.

Wednesday, March i.
The Cavalry Combat.

No. 7.— Operation Orders,— irt Cavalry Division.

Hbadquartkrs, Guroaon Station :

1st March, 1905 (3 heurs).
I. {0) The enemy's Cavalry, reporled near ChanUri last evening, is eslimaled J
at 3 divisions. A new Infantry bivouac is reported near Nuihaulo.
(i) Our and Cavalry Division was on the line Maodaula-Loni yeslerd&jr "1
morning.

a. The 1st Cavalry Division will concentrate with the object of attacking
the hostile Cavalry should it attempt to leave the fortress. The roads from Delhi
towards the west and south-west will be observed by detached posts.

3. («) The independent role of the 4th Brigade is over. The Brigadier will '

send forward a squadron towanls Chankri to get touch with the

enemy's Cavalry and report his movements. The roads from Delhi

towards Bahadurgarh will be observed. The rest of the Brigade will

concentrate near Najafgarh at 6 hours.
^S) The General Officer Commanding 5th Brigade will observe the country

from the Rajpulana-Malwa railway on the east to Mataula on the

west (both inclusive). The Brigade (less detachments) will concentrate

near Palum village at 6 hours.
(f') The 1st and znd Brigades and 3rd Brigade (less one squadron) will

march at hours lo a position of readiness near Amberhai.
(<f) The General Officer Commanding 3rd Brigade will detail one squadron

to protect the Kutab " Minar" (where a signalling station ii .

established) and will observe the road from Delhi viS Philadpur 1

towards Gurgaon.

4. Second Line Transport will concentrate at Gurgaon Station.

5. Reports after 7 hours, to he sent 10 Amberhai.

Narrative.

The above movements were carricti out as directed. At a
about 10 hours information was received that about 3 Divisional
(36 squadrons) of the enemy's Cavalry, with guns, were 1
advancing from Chankri in the direction of Najafgarh along J
the south bank of the Najafgarh canal. Three officers werel
sent out lo make a rapid sketch of the country between T
Mataula and the R.-M. railway. As the result of this!
reconnaissance the 4th Brigade was ordered to occupy Mataula, J
the Artillery was posted on the ridge to the south and south-^

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 127

■east of that place and the remainder of the division moved
towards the village of Palum to a place affording better
cover (see Sketch 10). The enemy posted his guns on some
commanding sandhills east of Hashtal, and pivoting on them
■continued his advance toward the south-west. Our Cavalry then
iDoved east of Mataula, and forming for attack compelled the
enemy to change his direction towards the south-east and
thus to mask the fire of his guns whilst ours were enabled to
■enfilade him up to the last moment. The enemy gave way
and retreated towards Delhi in disorder, abandoning most of
his guns. After the action the following orders were issued :

No. 8.-Oper

1 Orders.— iw Cavalry Divisian.
HeadqUahtbrs, Palum Station ;

11/ Marik, 1905 C13 hours).
1. (a) The enemy's losses in the Cuvftlty aclion lhi» forenoon include ao guns,
(i) The hill dose to Nuriana is now strongly held by the enemy, otherwise

the siluation on the south-west front of Delhi is UDchanged.
(c) Our 6th Cavalry Brigade (ind Cavalry Division) occupied a position
near Badii station this morning. Mahrauli is held tiy the "B"
Corps Cavalry Brigade and the ridge north of Tughlakabad by the
4lh Infantry Division of the Second Army Corps and "A" Corps
Cavalry Brigade.
a. The Division will occupy posiiions 00 Ihe main roads from Delhi with the
object of preventing the enemy froni moving towards Bahadurgarh, Najafgaih.
4)r GuijaoD.

3. Brigades will hold posilio:

5ih E

r Munilktt.

Najafgarh.
and ,, „ Philadpur,

Raj p u tana- Mai wa rail
3rd ,, „ Rujokhri, in readiness I

Cavalry Brigade and
from Mahrauli on Gurgaon.
The 4lh Brigade will be in Reserve near BiJB'u
4. Divisional Headiiuarlers will be at Bijwasun,

Brigade will also guard the
■UppoH the " B " Corps

Remarks on Third Day's Operations.

With reference to the situation on the evening of March 1,
the Western Cavalry having been defeated, the next objective
is to gain touch with the Western Army.

The independent Cavalry must be directly under theorders
of the Commander-in-Chief and be manoeuvred in accordance

I2S

CAVALRY STUDIES

with the strategical plan. Does he intend to blockade the 4
Western Army in Delhi, or to allow it to leave the place ii
order to engage in a decisive battle near Delhi ?

In the first case, masses of Cavalry must be pushed forwardil
as close as possible to Delhi, in order to command the mainfl
exits with guns ; in other words, to invest the place as closelyl
as possible until the Eastern Infantry can come up.

In the second case, the Western columns must be allowet
to emerge from the intrenched camp of Delhi. The genera
plan should be to have a Brigade ready to oppose the advanci
of the Western columns on each of the roads by which thq
can march westwards, say on the line Mundka-Najafgarh-
Philadpur-Mahrauli, In case of attack these Brigades will|
gradually fall back to a position fixed upon beforehand and!
rendered impregnable against a simple direct attack. This-'
front should allow room for the Western forces to deploy for
battle. At the same time sufficient depth must be secured
for the columns of march of the Eastern Army to form up
for battle and to ensure to them perfect freedom of
manceuvre. This was the plan adopted for March 2.

Care, however, must always be taken that the dispersion
of the Cavalry is justified by gaining first a victory over the
hostile mounted troops! In the case under consideration
a scattered disposition at this period is justified, and seems the
best way of adapting the means to the immediate end in
view, viz. to prevent the enemy from escaping before the
Eastern main columns can engage him in battle.

FOURTH DAY.

Thursday, March 2.

Observing the Enemy's Movements.

The hostile force, observed the previous evening, March I
in occupation of Nuriana, advanced during the night and d
daylight was in possession of the ridges east and north-eai
of Philadpur. The 2nd Brigade fell back to a position
near Mulukpur. During the day it was ascertained, both by

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 129

■ports received and by observations from the summit of the
Kutub " Minar," that the enemy was concentrating large
f bodies of troops on the south of Delhi with the evident in-
[ tention of attempting to break out to the west or the south-
I west on the following day. The following was the situation
I on Thursday evening, March 2 (see Sketch 11) :

The enemy took the offensive to-day on the south of Delhi,
I and by nightfall holds the following general line with outposts
\ about a mile farther south :

Mangul Ria (near Raj pu tana-Mai wa railway).
Philadpur.
Mujahadpur.
Humayun's Tomb.
2, The Eastern Forces are disposed as under —

First Army Corps (less I division) 1 On line Okhla-Vea-
Second „ j kutpur-Simalka.

Third „ Sultanpur-Shikandarpur, with detach-

ments watching the approaches from Ajmere.
Cavairy. — 1st Cavalry Division (less i Brigade) near Dun-
Idahera (on the Gurgaon-Philadpur road).
Sth Brigade Amberhai.
2nd Cavalry Division. — Mundka.

The following orders were issued by the Commander-in-
IChief:

No. 50.— Operation Orders.— fojWin Army.

Headquarters, RujokhhI ;

2Hii March, 1905 (17 heiirs).
LI. Lii^e hostile bivooacE are visible tram the Kulub on Ihe line Humayun's
" imh, Philadpur. The enemy's tighl seems to be near Mangul Ria.

"he iotention of ihe General Officer Commanding is to hold the enemy on
e Tughlakabad-Rujokhri, and \o take the offensive against the enemy's
wilh Ihe object of driving him eastwards towards the Jumna and preventing
im into Delhi fortress.
[ 3. {a) TheGencralOffiecr Commanding FirslAtmyCorpawill sironglyenirench
a position near Tughlakabad, which must be held at all custs as a pivot
of manoeuvre for the rest of the Army, and to cover the bridges at
Raipur.
(i) The General Officer Commanding Second Army Corps will entrench and
strongly occupy the high ground which lies between the villages of
Mulukpur-Sikandatpur-Ghutomi with the object of ptevcniing the

|0 CAVALRY STUDIES

enemy from marching towards Cutgian. The positions now o(

on the line Yealtutpui-Mulukpur will be held as a. false front i

as possible.
(c) The Third Army Corps will ha» to-night on the line Ambethai-Si

and al daylight to-motro«- will advance towards Philadpur and Mi

with the object of occupying the ridge between those villages.
(if) The and Cavalry Division will co-operate on the left of the Third

Corps by engaging the enemy on the front Chanltri-Nuriana ai

as it is daylight,
(c) The 1st Cavalry Division will

Chief in a position of readi
4. Reports to be sent to Rujokhri.

It the disposal of the Gencral-ii
Rujokhri.

FIFTH DAY.

Friday' , March 3.

Cavalry in the General Action.

The general engagement is in progress on the morning of J
the 3rd instant. The enemy advancing in strength from the^
line Munirka-Majahadpur have driven back the Second Army 1
Corps from their false front on the Rujokhri ridge, and 1
enemy now occupy the hills north-west of Mahrauli. AtJ
about 11 hours large masses of the enemy, covered by 1
troops holding this latter position, are pushed southwards 1
from Kutab in an attempt to escape towards Rewari by j
passing to the east of Gurgaon. The 1st Cavalry Division J
is ordered to leave its position of readiness near Rujokhri and
to delay this movement.

How should the Cavalry Division act? — The Divisional
Commander, being himself in a good "look-out" position and'1
in constant communication with his own selected staff officers, f
specially deputed to watch the course of the action, is not sur- ]
prised at receiving this order. He has possibly already detected I
the enemy's attempt to break out, and has decided in his own I
mind on some plan of action to meet it. To delay the enemy J
can only mean to attack him: and so at least to force his I
column to deploy. From a study of tlie ground on the spot,!
it seemed possible for the Cavalry Division to advance con-^
cealed in a column of brigade masses over the neck across
which the road from Gurgaon to Ghutorni village passes, to a

"1
i

•4
si

1
(

a
t
f

1
t

(

I
t

r
c
c
1
c

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

131

point within 500 yards of the latter village ; but one or two
small nullahs would have thrown brigades into disorder had
they come upon them unawares at a fast pace. In order to
take measures to ensure the smooth passage of the Division
over them it was essential for the Genera! Officer Com-
' manding to have known beforehand that they were there.
The ground being soft, easy soil, a sufficient number of
passages could quickly have been made, probably with half
I an hour's work, to ensure the rapid deployment of the
Division in the required direction.

On reaching the edge of the plain west of Ghutorni village,
I the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades were ordered to deploy and to
I attack respectively in the direction of the villages of Sultanpur,
L.Satbari, and Chandan.

The remaining two Brigades were at first retained in hand
tin case the opposing Cavalry should appear. It seemed
L.natural to expect that some hostile squadrons would have
I been reorganised out of the 72 which took part in the Cavalry
laction on the ist instant, two whole days ago, and these would
(doubtless closely support the enemy's bid for freedom.

The ground seemed very favourable for the attack of the
I Eastern Cavalry Division ; and, given foresight in previously
I reconnoitring the ground and determination in the execution
lof the attack, important tactical results may be expected
Ifrom' Cavalry operating in this manner at the right moment.

This attack checked the efforts of the Western Army to
■ break out southward. A general attack by the First and
(Second Army Corps, supported by the Third Army Corps
kand the 2nd Cavalry Division, was at once ordered. The
TWestcrn Army, attacked in front, and threatened in flank,
retreated in disorder on Delhi, pursued by the two Cavalry
Divisions.

General Remarks,
Into this Study have been introduced Brigades of Corps
Cavalry. These, sometimes called " Advance-Guard Cavalry,"
n p. 3, " Protective Cavalry," are for the provision of the

132 CAVALRY STUDIES

First Line of Security for the Army as a whole. Hitherto,
the units of which the Brigades consist have been regiments,
one of which has been attached to every Infantry Division,
and denominated Divisional Cavalry, But to detail a whole
Cavalry Regiment to an Infantry Division seems a waste of
power, when two or more Infantry Divisions are grouped in
the field.

Moreover, the disadvantages of having Cavalry marching
amongst the Infantry columns are obvious: this, however,
must occur when Infantry Divisions are grouped into corps,
unless at the same time their Divisional Cavalry regiments
are grouped into Brigades. In the field the latter practice
has usually been followed : thus we find Marshal Soult issuing
the following orders on this head on September 25, 1805,
regarding some three or four Light Cavalry regiments which
formed part of his Corps. They had been organised into a
body called the Light Cavalry Division, though in reality in
strength it was only equal to one of our Indian Brigades.
The order begins as follows : —

The Division will always be concenlraled and will receive orders direct from
Corps Headquarters. The regiments of which it is composed will only be-
detached as a temporary mensure (and then only by viitae of a special order
from Corps Ueadquarters) for duly uniler Ihe orders tif one of the General
Officers Commanding an Infantry Division. The General Officer CommandinE
the Light Cavalry Division wilt detail a party of ten Hussars or "Chasseurs"
under a senior Non-Com missioned Officer for duty as despatch-riders with the '
Headquarters of each Inbniry Division. These detachments are to be relieved
every eight days.

In this Study this practice has been adopted, and the
regiments usually allotted to Infantry Divisions have been
grouped into one Cavalry Brigade, per Army Corps of three
Infantry Divisions. A detachment, however, of one troop ^
per Infantry Division is detailed weekly from the Corps j
Cavalry Brigade and attached to the Headquarters of Infantry I
Divisions for orderly and despatch-riding duties.

The Corps Cavalry Brigade thus formed is, however, without
Horse Artillery.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

133

The following extract from an essay on the " Cavalry in
the Gettysburg Campaign" by Colonel Davis, United States
Army, shows how the force of circumstances in the field
compelled also the Americans to group their Cavalry into
large corps instead of retaining it "fractioned amongst
Infantry units" ;

" I will say a word in closing as to the lessons taught by
this campaign. In the first place, what may be called the
'science of outposts' was developed as it had not been
before in the history of war. Up to this time the practice
had been to maintain a chain of Infaotry outposts along the
front and flanks of an Army in the vicinity of the enemy-
Cavalry had been neither freely nor boldly used, and outpost
duty had, as a rule, been timidly and inefficiently performed.
Within the lines all was believed safe ; beyond the outposts,
not only was it ' enemy's territory,' but the country was
presumed and believed to be actually filled with the troops
of the enemy. In the two great wars just preceding our
own. in the Crimea and in Italy, this state of the case was
true to a remarkable degree. This was largely due to the
fact that the Cavalry had been fractioned up and distributed
among the larger units of Infantry. The same thing was
attempted in the Army of the Potomac, but after a year's
experience, the attempt was abandoned ; the Cavalry was
withdrawn from the Infantry corps and concentrated, first in
a division, then in a corps of three divisions, acting under the
orders of the Commanding General.

" In this campaign we have the first example of the outpost
work of an Army being done 'by \vholesaIe' by the arm best
fitted for the task. The Cavalry of one Army was employed
to locate the main body of the enemy, and incidentally to
examine the country between the contending Armies. The
Cavalry of the other Army endeavoured to prevent this infor-
mation from being obtained by interposing itself as a screen
between its own main body and that of the enemy. In the
performance of these duties we have seen that there were
frequent collisions. If the tactical details of these encounters

134 CAVALRY STUDIES

be carefully and thoroughly studied, I think the fact
appear that, while there was much fighting on foot, it was not:
so generally successful as has been supposed. I think the
fact will also appear that the command was most frequently
and uniformly successful which was most skilfully handled as
a moufifed force, dismounting only to accomplish a temporary
purpose, or, as in Buford's case at Gettysburg, when it was
necessary to oppose Infantry, or to hold a point of great
strategic importance until the Infantry could arrive."

Looking at the rdle of the Corps Cavalry during the
operations, the task of the First Army Corps in the first
phase was to mask the entrenched camp of Delhi during
the flank march of the Eastern Army. For this a flank
guard consisting of rst Infantry Division and Corps Cavalry
Brigade "A " was detailed. This surrounded the eastern side
of Delhi as with a veil, while the remainder of the First
Army Corps acted as the centre of resistance near Ghaziabad,
thus protecting the right of the main Army.

The Second Army Corps was next ordered to send forward
one Division beyond the Jumna with its " B " Cavalry Brigade
to act as an advance guard covering the front of the Army
in its march across the Jumna.

This General Advance Guard consisting of the Division
and one Brigade of Cavalry acted as a moving /ele de pont to
cover, in the first instance, the passage of the Jumna. Next,
it shaped itself to fit the heads of the enemy's columns, so
that behind this screen the Army could be manceuvred with
something akin to certainty for battle.

One special officer commanded this Advance Guard, and
another the Flank Guard.

With reference to the battle dispositions, given in Eastern
Army Operation Orders No. 50, the First Corps has to
co-operate in a passive defence of a position near Tughla-
kabad : the Second Corps to assist in the withdrawal from a
false front to a defensive position in rear : the Third Corps
takes part in an offensive movement. In addition to these
special duties, there is, in each case, the important one of

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 13S

keeping up inter-communication during the battle between

neighbouring corps and divisions, and also scouting ; but
it seems a waste of power to employ highly trained and
well-mounted Cavalry soldiers on work which can easily be
done by others.

In view of the difficulty experienced in mounting Cavalry
at all, it is a matter for consideration whether it would not
be an economy to organise a special corps of orderlies and
despatch- riders, mounted on country ponies, for work within
or in the immediate vicinity of Infantry Divisions. With
reference to this point Lleutenant-General Sir O'M. Creagh
writes :

I advocate that the scouts of Infaatiy baltalions be mounted ; in Ibne dayi of
long-iange rifle fire, it is impos^ble for dismounted men to explore the coontr;
efficiently when a battalion is acting alone. Should this anggestion be worthy
of adoption, I would suggest that fifty men pci battalion be mounted. This
would give an Infantry Division sufficient mounted troops for its own immediate
protection, as well 2£ for all the duties at present carried out by Divisional
Cavalry. Thus nine Cavalry regiments would be released for their legilimale
duties under the General OHicer Commanding that arm. These " mounted scoats "
should be drawn from the present Mounted Infantry. Their training should fit
them for all the duties that Divisional Cavalry oow perform ; and they sliould
be so oi^nised that they could be formed into battalions if required. They
should be mounted on country-bred ponies, so as not to compete with the
horsing of Cavalry regiments.

Notes on Supply.

With regard to the method of supplying the ist
Cavalry Division during the last four or five day.^ (see
Sketch 12).

1. Assuming that two days' rations and two days' grain are
carried both in the 2nd line A (pack) and 2nd line B (wheel),
then each unit had with it on the morning of the 27th
instant four days on pack and draught for men and animals.
In addition each brigade had In its supply column — three days
for men, and one day for animals. ( Vide table of " state " on
P- 139.)

2. On arrival at the Raipur crossing the supplies in unit
charge were pushed over the pontoon bridge on the night

136

CAVALRY

STUDIES
tpply columns \

e parked ^^^^^H

t would use^^^H
pH Iransnort '

of the 27th, and the brigade j
Raipur for the night,

3. On arrival in its camp on the 27th each unit v
one day's supply, and would send its empty wheeled transport
on the morning of February 28 to Madanpur to replenish
from the supply columns.

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and sth Brigades would, therefore, haveJ
had on hand on the morning of the 28th their full supplies^
of four days. \

4. The following would have been the itinerary of the
supply columns at Raipur : '

(rt) Crossing at Raipur on the morning of the 28th at -
5 hours, they would arrive at Madanpur two miles
away at, say, 6 hours. There would be a halt there
of one hour to enable brigades to replenish. |

{b) Leaving Madanpur at 7 hours via Faridabad, on the |
banks of the Agra Canai, and Ballabgarh, the column |
would reach Bangur at 15 hours that afternoon —
distance 20 miles.

{c) Leaving Bangur at S hours on March i it could arrive
at Gurgaon at 15 hours on that day— distance
25 miles. '

5. Our state of supplies shows that the ist, 2nd, 3rd and 1
5th Brigades have two days for men and animals in hand I
on the morning of the second instant, and the 4th Brigade 'I
one day only. 1

6. Under the orders of General Officers Commanding,
Brigade supply transport {i.e. 2nd line) as emptied would be
despatched to Gurgaon, which is the depot for supply, that
is to say, there would be in Gurgaon on the ist, or morning
of March 2, two days' wheel transport of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 5th Brigades, and two days' wheel and one day's pack
of the 4th Brigade, 1

7. The supply column transport arrives at Gurgaon on the
afternoon of March I, and the unit transport would take
over supplies that evening and rejoin their units on the
morning of the 2nd.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI) 13;

8. Each brigade would therefore have on the morning of
March 2 four days for its personnel and ttvo days for its
animals.

9. A convoy consisting of 2,056 carts would be required
to bring up ten days' supplies for men and animals of the
6ve brigades, and ivould cover a road length of 1 3,000 yards,
or practically 8 miles. This would be too cumbersome, and
it would therefore be run out in two lots, starting on con-
secutive days.

Assuming that the convoy left Dadri on the morning of
the 27th at 8 hours, and that it consisted of bullock carts
(though as a rule bullocks should travel at night when
possible), it would arrive at Amipur on the Jumna at 18
o'clock, and would park there for the night — distance,
15 miles.

Starting at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 28th, it would
march via Ballabgarh to Bangur, arriving there at 18 hours
that evening — distance, 18 miles.

Starting again on March i at 5 hours, it would reach
Bhundsi at 15 hours that evening — distance, 15 miles.

Leaving Bhundsi at 5 hours on March 2, the convoy
would arrive in Gurgaon, its destination, at midday — dis-
tance, 10 miles.

10. There would, therefore, be on the afternoon of March 3
■with the division —

In unit charge four days for men and animals.

In brigade supply column three days for men and one day
for animals.

In depot at Gurgaon two days for men and one day for
animals.

Total: 9 for men ; 6 for animals.

11. Calculations have been based on a uniform speed of
3 miles an hour for mule transport, li miles for bullock.

12. There is an alternative route from Sikandarabad to
Gurgaon vii Tigaon and Ballabgarh, but it is longer
{56 miles).

Dadri via Pali to Gurgaon is shorter (43 miles), but has

I3S CAVALRY STUDIES

the disadvantage of being over very broken ground, and
also of bringing the supply columns very close to the fighting
line, as no roads are shown across the bad ground except
the track to Philadpur.

Pali would be unsuitable as a dep6t, as it would be too
far from the line in front, being—

14 miles from Philadpur.

13 „ „ Rujokhri.

16 „ „ Bijwasun.

23 „ ., Najafgarh.

28 „ „ Mundka.

Note. — A point to notice is that the Brigade Supply
Column is the unit, and although Brigade Supply Columns 1
would often undoubtedly be collected into one group under
Cavalry Divisional Orders to suit the military situation of
the moment, the Brigade Supply Column must be recognised
as a component part of the Brigade and arranged for.

Points that would have to be put in Divisional Orders

on February 26.

1. That the Brigade Supply Column of each brigade would 1
move on Raipur on the morning of February 27, 1905, where '
it would remain parked till further orders, under the senior ]
Brigade Supply and Transport Officer.

Points that would have to be put in Divisional Orders
OH February 27, 1905.

2. Brigade Supply Column will move to Madanpur to- '
morrow, the 28lh, and will halt there to enable the ist, 2nd,
3rd, and sth Brigades to replenish their brigade transport. ,
They will then march under the orders of the senior Brigade '
Supply and Transport Officer vicL Faridabad, Bangur, and
Bhundsi to Gurgaon, moving as rapidly as possible. ,

3. General Officers Commanding Brigades will send all [
transport, as supplies are used daily, to Gurgaon to await J

SKETCH tZ.

Su rig pujv*^

/c/

Advand

|9^Ma4
2?^ •4

Amipur(l5Mj

DIAGRAM SHOWING METHOD OF

SUPPLYING CAVALRY DIVISION
AFTER Z7^» FEBRUARY, 1905.

ScdU ^i0tf^r*€>xin%aX^ly ^1 huK * 4«lfiiLM

SECOND STUDY (DELHI)

139

the arrival there of the supply column due on March i, with
orders to replenish there, and then to rejoin their units as
quickly as possible. Till further orders Gui^aon will be the
depdt for supplies for the ist Division.

The Divisional Supply and Transport Officer would issue
similar orders to his Brigade Supply and Transport Officers,
and would further inform them that a convoy carrying five days*
supplies would arrive in Gurgaon on the 2nd instant, and
another with five days on the 3rd.

STATE OF SUPPLIES

Mkn.

Aniuals.

.«

3l>d

3rd

4th

ilh

ist mi

3«1

4'1' 5*

Brigades.

26lh Febnijiiy, 1905

Expended 17th Fiibruary, 1905
Supply calumns detached ...

Balance in hinil

aSlh Februnry, 1905 :

S
3

5
3

Replenished al Madanpur...
Exp.nd«i ...

Balance

isl Match, 1905

Balance

Expended

aaii March, igo;

Balance

Taken from supply cnlumna

Days.

CHAPTER V.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD).

Subject.

A "DECISIVE battle" the real objective in war.
Strategical Preparation. Selection of a Primary and
a Secondary Theatre of War, and Use of Entrenched Depflts
illustrated by 1809, Measures to be taken with regard to a
" Buffer State." Employment of the Cavalry Division and
of the Army Cavalry up to the " decisive battle.

General Idea.

1. The Central Provinces south of the Narbudda and the
Nizam's Dominions on the north side of the Bombay-Madras ,
railway represent an Asiastic State called "the Buffer State,"
between two European powers called respectively "North" '
and " South." (Sec Sketch 1 3.)

2. The population of the Buffer State consists of a num-
ber of mixed races which are traditionally antagonistic,
but under the strong hand of the Nizam local disturbances
have been suppressed, and a force of semi-regular troops,
numbering about 50,000, has been raised and armed.

The residence and seat of Government of the Nizam is at
Aurangabad. Hyderabad and Raipore are the next most
important cities in the State.

A treaty of alliance exists between the Government of the
South State and the Nizam by which the integrity of the
latter 's dominions is guaranteed. Owing, however, to certain

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABADj

141

regulations enforced by the Nizam, the military geography
of the Buffer State is more or less unknown : nor has any
scheme for co-operation between the respective Armies ever
been evolved.

3. Madras and Bangalore are the bases of the South State,
and are connected by railway with Poona and Wadi, garrison
towns on the frontier.

4. The southern frontier of the North State is the river
Narbudda. Bhopal is the advanced base and is connected by
railway via Jhansi, Delhi, and Lahore to its ultimate base in
Europe.

5. The North State having recently built the railway
Bina-Katni suddenly extends it by Bilaspur to Raipore, and
overruns the country of the Buffer State southwards towards
the Godaverj'. Upon this the Nizam calls upon the South
State to fulfil its pledges, but, for political reasons, and
inasmuch as the capital (Aurangabad) is not immediately
threatened, the operations of the South are at first limited
to a military occupation of the country about Hyderabad
and Warangal, as a preliminary operation to expelling the
enemy from the Raipore province. The South employs for
this purpose an army of about 100,000 men, and extends the
railway from Wadi to Hyderabad. At the same time a force
of one Cavalry Division of three Brigades, with three
Batteries of Horse Artillery, and two Infantry Divisions are
concentrated at Poona ready to move upon Aurangabad,
should the situation require it.

6. Two Squadrons of Imperial Service Cavalry are with
each Cavalry Brigade.

JVoie.^No railways or railway bridges other than those
stated above will be supposed to exist, but in all other respects
the country is to be considered exactly as it is.

The " situation " depicted in the foregoing " General Idea "
is closely analogous to the " situation " in Germany and Italy
in 1809. It will therefore be instructive, before considering
this Study, to turn to the records of that campaign for
lessons of guidance from Napoleon himself.

CAVALRY STUDIES

ATORY T^^^l

Notes on Measures to be adopted preparatory
THE Strategical Deployment.
I. The real objective in war is a decisive battle. — In order to
prevent ourselves adopting wrong strategical principles, it is
essential to bear carefully in mind this, the ultimate aim of
war. Clausewitz describes Napoleon's conception of warJ
somewhat as follows : I

War has only one objective — namely, to annihilate the enemy. Now the
annihilation of the enemy really means thoroughly lo demoralise him, lo bmk
his will-power : because the will, much more than the use o[ any implement^ is
the real obslajile lo be overcome before the final end of a war can be itttained.
Thorough demoralisation, both in ihe theatre of operations and on the batliefield_
— i.e. strategical and taclical ilemoialisation — is the objective.

The means whereby Napoleon sought to produce thisl
general state of collapse in his enemy was a battle. Butf
that battle had to be a decisive one ; so decisive, that not'1
only were the troops which were actually present morally-1
affected by it, but also many others, including possible allies,

The battle was rendered decisive by a concentration of«
numbers and of effort, and by the suddenness of the blow f
upon the centre of gravity of the enemy's forces ; and the
latter, once broken, were pressed without rest until completely '
overthrown and demoralised.

There is no doubt then about the principles which guided
Napoleon ; and he tells us that the great Captains have "all ,
acted on the same principles."

War must be waged en [he same principles as a si^c i fire must be c
-ccntrated upon a single point. Once a breach is made, the equilibrium is broken,
the other defences become valueless and the place is taken. Attacks must not
be scattered, but concentrated. ( " Rapport sur la position politique el militaire
des acmees de PieroonI, iglh July, 1794," by Genera! Eonaparle lo Robespierre.)

A decisive battle must then be our real objective. But
there are great difficulties which prevent the massing of large
numbers of troops at the required point.

A consideration of the Campaign of 1809 shows what
steps Napoleon took to overcome such difficulties.

-43

ties
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142

Note;

preven
essentia
war. ^
somew-

War t
annihilat:

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the real <
Thorougl
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The
general
that hi
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The
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<;entrated
the other
be scatte
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A d
there a
numbe:

A c
steps I

THIRD STUDY (AURAXGABAD)

143

2. Strategical preparation necessaty to overcotite difficulties
4>/ operating in masses as illustrated by Napoleon's Campaign
in 1809. (See Sketch 14.)

In the same way as in the case under consideration,
Napoleon's enemy, the Austrians, had the initiative, and just
as the Commander-in-Chief of the South State has to protect
the territory of the Buffer State from invasion, so too Napo-
leon was bound by treaty to protect the country of his allies,
namely Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Italy.

The position of Napoleon's troops in January, 1809, was
as follows :

Held fast in Spain .....

A single concentrated unit under Davout

in Germany .....

300,000

60,000

From Steltin to Cherbourg and I'ile d'Aix, from Hamburg
fto Naples there were only scattered detachments.

Germany was in a ferment. Austria was preparing for war.

On January 14 Napoleon dictates at Valladolid (in Spain)
(No. 14,707) some notes to Eugene on the defence of
Italy (see p. 184J. At the same time he sends instructions
to his Ambassadors in Bavaria, VV'urtemberg, and Saxony,
and to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine,
telling them to get their troops ready to march. He also
instructs the Bavarians to arrange a line of defence on
the Inn and Salza rivers, with entrenchments at Passau and
Burghausen. His note to Eugfene directs the latter to defend
Venice and Northern Italy with 45,000 men by a "war of
, positions."

Here we see Napoleon dividing the whole Theatre of War
into a " Primary " and " Secondary Theatre '' : this is his first
step towards economising troops in one direction with a view
to obtaining a mass for the " decisive battle " elsewhere.
In the present case the valley of the Danube is made the
primary theatre.

His instructions to Bavaria further show his forethought
r^arding the " principal theatre." A covering force is to be

144

CAVALRY STUDIES

organised to give him time to concentrate his masses at tin
required point. Napoleon is always careful never to attempw
to fight a decisive battle until he has first concentrated everjRi
man possible.

Having made these preliminary arrangements more thai
three months before the decisive battle is fought, Napole(
proceeds to Paris with all speed to supervise the organising
and equipping of his Army, And, being obliged for diplo-'S
matic as well as for military reasons to await the enemy's
aggression, he arranges a " zone of manceuvre " in the primary^
theatre with the object of enabling him to take the offensive.!
at the first possible moment.

He makes use of two rivers (the Danube and the Lech) a
defensive barriers against the enemy, but not against his ow
forces, by forming bridge-heads at Ratisbon and Ingolstadt
on the Danube, and at Rain, Augsburg; and Landsbei^ on the
Lech.

The following other measures are taken—

(a) Three fortified supply dep6ts are organised, viz. at
Donauworth, Augsburg and Ingolstadt. (For the
amount of supplies, etc., in each, see the sketch.)
((^) Passau is formed into a place of arms " for offensive
purposes," and is organised to hold out for three
or four months against the enemy.
(c) Supply dep6ts in rear at Ulm and Strasburg.

3. Napoieons use of entrenched depots.

Napoleon's use of entrenched depfits should be particularly 1
noticed. Railways have to a great extent replaced them in I
modern war in Europe, for which reason Continental.!
strategists seldom refer to their advantages. But should it I
be necessary to wage war in a country in which there I
are no railways, the employment of large masses will be I
impossible without them. Napoleon's letter, dated J
September 3, 1806, to General Dejean, deals with this J
question :

Lasi cenluiy it was qucElioncd whether forliR cations were on; good. Some J
cTQwscd heads thought tbero useless, and conscquenll; dismsnlled their ibrtifiol J

PAS5AU.

TM U JO^marthi-xorfmif mnnthUL..
i /SSSSS**^ VallBdolld. Uth Jmnuary

a.TO(M>Oa of flouf. A mlinon aanrU,

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 145

plans. As for me, I would revene the question and ask uhcthei it is passible lo
cany on war on a large scale wilhoul entrenched depftts ; and 1 declare that il is
not possible. Wiihoul fortified supply dcpfits, no good plan of campaign can be
ananged, and without '* places " which I call " dc cnmpague," that is lo say which
■re capable of resisting Hu5sar5 and partisans, offensive vrnr is imposMblc.
(Compare poges 187-190.)

Again, "many such depots, of which only the half may
come in useful, will have to be organised for an army ; but
they are necessary to enable us to contend with possible
circumstances" fletter dated 8th December, 1806, to the
Intendant General Petiet).

Another great advantage derived from these " entrenched
depots," and from Napoleon's plan of having a fortified post
every sth or 6th march on his communications, was the
economy efiected in the troops for convoy work. In the case
of the campaign under consideration the writer of " La
Guerre des Masses," page 170, estimates that Napoleon's
arrangements of entrenched depots as compared with the
Archduke Charles's sy.stem of convoys and escorts, made a
difference of 160,000 men in favour of Napoleon in the
decisive battle. But with reference to these entrenched
depots it should be noted that Napoleon never deals in an
abstract manner with the problem of strengthening a place.
He always considers the role which he expects it to play, and
the maximum length of resistance required of it, and then
organises it accordingly.

His constant pre-occupation, as must be that of every

commander in the field, was how to reduce the number of

, troops employed on matters of secondary importance, in order

I to increase the numbers available for the decisive battle.

' Many military professors pay insufficient attention to details

of this nature, which are really the groundwork of success

The " manceuvring zone" thus organised by Napoleon
I possessed the following advantages : —

(ii) It covered his lines of supply and retreat.
(i) It was as close as possible to the enemy.

146

CAVALRY STUDIES

(c) It facilitated certain strategical movements with the
object of causiag the enemy to divide, so that
Napoleon was able, while remaining concentrated, to
defeat the enemy's armies in succession ; and

{d) It enabled Napoleon to manoeuvre in the primary
theatre, without any difficulties as regards supply,.
concentrated masses totalling over 200,000 men.

The following table showing the grouping of Napoleon's
forces on the i8th April, three days before Eckmiihl, gives
some idea both of the large numbers which he succeeded in
bringing together for the " decisive battle," and also of the
large area in which he was simultaneously conducting
operations at this period :

I. In the primary theatre, in the "zone of manceuvre,"
170,000 and 245 guns called the " Army of Germany."

The following reserves not yet arrived —

Guard

22,000 men, joined at Vienna.

In Hanover

14,000 men joined 20th April at
Donauworth.

In Saxony

18,000 men joined after Ratisbon

(Bernadotte).

In Poland

18,000 men threaten Galicia.

Guarding Germany

20,000 men Westphalians and Dutch

under Jerome.

In Holland watching

English landing.

20,000 men under King of Holland

112,000

II. In Italy (secondary theatre), 45,000 under PrinceJ
Eugene.

III. In Dalmatia „ „ 12,000 under Marmont '

IV. In Spain, 300,000 French, Italians, and Germans.
V. In France, camps of National Guards and Conscripts

for coast defence. A total of about 650,000 men
under arms.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 147

4. Measures taken wiih the object of causing tlie enemy to
detach, and so to reduce his strength at the decisive point.

In order to retain forces of the enemy in the secondary
theatre far from the decisive point, and also to cause the
employment of considerable forces on secondary objectives in
the principal theatre, Napoleon made use of diplomacy as long
as possible. Sometimes he caused the enemy to fear that he
would violate the frontiers of a neutral state, or, on the other
hand, he would profess profound respect for the neutral country
so as to induce the enemy to uncover his frontier in that
direction. Thus, for instance, in 1806 Bernadotte reached the
Danube without difficulty by violating Anspach.

Another method adopted was to spread rumours regarding
the assembly of troops eccentrically — e^. in 1800 of an army
of Reserve at Dijon, and again in 1806 of the Corps of
Observation at Wesel. The newspapers said of the latter
that 80,000 were there ; at the outside the numbers were
actually under 40,000.

The press is the great agent in this kind of work and ought
to be properly organised in peace with a view to assisting the
Empire when wanted.

Now to return to the " Study."

The following lessons may be deduced from a study of the
iSog Campaign to serve as guides in the situation under
consideration ;

(i) Divide the whole theatre into a "primary" and a
" secondary theatre," and organise a containing force to hold
the latter. (See Sketches 13 and 15.)

Thus the Hyderabad District becomes the secondary
theatre, whilst the primary theatre will consist of the zone of
country from the Narbudda to Aurangabad.

As a containing force in the Hyderabad District, some
20,000 troops supporting 30,000 of the best of the semi-
regular troops of the Nizam should suffice to carry on a " war
of positions " between the Godavery and Hyderabad. This
arrangement will set free 80,000 Southern troops for use in
the primary theatre.

148

CAVALRY STUDIES

(2) Provide supplies for lOO.ooo men during the time
required for the approach to, and the concentration of the
various columns in, the primary theatre, and for the probable
period of fighting.

(3) Organise a manceuvring zone in the primary theatre
(a) If time admits, organise the Tapti and Pooma" rivi

with the neighbouring mountain ridges, as barriedtj
against the enemy, and provide passages for
own use.

(d) Provide an entrenched depot with double bridge-heads
capable of holding out for four months, and con-
taining 500,000 rations at the junction of the Poorna
river with the Tapti (near Edalabad) (cf. Passau in
1809).

(c) Organise a fortified supply depot at Aurangabad with
twenty days' supplies for 100,000 men, and prepare
two double bridge-heads on the Pain Gunga river,
capable of resisting capture by coup de main, at
Kunnairgaon and at Deotannah. Five days' supplies
for 80,000 men to be collected in each.

id) Improve the main roads, and provide entrenching tools.

(4) Arrange with the Buffer State to organise a covering
force near Edalabad on the Poorna river in order to give
time for the Southern Allied Army to concentrate. Guides
and interpreters must also be provided.

(5) To cause the enemy to detach a Corps of Observation
on south-west of Bhopal, spread rumours of intention to pass
through the neutral zone.

(6) Delay concentration as long as possible in order to
economise supplies.

iy) Reconnoitre widely ; and as soon as the direction of the
enemy's march is pronounced, concentrate in a single mass
and march as rapidly as possible against the centre of gravity
of the enemy's forces with the object of fighting a decisive
battle.

to ihe south, which

tne
tble ^^

ient^^l

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

149

"Mon plan de campagne, c'est une bataille ; et toute ma
politique, c'est le succes."

The question arises, how best to employ the allied forces
of the Nizam ?

His troop-! may be assumed to be divided into two classes ;

(^) Regular, or rather semi -regular, that is to say, the
forces of the State, more or less organised, equipped,
and drilled. In the present case these may be sup-
posed to consist of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry,
with armament more or less up-to-date and with
an organisation based on, and to a certain extent
assimilating with, our own. They would wear uni-
form and be fairly well disciplined, but be ignorant
of all military training other than, possibly, ele-
mentary drill on a barrack square. It is doubtful
whether their departmental organisation, i,e. trans-
port, medical, etc., would stand the strain of
mobilisation.

i^B) Irregular tribal levies, both mounted and foot, armed
with inferior weapons, with little or no discipline,
and organised on a feudal system under which each
chieftain would be bound to provide a fixed number
for the defence of the kingdom. In addition to
these there would be a number of petty chiefs, each
with a .small following, poorly armed, professing
allegiance to the ruling power, but practically in-
dependent, and therefore a somewhat doubtful asset.
This class would be entirely without organisation,
and as they would not wear uniform, they would be
liable to be treated as spies if captured armed.

The first step to be taken would be to arrange with the
Buffer State that certain political and military officers of the
Southern State should be placed on the staffs of the Generals
in Command of the Regulars (class A), to whom they would
act as advisers. Orders should also be issued by the Buffer
State placing all troops under the command of a commandant

150

CAVALRY STUDIES

d£ place, or some other such person, who would detail such
troops as the General Officer Commanding the British Cavalry
Division had need of, whilst to assist the latter a strong staff
of civil and military officers in the employ of the Buffer State
should be detailed. This staff would from time to time, and
place to place, issue such proclamations in the name of the
Buffer State as might be necessary, and would also assist in
enforcing the collection of supplies, and in organising a local
intelligence system to assist the Southern Headquarter
Intelligence Staff

Class A (the Regulars) could be usefully employed to keep
open the lines of communication as the Cavalry Division
advances. (See General Map No. 3.) For instance, they
could hold the Chowka-Poolmurree defile pending the arrival
of our Infantry, the crossing of the several rivers, e^. the
Girja and Purnah, and the hills to the north-east of the road
between these two rivers ; follow up the Cavalry Division
and assist in holding all commanding positions taken by the
latter : garrison and hold certain strategic points, guarding
the approach to the capital, such as Roza, Dowlatabad,
Dhabaddy, etc. As a portion of their Artillery will probably
be mountain, they could be usefully employed in co-operation 1
with the Cavalry in the hills and about Adjunta.

Care should, however, be taken that the numbers sent tol
any one district should be in accordance with the wishes of J
the Southern military authorities, in order that useless!
mouths may not have to be maintained in a country whereV
supplies are difficult to procure.

Another means of utilising a semi-regular local Army has-l
been well illustrated in our own history. In the Peninsularl
War the Portuguese Army, after it had learnt its ownfl
inferiority to the enemy, was to a certain extent taken in|
hand by the British, who reorganised, equipped, and 1
paid it. It thereby became a valuable fighting asset, andl
Wellington's example should never be forgotten. Similarly.r
the Army of our ally Shah Shuja, in the Afghan War of 1838,!
was trained and led by British officers.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

151

Ciass B (Irregulars). — These could be given a free hand
to operate against the enemy's line of communications and
generally to harass the enemy, being assured that they would
receive good rewards for services rendered. Certain of them
could be employed by the Intelligence Department as spies
and for the collection of intelligence. When in their own
districts they could, if thought trustworthy, be used to piquet
heights.

Steps should also be taken to form a corps of Guides with
individuals attached to Southern Cavalry squadrons, regiments
and brigades ; in view of the fact that the maps are known to
be unreliable (see General Idea) the services of such guides
would be invaluable.

If organised and treated with tact, it should be possible
gradually to create amongst them a feeling of esprit de corps
which would certainly tend to strengthen their loyalty.

A large number of interpreters would also be required :
every Southern patrol and every detachment would at least
be the better for having some one able to question the
inhabitants. Without interpreters questioning is often quite
useless. According to the "General Idea" the population
consists of a number of mixed races, from which it may be
inferred that a variety of dialects will be met with. There
will, however, probably be a lingua franca prevalent in the
towns, and more or less common to all, and which would often
have also to be the means of communication between the
interpreter and the troops of the Southern Army for whom he
is interpreting. Assume, for instance, the case of Afghanistan.
The interpreter should there be able to converse with a variety
of tribes, each with a peculiar dialect, such as Usbaks, Tajiks,
Kafirs, Hazaras, etc. : the lingua franca of the type of men
from whom interpreters would be drawn would probably be
Persian — not Hindustani nor even Pushtu — so that to make
use of such interpreters we should require in our ranks a full
supply of Persian speakers.

Military history teaches us that the whole question of co-
operation with an ally is fraught with difficulties and danger.

152

CAVALRY STUDIES

When the theatre of operation lies in the country of the ally,
and when the organisation of the latter's forces is imperfect,
these difficulties increase, for war can rarely benefit the in-
habitants on the spot, and ill-feeling is certain to arise. ,
Wellington's constant trouble with the Spaniards is a case in
point These difficulties increase again, in an Oriental j
country, where the further element of religious fanaticism J
creeps in.

On the whole, it is probably wiser to openly recognise the '
danger and to risk hurting feelings rather than to misplace '
confidence. The so-called "political" considerations have
often spelt disaster.

Special Idea.

CSce General Map No. 3, and Sketches 13 and 15.)
I. During September it becomes apparent that the North
is meditating an advance from Bhopal. The Nizam is there-
fore addressed by the Southern authorities with a view to
opposing that advance, and the following preparations are
made :

(a) An entrenchment near Aurangabad, capable of hold-
ing out for two or three months with supplies
collected for twenty days for 100,000 men, some
supplies being put there from Poona and other
Southern magazines.
(^) Double bridge-heads capable of resisting a cou/i de
vmin over the Pain Gunga river at Kunnairgaon
(18 miles north of HingoH), and at Deotannah
(25 miles north-east of Jafferabad) with five days'
supplies for 80,000 men at each. Supplies are
al.so collected for that number of troops along the
roads from Hyderabad to Hingoli.
{c) Bridge-heads and entrenchments, capable of holding
out for three or four months, are also mnde at thi
junction of the Poorna river with the Tapti (near
Edalabad) and 500,000 rations stored.
This with a view to offensive operations.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

H^O Koads are alsc
above.

prepared between the places named

. The pfan of the Southern Commander-in-Chief is to
leave 20,000 of his troops to support about 30,000 of the
Nizam's levies in the Hyderabad District, and to concentrate
the remainder with the Poona Force In the direction of
Aurangabad, with a view to a decisive battle.

3. During November, Northern Forces, estimated at any-
thing between 100,000 to 150,000, crossed the Narbudda and
occupied Burhanpur. But little resistance is encountered, as
the best of tlie Nizam's levies are in the Hyderabad District,
and some 5,000 are holding the entrenched depots.

Some of our mounted levies are on the Poorna river near
Bdalabad.

4. The Poona F"ield Force has marched with the intention
■of opposing the enemy from Burhanpur until the army from
Secunderabad can co-operate, and at all costs to prevent the
■capital, Aurangabad, from being captured.

5. On Wednesday evening, December 14. the situation is
as follows :

(a) Divisional Headquarters, with the leading brigade of
the 1st Cavalry Division, Southern Force, reached
Aurangabad this afternoon after a long march
from bej"ond the Godavery ; the remainder of
the Division halts at Valooz (9 miles south of
Aurangabad).

The two Southern Infantry Divisions from Poona, with a
Cavalry Brigade, are to reach the Godavery to-morrow night,
Thursday, ijth December.

(_6) Five Cavalry Brigades with some Infantry, detached
from the Southern Field Force operating in the
secondary theatre near Hyderabad, were expected
to reach the line Basim-Mangrul last night,
Tuesday (about lOO miles east-south-east of
Adjunta).

.54 CAVALRY STUDIES

Their march is directed on the Adjunta Ghaut,

(c) The General Commanding the 1st Cavalry Division
has been sent forward with orders to assist the
Nizam's troops in holding the passes through the
Ghauts near Adjunta until the Infantry from
Poona can relieve the Cavalry : to clear up the
situation towards Burhanpur, and to open com-
munication with the force from Hyderabad,
Reports sent from Adjunta at 4 hours to-day show that
the levies have fallen back from Edalabad and are
holding the passes through the Ghauts, but that
they were confronted by a numerous body of the
enemy's horsemen, mostly irregulars, who are
harassing their advanced posts. The enemy has
detached a force to mask the Tapti entrenchment,
and is crossing the Poorna a few miles above
Edalabad with his main columns.
Buldana reports hostile mounted troops coming southwards
from Melkapur last evening.

Commence merit of the Operations.

The following orders were issued by ihe G.O.C ihe Cavalry Divisio
No. I. — Operation Orders.— u/ Cavalry Division.
Hbadquartkrs, Aurangabad

\^th Diitmher, 1904. (33 iaurif.

1. SilualiBn. — (a) The enemy's main columns are an the Poorna r
Edalabad ; his mounted troops (strength uncertain) are in close touch with our
native levies who are holding the Adjunta Ghaut.

The levies at Buldana report hostile mounted troops moving southwards from
Melkapui yesterday afternoon.

(*) The Poona Field Force should reach the Godavcry to-morro"' ; a force from
Secunderabad was expected to reach the line Basim-Mangrul last night.

2. Objective. — The task of the ist Cavalry Division is to clear up the situation
towards Buthanpur ; to hold the Adjunta Ghaul in co-opetalion with the native
levies until the Poona Force arrive? : and to open communication with the field
force from Hyderabad.

3. Task b/ Brigades. — [tt) The General Officer Commanding, ist Brigade, will
operate so as to ascertain the composilion and stiength of Ihe enemy's troops in
the neighbourhood of Adjunta and Buldana, and will send forward detachments
to clear up the situation towards Burhanpur, and especially to hnd out what forces

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 155

of the enemy have come south of the (notthem) Foorna river and jli what direction
Ifaey ue marchiog.

(*) The ami aiid yd Brigades, which are at Valooi lo-night, will, on reaching
Autangabad, halt on ihe Cavalry parade ground.

After filling up supplies ihe march will be resumed in Ihe following order :
Ihe head of the column will pass the Delhi Gale of Autangabad City at

Advance Guard, t regiment, 2nd Brigade.

Main Body, snd Brigade (less t regiment and and Line Transport}.
„ 3rd Brigade (less I Iroop and 2nd Line Transport).

,, Znd Line Transport 20d Brigade.

3ri ..

Rear Guard, I Iroop, 3rd Brigade.
4. CemmunicatieHS. — Repotls lo be sent 10 Ihe mcin body of Ihe Advance
Guard.

The general object of strategic exploration may be
summed up as the judicious selection of two or three prin-
cipal objectives. In the case under consideration the main
objective is Burhanpur, \vith Adjunta and Buldana lying on
the way to that place. A force of Cavalry which is employed
on strategical reconnaissance will not have to extend as a
dense and continuous screen across the whole front of an
army (or armies), as has too frequently been maintained.
Such dispersion, without giving it penetrative power and
strength at any one point, would leave it morally and
materially weak everywhere, and incapable of making any
useful effort. On the contrary, the independent or strategic
Cavalry must be divided into as many groups as there maybe
objectives chosen by the General-in-Chief, and each of these
groups must be well concentrated, for it is obvious that the
opposing Cavalry will be charged with a similar but opposite
mission. Presuming that the enemy's Cavalry have also taken
the field, then strategic exploration must culminate in a
tactical collision. Thus we conclude that Cavalry in this
rfile will work in two elementary forms : {a) a collection of
isolated groups for scouting ; and (J)) a compact and concen-
trated mass for fighting.

To apply these principles to the present situation. Bur-
hanpur, where the enemy's main army is believed to be, is
the real objective of the Cavalry Division, for from that

156 CAVALRY STUDIES

place sufficient news of the enemy's forces is likely to he\
gained to enable the General-in-Chief to form his plan of I
operations. But, approaching the Adjunta Ghaut, between T
that objective and the Division is a hostile force of Cavalry,
which may or may not have to be reckoned with. Some 1
reconnoitring detachments should therefore be directed upon '
this hostile Cavalry, while others must endeavour to avoid the i
enemy's Cavalry, and by working well round to the flanks find '
out what he covers. Jalgaon and Buldana seem to be suitable
places to which such contact squadrons might be despatched,
and from whence they could send out "soundings" — i.e.
patrols, to clear up the situation. In deciding the strength
of a patrol, the number of days it will be absent, and the
work it will have to do, must be taken into consideration.
In this case it would not be advisable to send less than a
squadron, as the calls on men and horses, including the
transmission of intelligence, will be heavy ; it may, too, often
be necessary to use force to obtain information by driving
back patrols of the enemy. Orders to the patrol leader
should invariably be given at a personal interview with the
Brigadier or his staff officer, who should explain clearly what
information is required, and should then give the commander
of the reconnaissance a free hand both to carry out his mission
and to transmit the information he may have acquired.

FIRST DAY.

Thursday, i ^th December.

Strategical Reconnaissance by a Cavalry Brigade.

The 1st Brigade marched at 6.30 hours, sending out at I
5 hours three contact squadrons, \'\i. one to Jalgaon, one !
along the Bhusawal road, and one towards Burhanpur. The
2nd and 3rd Brigades arrived at Aurangabad from Valooz at
midday, the 3rd Brigade being ordered at 13.5 hours to send
one troop of Imperial Service Cavalry to Loonar in order to
keep communication with the detachment from Hyderabad.

^V THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 157

Information received about 10 hours {Thursday).

1. The enemy's horsemen, marching by several tracks, were
able yesterday (Wednesday) to turn the positions held by the
Nizam's levies about Adjunta. The levies consequently had
to fall back, and last night halted on the (southern) Purna
river ; a camp of the enemy's mounted troops was at Podwuth.

2. Scouts from ist Brigade reach the Girja river about
10 hours, and find the native levies retreating in great disorder.
They Seam from some of the fugitives that the enemy had
surprised them in the morning. The levies from the district
north of the Ghauts are suspected of treachery, as many of
them joined the enemy during the night-

The enemy is in close pursuit : his force consists of both
regular and irregular Cavalry with guns.

Situalioii in afternoon { Thursday),

1. The main body of the ist Cavalry Division reaches
Chowka about 16 hours. The General Officer Commanding
decides to halt in that neighbourhood for the night. The
1st Brigade halts near Poolmurree, south of the Girja river,
with outposts along that river in touch with enemy.

2. Spies report large bodies of the enemy of all arms
were crossing the Poorna river near Edalabad yesterday
(Wednesday), and that Bodwad was occupied by a force
of all arms yesterday afternoon.

No. I.— Operation Orders.— irf Cavalry Division.

n K ADO U ARTE RS, CHOWKA :

\s,tk Dcctrnter, 1^04 [16 Mcurs).

1. (a) The enemy's advanced CavJry is on the Gitja river in louch wilh our

isl Brigade, which \f. hailing near Poolmurree to-nighi.
(<^) Spies report that large bodies of the enemy of all arms were crossing the
Pooma river near Ednlabad yesterday (Wednesday), and that Bodwad
was occupied by a force of atl arms yesterday afiemoon.

2. The and and 3rd Brigades will hall for the night in the vicinity of Chowka.

3. In the event of attack, the high ground north of Chowka will be held by
and Brigade, 3rd Brigade lieing in support.

4. and Brigade will provide the outposts.

158 CAVALRY STUDIES

5. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will water from the streams La the north of Chovln
the 3rd Brigade and tmnsport animals from the Chowka lank,

6. Headquarters will be at the village of Chowko.

It will be noticed that nothing is said in these orders as to
what wili be done the next morning.

It seldom, however, happens that orders for the morning's I
march can be issued until late at night. Information comes '
in late from patrols which have been pushed out far to the I
front, and it must then be collated and sifted before the
Commander can make his plans and issue his orders. It
is not, however, necessary to keep troops or subordinate
staffs awake until these orders can be issued. It will, as a
rule, suffice to issue an order that units will be ready to |
march at a certain hour on the following morning — for ,
instance, to-day, brigades are merely warned to be ready toj
march at 6 hours to-morrow.

It is sound to accustom all ranks to prepare each nighl
to march next morning, even if no such warning orders are 1
issued. And the headquarter staff should sleep in the after-
noons, when possible, so as to be ready to work at night.

SECOND DAY.

Friday, i6th December.

The Tactical Collision with the Enemy's Cavalry.

Situation at daybreak, i6t/t instant.

Just before dawn the General Officer Commanding, ist J
Brigade, sends one regiment across to the north (left) bank!
of the Girja river and captures the high ground about]
Kinnola. I'atrols report during the night that a large force |
of hostile mounted troops bivouacked last night at Boygaon J
and Allund.

In view of the report of the presence of a large force I
of hostile mounted troops within striking distance — lessl
than 10 miles from Poolmurree — the Divisional Commander-I

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 159

decides to concentrate at once by moving forward to join
the rst Brigade. The following orders are accordingly
issued :

No. 3.— Operation Orders.— 11/ Cavalry Division.

Headquarters, Poolmukreb :

\(ilh December, 1904 (5 igHrs].
1. (n) Our patrols have discovered during the night that enemy's bivouacs of
tnountetl troops are near Allund and Bo]rga.on.
(i) Spies report lai^e bodies of the enemy of all arms were crossing the
Pooma river near Etialabad on Wednesday, and that Bodwad was
occupied by a force of all arms on the afternoon of that day.
a. The and and 3rd Brigades will march in the following order :

The head will pass over the high ground north of Chowka at 645.

Advance Guard, one squadron 3rd Brigade.
y6 Brigade, less one squadron.
The oulposi line will close in on the column after it ha^ passed through it.

3. The 2nd Line Transport of 2nd and 3rd Brigades will halt, in conjunction
with that of 1st Brigade, at Poolmurree and await orders.

4. The General Ofiicer Commanding, 3rd Brigade, will detail his Imperial
Service Cavalry (leas one troop) and two guns to form an escort lo the transport.

5. Reports to Patree.

The first point to be considered is the advance of the
Division when within striking distance of the hostile Cavalry.

According to reports, the enemy is from 8 to 10 miles
distant. The advance, therefore, would be in a concentrated
formation across country in readiness to deploy and attack.
A mass formation, with intervals to allow of air, would be
suitable, the formation varying in width to suit the country
and its passages.

It will be noticed that only one squadron is detailed as an
advance guard. Apart from the fact that the ist Brigade
is on ahead, a reason for this is, that being in open country
and close to the enemy, the Division is moving in mass ready
for action. A body of Cavalry, on the other hand, when in
column of route (as, for instance, yesterday) has need of an
advance guard of .some strength to give it time to deploy
for action. Now, however, we are already, practically speaking,
" in action," so we merely protect our front and flanks by means
of combat patrols.

i6o CAVALRY STUDIES

Since the march orders were issued the situation has some-
what changed, by the fact that the 1st Brigade, finding that
the enemy in front of it was in weak strength (perhaps only
a contact squadron), was able to send a detachment across-
the river and so to establish a sort of h'ie du pont, and'
advance guard to the Division. Subordinate leaders must
always be encouraged to act on their own initiative and with-
out orders in cases of this sort.

Occasions will arise when a strong advance guard can be
employed with advantage. It will then have a manceuvring
r61e, and will operate so as to deceive the enemy, cause him
to make a mistake and draw him in one direction while the
mass of our Cavalry attacks unexpectedly from another. But
an advance guard of this nature must be fairly close to the
rest of the Division to enable it to profit by the enemy's
mistake. This is, more or less, the situation to-day, when the
news arrives that the ist Brigade has established itself north
of the Girja river.

If a road happens to be running in the direction taken by
the Division, place the Artillery on it. If there- be no road,
then mass the guns on a flank, level with the leading
brigade.

The Division loses its liberty of evolution the moment
it is deployed, hence the necessity to delay deployment as
late as possible. When in brigade mass, instead of deploying
into squadron column to the front, brigades can deploy by
taking ground to a flank in column of troops or open column
of squadrons and then wheeling to a flank, thus economising
space and gaining time for deployment. By advancing
obliquely at the end of an approach march, space is also
economised and we are enabled to deploy later.

The advance to-day shows that the manceuvring of Cavalry
does not consist solely of correct and rapid movements : the
situation will often require brigades and divisions to wind
cautiously through difficult ground, and climb up steep places,
such as the Girja river banks to-day, and then to deploy for
attack with cohesion and perfect order in the ranks. Only

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 161

the very simplest formations are required, but the greatest
accuracy and discipline in the rani;s are essential to success.
The process of making any Cavalry efficient in preserving a
continuance and uniformity in its pace is tedious: but there
can be no prospect of making the best fighting use of the
Division unless these two requisites are fully satisfied.

The enemy, about 20 to 24 squadrons strong, with guns,
attacked the Division near Noygaon after it had crossed the
Girja river, and were defeated. The defeated enemy, pursued
by the 3rd Brigade, fled to the hills north of Shellode, where
the pursuit was checked by fire from the hills north of
Shellode village.

The 3nd Brigade rallied and then followed, and on reaching
Boygaon was ordered to move forward toward B. Mooda vicl
Wanjola. The 1st Brigade and three batteries Royal Horse
Artillery followed to Chintshaida.

No. 4.— Operation Orders.— u/ Cavalry Divisioa.

HEAPfJUARTERS, CHINTSHAIDA;

16/-4 Diccmbcr, 1904 (16 hours).
, The enemy have been pursued by the 3rd Brigade past Ihe Purna river. The
Bri^de was stopped by the enemy, who are in position an ihc lidge north of
Shellode, and it is now in touch with the enemy's oul[iosl5.

The znd Brigade has been ordered to move towards Wanjola, sending the 3rd
Brigade battery to rejoin its Brigade,
a. The tst Brigade will halt at Chintshaida.

3. The and Line Transport has been ordered to move forward to Chintshaida
and jhould arrive by iz midnight.

4. Reports to Chintshaida.

Nate. — The 1st Brigade is in reserve after being on oulposl duty the night
before. The guna of the 3rd and znd Brigades are unable to remain up with the
punuers, so (hey join the neatest formed body and follow as beat they can — iu this
c»e Ihe ist Brigade.

THIRD DAY.

Saturday, \yth December.

Cavalry Division operating in Hills.

Yesterday the Division effectually performed one of its
I duties, by putting an end to the attempts of the enemy to
\ discover what was going on in the direction of Aurangabad.

162 CAVALRY STUDIES

This morning's reconnaissances tended to show that the
troops which checked the pursuit yesterday evening were the
Cavalry attached to the enemy's advance guard, and that
they numbered probably a brigade of mounted troops,
holding a front from on the ridge south of Mungrool to
Dygaon.

2. The 3rd Brigade contained them north of Shellode, at
the same time working round their left flank. The 2nd
Brigade threatened the enemy's right flank by a turning
movement. The ist Brigade supported the attack of the 3rd.

3. The enemy retired from all his positions to the hills
northward of Oondengaon.

4. The Division bivouacked for the evening in the following
positions : —

1st Brigade, Sarota.

3nd Brigade, Mandaa.

3rd Brigade and Divisional Headquarters, Podwuth.

No, 5. — Operation QiieiB.—m Cinialry DivisioH.

Heahquarters, Podwuth :

17/i Diiember, 1904 (18 hauri).

1. Helio from the contact squadrons indicates that the enemy is sdvanciog in
foice both towards Adjunta and Buldana.

2. The Division will occupy the ridges south of Oondengaon, the right on the
Juah river and Ihe left on the ridge south-west of Kollode, with (he object of
preventing Ihe enemy from moving southwards,

3. The 2nd Brigade will hold from and including the Adjunta road to Ihe

The ist Brigade llie east section.

The 3rd Brigade in reserve near Podwuth.

4. Special patrols, strength i officer, iS men (including signallers), 24 horsey
will be detailed by 3rd and 1st Brigades and be ready to march at 20 houn.
The officers detailed lo command them will report to the Assistant Adjutant-
G"ncral at 19 hours.

5. All empty supply waggons will leave Podwuth at 9 hours to-morrow, with an
escort of one squadron Imperial Service Troops detailed from 3rd Brigade to lill up
at Aurangabad.

6. Headquarters at Podwuth.

According to our reports we have in front of us on the
morning of the i8th instant, only the advance-guard Cavalry
of the enemy, together with the remains of his independent

THIRD STUDY (AURAKGABAD)

■63

Cavalry defeated on the Girja on the 16th. The object of
this advance guard, consisting, as it does, of mounted troops
alone, is, doubtless, to gain time for the army in rear. By
stopping to attack them in their position between Mungrool
and Dygaon we should have only been playing their game.
We should preferably manceuvre round their fianks, and so
compel them to retire. Our object is to find out where the
enemy's main forces are ; and as our object has been placed
within our grasp by the fact that we have defeated the enemy's
strategical or independent Cavalry, we should only be wasting
time and lives by entering into a fire action with this small
party of Cavalry.

The case might, however, occur of a brigade having to
attack Cavalry holding a similar position, so some remarks
on this matter.

In making such attacks it must be remembered that
whilst a purely frontal attack can rarely expect to succeed,
a flank attack, unless combined with a containing, or, in
other words, a frontal, attack, can hardly ever be successful.
The enemy, especially if, as in the present case, he happens
to be mounted, will merely withdraw his troops from the
portions of his position which are not threatened, and so be
enabled, assisted by his mobility, to meet the flank attack.
Flank movements, therefore, should not take place within
full view of the enemy, but should be commenced at some
distance back, so that, when developed, they may come in the
nature of a surprise ; whilst the containing attack must be in
sufficient force to admit of its being pushed home should the
enemy give an opportunity by unduly attenuating his line to
meet the flank attack.

As regards higher training for dismounted action the main
points seem to be :

(a) The necessity for all Cavalry leaders to cultivate an
eye for country with respect to its possibilities for
fire effect and cover.

{fi) Constant practice by squadrons and higher units in
moving rapidly, as concealed as possible, to positions

.64 CAVALRY STUDIES

offering tactical advantages. How to advance over
a fire-swept zone, the formation to employ, the use
to make of the ground, etc., need thought and
practice. All preparations for shooting mu.st be
made under cover, so that a hot fire can be opened
6y surprise. Squadron commanders, for instance,
must keep their squadrons hidden behind the fire
position about to be occupied until they have in-
dicated the objective and approximate range to
their troop leaders.

(fi) In normal conditions the number of rifles available will
not be great, but inferiority in this respect should
be compensated for hy Judicious leading a.nd mobility.
To gain the full advantage of mobility is for mounted
troops a consideration of equal importance to fire
effect. Whereas the ruling maxim for the employ-
ment of fire by Infantry may be said to be that
fire should only be opened when it is considered
likely to be effective, in the case of Cavalry the
importance of securing the highest results by (ire
has to be considered in connection with the retention
of the power to break off the action whenever it
may be advisable to do so. Moreover, a prolonged
fire combat will be the exception for Cavalry. Its
action must be swift and decisive, and the object
will usually best be attained by means of accurate
and highly concentrated rapid fire.

{d) In order to enable a commander to break off the
action at any moment and reopen it in a more
favourable situation, a rigid fire control is essential.
With this object inter-communication must be kept
up bet^veen the several parts of the force — by helio,
flag, orderlies, etc. To this end also, and with a
view to regulating the expenditure of ammunition,
the delivery of sudden bursts of fire on the tactically
most important target will be found most effective.
In the intervals between these bursts, when notj

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 165

actually advancing, it is often injudicious to maintain
a "pit-pat" fire. Better to He still when, even if
incompletely concealed, your presence will perhaps
be forgotten : or pretend to mount, and then steal
back again. Special patrols should always be out
to protect the flanks.

(e) Necessity for mutual co-operation between adjacent
units (i>. troops in a squadron, squadrons in
a regiment, regiments in a brigade, brigades in a
division) both in an advance and a retirement, and
also during an engagement.

{/) Led horses should be kept as close as possible, but
should not follow the movements of dismounted
men unless definitely ordered to do so by the
commander — lances must be left on the led
horses.

The strength of the Mounted Reseife mu-st depend on
whether there is a hostile Cavalry force within striking
distance, and the likelihood of its interfering mounted during
the fire-fight.

During December 18, 19, and 20, the Cavalry Division
remained on the ridges south of Oondongaon, endeavouring
by wide and extensive patrolling to ascertain the positions
of the enemy, and thus carry out another of its duties.

Meantime, the main body of the Southern Army has been
moving up from the direction of Hyderabad.

The situation on Tuesday evening, December 20, is as
follows :

r. Northern Force (the enemy)- —

{a) Reconnaissances of the Southern Cavalry show that

the left wing of the Northern Army (estimated at

about 30,000) is about Buldana and Deulghat.
((5) The Northern right wing, estimated at about the same

strength, is on the hills about Adjunta, from Wussai

to near Wolsingi.

:66 CAVALRY STUDIES

2. Southern Force —

(a) The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Force, finding
that his enemy is moving by the two roads, viz.
Bodwad to Adjunta, and Malkapur to Buldana,
concentrates the main portion of his Army (50,000)
on the Kaj'lna river from Podwuth to Jafferabad,
with the object of falhng upon the enemy's right
wing near Adjunta.

(<*) A force of 15,000 with three Cavalry Brigades is
detached to operate on the upper Pain Gunga river,
and, pivoting on the entrenched dep6t at Deotannah,
to contain the enemy's left wing (Sketch 15).

Army are in touch with the enemy on the line
Oondengaon-Dhar. The strength of this detach-
ment is two Infantry Divisions (20,000) and two
Cavalry Brigades.

(d) The 1st Cavalry Division is on the left flank of the

Army, with its headquarters near Wuddallee.

SEVENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 2\st December.

March to the Battle-field. Employment of the

Army Cavalry (Sketch 16).

On Wednesday morning, the 2 ist, the Southern Commander

sends forward three columns (each of a division of 15,000)

upon Dhaora, Shivani.and Oondengaon to engage the enemy.

The remainder (40,000) close up towards Podwuth with the

object of enveloping and vigorously assaulting the enemy's

right.

The Southern Army is now based on Aurangabad.

No. 100,— Operation Oiicts-Simlhei-it Forct.

Headquarters, Podwuth :

311/ Dtcentbtr, 1904 (3 hturs).
I. (a) RecoDnalssances show that the enemy's right column ii holding tbe !
following positiom od our front :

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

■ 67

His left is neat Wolsingi (three miles soulh-cflst of Dhnora) ; the hill between
Wol-iingi and Baduth is held in considerable sicength. The
plateau south-west of Shivani appears to be entrenched : thence
(he position runs along the hills north of the villages of Dotra,
Ch Golagaoti and Oonden{^on to Jalkee, where thi: right seems

(£) The enemy is said to have tatge reserves near Adjunta.
a. The General Officer Commanding intends to engage the enemy along his
front to-day, and to mass troops near Podwulh with n view to pressing
the attack against the enemy's right to-monow.

3. (d) The Genera] Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Division will engage the

enemy about Wolsingi and Badolh, and will entrench the hills about

Julgaon and Peeplegaon to protect our right flank.
(6) The General Officer Commanding znd Infantry Division nil] try to

capture the plateau between Shivani and Dotra.
The 5ih Infantry Division will move to a position of readiness near

VVakadee in rear of the and Division.
(>') The General OSicer Commanding 3rd Infantry Division will engage the

enemy on the ridges north of Oondengion, but will not press the

The 41h Infantry Division will remain near Podwuth in readiness to
support the 3rd Division.
(lO The 6ih Infantry Division will match on Podwuth at 6 a-m.

4. General Officers Commanding Divisions will march so as to commence the

action about S hour^.

5. The General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division will cover the left

Hank of the 3[d Division, and will especially reconnoitre the country
towards Uldah and Jalkee, with the object of diicovering where the
enemy's right flank rests.

6. Reports 10 be sent to Podwuth.

The march of any mahi Army to the battle-field deserves
careful consideration. Von Caemmerer's remarks on the
subject are worthy of close attention,

" The Army of Frederic the Great performed its march to
the battle-field, often for miles, in one compact body, the
various parts of which had always to execute simultaneously
the same movements, and to start, halt, wheel, deploy, or
attack by the immediate word of command of the Supreme
Commander, repeated by the lower ranks and transmitted by
them to the lowest Napoleon freed himself from such
formalism ; and the proper utilisation of the roads of a
country had become one of the most important parts of the
science of a General Staff. Every one then realised that this
procedure not only ensures the greatest celerity when march-

i68

CAVALRY STUDIES

ing for some considerable time, but also spares the I
most, in spite of unavoidably circuitous routes. Whentfl
however, a battle was imminent, when it became a question 1
of throwing overwhelming masses on the one point where ]
victory was to be ensured, then the habit of former times v
remembered, and the troops were brought fonvard to the
battle-field not only on roads, but also on rapidly improvised
tracks. On the roads, where Artillery and wagons had
precedence, the columns marched on as broad a front as
possible, and off the roads quarter-column of sections was the
formation chiefly adopted for marching. Considerable
friction and difficulties must have frequently arisen, when
water- courses, valleys, and other obstacles were met with, and
doubtless many movements must have completely failed
owing to these reasons. The troops, too, must have suffered
enormous fatigue when this mode was adopted ; and in spite
of the well -recognised marching power of the French Infantry,
must consequently also have suffered loss. But when, while
studying military history of Napoleon's time, we admire the
astonishing rapidity with which the Emperor hurled large
masses of troops from one point to the other, we find the key
to such phenomena in the procedure above described. And
when Jomini in his last work, while discussing retreats,
calculates only two hours for a corps of 30,000 to clear
one road before another corps can follow it from the same
camp, moving to the same object, he is not mistaken, as
perhaps some tactical scholars in our time may think ; for
Jomini has in his mind arrangements for marching above
described. He also quite distinctly says that it would be
sufficient to calculate the hours of starting for different corps
according to the time it will take the Artillery to move ofT. 1
Until we have grasped these peculiar technics of Napoleonic" j
Army movements when in the neighbourhood of the enemy,
we shall never understand his operation orders,

"But there was also a limit, after all, to these severe '
exactions and hardly conceivable performances. In the 1
autumn campaign of 1813 operations on the inner line nc^J

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

169

longer succeeded in preventing united action of several hosttie
Armies, and the principle of delivering alternate blows in
different directions completely broke down. The cause was
not disparity in numbers, nor was it the influence of unusual
and unaccountable accidents.

"The reason why the operations on the inner line failed in
the autumn campaign of 1813 will be found in tlie growth of
the Army, and in t/ie unwieldliness of the masses which were
meant to be hurled about with the greatest rapidity, and
which, in spite of all the artifices of Imperial march technics,
could not be got to where they were wanted, or were
exhausted by the terrible exertions exacted from them.

" As the roads developed and improved, the march technics
which Napoleon employed during decisive operations gradu-
ally disappeared. When there are useful and ample roads,
nobody nowadays would think of ordering the bulk of the
army (Infantry and Cavalry) off the roads, and telling them to
march for miles across country in quarter-column of sections.
We now continue to marcli on the roads in column of route
until close to the battle-field. In this way the individual
divisions, with their three arms properly combined and
distributed, always remain under the immediate command of
their leaders, and one of those reasons ceases to exist which,
with Napoleon'.s mode of procedure, made a special deployment
for battle absolutely necessary. While Jomiiii calculated
time and space for large bodies of troops (of course, only
when concentrated for decisive battle) exclusively by the time
it took the Artillery to get clear of the camp, and thus allowed
for the deployment of an Army Corps of 30,000 men only two
hours, we are now obliged to base our estimates for marching
and deploying on quite different conclusions. During the
staff rides of the Prussian General Staff, the staff duties in
the field (which Jomini calls Logistics) are constantly tested,
and their principles revised and kept up to date. The length
of columns and the time for deployment of large units, which
are now much more richly provided with Artillery, are carefully
determined ; and the result of all those calculations is that

170

CAVALRY STUDIES

the Army Corps of roughly 30,000 men is found to be th^
natural strategic unit, because it is that body of troops which J
in one column of route would occupy the normal length of a.l
day's march. Thirty thousand men occu/y about fourteen,
miks ami fourteen miles is about the usual day's perfomiancgM
of one Army Corps, for which the average endurance of thea
heavily packed pedestrian forms the standard. Such an Army l
Corps, therefore, can start every morning from a position of I
assembly, and can be again concentrated in the afternoon in
a similar position fourteen miles ahead ; it can at the same
time also be kept in touch with its baggage, its columns and
trains, which bring up ammunition and supplies, and which
at the present day are composed of at least four to five times
more vehicles than at the beginning of the last century, owing
to the increased demand for ammunition and the greater
weight of the Artillery projectiles, as well as owing to the
more ample provision for food and for the care of sick and
wounded.

" If greater exertions are urgently needed, we could stai
the corps earlier, so as to be assembled at the required pointJ
at noon. The number of trains and columns which would!
otherwise immediately follow could be limited to what is I
absolutely necessary; and, instead of the bulk of thel
impedimenta of this First Corps, a Second Army Corps could 1
then use the same road in the afternoon. This is the!
exception in our days, and, compared with the normal!
movement of an Army, is on a par with an example inl
Jomini's Logistics which closely investigate into a movement!
of 3 X 60,000 or 120,000 men in one day and on one road, <
rather, alongside one road."^(Von Caemmerer.)

On the same subject von Moltke writes as follows: —

"Very large concentrations of troops are in themselve
a calamity. The army which is concentrated at one pointj
is difficult to supply and can never be billeted ; it cannol
march, it cannot operate, it cannot exist for any length <
time : it can only fight.

" To keep all the forces concentrated without a distinct

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

171

object or otherwise than for a decisive battle is, therefore.
a mistake. For that decisive battle we can certainly never
be too strong, and therefore it is absolutely necessary to
summon even the last battalion to the battle-field. But any
one who wishes to close with his enemy must not intend
to advance in one body on one or few roads.

" To remain separated as long as possible while operating,
and to be concentrated in good time for the decisive battle, that
is the task of the leader of large masses of troops.

" No calculations of time and space will guarantee success
where accidents, errors, and deceptions form part of their
factors. Uncertainty and danger of failure accompany every
step towards the aim, and it will only be attained if the fates
*ire not altogether unkind ; but in war everything is uncertain,
nothing without danger, and we will scarcely attain great
results in any other way.

" If we realise that a Prussian Army Corps, with all its
trains formed into one column, occupies a depth of about
18 miles, that this normal length very quickly increases when
■on the march, and easily grows to double that length on bad
roads in bad weather, or owing to partial checks, that the
head of the column will already have arrived in the new
bivouac before the rear has quitted the old one, we find that
at the most only one Army Corps can be moved on one
road in one day.

"Of course we would leave behind all the trains that can
be spared when an action is imminent, yet the actual fighting
portion of the corps formed in one column still occupies a
■depth of twelve miles, the extent of an ordinary day's march,
-and the head of the column could not be supported by its
tail before some hours have passed.

" It is therefore an error to think that we are concentrated

I if everybody is, or many are, marching on one road. We

' lose more in depth than we gain in breadth ; for two divisions

marching abreast of each other at an interval of four and

a half to seven miles will more easily and better support each

■other than if they followed behind each other. It is thus

i;2

CAVALRY STUDIES

self-evident how important it is for large bodies of troop!
to march if possible in more than one column. The troops I
are thereby spared much fatigue, and their housing and'J
supplying are considerably facilitated.

"This mode of procedure naturally finds its limit in thft-fl
number of available roads and in the necessity of mutual I
support. Not everywhere will there be found many roads,
converging approximately towards the same object ; nor
must the columns be completely prevented by obstacles '
from co-operating, if co-operation is likely to become j
necessary.

"Of course the number of parallel roads decreases in the
same ratio as the space from which the start is to be made
"Contracts. An Army concentrated at one point can no
longer be moved otherwise than across country ; in order
to be able to march it must again separate either in breadth
or depth, which is equally dangerous in face of the enemy.
If, therefore, we wish to operate, we must continue to march i
in separate bodies,

" It will be gathered from what has been stated that little,
success can be expected from a mere frontal attack, but J
very likely a great deal of loss. We must, therefore, turn
towards the flanks of the enemy's position.

" If this is to be done with undivided force, a small change
in the direction of march would already suffice for small
bodies; because a Division, for instance, can, even under
favourable conditions of ground, scarcely occupy more than
a mile of front. Armies of more than 100,000 men, on the
other hand, occupy more than faur and a Italf miles of space.
To turn their front would mean a day's march ; this would
remove the decision by arms to the next day, give the
adversary time to evade it, and as a rule endanger our own
communications by our intention of threatening those of ]
the enemy.

"Another means consists in containing the enemy in front ]
with part of our forces and enveloping his flank with another
portion. It is then, however, necessary that we remain J

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

173

strong enough in front so as not to be overpowered before
the flank attack becomes effective. We must also be active
enough in front in order to prevent the enemy from throwing
himself with superior forces upon our flank attack. At
any rate, we are obliged to divide our forces in these
cases.

" The normal effect of a flank attack by its fire alone will
be greater upon smalt bodies than upon Armies. These
latter, however, cannot so easily escape the consequences of
a successful flank attack on account of the greater difficulty
of their movements.

" If the Army has approached the enemy in one body
before the battle, every new separation with the object of
enveloping or turning the enemy will necessitate a flank
march within his striking distance.

" If we do not wish to enter upon such tactics, which will
always remain risky, there is nothing else left but to reinforce
that wing which is to overpower the opposite hostile one,
and this would after all be again only a frontal attack. It
may succeed, however, if part of the reserves of the centre
and of the other wing could be spared for that purpose.

"Incomparably more favourable will things shape them-
selves if on the day of battle all the forces can be concen-
trated from different points towards the field of battle itself;
in other words, if the operations have been conducted in such
a manner that a final short march from different points leads
all available forces simultaneously upon the front and flanks
of the adversary. In that case .strategy has done the best
it can ever hope to attain, and great results must be the
consequence." — (Von Moltke's "Tactical and Strategical
Essays," pp. 172, 173.)

And now, on the very eve of the " decisive battle," it may
be well to consider somewhat fully the action of the Cavalry
not only as an arm, but as one of the " three arms," as to a
certain extent exemplified in this brief campaign.

Cavalry must not be considered merely as an independent
force searching for and engaging only the enemy's Cavalry,

174

CAVALRY STUDIES

Its value has always depended on the use made of it and on
the skill of the leader in co-operation with the other arms.
Acting in close co-operation with Infantry, it is an inseparate
part of a fighting machine composed of the three arms.

The two main principles governing the employment of 4
Cavalry in modern warfare are to give the Commander of |
the Army (a) strategical, (6) tactical liberty of action.

Before the battle, the preliminary success of the Cavalry
is of the highest importance, because its success or failure
must greatly influence the nature of the dispositions of both
parties ; one will operate more on the offensive, while the
other will be thrown on the defensive. On the one hand,
with a victorious Cavalry, we will have all the information
required, and full liberty of manceuvre and choice of ground ;
on the other hand, with a beaten Cavalry thrust back on its
own Infantry, the General Officer Commanding is more or
less in the dark, uncertain and hesitating in his movements;
advancing, if he does so at all, under cover of an Infantry
advance guard, with the hostile Cavalry harassing his flanks
and communications. The operations of the first few days
in this Study have shown us that, to admit of strategical
manceuvre, early information is absolutely essential, e.^. the
information gained by our Independent Cavalry influenced
the direction of march of the columns from Hyderabad.

What should be the first objective once our Cavalry has
defeated the hostile Cavalry, when it will have become
master of the theatre of war? As was emphasised in the
First Study (Jhelum), to discover the front covered by the
enemy and the position of the flanks. Its next task will be,
not exactly to attack the hostile columns, but to harass and
delay their march, to lay traps and ambuscades. For these
duties comparatively small bodies acting with Horse Artillery
will suffice. The enemy will be forced to halt, to make
premature deployments, and as a result to delay his advance.
Thus, too, his mora/ wiW be affected and his physical strength
impaired before the main action has really commenced.

Success in battle depends mainly on moral, and

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 175

determination to conquer. " Without the determination to
win, Marengo would have been a defeat ; with the determina-
tion to win, Mars la Tour would have been a victory"
(Colonel Millet). Moral force is the result of training, and
of daily efforts having as their objective the inculcation of
the sense of duty, of the value of discipline, and of the spirit
of sacrifice. Mutual confidence depends on moral. The
successes of Napoleon, Alexander, Hannibal, and Casar
were based on these facts.

As regards reconnaissance of an enemy who has determined
to take up a defensive position, there is no doubt great
difficulty owing to the introduction of smokeless powder and
the deceptive properties of the repeating rifle. But it must
always be recollected that the enemy, in order to reach a
selected position, must march to it ; and actual movements
are difficult to conceal. During their marches the Cavalry
ought to be able to ascertain all necessary information as
regards the numbers and composition of the forces concerned.

During the fight it is the duty of the independent Cavalry
to arrange for the safety of the flanks. It will therefore operate
in one or more bodies on one wing, or if strong enough on
both wings. It seems almost certain that with two bodies of
Cavalry directly opposed to one another and with contrary
objectives a Cavalry engagement must ensue. This fight is,
however, not a necessity ; it is only a means to an end, and
should the enemy's Cavalry be absent, it seems a mistake to
push Cavalry on to seek a fight. For success depends now
on close co-operation, and on the Cavalry protecting the
flank of the manoiuvring advance guard. But such a
situation seems unlikely to occur if our adversary possesses
any Cavalry at all, and we must therefore expect a Cavalry
engagement on a large scale.

And now as regards the other principle governing the
employment of Cavalry, namely, obtaining for the Com-
mander ip) tactical liberty of action.

In the forward movement of the main Army, the Army or
Protective Cavalry plays an important part.

176

CAVALRY STUDIES

Let us examine Napoleon's operations on the 9th Octol
1806, before Jena. His front covered, on this day, about
25 miles. The Army moved on three roads about 12 or 13
miles apart Two corps were on each road at an interval of
a day's march, thus requiring one day to concentrate on the
centre. To admit of this being done it was necessary that
the Army should be covered for one day's march in advance.
Accordingly we find an advance guard of one Army Corps
with six regiments of Light Cavalry, under Murat, marching a
day ahead, with patrols pushed out still farther in advance.
This force formed a sort of strategical advance guard for the
Army, and gave Napoleon freedom of manoeuvre. Out of
this method of procedure the strategical employment of
Cavalry seems to have grown.

There are obviously grave objections, when several Infantry
Divisions are marching together as a unit under one com-
mander, to having squadrons intermingled with Infantry in the
columns of march ; moreover, there is not enough work for
so many squadrons with an Infantry Division. It is far better,
both for tactical reasons and for the comfort of the troops,
to group these Divisional Cavalry regiments into brigades
and to employ them as Army Cavalry or Protective Cavalry.
This, indeed, has as a rule been done in most armies in the
field. But the main columns of the Army must be provided
with some mounted men for orderly work, despatch-riding,
etc. ; one squadron should either be detached for this work
from the Advance-guard Cavalry Brigade or special squadrons
of Cavalry should be trained in peace and mobilised for
this purpose.

Here we are combining the six regiments attached to the
six Infantry Divisions into two brigades ; the principles
governing their employment may be conveniently con-
sidered under four heads, corresponding to the phases in
a battle.

There are four phases in a battle :

The introduction, when manceuvring and preparation take
place.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) 177

The engagement, when Artillery and rifles come into play
to hold the enemy and prevent his manceuvring.

The ih'^nentenl of Napoleon, i.e. the supreme effort, and the
assault of the position.

The taking advantage of victory by pursuing the enemy
to the uttermost limits, or the covering of our own retirement.

During the introduction this Cavalry will have the r61e of
outposts to discharge, and in addition to this and to clearing
hostile troops from the front, it must throw itself upon the
points d'appui of the enemy in order to facilitate the progress
of its own Infantry and Artillery. It will constantly harass
the enemy's Infantry, and by taking up positions on its flanks
and pouring in thence long-range fire compel it to deploy.
Opportunities of surprising hostile guns or columns of Infantry
moving up into positions without having taken adequate
measures for protection en route, or of charging Infantry
detachments which advance too far without scouts, should
never be let slip.

And of supreme importance during this phase is the last
reconnaissance of the battle-field, for on the information gained
by the Cavalry the General Officer Commanding will base his
plan of attack.

Besides finding out, and informing the Commander-in-Chief
of the first general formations of the enemy, the Cavalry must
also report accurately regarding the conformation of the ground,
the cover afforded, and the difficulties and advantages of the
ground. This is certainly the work of Staff officers, though
there are never enough officers trained for such kind of work.
To enable these individual officers, whether of the Staff or
Cavalry, to see, they must be supported up to a certain point.
Even if the main body of the hostile Cavalry has been
defeated, there will always remain two or three squadrons fit
for "police" duty in the space between the two Armies. It
therefore seems indispensable that such reconnaissances be
supported by two or three squadrons for a short distance.
These can throw themselves on any hostile detachment, drive
it back, and so open a road for our officers and scouts.

178 CAVALRY STUDIES

In the reconnoitring period of the independent Cavalry;^
the value of a patrol depended rather on its composition than I
on its strength, and it was necessary to retain the fighting
mass as strong as possible. Now this principle is not so
important. The retention in hand of a fighting mass of
Cavalry is no longer so important, while on the other hand
the necessity for our scouts to reach their objective becomes t
overwhelming ; moreover, they have to .see as quickly as 1
possible. Time is short, and the General Officer Commanding J
is probably waiting for their reports.

The backbone of the reconnai.ssance of the battle-field ttj
the officer ; but his success depends in a great i
the squadrons which support him — without their support hoj
will often effect nothing.

To get the information to the General Officer Commanding '
use —

(a) Despatch-riders at the gallop, and
(d) Helio from the supporting squadron.

As the General Officer Commanding may be moving about,
there must be a regular system of helio-stations, so that the
results of the reconnaissances may be known at once, and
further orders sent if necessary.

It may be that by taking advantage of the ground, detach-
ments of Cavalry can surprise some of the enemy's guns
while, or before, they arc getting into position. In any case
our squadrons should move about in front as a temptation for
the enemy to open fire and disclose his positions.

Having discovered where the enemy's advance-guard
batteries are, we can decide upon placing our own with
greater advantage.

Possibly the latter are still far in rear, and the enemy
threatens to occupy points which are essential to our success.
The Cavalry must quickly dismount to hold whatever is
necessary. This will be easy, as the best Artillery positions
are on ridges with room in rear for led horses, etc. In such
positions, or in front of them, there will often be rocks and
boulders, or a wood, house, or point of sorts which will oBer

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) i;9

protection, and be capable of defence. Thither a few dis-
mounted men must be sent at once.

The General Officer Commanding malics his plan of
engagement behind this scattered veil of squadrons which
are disposed on the front covered by the advance guard ;
some scouting, or rather supporting the scouts ; others offering
a target to induce the enemy to open fire with his guns ;
others holding dismounted certain positions likely to be oC
value to the main body.

During the second phase, the engagement, the groups of
Cavalry can no longer remain in the front line; each one,
according to its role and field of action, will either drop in
rear or slip through towards the enemy, looking out for
opportunities of action : e.g. batteries dismounted by our
shell fire, and moving to some shelter for repair, or Infantry
resting, perhaps with piled arms, or moving in column of
route carelessly protected.

During the H'aiement, and in the pursuit or retreat, it will
probably be the independent Cavalry that will take the
principal part : but owing to the very great frontage of a
defensive position to-day, it is probable that the combat will
resolve itself into a line of almost separate encounters, and in
each of these the advance-guard Cavalry must be ready to
take up analogous rdles at any moment.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH DAYS.

Wednesday, 2\st, and T/mrsday, 22nd.

Cavalry in the General Counter-Stroke.

Situation at 5 hours on the morning of the 22nd instant.
{See Sketch 16.)

I. Hard fighting took place during all the 21st instant on
the eastern half of the battle front.

The Northern Commander was able to hold all his positions,
but was obliged to move some of his reserves towards
Shivani,

i8o CAVALRY STUDIES

2. The Southern 1st Infantry Division holds the entrenciS
ments on the Peeplegaon ridge with outposts on line Anwal
Julgaon-Saylood.

Dhar is held by a detachment of Cavalry with patrols t
north-east and east looking out for northern left
between Dheulgat and Gondankhera.

The Southern detachment which was left on the Pain J
Gunga river vigorously engaged the latter force and impeded J
its march towards Dhaora.

3. The Southern 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions hold the ]
ridges from Anwah westwards to Kollode, which have in J
places been strengthened with entrenchments.

4. The 4th Infantrj' Division moved from Podwuth on the ,
afternoon of the 21st instant in rear of the 3rd Infantry
Division, and is now about Nanagaon-Pangree-Virgaon.

The 6th Infantry Division near Boargaon and Huttee.
The 5th Infantry Division near Chichpoor and Podwuth.
All ready to advance.

5. The 1st Cavalry Division is near Umbai. Patrols have'^
ascertained that enemy has no troops west of Jalkee.

At s hours on the 23nd instant the 6th Infantry Division '
is ordered to engage the enemy on the hills between Kollode |
and Jalkee, while the 4th Infantry Division advances by !
Ghaut Ambree to attack Jalkee from the west and north-,
west. The 5th Infantry Division to march to Huttee in I
reserve.

The 1st Cavalry Division to move to a position of readiness ^
near Ghaut Ambree and to co-operate in the attack.

On the 22nd we return to the independent Cavalry Division,
which was left guarding the left flank of our advance, and
preventing the enemy from finding out what was going on
in rear of our Infantry attack. Thus the movement of our
4th Infantry Division from in rear of Podwuth towards
Nanagaon was probably unobserved by the enemy. To-day
the Cavalry Division must be prepared for its participation 1
in the "decisive battle." Before the break of day the 4th '
Division will have commenced its march up the side of the^i

I
t

l«w» t <» w _

X ILd lUaiCll \X\) LllC MUC Ul till.

■ THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD) i8i

Ghaut Ambree ridge, and by daylight will be in a position
to attack towards Jalkee, the enemy's attention having,
probably, already been diverted by the attack of the 3rd
Infantry Division. As soon as there is sufficient daylight,
the Cavalry Division would cross the Ghaut Ambree ridge
in rear {i.e. to the westward) of the 4th Division, and, moving
down the northern slopes towards Uldah, take up a position
of readiness. This position of readiness is well concealed
by ground and trees. Should the enemy's right wing attempt
to fall back on Baythulwaddy, we should here be astride
their line of retreat. There is water close by Uldah, and
there is an excellent position for guns and rifles along the
ridge which runs east and west, some 1,000 yards north of
the village. (See Sketch 17.)

Here the Cavalry would rest, with its patrols out until
the moment for the general assault arrives. The fewest
possible detachments must be made, and there must be no
unnecessary galloping. Patrols are required to guard against
surprise, and special officers, pushed as close as possible to
the actual battle-ground, must watch the course of action.
The General Officer himself also must be out in front watching,
and in communication, by signal, telegraph, telephone, or
orderly, with the General in Chief Command, and with com-
manders of neighbouring Infantry Divisions. Such is a
position of readiness.

While the general counter-stroke is in preparation, care
must be taken to prevent the hostile Cavalry taking our
troops in flank or rear. To this end the hostile Cavalry
will have to be beaten or driven back if it threatens to
interfere. This duty is secondary to taking part in the
counter- stroke, but still it is of vast importance. In the
case under consideration, the 4th Brigade, Poona Divisional
Cavalry, was detailed for this work, leaving three brigades
for the counter-stoke. The sketch shows the disposition of
the division when making the counter-stroke. The ground
must always decide the best method of execution and the
most suitable dispositions to be adopted. When the two

i82 CAVALRY STUDIES

brigades moving furthest round the enemy's Hank have made
their presence felt, then the first brigade is launched to the
attack. But these attacks will not be launched until the
"preparation^' is over. Moreover, each one will be mat
upon separate points, and beyond the zone of assault of t
Infantry columns. Each brigade must retain a reserve.il
The attack of all these masses of Cavalry upon the enemy's^
flank and rear, in combination with the assault of tho'l
Infantrj', will assuredly shake the enemy's nerve and resolu-
tion ; to such an extent, possibly, that the mere sight of t
advancing Infantry will cause him to evacuate his posjtioi
and to retire in confusion.

The general attack was successful.

Then followed —

The pursuit: as many squadrons and guns as ;
were thrown upon the enemy's demoralised columns so i
to harass their retirement. The 4th Brigade seems the raost'4
likely to be available first, since its role was to guard theJ
flank. Only a limited number of squadrons would, howevei^fl
be sent in direct pursuit. The bulk of the squadrons atugt,
guns marched rapidly via Baythulwaddy to seize a positio
on the enemy's line of retreat, whence to attack him I
by mounted and dismounted action. This should complet
the enemy's rout, and give decisive results.

AKING PART
><TER STROKE.

■Fid Mlly f round

PoKikm «1 G. {

n -,Sp«

(S)

Sm;«-

Loudon

CHAPTER VI,

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK).

Subject.

THE " General Idea " is the same as in the last Study, but
the operations foliowed are those of a Containing Force
in the " Secondary " Theatre of War, i.e. north of Hyderabad,

The "Idea" is similar to the situation in Italy in
where the Theatre of War was " Secondary " to that
Bavaria, the " Primary " Theatre as described on pp. 143 et st

Some of Napoleon's views on the utilisation of the
"Secondary Theatres" will, therefore, now be giv
historical example of the methods which should, or should
not, be employed under similar circumstances.

NOTES ON EUGENE'S CAMPAIGN IN ITALY—
1809. (See General Map No. 4, page 202.)

(A) Uses made by Napoleon of Lines of Defence
IN A Secondary Theatre, or for a Secondary
Objective in the Principal Theatre.

In Napoleon's Correspondence there are numerous passages
in which he explains how to utilise lines of defence to contain
an enemy by means of inferior forces in a secondarj- theatre,
or for a secondar>' objective in the principal theatre. In the
following despatch (No. 14,707), dated Valladolid, 14th
January. 1809, he explains very cleariy to Prince Eugene
how his principles should be applied to the defence of Italy,
in the first part he deals with an aclive defend, using Osoppo
and Palmanova as pivots of manceuvre.
183

i84 CAVALRY STUDIES

In the second part he supposes that the French Army on
Italy has been forced to retire upon the Adlge, and he I
considers the defence of that river. In the course of the ]
second part he defines clearly cases in which similar lines of \
defence may be suitably employed.

No. 14,707. Note on the defence of Italy.

Falmar.ova has an olTen^ive a& well as a dffensive tOle.

In ihe event of the French army wishing to advance on Laybach in
Carniola. Palmanova would be the advanced depdt and end of its line of c
municalions ; the supply prks, hospitals, and magaziiiES could be coDcenlialed
ihece, and in case of a check Ihe Army could then be reorganised.

After threatening ihe enemy in the Carniola nnJ on the Isonio, should il
desirable to march towards the left on Klagenftirlh and unite with the Armj of •]
Germany (which might meantime have marched on Salzburg), then Palmanova U ■
equally important. The troops detailed as its garrison will now form a curtain to 1
conceal our movements for two days from the enemy. Transport, sicli. and other I
details can be concentrated in the place.

Osoppo will also play a. similar rOle to PalrranovB. Should we wish lo advance
on Klagenfurth, it will serve as advanced depot to our line of com municalions.
If, on the other hand, after misleading the enemy by Ihieateaing Id march lowatdi
Klagenfurth, the army were to attack the etiemy on the Isonio, all the troops
left on the side of Tarvis lo mask this movemeot will retire lo Osoppo and form
its garrison.

In this way the two plac
circumstances compelled us lo leave falma:
l,Doo Sappers, and dep6t details would be m
to 500 would suffice for Osoppo. Thus, with 3,01
points would be made quite safe.

On the other hand, if we are compelled to fall back from these places, where
should we hall ? My Hrst idea was the river Piave ; this caused me to issue the
Memuire on this point six months ago. But the river Piave is fordabte for three-
quarters of ihe year. Now, if the enemy turned the Fiave, the French General
might be forced to make a false manceuvre : besides, the Piave is a long distance
from Mantua and Pescbiera, which form the centre of the defence of Italy. The
French General would of necessity become less bold through the fear that, if the
line of the Piave were turned on the left, he could not arrive in front of these
places, which require large garrisons, in time to oppose the enemy's advance.

What caused me to lix upon the river Piave in the first case was because that
river covers Venice, and before abandoning that large town with its large arsenal
a battle ought to be lost ; moreover, il seems most unsatisfactory to make ft
detachment of several thousand men from the field Army in order to leave s
garrison in Venice.

These advantages are of capital importance. But would il not be possible to •
give to the line of the Adige the same qoalities ?

useful for offensive operations. Again, if \
la lo iiself, 1,500 good \xixtArj,
: than sufficient lo hold it. 400
KXD troops, these important

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK)

Defence of Italy on the line of the Adige.

The line of ihe Adige can never possess the qualil)' of coveting Venice, because
it is not Builicientl^ far forward ; but water can be taken from the Brenta, from
the Adige, and the various torrents which run into one or other of these rivei^,
and be collected in such a waj' as la make the country between the Adige and the
Brenta so impracticable that it will be impossible for the enemy to cut off Venice
from the Adige, cunsequcntly he will be obliged to cross the Adige in order to
invest Venice. . . . This, then, must be the first work to be undertaken, viz. the
country between the Brenta and the Adige, which is already marshy, must be
made more so, and lo such an extent that ii will be absolutelj' impossible for the
enemy to penetrate until he shall have lirsl occupied the post defended by the
water, and which itself is verjr difficult of capture.

Once this has been arranged the French Army has every advantage : a large
and very rapid slrcam j bunds on right bank which reader its defence easy ; close
proximity to Mantua and Peschiera ; a central place of arms already of consider-
able strength, vii. Legnago.

On this line, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legmtgo, which luck has placed where
they are, will mutually support one another, and combine as a single unit in the
defeoce of Italy.

Under the circumstances presumed, the Adige must be fbrtided ; the position
at Legnago already exists.

Suppose that the enemy, after forcing the TagHamcnto and the Piave, advances
on Padua and Vicenza ; he might wish to move on Verona, but for that operation
only one road is available — he must pass by Vlllaaova. Now it is only about four
mile* from Villanova to Arcole. By erecting a forlihed work in the form of a
l^e-du-fenl, at Arcole, which will enable the French lo cross at any time at RoneOi
and debouch towards Villanova in an hour's time, the enemy will never dare to
advance on Verona ; only light Cavalry, hussars, and despatch-riders will risk it.

Beside) the advantage of preventing the enemy from advancing upon Verona,
the work at Arcole will also prevent the enemy from occupying the Caldiero
position, which he has twice occupied successfully already.

Thit will tend greatly towards the tranquillity of the larger town of Verona ;
because, even if the enemy did show himself there, he would be checked in front
of Peschiera, and, since that line of communications of the French Army runs
through Mantua, the fear of having the enemy at Verona could not seriously shake
the determination of the French General.

After Arcole and legnago, one or two other " places'' seem likely to be useful
between Legnago and Venice : one roughly in the direction of the main road from
Padua lo Ferrare, near Anghiara ; and perhaps a jiost at Castelbalda ; but this
place, or these two places, must derive their chief strength from the inundations,
and must be field works ( plans de campagne). possessing the power of retaining
the enemy on the left bank if necessary, or of being defended by their own
garrison of 400 to 500 men under another set of circumstances.

The Army having four passages over the Adige, with its right at Malghera
(a fort at the month of the Bienta), suitably sirenglhencd, its left at Arcole, and
its liront covered by the inundation between the Brenta and the Adige, what can.
the enemy do ?

CAVALRY STUDIES

(fl) If he advances on Verona, our Army debouches by Arcole and Ci
in Ihe very act \ (,i) if he masks each of the crouings, we unexpectedly deploy by
one of them, and defeat hia several corps in detail ; {<-) finally, if he Tnarcbes up
ihe Btenla in order to reach Trent, and move on Monlebaldo and Veron«, with
his line of com munical ions passing lo Ihe Tyrol, he makes a detachment which
will be absem for S lo lo days : he weakens himself to ibis exient. If the
detachment is small, it is of no consequence : a few troops al Rivoli will hold
and roul it. If the delachmeni is large, then Ihe main Army is weakened lo Ihi

Next suppose the enemy e^lablishes his headquarters al Padua and tries
cross Ihe Adige between Legnago .and Arcole.

Leaving then a small garrison in Arcole and the olher places, the Aimy ci
debouch by ihe bridge of Anghiara, or even enter Venice, and ihen deploy by
Brandulo or by Malghera against whatever is investing the place, cut the enemy's
communications in all directions, and place his Army in the most hizardooK J
position.

Whatever ihe enemy does, the terrain is so disposed that with half Ihe a
of troops but equal skill, everything is simple for the French General, everythiBg-l
presages viclory for him and points ihe way to it : on the other hand everythb^;!
is most diFhcult and risky for the enemy.

This is the one advantage which fortifications can offer in war. Field *
«re like guns ; they cannot obtain iheir objects single-handed : ihey must be I
properly used and well handled.

In these operations, the importance is apparent of carefully organising thftd
means of communication from Ronco by Ihe right bank of the Adige to Anghiai
and Venice : the roads must be carefully reconnoitred and kept in good order, m
that il is possible to move the Army to either eilremity of the line by night •
in two or three marches.

No general of experience and common sense would risk anything in front vtU
this great fortified reentrant from Konco lo Malghera, where Ihe French Annyifl
covered by inundations can mancEUVre unobserved, and by means of wtucb iJl4
spying and other means of scouting are rendered impossible,
might find his enemy Ihree marches in his rear or on one of his Hanks, with l^
the enemy's forces concentrated against his own still scattered. If il be allied t]
"Bui the enemy will lake Arcole"} Arcole surrounded by water is not ei
captured. Or, again, " The enemy will lake Legnago," which is supposed ti
stiU more important to him. Then the highest possible praise Is bestowed upcai 1
the proposed line of defence ; because if il is only possible to allack i
capturing a fortified place, it has attained ils object.

We can only hope for ihe following advantages from a line of defence : tt
the position of the enemy so difhcult that he become involved in faulty operatiotafl
and be beaten by inferior numbers ; or, if ihe hostile general is prudent and h
some engineering skill, to force him lo cross methodically Ihe obstacles which v
at our leisure have coastrucled, and so to gain time. On Ihe other hand, v
from the side of the French Army, lo assist the weakness of the French General t^
making his position so clear and easy that he cannot commit any great mtitaki^V
And, lastly, lo allow him time lo await support. In the art of war as in mechaniiXr^
time is the important element between mass and power-
In discussing the line of ihe Adige, il may be a^ed ihat the enemy will ci

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 187

by Insbruck on Tiente, Id this case ihe enemy weakens himself in ihe face of our
othet forces, and. secondly, the positions of Montcbaldo and Rivoli leave nothing
lo be desired. If we are niaater of Rivoli, the enemy cannot advance on Verona.
If we hold Montebaldo, he cannot reach Rivoli.

On thai side nature has done everything, and nothing further is wanted.

Undoubtedly the best has been dune if the enemy occupies Verona and has
crossed the Adige, but the French Army has not been turned, becanse, to suppose
the most exag|-<:'^ted case, if Iki enemy has his centre at Verona, his right at
PeKhiera, and his left at Trevise, the French Army would have its right at Venice,
its left at Mantua, its centre at Legnago. It must be recognised that, in this case,
the advantage would be on the side of the French Army which has both flanlcs
resting upon fortified plares and can maniEUVre at will between them against
hostile forces, the lefi, right, and centre of which are equally in the air and
«qaall}- open to attack.

The more we think over this position, the more we come to the conclusion that
with 30,000 men there is nothing to be feared from an Army of 60,000 troops of
the same value, or that at least we shall be able lo gain several monlhs' lime.

Thus, according to Napoleon, in a struggle in a secondary
theatre, an offensive attitude must still be adopted at the
outset ; we must try and impose upon our enemy by continual
threats, force him to scatter his troops, so that we can fall
"Upon one of his isolated corps with a real superiority in
numbers.

In this game of obstacles which is being played with the
enemy we must make up for our smaller numbers by increased
rapidity. But this superior mobility can only be derived
from certain entrenched places which will relieve us of our
impedimenta, convoys, sick, wounded, etc.

To sum up, act vigorously to retain the enemy as far as
possible from the defensive barrier. But once he has got
close to it, there is nothing else to do but attack him while he
is crossing it, and in most cases the dispositions which he has
made to ensure success will then be badly disarranged and
time will be gained.

Regarding "places de campagne"
The following letter, dated 17th June, 1806 (No. 10419),
was sent by Napoleon to General Dejean, his Minister of
War, and explains more fully Napoleon's views on the use
of fortified posts and towns.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Here are a few notes, Monsieur Dejean. on the Peschieii project. Ereti
sup[j05ing the works V X and S R are completely finished and armed, Peschieni
is oot capable of offering such a resistance as to justify its garrision of 3.000 men.
If 3,000 good (loops are placed in Peschieis, it merely means thai 3,01
be handed over 10 the enemy after a month's resistance.

It is most essential to be quite sure in out minds as 10 the usefulness of fortified I
places. Somt foilifications defend a pass : this of itself gives them a spedilf
character. There are also "fortified bases" which, being strongly garrisoned, (T
are able to hold out for a long lime; Ibey thus permit of a weaker Army beiQE i
reinforced or reorganised, so that it can try its luck again In Ihe field.

In the first case a fort or small entrenchment is all that is required ; i
second case we want a large place of arms on which neither money nor trouble ^
ought to be spared.

Besides these two cases, there is a third one, namely, the defence of a frontier by
fortifications. Thus Ihe frontier from Dunkirk to Maubeuge, eti:., etc.

Let us consider into which of these cases Peschiera comes : — (0) It i:
cannot be made into a "fortified base," commanded as it is on every side and
being also restricted in size. Moreover, it is close to Mantua, which performs this
r61e. Ooe forlJIied base depot is sufficient upon one frootier. It would be better
then, for this reason, lo locate the artillery services, supplies, and the garrison at
Mantua, and to spend on that place whatever the fortificalions of Peschiei*
would cost.

Peschiera, however, might, on account of its size, be r^arded as having a special
abjective, namely, that of covering a crossing over the Mincio ; but the Mincio '
is such a small river that this consideration does not merit attention.

As a frontier the line of the Adige is not fortified. Unless it were suggested
to coDslruct fortifications at Peschiera, Valeggio, Goito, Govemolo, and that the
Adige be (leated in like manner -, and that as third tine, Lonato, Montechiani, .
Castiglione, Solferino be entrenched so as lo have in Italy a similar frontier to
that of Flanders, where, even if the enemy were four times the strength of the
defenders, he wouki not be able to advance until he had taken two or three
entrenchments. Bui in the present case, however, the enemy would merely have
10 leave a body of Iroops opposile Peschiera, another detachment in front of
Mantua; and pass at Valeggio and Goito or al any other point, and would coniinne
his operations on the Mincio and Adda, presuming always that he possesses tk
decided superiority in n ambers.

By masking these places he would reduce his numbers very slightly, perhaps
by 14,000 men ; this figure, considering the very superior number which we have
supposed him lo possess, would affect bis strength much less proportionately thai)
the garrisons of Mantua and Peschiera would reduce Ihe strength of the French
Army ; presuming, say, 3,000 men in Peschiera and 7.00a men in Mantua, or a
total of 10,000. It must be admitted that the enemy need not deuch more than
14,000 men ; while, if a battle were imminent neat Castiglione or in the plaint
of Montechiaro, the enemy, if at all skilful, would be able to arrange to withdraw
8,000 men from the corps of observation at ihe critical moment. The garrison*,
however, would only be able 10 make sorties against the opposing light troopt
which would withdraw before them. We have seen a similar stale of circum-
stances during the last wars in Germany, in the case of the large garrisons which
Austria lefl in Philllpsburg, Mayence, and Mannheim ; it was never necessary to |

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK)

1 number of troops equal to the Btrengtli of Ihe

ohsetve these places with e
gurisons.

However, suppose the enemy does besiege Peschierii, he will take it after
13 to 15 days' work : we shall lose many guns, supplies, J.txn men, und the
money expended in foctiryiag the place. But is Peschiera for these reasons of no
value whatever ? Is it unnecessajy to have fortifications al all at Pe5chicra? In
Ihe circumstances already considered any fortifications would be superfluous. Bui
there is another aspect of the question which I shall now enamine.

(i) Peschiera as a plan de campagni. If it were possible to suggest putting
Feschiera al Saint Georges, or in any other position in the Mantua zone of
operations —that b to uy, in such a position that its communications with Mantua
could not be cut— then it would be of the greatest value, and 1 would not hesitate
a moment in deciding what to do. It would give addiliorai! strength lo the
Artillery and to the garrison of that great fortified base dep6t, which would give
time to an Army lo fall back to reorganise and resume the initiative.

But Peschiera eiisls where it is, and will be of the greatest use from an ofTensive
point of view ; its works render secure from hostile raids the dep6lE, hospital,
warlike supplies, and the transport boats which convey to Torbole and al] points
on the lake, troops and supplies, and assist enormously an Army near Trente.
Peschiera also blocks the direct road from Verona lo Brescia, acts as a pivol of
manoeuvre lo an Army defending Montebaldo and the upper Adige ; it supports
the left of an Army operating on the Mincio, and enables it to concentrate its full
■trenglh alxjut Mantua or for any olher operation by affording a safe refuge 10 such
troops as might be left behind the Mincio for two or three full days to mislead the
enemy. Although Peschiera is protected by permanent fortifications, it is slill
what I call a plaa di canpagne (a temporary field-work). A sbilfiil General
will be able lo derive immense value from it, but it would not be of the slightesl
use to an incompetent one.

During the Cosliglione operations, Peschiera had a garrison of only 500 men,
the greater number of whom were cripples, and for seven or eight days it was left
lo its own resources. It proved of the greatest advantage lo the French Army,
because, instead of 500 men, the enemy came to the conclusion that there were
1,500 in it. and left 4,000 before the place. The movements of the Army were
thus concealed, and when a French Division returned lo Peschiera after Casliglioue,
Ihe enemy was unable to delay its passage of the Mincio even for one hour, but
was afraid fur its own retreat, and failed effectually in cutting it off.

The French General leR 500 men there ; a nervous one woald have left 1,000 ;
but a skilful one would only have left a garrison so long as the enemy had nal
gained a decided superiority, and provided that lighting was slill going on and
there was every chance of the Army subsequently returning.

But let us suppose that in the case in which Peschiera played so important a
tflle, the French General had come to the decision lo concentrate alt his troops at
Kivoli and fight a decisive battle ; (hat he had already lost a portion of his Army
in killed and prisoners ; and that he had no hope of reinforcements, as there were
none beyond the Alps, do you think he would leave the garrison locked up in the
forts? Not at all ; he would blow up two or three of the baitions at Peschiera,
sr al any rate evacuate the place it it were impossible to blow it up ; but he would
not reduce his field Army by a single man.

If you ask me what is meant by a place de tampi^Ht with permanent fortifica-

190

CAVALRY STUDIES

tions, just casl your eye over the evenls which look place last Vendemiair*
(September zl to October zt) ; see how valuable Ebal wretched old Chateau
of Veiorn wns: its influence on events was possibly incalculable. Thai poor
Chileau mode us master of the Adige ; this kct at once altered the whole
complexion of affairs in the campaign. That insignificant fortress, Lcgnago, loo,
is only i.plact de lampagne.

If, instead of acting as he did, ihe Grand Duke Charles had crossed the Adige
at Ronco or at any other point, and beaten the French Armj
Scherer was beaten in the year Vll, the Chateau nf Verona and Leg;nago would J
at once have fallen.

Moreover, during all the lime that an Army is manceuvring, while it withdraws J
from one flank to concentrate upon the other, or makes a march or two toward* ■
the rear to combine with some support or reinforcement which has remained on f
the Ticino or Adda, or which is coming forward from Alexandria, or pcrhapl I
from Bologna 1 during all these mancenvres the enemy has neither the lime ni
the means to carry on a sit^e : he masks all fortified places, (ires a few shells and
salvos from hia Field Artillery at Ihcm— that is exactly the degree of strength
which a place de ramfuigiK should possess.

Peschicra ought 10 be a place ile laiiipagiie and possess the degree of resistance
required ; bul it has not the qualities for a place of this kind. In this case the
qualifications required are to be able to afford protection to a Division retreating'
from Verona pursued by the enemy : the heights would have to be evacuated
because the fire from the works does not command them.

Another reason why Peschiera cannot be used as ^ place de campagiie is becausa
it does not possess snfiicient power of resistance to give a commandant of ordinary
courage a feeling of security ! C bastion is cjuile commanded by the heights and ,
is easily breached, so that there is some fear that an enterprising enemy, who ha>
a few iS or 14 pounders, might cany the place in the 11 or 15 days during whiclt
the Army is manfEuvring.

Such ate the qualities and amount of resisting power which Peschiera should
possess ; there must be no, or very little, increase of garrison, because a place df
campagne must ije capable of being held by the smallest possible numbers.

(B) Napoleon's Instructions for the
Defence of Italy.

—Arms and Ammunilion.

No. 12,173. From ihe Emperor Napoleon to Prince Eugkni,
Viceroy of Italy,

Italy may be divided into ihree zones : the country from the Isonzo to tb
Adige ; the country twtween the Adige and the Adda ; and Ihe coimir; betWM
the Adda and Piedmont.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) igs

If a bitlllc is loBl and the enemy happens In be in Buperioc force, you might
lie driven hack behind the Adige. In ihts cue ihc 17,000 tides which you have
at Venice and Ihe 7.000 .tt Fnlmanova would be of no use to you. Those at
Palraanova can be used by the Army, but 17,000 15 loo large a number at Venice ^
so lemove 7,000 of ihem.

Vou have 3,000,000 cartiidBcs al Palmanova, and 3,000.000 al Venice. Take
■way 1,000,000 from each of these dep6ls. and place them behind the Adige.
These 3,000,000 rounds would be of considenible value to the enemy. If there
are 2,000,000 lb. of powder at Paltnanova, remove hftlf of it without delay.

After this, presume ihal the enemy has crossed Ihe Adige and drives you back
on to the Adda. V'oa will Ihen want arms, cartridges, ami powder at Pavia and
Plasencia,

Finally we come lo Fiedmonl, but this does not concern you.

Piedmunt, however, will be divided into two ; Aleiandria and Turin, Fines-
(rella and Genoa.

Thua all (he ammunition supplies in Italy will be divided into five parts, in
order that, if communication should be interrupted with the Snt four, we still
have the means of arming and supplying the last part.

Think over these ideas ; act in accordance with them, but make your dispositions-
gradually and without hasle.

2. — Foati ami Forage.
No. 14,909. To Engine Napoleon, Vicerrry of Italy, at Milan.

\bth Marc,

.809,

My son, you must think over the question of supply : the plan of feeding troops
by markets becomes impossible when large concentrations lake place. Vou must
then have recourse to requisitions, and at the same time bring in la^e supplies
from the neighbouring territories ; lix the prices, and see that the requisitioning
is If^aJly carried out : thai is the best plan.

Padua, Venice, Bassano, and Verona are rich countries. Supplies should be
easil; conveyed from the Fo and Adige lo Palmanova. Under the drcumitanoes.
you must help the Treasury by making Ihe requisitions at a moderate price : this
is Ihe universal custom in every countiy in the world. . , .

No. 14,698.

Valuidolid,

lyh /attuary, 1S09.

that you have heard that the
It seems lo me exiraordinaiy

My son, 1 have received your letter telling n
A ustrians are collecting large supplies al Gorili
that ihey should collect supplies so close lo us.

I suppose that Palmanova is fully supplied ; that is the principal point I
presume also Ihal you have collected at Palmanova sufficient amount of Inwuit to
supply the whole Army on an emergency.

CAVALRY STUDIES
—Communications of t fie An

No. 14,926.

Give orders for the load Mantua-Legnago-Podua-Trevise <o be put in the best
state of repair ; Ihis in fatnre will be the main line of communicalion, instead of
by Brescia and Verona. i^N.B. — Note Napoleon's care to change his line of cc
municalions, so as to render any hostile atlempt against them more difficult.)

I have ordered ihe telegraph to be put in working order by the 1st April '
between Paris and Milan.

Situation of t lie French and Austnans wlien Hostilities
commenced.

Napoleon was anxious to delay the outbreak of hostilities
until he was ready, and in order to avoid giving the Austrians
any pretext for a rupture, he on several occasions warned
Eugfene against making any conspicuous movement with a
view to concentrate his Army.

On March 14 he wrote :

After Ihe 20lh March you are at liberlylo occupy campsat Udine, Saint Danid,
and Montechiaro ; but I am anxious that these moves be carried out Idnitely, aod
the health of the troops considered.

And on March [6 :

You will then have on the ist April 60,000 Infantry, 10,000 Cavalry, and
70S guns on Ihe left of the Adige, forming the nucleus of an Army of 80,00

Not wishing to give Napoleon any cause for complaint, 1
Eugene delayed his concentration as much as he could.

On the other hand, on the ist April (ten days before the j
outbreak of hostilities), the Austrian Army was concentrated ,
on the Italian frontier under the Archduke John.

Headquarters at Goritz.

8th Corps between Tarvis and Villach.

9th Corps between Laybach and the Isonzo. Total, 4S,ocoJ
men.

Tyrol Corps (Chasteler), 12,000 men.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK)

193

Dalmatia Corps, 8,000 men.

Reserve, 20,000 Landwehr troops.

The whole Army numbered about 100,000 men.

The Franco-Italian Army was commanded by Prince
Eugene, with General Charpentier as Chief of Staff. The
latter had acted in the same capacity to Massena in the
same theatre of war in 1805.

The Army consisted of:

In First Line.
Seras' Division between Udine and Palmanova,
Broussier's Division between Udine and Saint Daniel and

Osoppo.
Sahue's (Light Cavalry) on the Tagltaraento.

/« Second Line.
Grenier's Division at Sacile, Conegliano, Pordenone.
Barbou's Division from Bassano to Legnago.
Severoli's Division at Padua and Este.
Grouchy's Division of Dragoons between Mantua and
Verona.

In Rear.
Lamarque'.s Division marching on Verona.
Fontanellis' Division in camp at Montechiaro looking

towards the Tyrol.
The Royal Guards between Milan and Paduai
Pulley's Division of Dragoons at Ferrare and Rovigo,
Total about 63,000 men and 6,000 horses.
The nth Corps (Marmont), 10,500 men in Dalmatia.
Finally some troops were moving up from Naples to join

the Army.

Napoleon was fully persuaded that the Austrians would
remain on the defensive in Italy, and would march the bulk
of their troops by the Tyrol into the principal theatre of war
in Bavaria. His instructions to Eugene, put briefly, were to

194 CAVALRY STUDIES

try and detain the enemy by threatening him in the direction

of Tarvis, but on no account to compromise the safety of
his Army.

No. 14,909. To Eugene Napoleon.

My son, I told you in my letter of IhiE morning that I thought il would be
Qeces&ary at the bc^DOg of April to locale the Divisions of Seras and Broussier
with two regiments of Light Cavalry in the Friaul ; Grenier's Division at
Conegliano, Sacile, and Poidenone ; Barbou at Trevise and extending as fai as
Bassano, the Italian Divisions at Padua and Vicenza ; Lamarque's Iroopi at
Verona, except the 112th, which is slill required in Tuscany. You should also
move the Cavalry closer up ; but at the same time you must not produce a scarcity
of forage. My inteulion ia not to make any raovemenl at all during April, and
everything leads me to think that the Austrians for their port will reflect upon the
abyss which is ready to swallow them up ; the Russians are marching against
Ihem. However, we must be in perfect readiness for anything, am! talk big. It
is not beyond the bounds of possibility (but this is for you alone) tbal 1 might
come and spend a week in Frioul during April, see all the troops, who must be in
£ne condilLon, and get back at once to Paris. . . .

No. 14,943.

Napoleon orders a reconnaissance of the theatre of war.

No. 15,050. To Eughte Napoleon, Viceroy of Italy, at Udine.

\olh April, 1809, II a.m.

My son, everything leads me to the conclusion that the Austrian! began hos-
tilities yesterday or will do so lo-day or to-morrow. If they attack before the
I5tb, I have ordered my Army of Germany to retire on Augsburg and to the Lech,
in Older to be able myself to be present to direct the first blows.

Move your headquarters without delay to Pontenone. Put Broussier's Division
between Ponlebba and Chiusa ; Grenier's Division between Chiusa and Venione ;
Lamarquc at Osoppu ; Barbou at Udine ; one Italian Division near Udine, the
other near Codroipo. Concentrate your whole Army, for hostilities ate imminent.
Give the Venice command to General Vial, and order that place and Porto-
Legnago to be armed and supplied.

Barbou's Division, with an Italian Division and a few Cavaliy Regiments, under
the orders of Genera! Baraguay d'Hilliers, ought to be sufficient to hold whatever
forces the enemy may have in the direction of Gorilz and on the road to Trieste.
At the same time you should be ready to debouch and attack Tarvis with the
Divisions of Grenier, Seras, Broussier. Lamaique, the Italian Guards, one Italian
Division, and even Barbou's Division as well, if you lind that the enemy is not in

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 195

force on Ihe left of ihe Isonio. But you must avoid the enemy's entrenchmenti,
and don't biea.k your head against his redoubts.

(Note.— This letter did not reach Eugene till the iSth. He was defeated at
Sacile on the l6th April.)

No. 15,061. To Eugine Napoleon, l^iceroy of Italy,
at Valvasone.

ink April, 1809, It f.ni.

My son, I suppose that you had scarcely arrived at Verona or Trente when you
heard that the Austrians had begun hostilities, and you have gone to your head-
quarters in Frioul. I have heard by the telegraph only that the Auslrians have
passed the Inn and so declared war. I think I have already told you that my
orders were that if the Austrians attacked before the Ijlh, my troops were to
retire behind the Lech, where I shall be myself on the 15th. I om anxiously
waitit;g to hear what they have done in Italy ; but all my information lends me
lo think that Ihey mean to remain on the defensive there.

You will have concentrated your Army in the Frioul and placed a Division in
the Pontebba defile, so as to threaten a movement on Tarvis at any moment, I
presume that you have taken precautions to prevent any encumbrances remaining
at Udine, and have placed all the Cavalry depQls, as well as the hospitals, on the
other side of the Piave.

Palmanova and Osoppo shouW conlain your linal requirements.

In this way you will be free from all impediments, and can act according to the
enemy's movements. As far as I can calculate, the enemy's main forces should
beat Tarvis. If that is so, he will not advance on Goritt, but will concentrate at
Lay bach.

Post some Cavalry and about 12,000 men on the Isonto, and march with all
your Army towards Tarvii. Leave nothing to chance, but avoid the entrench-
ments which the enemy has made, so that you may not smash your head ;^ainst
his redoubts. 1 expect the road to the Tyiol will be (UHicull ; write me in
duplicate by the St. Golhard and by ordinary courier. Keep your Army well
concentrated.

Teli Marmont of the hostilities. I have already advised you to place the
14th provisional half Brigade at Verona, and to bring up the Division consisting
of the 62nd, ajrd, and ilni! by forced marches by Bologna and Ferrare to Trevise,
in order to act as a reserve. Leave Miotlis at Rome. Issue orders again to
ensure thai Venice is well anned and provisioned. Don't be in any huny, but
see what the enemy does : his dispoHtions must serve as your guide.

No. 15,068.

STRASBtTRG,

15M Afiril, iSog.
My son, I am now at StrasbuTg. I wrote to you from Paris. Threaten much,
bat be in no hurry, and much with every precaution.

196 CAVALRY STUDIES

No. 15072.

Stuttgart,

16/ii Afril, 1

I suppose that Ihef have attempted nothing on your side. Keep youc boopi l
well concentrated. March deliberately. {Meoxhtz fosimtnt.')

On the loth April the Austrians crossed the ItaHan 1
frontier, and surprised the French Army, which was not j
yet concentrated, in the same way as they had forestalled J
them in Bavaria.

The Archduke John moved the bulk of his Army (the I
8th and 9th Corps) along the central route by Cividale and
Udine, and only sent two advance guards on the roads
through the Carinthia and Carniola,

Thus surprised, what ought the Viceroy of Italy to do?
Retire, but delay the enemy's advance as much as possible
in order to gain time for his Army to concentrate. With
this end in view, every line of defence must be employed
to advantage. A halt should be made on each line, and
steps taken to make the enemy believe that a most vigorous j
opposition is to be expected. If deceived by these measures,'
the enemy will deploy and make dispositions to force thca
line, and await the arrival of his supporting troops before J
attacking. By operating this way the French Army might!
gain valuable time. A further retreat, however, must be J
begun sufficiently soon to allow the same procedure to be I
carried out at the next line of defence.

By such methods Eugene might have gained sufficient 1
time to organise a strong defensive position on the river"!
Piave, without ever fighting a decisive battle. In accordance 1
with Napoleon's strategical plan he was weaker than the \
enemy, so he should have avoided a pitched battle. His ]
r61e was to contain 100,000 Austrians in the secondary theatre ■]
while preventing them both from rendering any assistance 1
to the main Austrian Army, and, as far as lay in his power, '
from laying waste the rich country of Northern Italy, i
Napoleon would be able in the meanwhile to deal with '

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 197

the Austrian main forces in Bavaria. Moreover, supposing
these 100,000 Austrian troops were stupid enough to delay
too long in Italy, that country might become their grave.

Such, then, were the possibilities of the situation. But
Eugene lacked the power of calmly appreciating it : he
merely acted with the courage of despair. He seems afraid
that Napoleon will blame him because the Austrians have
invaded Italy. And so he gives battle to the Archduke
Charles, in open country, near Sacile in front of the Livenza,
and without the following troops : Lamarque's Division,
PuUy's Division of Dragoons, the Royal Guards, part of
Fontanelli's Division, and the troops coming up from
Naples.

His Army is routed, and he retires in disorder at one
stride to the Adige, without even trying to defend the line
of the Piave.

(D) Letters from Eug6ne to Napoleon showing the

Decisions at which he arrived at and why.

Eugene to Napohon.

UDINE,

\Kifh April, i8og.

Sire,

I huslen to inform Your Majesty thai the letter, of which I send you a copy,
va» delivEced to our outposts near Ponlebba at ; a.m. lo-day. It has this
moment reached me, and I have ordered Geneml Broussier to advance aX once
beyond Osoppo and defend with energy the position of Ospitaletto (N.B. — a
few miles north-east of Osoppo).

I have directed Ihc following — the Divisions of Grcnier, Barltou, and Severoli,
with Grouchy's Division of Dragoons, to inarch to the Tagliamenlo. Geneml
Seriis has been told to throw any one who attempts to cross the Isonio into
the river. I have arranged to collect live In&nlry and two Cavaiiy DiviaioDS
on the Tagliamento, and I shall dispose them as circumstances develop. I have
left two Infantry and one Cavalry Division on the Adige, which will join tne,
however, should no movement be reported in the Tyrol. Should the enemy
be moving in that disltict, I shall send Geneial Baraguay d'Hilliers to take
command of these Divisions.

Note the various dispositions made by the Viceroy. To
leave one Cavalry and two Infantry Divisions on the Adige
is to operate in direct opposition to the principle of the con-

198 CAVALRY STUDIES

centration of force at the decisive point (s
letters of April 15 and 25).

Eugene to

VAtVASONK,

t2tli April, i8og.
The enemy's advance was well developed on the nth along the whole front.
According to numerous reports which have reached me, General Chasteler is in
the valley of the Fella with 18,000 men. Prince John has arrived with 11,000
men, and General Giulay has crossed the Isonio with 17,00a As 1 have only
Braussier's Division available to withstand such large hostile forces I havs
decided that I ought not to tackle the enemy, and have ordered a retrograde
movement towards my reinforcements, and with the object of concentrating my
Divisions behind the Tagliamenlo. This movement appeared the more necessary
since Prince John, having reached Cividale, threatened to turn General Broussier's
light. General Seras was accordingly ordered last night to take up a posilion
near Campoformio, and to cross the Tagliamenlo to-day, leavir^ one regiment
to hold the bridge-head, while the Sih Chasseurs and (jlh Hussars scouted further
to his front.

This movement has been carried out. General Grcnier, who arrived at the
bridge when General Seras was crossing, took position at Valvasone. General
Broussier was to foil back last night after dark and cross the Tagliamento at
Dign<^ma. These movements have been carried out in quietness and with
precision, and without affecting the moral of the troops. Before leaving his
posilion at Ospitaletto General Broussier had a most brilliant affair which augurs
well for the future success of the campaign. He was attacked at 2.30 p.m. by
a force double his numbers. . . .

I cannot tell Your Majesty what I shall do to-morrow. My disposition will
depend on the enemy's movements.

My intention is to pass the day in my present positions, to rest my troops,
who are much fatigued by the long marches, which they have been makii^ in
the midst of continual rain. I shall bring up Barbou's Division : its head is at
Pordenone to-night. I shall closely watch the enemy, and if I notice any
hesitation or weakness in his advance, I shall attack him vigorously with my
four Divisions. If, on the other hand, the enemy advances in force towards
the Tagliamento, which is fordable everywhere, I shall make another march
rearwards to the Livenza, and from there resume the offensive with all mj

On the 15th the Austrians attacked the French rearguard.
Eugene expected his rearmost divisions to join him on the
i6th, and, for the reasons given in his letter of the 17th
(see below) to Napoieon, decided that he must accept battle
at Sacile.

The Austrians had 4S,ocx) men, and Eugine 5 Divisions |

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 199

(Broussier, Seras, Grenier, Barbou, Sevoroli), or about 36,000
men, Lamarque's Division and Grouchy's Dragoons would
have given him 10,000 more troops. But tliese Divisions,
being delayed by swollen torrents, did not arrive, and Eugene
was beaten. He lost 3,00a men. The Austrians lost about
the same in the fight, but the retreat of the French was
made under the most deplorable conditions, so that their
total losses were very great

It was an error to give battle in open country for such
insufficient reasons as those advanced by Eugene. It was
a still greater error to fight this battle before the concentra-
tion of his troops had taken place.

Eugkne to Napoleon.

On the Banks qf the Piave,

lyih April, 1809.
In conformity with what 1 have already reported to Your Mnjestj, it became
each da; more necessary to offer battle lo the enemy.
lit/. — Because Prince John began to press us closely.

indly. — Because I could not bear (he iden of giving up two provinces of Vour
Majesty's Kingdom without a fighi.

3n)V>'. -.Because General Chasleler'a match ihroagh the Tyrol (he Arrived at
Brixen on the 13th April) rendered an engageiiient more and more necessary.

Accorditigly I fought a battle yesterday, and I am sorry to have lo report lo
Your Majesiy thai I lost il.
The fight began at 9 a.m., etc.

Engine to Napoleon,

ViCENZA,

Ijrrf April, 1809.

If Your Majesty disapproves of my having given bailie, you will at any rate
take into consideration my reasons for fighting: isl, I had already made Ihrce
TelTogmde marches, and brought together five division of Infantry which, but
for the floods, would have arrived upon ihe batlle>(ield during the day ; indly,
the men were complaining at lieing obliged to fall back before they had even
seen the colour of their adversary ; ydfy, laslly, Cbasteler's arrival in Ihe Tyrol.

If I already had had the honour of winning victories I would have let Ihe
iroopB tallt, and would have made two more marches to the rear lo reach the
Piave, which undoubtedly would hare been a mure favourable battle-field. But
I was a&aid, above everything, that Your Majesiy might disapprove of my
retreating and giving up several provinces in which you had won renown ; and
I could not bear ihe idea that any day Your Majesiy would be able lo say to
me: " Vou ought to have fought."

These reasons entirely decided me. But, if I had known on the evening before

200 CAVALRY STUDIES

the battle what I only learned next day, namely, that your Majesty ha
the Grand Array lo retire to the Lech, I would then have followed your
and the results would have been very different.

The following report on the battle of Sacile was sent by
Eugene on April 25 to General Clarke, the Minister of War:

The concentration should have been completed by the morning of the i6tli,
I knew that my orders had reached the troops, and thai Ihey had marched in
accordance with them ; but the terrible weather which was experienced for
several days, and (he flooded water-courses, delayed the march of several Infantry
Divisions and ihe Cavalry. On the :sth the enemy attacked my advance goaid
in force, and on the l6lh I was obliged lo stand and give battle. Everyone
fought wilh the greatest delennination, but victory was entirely on the side of
the Austrians,

(E) Napoleon's Criticism.
No. 15,116. Napoleon to Eugene.

Rat IS BON NK,

2ltk April, 1S09.

I received your two letters (dated 14th and i^Ih) together. It was a pity to
have fought without your Cavalry. If you weakened your Field Army in ordex
to hold Verona, you did wrong. Btfsre giving baltli you ought to havt con-
centrattd all your troops : if you had vmil it, you would have had nothing fa
fear from the tiumys farce in Tyrol. The line of the Adlge ought now lo be
strongly held.

Duroc to Eugitte.

Landskut,

x6ti April, 1809.
The Emperor says: "A lost battle is nothing, we can remedy that; but he
cannot prescribe tliat remedy because he docs not know where you are, not
what troops you have with you. It would have been better lo have sent an
officer here who had had a good look round, and would be able lo give a full
report to Hii Majesty. An ordinary despatch- rider can tell us nothing."

No. 15,128. Napoleon to Eughm

Landshut,

■ihlh April, 1809.
You «re fining your attention on the Tyrol, where there is absolutely nothing
to cause you alarm. Setting aside the fact that one of my corps is marching
00 Salzburg, what do you imagine iz,ooo men can do, so long as a handfitt
of your troops are posted at Montebaldo, to contain the enemy ? All that il
foolishness. The battle must indeed have been a most terrible one smce it
caused you lo abandon the line of the Piavc. It was most stupid of you ti
allow Venice lo be invested without some very strong reasons, apart from youi
ridiculous terror about the Tyrol. If you are afraid of an invasion from the j

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 201

Tyrol, occupy the positions which I held during my Italian campaigns. Every
drummer in your army knows them ! I occupied Monlebaldo, Corona, Riroti,
and the Adige ; ihe enemy was then in possession of Imliruck, Bavaria, nnd
the Tyrol, and I beat him, mainly through preventing ihe junction of his troops
in the Tyrol with those in Fiioul. I see that yon ate not very well up in the
history of those campaigns, since yon say ihat if the enemy comes by (he Tyrol,
the plain of Verona must be given up to him. He cannot possibly debouch
from the Tyrol if you occupy the heights about Rivoli, and he cauiot force
the Rivoli position if you occupy La Corona and Monlebatdo. If you ate master
of Bassano, the enemy will never dare to pass beyond Trente because you would
intercept his communications by the Brenta deliles.

No. 15,131. Napoleon to Eughie.

Lasdshut.

^Ilk April. 1809.
I sincerely hope that you have not evacuated the line of the Piave. nor given
up the fine country between that river and Ihe Adige to be pillaged.

30(4 April.
I trust thai yon have not lost your head to such an cWent as to have evacuated
the line of ihc Piave. The enemy's Italian Army will soon be upon my right
flank ; I want to know its strength. If I only knew what had happened to my
Italiwi Army, I could operate with greater boldness.

No. 15,144.

BUBCHAUseH,

ynh April, 1S09.

My son, I have received your letlet of the 22nd by the post,
I am sorry to see that you have given up the line of the Piave. You consider
it strange that the enemy has not appeared there yet : I should have been
astonished had he done so, and not rested content at capturing in oi;e day the
whole country from the Isonio to the Piave. If instead of destroying the bridge
over the Piave you had constructed a bridge-head, and made some show of an
intention to defend it, the enemy would never have dared to pass that riverj
Venice would never have been invested, and the country between the Piave
and the Adige would not have been pillaged. If, however, contrary to all
expectation, the enemy had tried to cross the Piave, and you were not in a lit
state to oppose him, you still had twenty-four hours before you. I am sorry to
see that you have no notion of what war is or how to carry it on. The Aualtians
are So little accustomed to make war in this fashion that they were surprised at
finding that'you had not held on to the line of the Livenza, which formed a good
rallying point for you. They also never conceived that you would abandon the
Piave, In viar, iM ahiiays see our avin miifortuius, hut fail la notice Biir entm/s
iligiculties. Vou must show some confidence. Until the enemy had madi
attempt to force the bridge over the Piave, you ought to have held on to
bridge-head ; you were always in a position to destroy the bridge even if thi
enemy had crossed above or Ijclow it.

I am aware ibat people in Italy pretend to despise Massena ; if I had
him there, what has happened would never have taken place, eld, etc

202 CAVALRY STUDIES

If you knpw anylhing of history, you would know that the " quolibets" &

no use at all, and that the grealesi bnllles in history have been lost siniplr^J

through the general having listened to the advice of ihe Itoops.

There arc many valuable lessons to be leamt from a study '
of the campaign outlined above. In the first place it
teaches us that a commander must never stand to fight a
decisive battle when he has no chance of being victorious.
It is an error to fight without all one's means at hand:
time must be gained for concentration : to this end impose
on the enemy by partial and timely counter-attacks, take
up a position to make him expect a fight, make him lose
time in preparations, then retire before allowing one's troops
to become involved ; but take every precaution to ensure
an easy retreat. By such tactics the necessary time will
be gained for concentrating one's troops on some prepared
position, which is designed to compensate for the inferiority
in our numbers. Defend this line with determination, but
prepare a second, in case the first line is forced.

This system of defence, step by step, is the only method
of war possible for a General of ordinary ability in a secondary
theatre of war, where he has been placed with resources
which are recognised to be inferior to those of the enemy.
By operating as described he will prevent the enemy from
advancing too rapidly, and will keep his attention occupied J
while the fate of the campaign is being settled on the decisive 1
theatre.

If the enemy retires, attack him vigorously so as to make I
him face about and delay. Such was the second act <
this campaign.

The Austrians were forced to fall back by Napolet
successes in the main theatre, and began their retreat on
May 1. Eugene followed, crossed the Brenta behind them,
and arrived on May 7 on the Piave. Here the Austrians
wished to halt ; but the French forced the Piave, and
defeated the Austrians in battle at Conegliano.

We now proceed to the consideration of the strategical I
situation as depicted in the "General Idea" (p. 140}.

(kNERAL UA>

vaiiey. many roaas raaiate irom ine uiiy, sxj l:

as depiciea in me vjcuciai xo^-cA ^^. *-^-y.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 205

(Sec General Map, Na 5*)

1. One of the enemy's Armies (believed to be his main force)
is acting offensively from Bhopal in the direction of Auranga-
bad Another of his Armies holds the line of the Godavery
and the country northwards to Raipore.

2. Our objective is to contain the latter Army and to gain
time for our main Army about Aurangabad to defeat the
enemy's forces in the primary theatre. To this end the
General Officer Commanding containing force must not only
prevent the enemy from occupying the district south of the
Godavery with its capital Hyderabad (the second most im-
portant town of the Buffer State), but must also prevent any
large detachment being made towards the primary theatre.

3. The forces at our disposal are 4 Divisions of Regular
Infantry, i Cavalry Division of 4 Brigades and 4 Batteries
Royal Horse Artillery, and 20,000 levies (mounted and on
foot).

The enemy's Army on the Godavery is believed to be much
superior in numbers and is estimated at 120,000 Infantry and
10,000 mounted troops.

4. {a) The country southwards from the Godavery to

Hyderabad is, speaking generally, composed of
rugged hills covered with jungle alternating with
open cultivated plains in which are numerous
villages and large tanks.

{b) An important edge of hills runs south-eastwards from
near where the Manjera river joins the Godavery
vii Duggy and Sircilla to Warangal (east of
Sunnigarum). From Sunnigarum, both westwards
and eastwards, there is a belt of very rocky country
indeed, but passable by numerous roads and
country tracks between the hills.

{c) Hyderabad is situated in this zone in the Moosy river
valley. Many roads radiate from the city, so that

204

CAVALRY STUDIES

a force at Hyderabad can be moved quicVly to 1
any part of the Godavery river: and, moreoi
can be moved more quickly from the secondary ^
to the primary theatre than can a force about
Nirmal and Yellagudpa on the Godavery, as this
would have to march, by cross-roads.
(if) There are four main lines of advance from thej
Godavery upon Hyderabad available for the 1
enemy : —

(i) Up the Manjera valley. This river is a ,
formidable obstacle parallel to the march
of an Array operating from the North.

(2) Via Dichpali and Bhiknur (a metalled
road).

(3) Via Polas and Kutkoor.

(4) Via Sunnigarum.

Routes (3) and (3) can easily be blocked by an inferior
force at the passes through the important belt of hills referred
to in paragraph {d) above, vh. about Duggy and Sircilla.
Route (4) passes the ridge at Sunnigarum, but the defile is
there less of an obstacle.

5. Courses open to the enemy and to Officer Commanding
Southern containing force.

The enemy may (a) act on the defensive, or (i) move a
part of his force to the primary theatre, retaining another part
on the Godavery, (c) march in force on Hyderabad.

The consideration of case (a) by itself may be omitted
because a plan to meet (d) includes it.

(d) A hostile force from Nirmal and Yellagudpa, wishing to .
reach the primary theatre, would probably march vik Bhainsa
and Bokur, Ooiah and Nandgaon. Such a movement might
best be delayed by mounted troops from Kondelwaddy and
Nandair on the south, while a southern Infantry column
moved from Hyderabad towards Kheir and the Purna river,

iVti^ir.— Kunnairgaon (18 miles north of Hingoli), on the
Paingunga river, is held by a double bridge-head — (see Third
Study : Aurangabad).

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK)

205

(c) In the event of his marching in force on Hyderabad, a
distance varying from 25 to 40 miles would separate Ihe
several columns, if the enemy used the four routes mentioned
in paragraph 4 (rf). It is to be presumed, therefore, that in
this case his real advance is likely to be made only on the
front comprised by two of these roads until the Beerkoor-
Duggy-Sircilla ridges have been occupied by his troops.

The Southern Commander cannot oppose this movement on
the Godavery because the enemy already holds that river line.
The next obstacle to the enemy's advance is the belt of hills
Beerkoor-Duggy-Sircilla-Waranga!. The country comprised
between this belt and Hyderabad should be organised to
enable the containing force to carry on a war of positions,
and to take the offensive should the enemy commit an error
in his advance.

These measures would include : —

(1) Double bridge-heads near Basvada and Medak over

Manjera river for offensive purposes, 500,000 rations
in each.

(2) Positions round Sircilla and Waranga! strengthened

for occupation by levies ,as a pivot of manceuvre,
100,000 rations in each.

(3) Position prepared near Bhiknur to block the road from

Balkonda and to cover lateral communication be-
tween Medak and Sircilla. Roads to Medak im-
proved.

(4) Improvement of road generally.

Disposition' of Containing Force.

(l) Cavalry. — The bulk of the Cavalry to be located on
the enemy's right front, with patrols on enemy's right flank,
in order to gain early warning of any movement towards the
primary theatre. A detachment to watch the approaches
towards Sircilla.

Say three Brigades on a front from about Sungum, near
the mouth of the Manjera, to Sakunderpoor, on Dichpali
road, 25 miles. One Brigade on the front Korutla-Polas,

206

CAVALRY STUDIES

rS miles. Sakunderpoor to Korutla, 30 miles. Mounte
levies from Polas eastwards to mouth of the Maner river, ]

50 miles.

(3) Infantry. — Two divisions with lO.OOO levies on the front J
Basvada-Duggy-Sirdlla, 60 miles. Two divisions in Reserve: |
at Hyderabad, So miles from Duggy.

Then, A. — If the enemy advances on the front Manjera.1
River-Duggy :

(i) Garrison of Sircilla and i Cavalry Brigade covers the I

front Sircilla-Sunnigarum, 20 miles.
{2) One Infantry Division with 3 Brigades of Cavalry delay I

enemy on the line Basvada-Duggy, 25 miles.
(3) Remaining 3 Infantry Divisions and levies concentrate 1
on Medak with the object of using the line of the j
Manjera as a "parallel obstacle." Duggy-Medak,
30 miles.

B. — It is unlikely that the enemy will advance by bothl
the Duggy and Sircilla roads, because for 40 miles a mass '
of jungle would then separate the two columns ; but if he
does so the Sircilla garrison will delay his column on the I
east, while 2 Infantry Divisions and 3 Cavalry Brigades fall \
on the head of the western column debouching from Duggy. f
Medak-Bhilinur (on Dichpali road) will in this case be the |
main position and pivot of manoeuvre.

C. — If the enemy advances on front Sircilla-Sunnigarum
I Infantry Division with levies, the Sircilla garrison and
I Cavalry Brigade delay him on the line Sircilla-Sunnigarum
long enough for the remaining Cavalry and 3 Infantry
Divisions to concentrate towards Bhiknur and Medak. In
this latter case, a new base would be organised towards the
west at, say, Tandoor, with line of communications via Pampad
and across the loop of the Manjera river to Medak, whilst ^
the Hyderabad garrison would be provisioned for a siege.

Commencement of the Operations.

I. The North holds the line of the Godavery river, frota-J
the junction of that river with the Manjera on the west tal

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 207

its junction with the Maner river on the east The enemy's
main strength seems to be about Nirmal and Yellagudpa.
Hostile Cavalry detachments are scouting in the district
south of the Godavery.

Supplies have been collected in large quantities near the
two places named, and also near Mudhol (some 30 miles west
of Nirmal) and Kohal (30 miles north-east of Yellagudpa).

2. Southern Army Headquarters are at Aurangabad. The
Commander-in-Chief does not expect the enemy to take the
offensive on the Godavery, but the General Officer Command-
ing containing force is ordered to be ready to prevent the
enemy overrunning the country between Hyderabad and the
Godavery river, and meantime to engage the enemy's attention
on that river with the object of preventing him from detaching
troops to strengthen the Northern Army in the primary theatre.

3. The dispositions of the Southern Troops of the contain-
ing force in the secondary theatre on the evening of the
i6th January were as under: —

(a) ist and 2nd Infantry Divisions with 10,000 levies on

line Basvada-Duggy-Kutkoor,
tj>) 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in reserve at Hyderabad.
{c) Warangal, Medak, and Hyderabad are fortified and

garrisoned by levies.

(d) Southern 2nd Cavalry Division (of 4 Brigades), Divi-

sional headquarters and 3rd Brigade at Dichpali, 8
miles south-east of Indoor, on the Nirmal- Hyderabad
main road: 1st Brigade headquarters at Indoor,
2nd Brigade headquarters at Sakunderpoor, 4th
Brigade at Korutla. Brigades have detachments
pushed forward to get touch with the enemy's
mounted troops.

(e) Mounted levies are in touch with the enemy on the

Godavery eastwards of Polas, and are in independent
scattered groups throughout the country ; only a
corps of scouts being in any way organised under
the orders of the General Officer Commanding
Cavalry Division.

208

CAVALRY STUDIES

4. The role of the Cavalry Division is to observe the enemy^
on the Godavery west from where the Hyderabad-Polas r
crosses the Godavery river. In the event of the
moving southwards or detaching towards the primary theatre,
the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division, is directed
to operate so as to delay the movement and to give time for
the Southern Infantry to co-operate.

FIRST AND SECOND DAY.

Wednesday, lytk January, and Thursday, \%th January.

Strategical Reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division.

In accordance with the situation on Tuesday evening. .
January 16, the following orders had been issued: —

— Operation Orders. — 2nd Cavalry Division.

HEADIJUARTBRS, DiCHPALl :
Tuesday. i6lk January, igaS (2a heurs),

I. (11) The enemy's main strength appears to be aljout Nirnial and Yellngudpo.
Supply depOls have been formed at these places, and at Mudhol and
Kahal. Dclnchments of his Cavalry are reported south of Godavery

(i) The headquarters of our 4th Cavalry Brigade are at Korutla, wilh ,
delachments in touch with enemy's mounted troops near Polas and
MulUpootam.

3. The lask of the Diviaon is lo observe the enemy on and west of the Pola»- ,
Dermapoor road and lu clear up the situation about Mudhol ; and in [he event ]
of the enemy moving either towards Hyderabad or westward up the left bank of 1
the Godavery, lo delay such movement with the object of gaining time for our 1
Soathem Infantry Divisions to co-operate.

3. (a) The G. O. C. lat Cavalry Brigade will reconnoitre the crossings ovei

Godavery lietween Sungum and Nalaishwar (on road frotn Mudhol ta-'m
Koodaunpoor) with the object of discovering what parties of Ibe cnen^ T
have come south of the rivet. Reconnaissances are also to be
towards Mudhol to ascertain the situation there, and lo report whether ,
there are any preparations for a movement up the Godavery 01

In view of the possibility of the Division having lo operate on the west irf 1
the Manjem, a suitable crossing-place near Kundgaon will be reconnoitred I
and prepared.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 209

(*) The G. 0. C, znd Cavalry Brigade will occupy Balkonda with (he object
of impeding the movement of hostile detachments on the soath ol
the Godavery. Reconnaissances will be senl towards the crossings
over the Godavery betmeen Nikkalpoor (inclusive) on the west, to
Chintulchsoda Ferry inclusive on the east, and also beyond the river
to clear up the situation about Ninnal.

Connnunication will be opened with the 4lh Cavalry Brigade at Korutla.

(f) Tbejrd Cavalry Brigade will remain in a position of readiness near Dichpali.
The G. O. C, will send forward al daylight connecting posts lo Indoor,
and lo a suitable point beyond, to connect wilh the 1st Brigade, and
also to Sakunderpooi to connect with the 2nd Brigade.

4. Divisional Headquarters will be at Dichpali,

Where opposing Cavalries are in close contact as in the
present instance, it is highly probable that the reconnoitring
parties endeavouring to cross a river may find their advance
opposed. Although the r61e of a reconnoitring party is to
obtain information and not to fight, yet a combat may be
a necessary prelude to fulfilling the main purpose ; thus a
strong feigned attack may be commenced, and under cover of
this a portion of the party may, by a wide, rapid, and well-con-
cealed movement, gain a crossing elsewhere ; or even during the
combat itself, by engaging the attention of the enemy, may
cause him to leave unguarded some entry not far off, through
which scouts can gain access to the further bank. In all
cases, however, any tendency to detach too freely must be
carefully checked, as it leads too often to unnecessary dis-
semination on insufficient information.

The reconnaissances ordered were carried on during Wed-
nesday, 17th, and Thursday, 18th, with the result that about
noon on the latter day the General Officer Commanding was
enabled to locate the enemy as follows :

Detachments of the enemy's Cavalry in occupation of the
following places south of the Godavery :

Sungum and Kundakoorty (near the junction of the

Manjera River).
Banouli-Kandaunpoor-Balkonda (on the Nirmal Road) in

force.
Mullapooram-Polas, 500 to 600 men, with 4 guns,

210 CAVALRY STUDIES

Columns of all arms are reported to be advancing frort

Banouli, Balkonda, and Mullapooram.

Later in the day more information was obtained, and thel
situation at night was as follows:

Enemy.

Cavalry at Novvapett and Palda (58 miles north-west ofil

Indoor).
A strong column of ail arms at Balkonda.
Some Cavalry and guns moved west from Polas to Korutla,

joining there a mounted force which had come froni

the north.
Velloolla, west of Korutla, occupied.

Southern Force.

1st Cavalry Brigade at Indoor, with one squadron nearl

Kundgaon.
2nd Cavalry Brigade at Sakunderpoor.
3rd Cavalry Brigade and Divisional Headquarter^ at |

Dichpali.
4th Cavalry Brigade near Pasaneepett, 10 miles south <

Korutla, and 30 miles east of Sakunderpoor.

The Genera! Officer Commanding the Southern Force

directs the Infantry at Basvada to move off on the 19th

towards Yelaspoor (south of Duggy and on the Nirmal Road).

THIRD DAY.

Friday, igth January.

Strategical Reconnaissance culminates in Tactical
Collision.

On the morning of the igth the following orders were serri
by the General Officer Commanding to the Commanders <
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades:

^^1 FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 211

^^^^P (Telegram.)

^^^* No, 2,— To G. O. C. isl Brigade, Indore.

DiCHPAU ;
Friday, ig/A Januaiy, 1906 (4 hours),
I. Enemy appeais lo hive one Cavaliy Division on line Awnnoor-Ramanapelt,
My inEenlion is to contain it with bulk of znd Brigade about the Sakundcrpoor
defile, and 10 aupporl you in overthrowing enemy's mounted troops with which
yon are now engaged.

7, 3rd Brigade with one regiment from and Brigade will be in position o{
readiness near village of MuddenpuUy by 7 hours.

3. Withdraw in direction of Dichpali.

4. I am leaving for Indoor. Send reports along main road lo meet me.

(Telkgham.)
No. 3.— To G. O. C. znd Brigade, Sakunderpoor.
DlCHPALl :
Friday, V^h January, 1906 {4 hoursT.

1. My intention is lo conccntrsite as strongly .is possible with object of
overthrowing hostile mounted troops now on line Nuvvspett-Palda, wMle you
with your Brigade [less one regimgnt) contain enemy reported on line Awrmoor-
Ramanapett.

2. Detail one rEglinenl to inarch so as Co reach MuddenpuUy by 6J hours.

3. Your bne of retreat will be on Yedulvoy [on Nirmal- Hyderabad road).

4. I am leaving now for Indoor.

(Bv Staff Offjckb.)
No. 4.— To G. O. C. 3rd Brigade, Dichpali.

' . > as per Noi. I and 3 in copies of telegrams sent herewith.

3. March at 5 hours to MuddenpuUy. Send your 3nd Line Transport It
Yedulvoy at daylight.

4. Report to Indoor.

In conformity with these orders, the General Officer
Commaniiing 2nd Brigade, after a rapid reconnaissance of
the ground north of Sakunderpoor, decided to take up a
position south of Juckumpully (see Sketch iS), holding the
mouth of the defile with two squadrons only. These, if
driven back by superior strength, would retire in the direction
of Sakunderpoor, drawing the enemy on behind them. The
remainder of the Brigade (i^ regiments and 6 guns) were
kept concealed in a position towards the west, whence, when

212 CAVALRY STUDIES

advisable, a counterstroke against the right flank of 1
pursuing enemy could be made.

Meantime, the 3rd Brigade and a regiment from the :
Brigade had concentrated near MuddenpuUy at 7 hours. 1
The rst Cavalry Brigade fell back from Indoor on
Dermawaram, to the flank of this position. The resultii
General Situation is shown on Sketch 19. The hostile
mounted force following the ist Brigade was overthrown a
driven back in disorder, whilst the advance from Balkonda^^
sustained a severe check by the action of the 2nd Brig;

One of the consequences was that freedom of patrolling!
was at once gained. The enemy's main advance was now!
discovered to be vii Balkonda-Dichpali road, and also inl
great strength along the Bimgul-Godkole road, which]
bifurcates from the former at Balkonda.

The pursuit of the north-west hostile force was therefore!
not pressed, and the Division fell back towards the Dugg;
defile.

In the evening the situation was as follows :

Enemy at —

(a) Jultalpoor — 6 miles north of Indoor — (Cavalry).

(b) Dichpali— (Cavalry). Head of Infantry at SakunJ

derpoor.

Mullailla — (Cavalry), Korem — 13 miles north-ea
of Sircilla— (Cavalry). Enemy's main advance
now ascertained to be from Balkonda and byi
Bimgul, moving southwards.
Southern Forces —
Cavalry Division. — ist Brigade at Gowrsummodrum ;
Indoor occupied by contact squadron. 2nd and i
3rd Brigades and Divisional Headquarters
Yedulvoy.

4th Brigade, after being engaged with hostile division a
day, retires on Sircilla entrenchments at nightfall ; report
Infantry columns of enemy moved towards Bimgul {i.eL
south-west from Velloolla).

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 213

The Commander of the Southern Army is now con-
centrating his main forces towards and on the Balconda-

Hyderabad roads.

Infantry. — ist Division, with 5,000 levies, at Gandaree

Upalvai, Yelaspoor.
2nd Division, with 5,000 levies, at Racherla, Kutkoor.
3rd and 4th Divisions at Medchel (38 miles south of

Bhiknur on main road to Hyderabad, and 55 miles

south of Yelaspoor.

The patrol sent to report on and watch the Manjera river
{Operation Orders No. i of 16th instant) is still out — a most
important point of detail. The patrol sent to Chintulchanda
ferry has been reporting on the enemy's advance to Bimgul,
and keeping touch both with enemy and with our 4th
Brigade patrols ; its supporting squadron halts to-night near
Kondoor, on Bimgul road.

FOURTH DAY.

Saturday, lOth January.

Action of Cavalry in broken Country retarding Hostile
Advance in order to gain time for its own Army
to concentrate.

The following orders were issued 1

No. 5.— Operation Orders.— u/ Cavaliy Division.

Hkadquartrrs, Yedulvov ;
Salurday, 20IA January, 1906 (4 hours),
). (a) No change reporleil in enemy's position.

(A) Our 1st Infatilry Division, wilh 5,000 levies, will teach ihe line

LinEiinipully-Pudmajeewaddj' tiy 15 hours to-day.
(c) The 4lh Cavnlry Brigade should reach Reddypell about the same

a. The Division will delay ihe enemy's advance from the direction of Dichpali
by holding the line Gowrsummodrum- Yedulvoy-Gowtarum at dnylighL If
forced to fall back, the line Duggy-Simapully will next be held.

214 CAVALRY STUDIES

3. Brigadiers will dispose their brigades to hold posicions is follows :
(a) ist Brigade belweea Yedulvoy and Gowisummodnini.
(i) 3rd Brigade near Yedulvoy.
(f) zad Brigade wilt detail two squiilrons 10 mBi[:h al 5 hours to Kondoor 1

Lo support its reconnoitring detachment in that vicinity ; if forced to J
retire ihey will go southwards on Reddypett. The remainder of the J
Brigade will hold the line Coondawarum-Gowraruin.

4, Reports 10 Ramchundet after 7 hours.

Two general lines of resistance are named in Divisional
Orders, and each Brigade had its own line of retreat to the
second line ; otherwise Brigadiers had a free hand to delay
the enemy in the Duggy defiles as best they could. Brigadiers
formulated their own plans. The following was, for example, ,
suitable action for 3rd Brigade, holding the centre of the line
and covering the main road ;

To capture the Duggy plateau by frontal attack would be
an extremely difficult task for enemy's Cavalry alone; if
they turned the flank they would be open to a combined
attack of two of our brigades, who would then have every
advantage. We may take it as possible to hold the plateau
against them till the arrival of their Infantry and t;juns, which
with hard marching may be expected about the middle of
the afternoon ; if their attack is not immediately and vigorously
carried out we may calculate on holding the Duggy plateau
till to-morrow morning.

Counterstrokes.— Enemy's march may first be retarded at
nullah and swampy ground from Yedulvoy tank eastwards,
held by dismounted fire of one regiment with cross-fire from
rocky hillocks, supported by Artillery and dismounted fire
from ridge north of Ramchunder. A counterstroke might be I
prepared here, as ground favours mounted action. One regi- •
ment might charge enemy as they struggled over nullah or j
gained open ground near Goondawarum.

Next. — On the northern edge of Duggy plateau, ground i;
suitable for charge just as enemy struggled on to plateau I
edge ; troops would be invisible to one another till moment
of attack, which would have to be well timed by signal.
Lastly, if enemy turns west flank and gains open ground I

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 215

there, attack, pivoting on guns near Duggy Fort If
necessary, ground on top of Duggy plateau is suitable for
charge to cover retirement.

In preparing or selecting any position for defence, it must
be remembered that all the more important topographical
objects, such as river-courses, marshes, forests, mountains, etc.,
are in the first instance obstacles to movements, and,
hampering the attack, favour for that reason the defence.
This does not at all preclude the fact that the defence, by an
improper use of obstacles, may deprive itself of the^e advantages.
As a rule, it is an improper use when the defender tries to
make use of an extensive obstacle as a position with the bulk
of his Army for decisive battle. He will then almost always
find that he can only be successful if he maintains the whole
line, whilst the victory will fall to the assailant as soon as
the latter penetrates at one point. The correct use of such
an obstacle is to stand in rear of it, to block, perhaps, one or
some of the crossings, but to leave others open or to make
only a pretence of defending them ; whilst the centre of
gravity of the action lies in the counterstroke upon the first
large body of the enemy which forces the passage and ap[>ears
before our front.

Excepting to the west of Duggy no mounted action was
possible in the very broken country passed over. Numerous
opportunities of ambushing the enemy's advance, however,
presented themselves, which would have had a moral effect on
the enemy similar to that of mounted counterstrokes. The
fighting during the day was limited to fire action, and
dependent on the initiative of the Regimental and Squadron
Leaders. The enemy's "Independent Cavalry" and his
" Advance-Guard Cavalry " were in these defiles pending
the arrival of his infantry in force.

The question of intercommunication between brigades
was a difficult one on account of the thick jungle. All
three brigades communicated back to a central station at
Duggy.

The situation at 18 hours, Saturday, 20tb January, was :

CAVALRY STUDIES

. (a) Enemas Ca\-aliy unable to get fitrtlier sooth I

Yedu]v-oy.
{&) Southern Ca^-alrj-, after engaging enemy all day, are '
reUeircd by Infantrj- outposts on line Ootaloor-
Du^y-Raganadpully, and Brigades halt for
night as under:
1st near Jeevada.

3'^^,, • ■ ^ jOopulv,

2nd (less 2^ squadrons ,1 )

2j squadrons of 2nd Brigade, Kondapoor and 1

Toompully in Gadkole defile.

4th Cavalry Brigade, Reddeypett.

2. Enem>''s outposts on line Beechpully-Kondoor. Gad- ]

kole occupied by their Infantry.

3. Our 1st Infantry Division, with levies, on MuUoorpett ]

position.
Our 2nd Infantry Division, marching to Bhiknur.
Our 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions, marching to 1

Masaibpett (22 miles south of Bhiknur on main I

Hyderabad road).

4. On the east. — Hostile Cavalry near Yelgandal, «

with Sircilla garrison and levies.

FIFTH DAY.

Sunday, 2 1st January.

Tactical Action of Cavalry Division in retarding Hostile ]
Column much superior in number of rifles and guas 1
but weak in Cavalry, arising from the advance dowa |
the Bimgul Road.

With a view to dealing with this problem the four Cavalry J
brigades were temporarily organised as follow

The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued to deal with the main I
situation, whilst the 2nd and 4th Brigades were formed into j
a Division for the special task of attacking a hostile column
advancing from Gadkole on the Bimgul Road.

FOURTH STUDY TMEDAK)

217

The following information and instructions were given late
at night on the 20th to the General Officer Commanding
appointed to command the Division.

1. Further information shows that a hostile division was

at Gadkole yesterday evening (Saturday). It comprises :

2 Brigades Infantry, ie. 4 regiments = I2 battalions.
2 " Groupes " of Field Artillery = 6 batteries.
I Squadron of Cavalry.

2. About two squadrons of 2nd Brigade are in touch with
enemy's advance, and the remainder of that Brigade, with
the 4th Brigade, will be at 6 hours in a position of readiness
near Ramaredypett, covering the right flank of the Mulloor-
pett position.

3. Hinder the advance of the enemy as much as possible.
At 9 hours, 2rst January, this General Officer Commanding

received information that the enemy is advancing from
Gadkole, and that at 10 hours his vanguard would probably
arrive 3 miles south of the line Kondapoor-Toompully,
moving south-west towards the right of the Mulloorpett
position (see Sketch 20).

Tlu country through which the enemy must pass in his
advance on Ramaredypett is thickly wooded and the various
ridges rocky, with the exception of that part marked as
cultivation in Sketch 19. Nevertheless, it is possible for
mounted troops and Infantry to move through any part of
it in open order. Guns, however, would be confined to the
tracks.

The field of fire is much restricted, and the enemy's guns
coutd not be employed until capture of the ridge two miles
north-east of Ramaredypett (marked Y Y in Sketch). The
kopji (marked X in Sketch) forms a salient in this important
ridge. This prominent feature commands an uninterrupted
view of whole area of the operations. From this point
there are only two lines of advance open to the enemy, east
or west of it. Either route necessitates the capture of kopji
ridge by the enemy.

2i8 CAVALRY STUDIES

Immediately on receipt of information of the enemy's'
advance from Gadkole, the whole of the Division was moved I
forward to a position of readiness behind Kopji X. At the J
same time were detached —

(rtj One regiment to act on the enemy's left flank and i
harass his advance in every way, in which operation •
the rocky spur north and north-east of Reddypett
will assist.

(b) Two squadrons, i.e. the remainder of the regiment
already in touch with enemy's vanguard, to act ■
similarly on enemy's right flank.

From the commanding position X, already noted, could
be seen at once how far other troops might be advantageously
employed, and their immediate proximity in rear would
obviate any difficulty in the rapid communication of orders.
With the object of influencing the enemy to decide on the
route to the east of the ridge one section R.H.A. was posted
on the flat hill D, and the remainder of the R.H.A. (lO guns)
was kept concealed in the eastern spurs of the ridge Y Y Y.
Should this device be successful there will be an excellent
opportunity of making a counterstroke against the enemy's
advance guard in their deployment over the open ground
before referred to. i

In dealing with a hostile mixed force weak in Cavalry,
detachments can safely be made, and thus the enemy's
Infantry is caused to deploy first in one direction and then
in another, until they finally become physically and morally
exhausted. Then, and probably not till then, the opportunity
will arise for Cavalry to charge home and complete their
discomfiture.

At noon, Sunday, 2ist January, the enemy was in force on
Duggy ridge, driving in Infantry outposts ; the enemy's
column from Gadkole, three miles north-east of Ramaredy-
pett, was engaged with the Eastern Cavalry Division.

1st Division Southern Infantry began withdrawing from
Mulloorpett position on to Yelaspoor ridge, leaving outposts
on Mulloorpett ridge.

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FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 219

In the course of the day the Eastern Cavalry Division had
succeeded in driving back the hostile Infantry column into
the jungle south of Toompully. The normal organisation
of the Division was resumed, and the 2nd Brigade returned
to the main body.

The Commander of the Southern Force now decides on a
retirement by night towards Bhiknur, so the following orders
are issued by the General Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry
Division :

No. 6. — Operation Orders.— znrf Cavalry Dimskn.

Headquaktebs, Oopulvov :

Sunday, iUl January (i6 kours),
1, (a) The enemy'sadvanced troops are on thclineOolaloor-Duggj'-SirnapuUy,
wilh Dulposls on Ihe watercourse from Bomapally eastwards viS
Kulvaral 10 Raganadpully,
(J) Our 1st Infantry Division attd levies are holding the Veloapoor position,
with a rearguard on the MuUoorpelt ridge in touch wilh Ihe enemy,
but will withdraw from Velaspoor towards Bhiknur at midnight.
a. The Cavalry Division will lake over the position now occupied by our
Infantry at 18 hours, and will hold them with the object of covering
the withdrawal of the Infantry.

3. (a) The 3rd Brigade will relieve the Infantry rearguard on the MuUoorpelt

ridge at iS hours.
(*) The remoinder of the Division will bivouac as follows: each Brigade will
provide for the security of its bivouac :
1st Brigade, Velaspoor.
md „ Vellaredypetl.
4th ,, Rungumpett,
(f) The Velaspoor hill will be entrenched anil held by 2nd Brigade.

4. Headquarters will be at Vcllaiedjpetl, where reports ore to be sent until

daylight.

Von Ccemmerer writes as follows on withdrawing before a
superior enemy before battle :

Schlichting clearly points out that we would do well to adopt a "limited
t fccentric" mode of procedure when it becomes necessary to retire. If we are
.0 withdraw before a superior enemy before battle, it is 'not a question of
L Immediately moving towards the nearest friendly force, or eveti to retire straight
I' upon its front, but la place Biiestlf ahrcoil ef il ■milk a frsptr interval. The enemy
I is thereby not only prevented from seriously endangering the loo closely concen-
f tiUed and utuIhI portions by enveloping them, but such action may eventually
L perhaps lead to our advancing against the flank of the punuing enemy. If a

320

CAVALRY STUDIES

bsllle has been fougbl, after which wc are obliged lo leliie— /j. if we arebes
ihen ihe problem of eslablishing an adcqualc slralegtc Irani is ab a rule d
to solve. Its establishment behind a natural obstacle pie^nled by ihe g
seems then the sole safeguard of the Army.

Another highly impoilani idea which Schlichlinj; has iatioduced int
theory of war is that in a dc/insivt battle the place of the reserves must nc
not be behind the centre, and not even close behind or beside the flank, 1
rather that a lonsiderabli inlirvat must be le/l bclwitH reserves and flank if d
object is to be attained. How diflecen:ly could BazaJae have shaped his I
on August iSlh, 1S70, if he had bad ready at his disposal a strong Army re
so far towards the right rear that they could have rolled up the exhausted Gi
before all the forces of the Saxons became available !

Where large bodies of [roops are concerned, this interval of the n
must be increased to half or a whole day's march.

Only one thing is to-day no longer advisable — natcely, to plan an offensifa
movement in a defensive battle by a simple count er^attacl: of the whole front,
strengthened by the reserves, as Benedek had intended id those days. Where wc
ourselves have chosen gentle, op«n slopes with the object of obtaining the fullest
effect from our own firearms and of rendering the enemy's advance impossiblCi
there will hardly be suitable ground for cuunler-allack. A diliberalt division ef
labettT among the verioHS tmits of the Army or portions of the Army, that is the
actual principle which Schlichting has established for the tactical defence ; and
the maintenance of an adequate front for operations in the defensive is
just as important as in the oflensive.

SIXTH DAY.

Monday, 22nd January.

Cavalry holding a Defensive Position to cover Retiremen)
of its own Infantry.

The enemy is advancing in force in four columns on tlu
front Gowrsommodrum-Gadkole, his advanced troops beiii)
on the line Ootaloor-Duggy-Sirnapully.

The 2nd Cavalry Division is holding Mulloorpett (3rc
Brigade), and the Yelaspoor position. The ist Infantr
Division is retiring from Yelaspoor in the direction
Bhiknur. |The 2nd Infantry- Division is one march east t
the Bhiknur position. The 3rd and 4th Infantry DivisiorH
are one march south of Bhiknur.

Some S,ooo levies are on the Sircilla front, the remaindel
are moving on Bhiknur,

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 2Zi

It is our object to induce the enemy to attack our prepared
position near Bhiknur, and there so decisively to defeat him
by means of a vigorous and well-timed counterstroke that he
may be forced to relinquish his advance on Hyderabad.

Factors affecting the situation. — {a) South of Duggy the
country opens out into a wide undulating valley, dotted with
large tanks, and with wet cultivation (paddy-fields) following
the lines of the valleys as far south as Yelaspoor.

(i) The Yelaspoor ridge stands out as a prominent feature,
and, with some detached hills to the west, forms a command-
ing position, with an uninterrupted view over the area of
operations — with the exception of the north-west where a
ridge runs roughly north-easl-south-westj at a distance of
some 3,000 yards.

(<:) South of Yelaspoor, until about six miles north of the
Bhiknur position, the country is as noted in para. {a). From
this latter point commences a stretch of dry country covered
with scrub jungle, with occasional rocky prominences.

(rf) The moral of the enemy's Cavalry and of the Infantry
column advancing from Gadkole must have been con-
siderably affected by their severe handling near Indoor
and Ramaredypett respectively.

The probable objective of the enemy is, after concentrating
his forces in the vicinity of Upalwai, to continue his southerly
advance upon Hyderabad. Our retirement from successive
positions may weii lead him to suppose that we do not intend
to make any very serious opposition to his advance, and
so may induce him to commit himself to an attack on our
prepared position.

The Cavalry Division, in covering the retirement, will there-
fore delay the enemy's advance as much as possible, and
take care that no hostile flanking movement takes place
undetected. They will retire in the direction of Bhiknur
with the object of drawing the enemy on to our prepared
position.

The 1st Infantry Division will retire via Chittial to
Yellapoor, where they will be tcmperarily in reserve.

222 CAVALRY STUDIES

The 2nd Infantry Division will take up a position extendii^
from Bhiknur (inclusive) to about Ped Mullareddpully.

The 3rd Infantry Division will take up a position from J
Bhiknur (exclusive) to about Argoonda.

The 4th Infantry Division will be in reserve in the vicinity I
of Chota Duntapully.

The native levies will be utilised in the difficult ground tol
the west and north-west of our left flank.

The Cavalry Division, after the completion of their duties^l
noted above, will concentrate in the vicinity of Tongundia, |
prepared to move to a position of readiness on either flank j
as required— leaving detachments in observation on both ]
flanks.

SEVENTH DAY.

Tuesday^ 2ird January.

Role of the Cavalry before, during', and after the General '

Engagement .

The Situation on Tuesday, 23rd January — daylight,
follows :
I . — Enemy.

The enemy's reconnoitring detachments have been J
checked on the line Rajumpet, Lingiapully, FortvJ
Beebeepett, Bopapoor,
The remainder of their Cavalry Divisions {about 4,000'J
sabres strong all told) are in bivouac near Mootium-j
pett in readiness to press the reconnaissance furthers
southwards.

The heads of the Infantry Columns are on the line J

Sundapoor, Kamaredi, Arrapully — moving southwards.,!

Southern Troops.

1st Infantry Division — UntumpuUy, with outposts on

line Rajampett — Fort.
2nd Infantry Division — Loreepully, holding line of 1
outposts east of Fort to Bopapoor hill.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 223

3rd and 4th Infantry'Divisions — Kondapoor, Yeliapoor.

Cavalry Division^ — Chittial.
Corps Cavalry Brigade — Bopapoor ("made up of four
Divisional Cavalry regiments, less one squadron per
Division).

Note. — -Position prepared and entrenched from NaroneepuUy
on east along northern edge of Bicanoor village to detached
hill half mile south of Thippapoor. The plateau south-west of
Venkadripully is entrenched Jin the direction of Kondapoor
to resist an attack from the north or north-west.

On the ninth day, Thursday, the 2Sth January, the situation
is as follows, the interval having. been spent in manoeuvring
operations :

2. Southern Troops ; — Corps Cavalry Brigade on right
of Bicanoor position in position of readiness.

1st Infantry Division holding Bicanoor entrenchment.

2nd Infantry Division has been withdrawn westward, and
is in readiness near Fed Duntapully and holding plateau
north-west of that village.

3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in readiness near Konda-
poor,

Cavalry Division (four Brigades) north-west of Kondapoor,

Enemy: — [a) The Northern Commander-in-Chief deployed
part of his Army on the line Buswanapully-Gootimookla to
hold the Southern Army in front, while another part, consisting
of two Divisions, marched vi4) Beebeepett to turn right flank
of Southern Army and to connect with a force expected from
the north-east.

, (i) Remains of Northern Cavalry, which is now reduced to
about twenty-five squadrons, accompany the turning column.

Early news of the turning movement by Beebeepett was
received by the Southern Commander-in-Chief, thanks to the
energy and good dispositions of the General Officer Com-
manding " Corps Cavalry Brigade."

The 1st Division was thus able to retain sufficient troops in
hand to extend the right flank southwards to the Damar-
cherroo hilJ,

224

CAVALRY STUDIES

Hard fighting took place on the front Venkadripully-
Thippapoor, and the 2nd Division had to reinforce the 1st
Division on the west of Bicanoor and also to Hold the
trenches on the south-west of Venkadripully.

The Southern Commander-in-Chief then decided that the
time had come to make " the supreme effort," and he launched
the 3rd and 4th Divisions against Arrapully-Tallamudla,
while the Cavalry Division (four Brigades) co-operated on their
north flank in the direction of Buswanapully and Rajumpett.

This counterstroke took the enemy by surprise, and his rigl
wing and Reserves were shattered. They begin to rem
northwards.

The Southern Cavalry harassed the retreating columns, and
cut off their retreat on Duggy.

The left of the Northern Army was obliged to draw off, and
hold the hills about Bopapoor.

The remains of the Northern Army collected on this line,
and were only saved from complete destruction by the
approach of reinforcing columns from the north-east.

The South was soon victorious in the Primary Theatre.
The enemy's troops in the Hyderabad District then retreated
north-east on Polas, closely followed by the Southern forces,
which were enabled to press the pursuit closely, thanks to the
Sircilla entrenched Supply Depdt which then fulfils its rflle,
i.e. it becomes useful for "offensive purposes." (See Napo-
leon's note on Palmanova on page 184.)

" Moral " — the Basis of Success in War.

In discussing all these problems we must not forget thai
we are dealing with men of flesh and blood and nerve
Great moral difficulties confront a Commander whom circum
stances compel to retire before giving battle.

To withdraw from one position to another before one's
troops become involved, is easy enough at manceuvres i
at the war game, but Eugene's letter to Napoleon, dateil

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 235

Vicenza, 23rd April, 1809 (see page 199) shows what happens
when dealing with men of high courage in the presence of a
real enemy and when feelings run high. It was really the
complaints of the troops which forced Eugene to give battle
at Sacile and which brought about his defeat Again,
although Kuropatkin loudly protested before he left St.
Petersburg that he would not give battle until he was ready,
but that he would withdraw and concentrate detachments
first, yet the results show that circumstances were too strong
for him ; detachments gave battle and were defeated before
concentration was effected.

Grumblings and criticisms of a similar kind are common to
all Armies under similar circumstances, not by any means
excluding the British Army,

The following " General Orders " show what difficulties Sir
John Moore suffered in this respect the moment his Army
commenced its retreat towards Corunna. (The orders are
copied from " A Narrative of the Campaign of the British
Army in Spain, commanded by His Excellency Lieutenant-
General Sir John Moore, K.C.B.," published in 1809,)

GENERAL ORDERS.

Headijuabtebs, Bbnavente,

27M Detembtr, 1808.

The Commander of the Forces has observed with concern the exlieme bad
conduct of the troops at a moment when they are about to coroe into contact with
the enemy, and when the greatest regularity and Ihe best conduct are the most
Tequisite. He is the more concerned at this as, until lately, the behaviour of that
pait of the Anny, at least, which wu under his own immediale command, was
exemplaiy, and did them much honour.

The inisbehavioiii of the Iroops in the column which marched by Valderis lo
Ihis place, exceeds what he could have believed of British soldiers. It is disgrace.
fill to the officers, as it strongly marks iheir negligence and inattention.

The Commander of the Forces refers 10 the General Orders of the I5lh of
October, and of (he lllh of November. He desires that Ihey may be again read
at the head of every company of the Army ; he can add nothing but his determi-
oatioit toeiecuie ihem lo the fullest extent. He can feel no mercy towards officers
who neglect in times like these essential duties, nor towards soldiers who injure
the country they are sent to '■ protect." The Sponish forces have been over-
powered ; and, until such lime as they ate tc-assembled, and ready again to come
forward, the situation of the Army mu^l be arduous, and such as lo call for the
exertion of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military lioiiy. These are not

226 CAVALRY STUDIES

braveiy alone, but patieoce and cooslaocy under faligue and hardship, c

to comouLnd, sobriety, firmness, and lesolution, in every dilTereQl si

they may be placed. It is by the display of such qualities alone that the Army can

expect to deserve the name of soldiers ; that they can tie able to withstand the

forces opposed lo them or to fulfil the expectations of their country.

It is impossible for the Genera] to explain <o his Aimy the motive for the more-
menl he directs. The CommaniJer of the Forces can, honeier. assure the Anny
that he has made none since he left Salamanca which he did not Toresee, and was
nol prepared for ; and as far as he is a judge, they have answered the purposes foe
which they were intended.

When it is proper lo fight a battle he will do it ; and he will choose the lime
and place he thinks most fit : in the meantime he l)egs the officers and soldiers of
the Aimy to attend diligently to discharge their parts, and to leave to him and to
the General Officers the decision of measures which belong to them alone.

The Army may rest assured that there is nothing he has more al heart than their
honour, and that of their country.

The latter part of the above order alluded to a number of
officers having been indiscreetly free in their criticisms of the
military operations. This licence is characteristic of English-
men ; but in the present situation of the Army it had a most
mischievous tendency. Moreover, as Sir John Moore kept all
his intelligence extremely secret, it was quite impossible for
the officers to judge of the propriety of the movements.

GENERAL ORDERS,

Headquarters, Astoxoa,

30/4 Dtamber,
The present is a moment when the Army is necessarily called upon to
great efforts, and to submit 10 privations, the bearing cheeriiilty with which is a
quality not less estimable than valour.

The good-will of the inhabitants will be particularly uschil to the Army, and can
only be obtained by good conduct on the part of the troops.

The Commander of the Forces cannot impress too strongly on the whole Armjr
the necessity of this ; and he trusts that the Generals and Commanding Officers
will adopt such measures, both on the march and in the cantonments, as will

It is very probable that the Army will shortly have to meet the enemy ; and the
Commander of the Forces has no doubt that they will eagerly imitate the worthy
example which has been set them by the Cavalrj-, on several recent occasions, and
particularly in the affair of yesterday, in which Crigadier-General Stuart, with
an inferior force, charged and overthrew one of the biggest corps of Cavalry in the
French Army.

The Generals will immediately inspect the baggage of the brigades and divisioni.
They are held responsible that it does not exceed the proportion filed by the
General Orders.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK)

^^ GENERAL ORDERS.

^H( Headquarters, Lugo,

^^f bill January, 1809.

' Generals and Commanding Officers of Corps must be as sensible as [s (he Com-

mander of the Forces, of (he compleie di^irganisalion of the Anny.

The advance guard of the French is aJteady close to us, and it is to be pre-
sumed that the main body is not far distant ! an action may. therefore, lie hourly
eipecled. If the Generals and CommaDding Officers of regiments, feeling for the
honour of their country and of the British arms, wish lo give the Army a bir
chance of success, they will exert themselves lo restore order and discipline in the
regiments, brigades, and divisions which they command.

The Commander of the Forces is tired of giving orders, which are never attended
to : he therefore appeals 10 the honour and feeling of the Army be commands ;
and if those are not suificienl to induce them to do their duty, he must despair of
■acceeding by any other means. He was forced to order one soldier to be shot at
Villafranca, and he will order all others 10 be executed who are guilty of similar
nities ; but he conutlers that there would be no occasion to proceed to such
mities if the officers did their duty ; as it is chieHy from their negligence, and
■ Irom the want of proper regulations in the r^menls, thai crimes and irri^ularities
are committed in quarters and upon the mari^b.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Near Liioo,

Jtk January. 1809.

The Army must see that the momenl is now come when, after the hardships
and iatiguing marches they have undergone, they will have the opportmiity of
bringing the enemy lo action. The Commander of the Forces has the most
perfect confidence in their valour, and that it is only necessary lo bring them to
close contact with the enemy in order lo defeat him ; and a defeat, if It be
complete, as he trusts it will be, will, in a great measure, end their labours.

The General has no other caution to give Ihem, than not lo throw away Ibeir
fire at the enemy's skinnishersi merely because they (ire at them ; but to reserve it
till ibey can give it with eflect.

GENERAL ORDERS.
I Heaikjuabtkrs, Lugo,

^rh January, 1S09.
It evident that the enemy will nol tight this Army, notwithstanding the
superiority of his number ; but will endeavour lo harass am! tease it upon its

The Commander uf the Forces requests that it may be carefully explained to the
soldiers ihal their safely depends solely upon iheir keeping wiih their divisions, and
inarehing with Iheir regiments ; that those who stop in villages, or stra^le on
the march, will inevitably be cut off by (he French Cavalry, who have hitherto
shown little mercy even lo the feeble and inRrm who have fallen into iheir hands.

The Army has still eleven leagues to march, the soldiers must make exertion to
ftccomplish them ; the rearguard cannot stop, and those who &11 behind must
take their ble.

228 CAVALRY STUDIES

So much fatigue had been endured in the march from Lugo
that Sir John Moore halted on the loth to give the soldiers
repose. He there published a fresh order, being unwearied
in his exertions to diminish the irregularities, though he
could not entirely restore discipline.

GENERAL ORDERS.

H HAD QUARTERS. BiTANZOS,

lo/i Jannary, i8og.
A great deal of irtegularily has arisen frtun the practice of some Commanding
Ofliceis allowing soldiers, who pretend to be bad marchers, to precede liieiT Corps. .
Men of this description, whom Commanding Officers may think expedient lo send '
forward, must be placed under an officer, who is held responsible tor th«r
conduct.

(Memorandum for General Officers.)
To prevent the renewal of the same scene which the inarch of last night ,
presented, the Commander of the Forces directs thai, previously to the march J
to-morrow morning, the General Officers will see their Divisions e
properly formed ; that they wheel them by sections; and that during the n
Ihey pay constant altenlion to the preservation of thai order.

It behoves us all to realise the fact that grumbling and I
criticisms will take place, and their mischievous tendency J
during operations in the field. Each one must, in his own 1
particular sphere, discourage all "grousing" and ignorant]
criticism of what is being done. The General who is directing 1
operations can alone decide when it is proper to fight ; it is -J
impossible that subordinates can have the necessary informa- |
tion to judge the propriety of movements ordered from J
headquarters.

"Grousing" is very infectious, and, if allowed to go unH
checked, the moral of the force will be greatly affectedfl
for the worse. Now the bed-rock on which every strategical^
and tactical problem depends is the moral of the troop&l
The success of Japan has recently brought this fact very!
prominently to the front. The German instructor could not |
alone have produced the great results recently achieved by 1
the Japanese Army had the latter not been composed of J
patriots, each individual ready to die rather than to do i
discreditable act.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK) 229

The question for us all, is how can we train our squadrons
and regiments so that we may be sure that they can cope
with the difficulties of all kinds which will undoubtedly
confront them in war? Careful tactical training is not
enough. We must be sure that the foundation is sound — i.e.
the recruits on joining must have already a knowledge of
national duty.

The educational system of the country should imbue the
youth of Great Britain with a true feeling of patriotism. For
the last fifty years the tendency of education has been to in-
culcate the idea that war is a crime instead of being a natural
incident in the life of nations. It is a natural law that any
animal which becomes unable to defend itself becomes a prey
for the more plucky and powerful ; the history of the world
shows that the same law holds good for nations. Egypt,
Greece, Italy, India, China, etc., are all examples of this.

These are facts, and the future efficiency of our Army
greatly depends on their being recognised. France had to
learn her lesson in 1870. Few people in England seem to
realise fully what unsuccessful war must mean for us. No
strategical and technical skill on the part of officers will
make up for deficiencies in the human factor of our Armies,
Moreover, training, discipline and methodical work are more
potent than patriotism, when the latter is combined (as must
inevitably be the case if oi^anisation is lacking) with ignorance
and lack of experience.

CHAPTER VII.
ATTOCK STAFF RIDE.

THE general idea is intended to bring into prominence |
the strategical employment of Cavalry covering the I
concentration of the Main Army to one flank. As Napoleon's
employment of his Cavalry during the Ulm Campaign, i8o5,<
is a classic historical example of this employment, the workf
of the Ride is prefaced by notes on that campaign.

General Idea, (f'/iyt' Sketch 21 and General Map No. S-XJ

I. {a) SHnagar is the caphul and base of an Eastem Empire.

ItR western fioiitiec tuns from a point about II mllifs west of Chitral t
another point some 40 miles north-west of the Malakand Pass ; thence i1
eastwards near Abbottabad and thence Eciuth to Golra ; from the laltet p
as far as the river Jhelam tbe existing N.-W. Railway line shows the fronti^^
thetice a line eastwards to Pathankot.

n alliai

e with the Easlim Empire and is bounded

from north-
the Sohan \
Kohat, and

re contiguous with the Eastern Empin
s far as Sihala ; ihence it passes alon
IS west, passing south of Khushalgi
eastwards to the Khaibar, and ihen

and eastern bound ari
of the Malakand Pass
to Chaoutia, where it
} Kurram ; thence it 1
north tili it joins (he Northern Frontiei

A Nmlral Slate is bounded on the north-east by a line passing throi;
Palhankol, west to Sihala, thence west-by-soulh by the Independent Slate
a point some 50 miles wuth-easi of Kurram, whence it trends south and
to Chaman (the latter place is off the map).

Walcrn Stale is bounded on the east by the Eastern Boundaries of the Eagti
Independent, and Neutral Stales of which the primary base is }vabul.
latter is connected by railway with Europe, its ultimate base.

i. {a) Hostilities have broken out between the Eastern Empire anc
dependent State on the one hand, and tbe Western Empire on the other.

(*) In order to gain lime for reinforcements to arrive (rom Europe the W(

Forces at once invade the Independent State, viS the Khaibar and KurraiD,

830

tti

■ h-

* l^'^ %

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 231

about 75,000 men, and occupy the countr)' as far east as a line Tothcla-AlloCU,
pushing reconnaissiinccs towards Pindi, Abboltabad, and Derband.

(f) The troops of the Independent State (about 20,000) withdraw north of
the Malakand Pa^ until the Northern Army is ready to take the lield.

Ifott.—la this Staff Ride the Altock defences, and other railways than those
■hovm on Sketch zo, are non-ciistent.

Special Idea.^ — No. I, (See General Map 6.)

he mountainous nature of the country and the absence of railways cause
the atral^cal concenlration of the Eastern Fore's to proceed slowly. The
• general plan of the Committee of Defence is—

V Infantry Divisions (British), each

with their Divisional Troops.
[ Infantry Brigade (British).
[ Caralry Division (the isi) of 4

Brigades.
I Brigade Howitzers, and tile usual
Corps Troops.
( t Infantry Division (British).

Abbollabnd -. i Cavalry

Nativ

Infantry Brigades

Derband

/ I Infantry Division (British), vpeak.
1 I Cavalry Regini

y Regimenti

Reserves, numbering 50,000. will bt^n to assemble at Rawalpindi as soon
as possible after the first mobilisation is completed.

(i) To concentrate this Army as soon as possible on the line Haripur-Torbela-
Khabal. This concentration is expected to be completed by the
20th March.

(c) To cross the Indus and march on Hoti Martian, join hands with the corps
of 20,000 of the Independent State [see paragraph 2 (c) of General
Idcn], and then, based on the line of the Malakand, to operate against
the enemy's forces holding Nowshera, Altock, and vicinity.

3. As reganls the Western Forces, reconnaissance and report of spies indicate
I thallhcy—

(a) Hold the line of the right bank of the Haro river, from the point where
it joins the Indus to a position north of Biirhin Station (20 mites east),
and have occupied Hazro and the villages lying to the narih-east as
far as the Indus. The Kabul river bos been bridged between the Indus
and Jehangira.

<i) A bridge of boats has been thrown across the Indua between Topi and
Dal, 38 miles east of Attock. A force of Cavalry (estimated at 2,000).
based on Dal-Mobat, is scouting towards Abbottabad and Haripur.

(<■) Nowshera and Hot! Mardan are held by the enemy.

(<0 The Khushalgarh-Golra road is reporied to be clear of Western troops.

N'ole.—la the Staff Ride it is mainly the operations of the ist Cavalry Division
I of the Eastern Army that will be considered.

CAVALRY STUDIES

Notes on the Ulm Campaign as a Basis for the Attockl
Cavalry Staff Ride.

The following /f-iV/j is taken chiefly from General Bonnal's
" De Rosbach a Ulm " :

The Campaign of Ulm, 1805. (See General Maps 7 and 8^9
page 256.)

On tlu 2^th August, 1805. — Napoleon concluded an offen-j
sive and defensive alliance with the Elector of Bavaria.

On the 2ird August. — Napoleon wrote from his campifl
at Boulogne to Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign AfTaii
as follows :

"The more I think over the European situation, the moi
1 see the necessity for decisive action. I can really expo
nothing in the way of explanation from Austria. She will
reply with fine phrases and gain time in order that I can da
nothing this winter, and in April I shall find 100,000 Russianfl
in Poland subsidised by England, 15,000 or 20,000 English ii
Malta, and 15,000 Russians in Corfu. I shall then be in 1
critical position. So my mind is made up. I shall striki
my camps and replace my war battalions with the 3rd ban
lalion.s, which will always give me a fairly efficient Army a
Boulogne, and on the ist Vendemiaire (23rd September) |
shall have 200,000 men in Germany and 33,000 men in 1
kingdom of Naples. I shall march on Vienna and i
not lay down our arms until 1 am in possession of Naplej
and Venice, and have so increased the Elector of Bavaria^
kingdom that there will be nothing further to fear fra
Austria— Austria will certainly be pacified in this mannqj
during the winter."

At this date (23rd August) Napoleon knew that Austrid
had withdrawn troops from Hungary and Bohemia, and v
moving large forces towards the Bavarian frontier ; and 1
presumed that during the coming autumn and winter 1
would have to deal only with the Austrian Armies.
intention to march at once upon Vienna is thus easily eK{
plained. The Bavarian alliance was sure, and the nelitr

«
■f

• .4

'i^4<

,.-f*

•ill

A-^. ^

■•"y.--

^■-'

» -.

•\*

/ .;

"' s

%> .

- ;(♦

*^i?^

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

233

of Prus.sia had been gained, while the presence of Massena
with 50,000 men in Italy relieved him of any anxiety in
that direction — Napoleon had, therefore, nothing to fear by
carrying the war into Austria.

On the same day (23rd August) Napoleon sent several
letters to Marshal Berthier containing orders to be issued
regarding the forthcoming movement of the Grand Army
towards the Rhine.

24/// August. — Napoleon issued orders to complete the
organisation and strength of the divisions of Reserve Cavalry,
and to despatch them to the Rhine.

"The concentration of the Austrians in the Tyrol makes
me think it will be useful at this time to 'border le Rhin.' "

The six divisions of the Reserve Cavalry were then directed
to form a screen on the left bank of the Rhine from Belfort to
Mayence.

The 1st Division of heavy Cavalry (D'Hautpoul), two
brigades, went into billets about Landau.

The 2nd Division of heavy Cavalry (Nansouty), three
brigades, marched upon Schlestadt and Neu-Breisach.

The four divisions of Dragoons (each of two brigades)
marched by two roads on Strasburg ; the first two brigades
left on the 26th, the other two on the 27th August.

25/^ August. — Murat and Bertrand were sent off on recon-
naissances, viz, :

(I.) Murat, the Generalissimo himself of the Cavalry, was
ordered to start by post on 26th August, and be back at
Strasburg on nth September, in 16 days he had to carry
out the following programme :

1st. Go straight to Mayence, but not to stop there ; pass
through Frankfort, reconnoitre Offenbach, and go on to
Wtirzburg, where he was to slay 36 hours.

" He will look at the communications from this place to
Mayence and the Danube, and find out about the exits
towards Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Ratisbon,"

This order was given after full deliberation.

Napoleon had ordered the ist Corps to assemble at Got-

234

CAVALRY STUDIES

tingen (Hanover), whilst the 2nd Corps marched on Mayena
(order of 23rd August). Thus Wurzburg might be choseriiB
as the point of junction for the two corps. " In this case isi
it possible to move in several columns (at least in two) upon
Ulm, Ingolstadt, or Ratisbon ? " The fact that these three
towns are mentioned shows that Napoleon was thinking of
uniting the bulk of his forces near one of them before begin-
ning the actual operations against the Austrians, who had ]
halted in observation on the right bank of the Inn.

2tid. From Wiirzburg to go to Bamberg, and from there
to the Bohemian frontier, near Egra.

" He will look at the communications between Bamberg, *
Bohemia, and the Danube, find out about the Bohemian \
mountains, have a description compiled of the route from
Bamberg to Prague and especially of the Egra gorges — it
is of the utmost importance that he should procure a copy of ]
' Marshal Belle-Isle's Campaign.' " "

For Napoleon, Bamberg would be the point of junction of j
the troops which he would have to concentrate against any
Austrian diversion debouching from Egra upon the left flank
of the Grand Army as it marched upon Ingolstadt or
Ratisbon. And so, in his eyes, the account of the famous
retreat from Prague would supply some valuable hints to i
the commander of the containing force eventually located at I
Bamberg.

%rd. Follow the river Regnitz, go along the left bank of 1
the Danube, cross that river at Passau and move up the Inn f
as far as Kufstein, then pass through Munich, visit Ulm,'f
Stockach, see the battle-field of Mbeskirch, and have a look at \
the exits from the Black Forest.

(II.) General Bertrand (an engineer) was ordered to go ^
direct to Munich and to deliver an autograph letter from ;
Napoleon to the Elector of Bavaria, to examine Passau 1
fortress, carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the Inn as far i

* The reference Is to Mnrahat Belle-IsU's relirement from Prague through the. |
Egra gorges 10 Alsace, pursued by the Aoatrian Army wa&a Prince Lobkowit^ \
in December 1741.

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

235

as Kufstein, of the Salza as far as Salzburg, and to report od
the road from Wasserburg (on the Inn) to Munich. Detailed
information regarding the exits of the passes from the Tyrol
into Bavaria was wanted, and the Lech had to be reconnoitred
from Fussen downwards, also Donauwbrth and Ingolstadt

Genera! Bertrand had finally to reconnoitre the Regnitz as
far as the Main, and from Bamberg he was ordered to go to
Ulm : then to Stuttgart and Rastadt. " In the course of
this journey, he will be careful to indicate very clearly the
road from Ulm to Donauwbrth by the left bank of the
Danube, from there to Ingolstadt and thence to Ratisboii.
From Ratisbon to Passau he will fill in details of the road
according to information gathered. When at Pas:sau he wii!
reconnoitre the road which goes from Passau into Bohemia.
Is it possible to march to Prague by this route? "

Napoleon's train of thought is clearly visible. He wishes
to lead his Army from the Middle Rhine into the district
north of Ratisbon, thence to march on Vienna along the edge
of the Bohemian mountains with the Danube covering his
right flank. Only it is most essential that, during the
execution of this march, no Austrian corps should be able
to come either from Prague to Passau, or from Prague to
Bamberg.

Referring to the instructions issued to these three officers,
' Von Wartenburg, in " Napoleon as a Genera! " (vol. i., page
203), writes as follows : —

" In tliese orders the Emperor's whole plan of campaign is
revealed, and we should pay the greatest attention to them ;
for Napoleon, standing as he did at the head of the State,
invested with absolute power and no longer fettered by any
personal considerations, has now free-play for his genius and
could put his ideas fully into practice.

" To begin with, we note that he resolved to bring matters
to an issue in Germany ; we have already, when treating of
the campaign of 1800, pointed to the fact that the decisive
point lay there. He now placed the bulk of his Army,
200,ocX) men, there, opposing only 50,000 men to the Austrian

236

CAVALRY STUDIES

Army in Italy. Thus we have a more markedly admirable
illustration than at any other time of h.xs principle of appearing
at Ote decisive point with overwhelming forces, neglecting all
considerations of secondary importance. And, just as in iSoo
against Kray's left wing, these overwhelming forces were now
set in motion against the right wing of the Austrian Army
in Germany, as indeed the reconnaissance of the roads by^
Savary ^uide page 239) led us to expect This iving was thsV
right one to attack, for it was the one first met with from the I
north-west and indeed from the north, whence two corps,
those of Bernadotte and Marshal Marmont, were marching.
Therefore, by attacking and turning this wing with superior
strength, the Emperor would cut the Austrians entirely oSm
from their communications with Vienna, and would con'J
sequently annihilate them.

" Here we must point out the difference which is showtsl
between Napoleon's strategy and that in vogue nowadays
Napoleon, as appeared from his first plan in rSoo, and as noi*
may be more particularly noted here, effected the stratcgicaf
concentration of his Army in the first place on the enemy'n
flank, so that with a simple forward movement for battle hc
gained the latter's communications ; hence the first encountef 1
could not fail to prove an Ulm or a Jena. Nowadays thisJ
can no longer be done. Inasmuch as we must endeavonT'l
now to employ all the railway lines for our concentration, and I
inasmuch as the enemy also has to make use of all his railway
lines leading towards the frontier, there will be in the main
a frontal concentration on the part of both combatants, and
it will no longer be possible to gain such an enormous
advantage with respect to space in the first massing of forces,
as Napoleon gained here by his strategical marches on the
enemy's flank ; it will only be possible to gain an advantage
in point of time,

" In Napoleon's day there was plenty of time during the
march of the Armies to the field (for then they had to march)
to become acquainted with the enemy's formation and to
direct one's own concentration to his flank, assuming of course

^P a correct
H rapidity
V means o

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

237

a correct strategical perception of the situation. The modern
rapidity of mobilisation and of strategical deployment by
means of railways has made the latter a task which must be
arranged in all its details during peace ; it is therefore
impossible to alter it according to the position of the enemy's
flank. Only after the Armies have been massed and opera-
tions have begun, can a superiority of strategical calculation
be displayed as to placing oneself on the flank or the rear of
the enemy ; hence the manceuvres with which Napoleon was
in the habit of opening his campaigns will only be possible
after the first few encounters. We can no longer begin
immediately with a Jena, but we can still, after a Worth or a
Spicheren, choose our lines of operation in such a manner
that we may force the enemy to a Gravelotte."

The main principles of the plan of operations had alreadj'
taken shape in the mind of Napoleon by the 25th August^
perhaps even on the 23rd when he took steps to concentrate
the 1st and 2nd Corps at WUrzburg. That plan consisted in
turning the important and numerous watercourses (con-
stituting so many defensive lines) which flow from the Tyrol
into the Danube, from Ulm to Passau, by operating along the
left bank of that river. The proof of this statement is
confirmed by the following phrase at the end of the
instructions given to General Bertrand :

" What advantageous circumstances or obstacles confront
an Army marching along the left bank of the Danube with the
object of turning the river Inn, and which might move by
Freistadt (20 miles north -north- east of Linz, the latter being
on the Danube about 45 miles below Passau) with the
intention of advancing into Moravia?"

The letter which General Bertrand delivered to the Elector
of Bavaria (dated 25th August) shows that Napoleon had
formed the opinion that Austria would not attack until the
following spring ; it also contains the following information :

"My intention is to entrust my advance guard to Prince
Murat, who will probably precede me by several days'
march." Thus the Grand Army is to be preceded by a

238

CAVALRY STUDIES I

" strategical advance guard" to ensure to Napoleon strategical
freedom of action,

2St/i August. — Murat and Bertrand had been sent off on
their reconnaissances on the 26th. Three days later Napoleon's
ideas have further developed. He now sends one of his
aides-de-camp (General Savar>') to explore and report on
three parallel roads running from the Rhine to the Upper
Danube, which seem suitable for the corps of the Grand Army
to use.

These roads are —

(1) Mannheim to Dillingen.

(2) Germersheim to Gundelfingen :

(a) by Bruchsal. Aalen, Heidenheim.
(^) by Weissenstein and Heidenheim.

(3) Pforzheim to Ulm by Stuttgart.

The reconnaissances ordered by Napoleon on the 25th a
28th August show the working of his mind.

T/ie wain idea appears first of all to march on Vienna wifl
20o/X)O men before the Russians can make their strength fell
But the Austrians are concentrating on the right bank of t
Inn. Their position will be turned by marching down
left bank of the Danube.

What difficulties beset this march from L'lm to Passauj
Prince Murat and General Bertrand will answer this questtoi

Before beginning the operations properly speaking,
means for carrying on the struggle must be collected.

If the Austrians remain in observation on the Bavaria]
frontier, as their interests seem to demand, the Grand Arm
ought to be concentrated within measurable distance 1
the Inn.

The concentrationof the Grand Army can be carried c
under favourable conditions in Bavaria, the country of ;
ally. The zone of assembly should touch the Danube becau!
that river will serve as an obstacle towards the enemy and v
conceal the operation. But it must be possible to reach t
zone by good roads, sufficient in number and at suitab|

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 239

distances one from the other, with ample lateral communica-
tions. Between Carlsruhe and Mannheim, immediately north
of the Black Forest, Napoleon noticed that there were the
beginnings of three, if not four, itineraries, leading towards the
front Ulm-Dillingen (about 35 milesj.

Hence General Savary was sent at once to reconnoitre
these roads, and report on the size of the water-courses and
valleys which they cross, etc.

On this date (28th August) Napoleon seems to have decided
to avoid sending any troops through the Black Forest.
It is a wooded mountainous district with few and indifferent
roads, so that the columns would experience much difficulty
in marching, in obtaining supplies, and in billeting.

2g//i Au^st.-— The 7th Corps (Augereau) is detailed as
Strategical Reserve and only the four corps in the camps on
the English Channel are set in movement towards the Rhine,
Napoleon remained himself at Boulogne until the 5th Septem-
ber, busy with the organisation of his forces.
61/1 September. — An order was sent to Marsiial Bernadotte

' to have his Army Corps fthe ist) at Wurzburg by the 23rd
and 24th September. On the 26th August an order to
Marmont directed him to have his Corps (the 3nd) at

. Mayence by the [7th September, at the latest. The start
given to these Corps over those marching to the Rhine
between Mannheim and Strasburg, shows clearly that by the

I end of August Napoleon had an idea of concentrating the
1st ( Bernadotte 's) and 2nd (Marmont's) Corps at Wurzburg,

I at the time the 3rd (Davout's), 4th (Soult's;, 5th (Lannes'J,

[ and 6th (Ney's) Corps would be beginning to cross the Rhine.

Wurzburg to Mannheim is . .3 marches.

„ Egra (Bohemian frontier). 6 „
„ „ Ralisbon . . .6 „

„ „ Donauworth . . .5 „

By the time the 3rd, 4th, sth and 6th Corps were upon
[ the Rhine between Strasburg and Mannheim, the ist and
[ 2nd Corps (and eventually the Bavarian Corps) would be

240

CAVALRY STUDIES

at WUrzburg and in a position to cover the deployment otl
the main body of the Grand Army upon the Ncckar by f
containing any Austrian forces which might try to debouch J
from Bohemia.

On the other hand, if the Austrian forces concentrated only 1
in the Tyrol and behind the Inn, the Ist and 2nd Corps (wiUi'l
the Bavarian Corps) would form a manceuvring mass ready J
to outflank the Austrian right wing.

\-zth September. — Napoleon wrote to Fouchi : — "Forbid!
the gazettes published about the Rhine to speak of th^fl
Army, but bid them to write as if it does not exist,"

lltk September. — The aerial telegraph was working be-1
tween Strasburg and Paris. Murat, who had been ordered I
to be at Strasburg by the lUh September, after the com- J
pletion of his reconnaissance, reports by telegraph on the I
13th that the Austrians crossed the Inn on the loth Sep- |
tember and were marching on Munich. Without losing a I
moment, Napoleon at once sent an order to General Marmont I
to go on ahead of his Corps to Mayence to take command i
of the place and put it in a state of defence, as well as of I
Kastel, its tete-du-pont.

"General Marmont must send spies, officers even,
Nuremberg and into Francoma to discover and watch the ]
movements of the Austrians,

" Under certain circumstances, there is no doubt but that]
you should manoeuvre to combine with Marshal Bernadotte's j
movement upon Wiirzburg in order to support him." Prince J
Murat received orders to send agents to Donaueschingen, toJ
the several exits of the Black Forest, to Kempton and!
Stockach.

15M September. — General Marmont is ordered to march 1
Wiirzburg, where Bernadotte's Corps and the Bavarian troops*!
were to assemble. Napoleon was at St. Cloud from 7th t
22nd September : the 23rd and 24th were spent in Paris : andfl
he reached Strasburg on the 25th September,

!///( September. — An order from Napoleon fixes the points^
where the Cavalry Divisions and Corps of the Grand Army J

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

241

are to cross the Rhine, and fixes their itineraries up to the
points of assembly which have been selected near the
Danube, left bank. The main body of the Army was to cross
the Rhine along a line from Mannheim to Kehl, seventy
miles in extent, on the 26th September, the independent
Divisions of Cavalry having preceded it on the 2Sth by the
same roads. The latter would arrive before the entrances
of the Black Forest and penetrate some way into them.
Thus they would not only cover their own Army during the
passage of the Rhine, but also create amongst the enemy
a mistaken impression as to the real direction of the
Emperor's advance. For, as we see, the mass of the Army
was not to cross the Biack Forest frontally, but to turn to
the left so as to avoid its passes, and to stand by the gth
October on the line Weissenburg-Nordlingen-Aalcn-Ulm.

"This employment of the Cavalry," writes Count von
Wartenburg, in his work on " Napoleon as a General," " may
be considered masterly. It is indeed a characteristic, uni-
formly noticeable in the strategy of all the greatest generals,
that they know how to utilise their Cavalry to the best
advantage. For it is this arm, designed for a wide field and
rapidity of movement, which requires superior officers of
exceptionally large grasp and quick resolution, who, keeping
only the great aims of a war in view, are able to set aside
objects of secondary importance and to put up with heavy
losses also, for Cavalry employed over a large area must
often get into situations from which it cannot withdraw
without suffering them." Napoleon himself said : "The use
of Cavalry demands boldness and ability ; above all it
should not be handled with any miserly desire to keep it
intact." And again in this very campaign: "1 do not wish
the horses to be spared if they can catch men. Take
no heed of the complaints of the Cavalry, for if such great
objects may be obtained as the destruction of a whole hostile
Army, the State can afford to lose a few hundred horses from
exhaustion,"

The effect of the order of the 17th September is summed

242

CAVALRY STUDIES

Up as follows by the Emperor : " Thus on the giix (or io(
October Xcy's and Lannes' (6th and 5th) Corps should I
at (Jim ; Soult (4th ,1 at Aaien : Davout (3rd; at Nordlingcn ;"!
Bemadotte (ist) and Marmont (2nd) at Weissenburg : the
Reserve Cavalry' (a division of Cuirassiers and two of
Dtagoons), the park, and the Guard Grenadiers at Gmund."
By this order Napoleon assigns points of assembly for his
Army Corps 125 miles distant from their starting points
upon the Rhine; and for the ist and 2nd Corps lOO miles
from Wurzbui^.

It should be noted that the Austrian Army which
crossed the Inn near Wasserbuig on the loth September
could have had its outposts fifteen days later on the Danube
from Moeskirch to Donauworth, and its main body at
Memmingen.

But on the 17th September Napoleon does not credit the
enemy with such decisive action. Being in the dark as to
the nature of the Austrian movements, then in course of
execution, Napoleon does not yet modify the plan which he
has formed, but reserves the power to do so later, if cir-
cumstances require it Similarly von Verdy WTites (page 11,
"With the Royal Headquarters, 1870-71"): "In making
a plan of operation it is always well to begin first of all by
getting a clear idea of what our own intentions are, and
only then to ask oneself what the opponent may do to foil
them. If the opposite course were taken, and one were
first to consider what the opponent could do, and then
deduce one's own plan, the latter would be dependent on
the opponent's will. This would be to allow him to lay
down the course of procedure and to deprive oneself of
the most important factor in the conduct of war, viz. tAe
iniliaiive. And so, in order to keep our attention fixed
upon the objective of our operations we must constantly
fight against drawing imaginary conclusions which partial
news of the enemy may cause our minds to formulate. A
good general follows the plan which he has decided upon
until the enemy opposes some obstacle in his path ; then

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 243

he operates with the object of destroying the hostile masses
which have placed themselves in his way."

In the present case there was nothing to prevent the
junction of the French Corps into four groups, namely, the
right fsth and 6th Corps) at Ulm, the centre (4th and 3rd
Corps) between Aalen and Nordlingen, the left (1st and 2nd
Corps) at Weissenburg, and, lastly, the Guard and Reserve
Cavalry at Gmund.

As the crow flies, the distance from Ulm to Aalen is about
31 miles ; ig miles from Aalen to Nordlingen ; and 31 miles
from Nordlingen to Weissenbui^. So that the Army would
be formed into three groups on a front of about 80 miles.

The instructions contained in the order of 17th September
do not take into account the enemy's possible movements,
t.e. where and when he is likely to be met. They seem to
be the result of a decision arrived at before the Austrians
had entered Munich.

There appears to be no doubt that on the 17th September
Napoleon paid but little attention to the invasion of Bavaria
and occupation of Munich by the Austrians, because on the
i8th September he wrote to Massena :

" I calculate that I shall cross the Rhine on the 27th
September, atid I shall not slop until I am on tlu Inn and
beyond it''

In Napoleon's mind, the manoeuvre to turn the line of
the Inn must follow at once, without any delay, after the
grouping of the forces as laid down in the order of the
17th September, and he expected the decisive battle to be
beyond the Inn, perhaps on the Morawa.

zoth September. — Napoleon issues an order from Saint
Cloud modifying the disposition contained in that of the
17th September. He now takes into consideration the prob-
able positions of the Austrians behind the Danube on the
front Donauworth-Ulm, and withdraws the Right of the
Grand Army northwards from Ulm. Thus the strategical
Front of the Army is now almost parallel with the Danube,
and Is reduced to some 52 instead of over 80 miles in length.

244

CAVALRY STUDIES

2ise SepUmber. — Napoleon still thought that the advance
guard (the Reser\'e Cavalry under Murat and sth Corps
under Lannes) could pass by the Kniebis road through the
Black Forest, and he orders Murat to send his Dragoon
Divisions by the three roads fFrieburg, OlTenburg, Kniebis)
through the Black Forest, and to push his reconnaissances
as far forward as possible.

This evening (or on the morning of the 22nd) Napoleon,
who was still at Saint Cloud, learns that the Austrians had
appeared in considerable strength at the various exits from
the Black Forest, as well as on the side of the Lake of ]
Constance. At the same time he hears that the Austrian
advance guard is on the Iller, and the main body of the
Armj' between Munich and Augsburg. Under the circum-
stances, Murat and Lannes cannot march by Kniebis, but
must be drawn to the north of the Black Forest

Napoleon was still in hope that he could leave the J
Austrians to sleep in false security on the Upper Rhine^
whilst he operated to cut them off fi-om the Inn before th^d
arrival of the Russians.

He therefore drew up the following table with his own \
hand :

Saint Cloud, 22nd September.

s™

Slruborg.

Anspicb.
CrsiTiheim

Dieirun.

IngoUUdt.

N=ubuiT[.

On the i6th October the three Corps on the left would be
ready to contain the Russians if they appeared : and the three
Corps on the right to reduce the defences on the Lech, no
matter whether the enemy decided to hold the left or the
right bank. For it will be seen that the sth and 6th Corps
from Neubui^ and Ingolstadt are in a position to take in

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

24 S

flank the defences on the right bank : while the 4th Corps
from Donauworth could debouch upon the enemy's fiank
in the event of his holding the left bank.

But two faults seem patent in the order of the 22iid
September :

is/. An enveloping movement is planned about a month
beforehand against an enemy who is believed to be on the
Iller, but who is perfectly free to move as he chooses, and
that for several days.

2nd. Suppose the Austrians remained stationary until
they found their position turned, and then decided to reach
the Inn before the French, the campaign would then be
shifted further eastwards, towards the district whence the
Russians were expected to arrive.

The orders of the 22nd September aimed at a second
Marengo. But, even with his boldness, Napoleon could not
attempt so rash a manceuvre before knowing the actual strength
of the Austrians in Bavaria, their position, and how far away
the Russians would be when the first collijiions took place. So
he abandoned the plan of operations embodied in the orders
in question.

26i/i Septetnber. — Napoleon decided not to attempt to force
the Kniebis defile. The sth Corps (Lannes) was halted
between Rastadt and Baden, and Lannes was ordered to
reconnoitre up to Wildbad with his Cavalry. The recon-
naissances are to start before daylight : "You will send two
regiments two leagues (5 miles), one regiment two more
leagues (10 miles), a squadron another league (12J miles),
and a well mounted ' piquet ' another league (total, 1 5 miles)."

Note how Napoleon considered that the special circum-
stances of the situation required three regiments to scout
:5 miles. Owing to a long defile through the mountains,
Jt was necessary to arrange for detachments of increasing
:size towards the rear, to secure the safe retirement of the
parties in front.

But why scout to Wildbad ?

The 5th Corps (Lannes) had to march northwards from

24^

CAVALRY STUDIES

Rastadt along the narrow valley of the Rhine before i
reached a road by which it could arrive at its position
between the 4th (Soult) and 6th (Ney) Corps in the general"
march disposition of the Grand Army. During the flank
march it was necessary to protect it from any surprise which
a hostile detachment might attempt by descending through ■
the Black Forest by Simmersfeld or Wildbad.

zjth September. — Marshal Davout (3rd Corps) was order«
to send a staff officer to Marshal Marmont (2nd Corps), andl
to communicate with him by Cavalry connecting posts ever^
evening, partly in order to exchange information, and partlyj
in order to be in a position either to support him or to 1
supported by him.

Writing to Marshal Bernadotte to-day. Napoleon thui
outlines the situation :

" The Austrians have sent no detachments over (/>. oil'l
to the left bank of) the Danube, and the Russians have noj
yet arrived. I am thus in a position to deal with an;
eventually.

" From Wiirzburg you will march to the Danube,
accordance with the orders which the Minister of War i
sending you. Keep General Marmont on your right an<
the Bavarians on your left.

" I shall join up my whole Army with Marmont, and if I'M
have the good luck for the Austrian Army to remain sleeping'*
three or four days longer on the Uler and in the Blacky
Forest, I shall have turned it, and I hope only some fragm
will escape, Austria will be done for before the I2tl
October."

The plan thus unfolded to Marshal Bernadotte was arrivedfl
at gradually, and was not, as some historians make out,
once decided upon when the camps at Boulogne were
struck. There is something very human in the workings c
Napoleon's mind, as indicated by the several modification!
of his orders.

At the same time that Napoleon sent instructions to 1
marshals to ensure a certain combination in their marchej

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

247

he left Prince Murat with three divisions of mounted, and
one division of dismounted, Dragoons facing the exits from
the Black Forest defiles, to occupy the attention of the
Austrians and to lull them to sleep.

Marshal Ney was ordered to occupy alarm quarters at
Stuttgart on the 30th September in order that his whole
Army Corps (6th) might be concentrated if necessary " in jess
than two hours. I wish him to take up a good position
at Stuttgart, because I don't want any serious fighting in
that direction."

Key's 6th Corps was thus to form the pivot on which the
rest of the Grand Army wheeled from facing east to south,
preparatory to its advance in three groups in echelon from
the left (two Corps in each group) towards Heidenheim, Nord-
lingen, and Eichstadt.

30/// September. — The following extracts from a letter, dated
the 30th September, written by Napoleon to Marshal Augereau,
commanding the reserve at Langres, explain the situation
at this date as well as his intentions: —

"My dear and good brother the Emperor of Austria came
to Memmingen. His Army is opposite the exits from the
Black Forest : counting the troops which are towards Lake
Constance, it numbers ioo,cxx) men; but reports which
reached me yesterday state that the Emperor returned to
Vienna after holding a grand council yesterday. May God
grant that his Army may remain in the same positions for
another eight or ten days, or, what would be still better,
may advance towards the Rhine,

" Marshals Lannes (Sth) and Ney (6th), the Dragoon
Divisions, and my Guard, have reached Stuttgart. I am
leaving myself to-night to take command of this part of the
Army, in order to combine with Marshal Soult and to turn
Ulm. The Austrians are done for if they allow me to gain a
few marches on them. 1 hope to be able to turn them and
to place myself with my whole Army between the Lech and
the Isar ; but I fancy the departure of the Emperor already
indicates an awakening, and that the Austrians will be in a

24S

CAVALRY STUDIES

The head of the

e RtissianS^^^H
strians are ^^H

. that ihfV '

hurry to withdraw from Bavaria.
is gradually drawing nearer."

Napoleon does not yet imagine that the Austrians ;
going to shut themselves up in Ulm. He believes that they
are behind the lUer, their centre at Mcmmingen protected
towards the Upper Rhine by strong detachments holding the
Black Forest defiles, and others posted in the direction of the 1
Lake of Constance.

2w(/ Ocioder.—When Napoleon speaks of " turning Ulm," I
he means to do so well below the junction of the Iller with ■
the Danube, because on the 2nd October (two days later) he
writes as follows from Ettlingen to Bernadotte:

" I am following the road Stuttgart, Schorndorf, Gmiind, j
Aalen, in order, if the enemy crosses the Danube and waits I
for us at Heidenheim, personally to direct the movements of I
the right, i.£. 5th and 6th Corps, Reserve Cavalry, Guard, and [
Soult's 4th Corps. My latest information is that the enemy '
is still on the Iller, and has fortified Memtningen."

Napoleon's information of the enemy's movements was very
good. He writes this same night to his brother Joseph :
" The enemy is marching and countermarching, and seems
much perplexed "; and he calculates that with the right of
his Army, numbering 8o,cxx), he will be in greatly superior
strength on the battle-field to the enemy, whose total numbers
are ioo,ooo, but who are so much scattered that not more
than 50,000 could be united on one battle-field to oppose
him.

Napoleon informed Murat to-day that the Dragoon ]
Divisions (mounted and foot) which had been employed from j
2Sth September until 1st October in scouting the passes of J
Oberkirch, Kniebis, and the Val iTEnfer \s&xe. on the march' J
by Rastadt to join him at Stuttgart, Murat is requested tol
come at once to the Imperial Headquarters at Miinchingeai
(10 miles tiorth-north-west of Stuttgart), and
meantime Napoleon prepares him for what he wants hini
to do with the Cavalry: " You must flank the whole of mj^
march, which is a delicate operation, because it is an obliqUi

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

249

march towards the Danube. If the enemy tries to take the
offensive, you must give me warning in good time, in order
that I may have the initiative, and not be obliged to do what
suits the enemy,"

Napoleon still does not believe that the Austnans are
concentrated at Ulm, but believes that they are behind the
Iller, and that when the advance of the Grand Army is
reported, they will cross to the left bank of the Danube, either
by Ulm, or Donauwiirth, or Ingolstadt, and will attack the
French columns of march in flank.

During this " delicate flank march " Napoleon is determined
that his will shall not be subordinated to that of his enemy.
At all costs he means to preserve his liberty of action. Note
the means he employs to secure this end :

Three Divisions of Dragoons under Murat are detached
towards the enemy {i.e. upon Napoleon's right) with orders
as given above. But they are not to be without support.
Napoleon orders as follows :

"The Dragoons will leave Stuttgart on the 3rd October.
The 6th (Ney's) Corps will follow them on the 4th instant at
24 hours' di-stance, and will operate under the orders of Murat,
who will command the whole flank guard, numbering 30,000
to 35,000 men.

" I shall be myself with Marshal Lannes' 5th Corps, which
marches by Gmund."

Murat's flank guard marched by Goppingen and Weisaen-
stein upon Heidenheim.

On the 5th October the 6th Corps, supporting Murat's
Dragoons, was at Goppingen, while the 5th Corps reached
Gmund, and Saint-Hilaire's Division (from the 4th Corps),
coming from Heilbronn, halted at Gaildorf

" You see, then, that if the enemy were to debouch from
Ulm with the object of attacking me in flank, the two Corps
(6th and 5th), with which he would be met, could be easily
reinforced by part of Soult's (4th) Corps, which I have
disposed suitably for that purpose."

2,rd October. — In a letter, dated Ludwigsberg, 3rd October,

250

CAVALRY STUDIES

Napoleon explained to Davout the three movements open to
the Austrians, and how to frustrate each in turn. The latter
were still in possession of the Danube, and were free to
debouch on to the left bank, either by Ulm, by DonauwortH. by i
Ingolstadt, or by all three crossings simultaneously, in order j
to assail the Grand Army in flank.

Napoleon also wrote to-day to Marshal Soult : " Myl
intention, when we meet the enemy, is to surround him on J
every side," And in a letter to his brother Joseph he states r
" No blood has been spilt anywhere yet"

Thus, before the smallest engagement had taken placCiJ
Napoleon contemplates investing and capturing the enemy'n
Army. This is the first time in which such an idea appears in
Napoleon's correspondence.

a,tk October. — On the 4th October Napoleon knew that t
enemy was still behind the Danube, and had made no offensim
movement.

He was more than ever confirmed in his decision to crosfl
the Danube below the point where the Lech joins. Thij
movement, however, required a covering force in the directioif
of the enemy who was known to be established on the lUer.

Ney's 6th Corps, with Bonrcier's Division of Dragoons,
was directed to remain on the left bank of the Danube:
" Bourcier's Division at Geislingen," in order to explore "all
the crossings from Ulm, and to cover the whole movement";
the 6th Corps at Heidenheim, with detachments of light
Cavalry at Giengen, watching the crossings from Gundel>
fin gen.

The remaining Cavalry Divisions marched by Neresheim
on Nordlingen under Murat's orders.

At the same time Napoleon busied himself in providing
means for the 4th (Soult's), 5th (Lannes'), 3rd (Davout's),
2nd (Marmont's), and 1st (Bernadotte's) Corps to cross the
Danube.

S/// October. — Napoleon wrote from Gmiind to Murat telling
him that Marshal Soult reported 5,000 to 6,000 of the enemy
at Nordlingen. The 4th Corps would deal with these, and

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

251

Murat, with the Dragoon Divisions, instead of moving by
Nordlingen as already ordered, was now to march pn the 6th
from Heidenheim direct on Donauworth.

6M October. — Napoleon wrote to Soult from Aalen : " My
intention is to throw bridges of boats across the Danube
below the point of junction with the Lech, in order to turn
that position ; but if 1 can surprise the bridge at Donauworth
this plan will not prevent me from making use of it at
once."

Soult's 4th Corps had the good fortune to find the bridge
of Munster, a few miles above Donauworth, undefended, and
occupied it.

On the evening of the 6th October, the Grand Army was
disposed approximately as shown in the Sketch 22.

Comparing the actual positions of the Grand Army on the
6th October with those which the several Corps ought to have
reached on the 9th October, in accordance with Napoleon's
order of 20th September, it will be seen that the ist, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th Corps have gained three days, and the 5th and 6th
Corps five days. The acceleration of the march was due to
urgent orders from Napoleon, who was afraid that the
Austrians might extricate themselves from their dangerous
position by withdrawing towards the Inn before he could
place his troops upon the Lech.

Napoleon now decided to pass his troops simultaneously
over the Danube at three points of crossing below the mouth
of the Lech, and also at Donauworth, namely ;

At Ingolstadt . 1st Corps and Bavarians.

At Neuburg . . 2nd „

At Bertholzheim . 3rd „

At Donauworth Murat's Cavalry, 4th and 5th Corps.

Thus, supposing that the ist Corps and the Bavarians were
required to act as a containing force against the Russians,
who were reported to be marching towards the lower Inn,
Napoleon would have :

\st. As a covering force to watch the sector Ulm-
Geislingen- Heidenheim -Gundelfingen, Ney's 6th Corps

252

CAVALRY STUDIES

Bourcier's Division of Dragoons, and a Division of Dfl
mounted Dragoons.

2nd. As covering force towards the east, either
Ingolstadt, Freising, or Munich, Bemadotfe's rst Corps i
the Bavarians.

^rd. To make a frontal attack from east to west agaifU
the line of the Lech, which was supposed to be held by ti
Austrians, Davout's 3rd and Marmont's znd Corps.

4?A. To take this line in reverse on the left bank, anj
from north to south, Soult's 4th and Lannes' 5th Corps, w
Murat's Cavalry, and perhaps the Guard.

It will be noted that Napoleon had not yet judged
necessary to hold in force the exits from Ulm on the Id
bank of the Danube. He wrote to Murat on 5th October: '

"General Bourcier can hardly be turned out by Cavalrj*. s
he must only retire when he sees Infantry in force. The
enemy wil! not be able to occupy a position about Uim. So
order him to place posts on all the exits from Ulm at a
distance of 7 or S miles.

yth October. — Events now began to move quickly.

Early this day, the 4th Corps (Soult) carried the bridge at
Donauworth, which was weakly held, and crossed the Danube
there. Murat's Cavalry, followed by Lannes' sth Corps,
crossed at Munster.

On reaching Donauworth, Napoleon learned that General
Kienmayer was in command of the enemy's Division which
had fought there, and had then retired towards Munich. He
at once concludes that the bulk of the Austrian Army must
be on the march to escape from its perilous position,

%th October. — Soult C4th Corps) is ordered to march on
Augsburg, keeping two Divisions on the right bank and one
on the left : Murat's Cavalry and Oudinot's Division of
Lannes' Corps (5th) to Burgau, on the main road from Ulm
to Augsburg. Napoleon calculated that the mass of the
Austrian Army must pass by Augsburg on its retreat towards
Munich and the River Inn. The main body of Lannes'
5th Corps was ordered to halt at Wertingen, and to com-

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 253

municate with the 6th Corps (Ney) by the bridge of
Dtllingen,

At I p.m. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp (General Dumas)
to Neuburg to hurry on the crossing of his left wing, as he
expected the Austrians to attack. He calculated that the
whole Austrian Army could be before Augsburg on the
loth.

gth October. — Supposing that the Austrian Army, after
concentrating on the south of Ulm, had advanced on Augs-
burg with the object of cutting its way through the French
forces, Napoleon would have had at his disposal on the
9th October four Army Corps disposed as follows ;

(1) At Gunzburg astride the Danube. Ney's 6th Corps,
forming the most westerly group of the Grand Army.

(2) At Wertingen, the Imperial Guard and Suchet's
Division (detached from Soult's 4th Corps).

(3) At Zumarshauaen, Lannes' 5th Corps.

In advance {i.e. west) of the line Zumarshausen- Wertingen,
towards Burgau, Murat's Cavalry.

(4) The line of the Lech, from Rain to Augsburg organised
as a defensive barrier and occupied as follows :

At Rain, an Infantry regiment with Artillery and

Cavalry.
At Augsburg, three Divisions of Soult's 4th Corps.

(5) In reserve in rear of the left wing, at Aicha, Davout's
3rd Corps.

Napoleon's plan was for the advance guard to fall back
from Wertingen to Donauworth, whilst the Sth, 4th, and
3rd Corps, together with Murat's Cavalry, manceuvred
towards his right with the object of driving the enemy
into the cul-de-sac formed by the Danube and Lech near
Donauworth.

The Austrian General, hoivever, had no plan of such a
decided nature. To go back a few days, and consider the
movements of the Austrians, on the ^th Ocloier General Mack,
the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, heard of the French at
Geislingen (Ney and Murat). He concluded that this was

254

CAVALRY STUDIES

the left of the Grand Army moving to attack his right, and
that the French main body was marching through the Black
Forest direct upon the Ilier, He therefore deployed his
Army on the right bank of that river south of Ulm facing
wesL

6/A October. — Discovering his mistake. Mack concentrates
his Army between Ulm and Gunzenburg, and faces north.

7/// October. — The passage of a French Corps at Donati-
worth is reported. Mack decides to march thither, and to
drive back the enemy; and with this object Auffenberg's
Division is sent off as advance guard towards VV'ertingen.
Later in the day, however, he changes bis mind, and decides
to retire by Augsburg on Munich and Wasserburg (on
the Inn).

%th October. — Preparations for this retreat are begun.

9/A October. — On the head of his columns reaching Burgau,
he hears that Auffenburg's Division has been cut up. There-
upon Mack's next plan is to cross the Danube at Gunzburg
and to escape to Bohemia, But on the evening of the 9th,
Ney captures Gunzburg bridge and repulses the new advance
guard which had been sent out by the Austrians. Mack is
still determined to march towards Bohemia, so he orders a
retreat on Ulm, meaning to march by Nordlingen and
Nuremberg.

\otk October. — The Austrian Army falls back to Ulm and
prepares to march next day on Heidenheim.

Turning again to consideration of Napoleon's operations :

\oth October. — Vague rumours are current that the Russians
are approaching the Inn. Napoleon's orders of the gth
already foresee a possibility of having to meet an attack
from the east, and on the 10th October two advance guards
or " covering groups " are formed : one offensive, towards the
west, consisting of the 5th (Lannes') and 6th(Ney's) Corps and
four Divisions of Cavalry, all under Murat : the other,
defensive, towards the east, namely, Bernadotte's (ist) and
Davout's {3rd) Corps and the Bavarians, all under Bernadotte.

The remainder of the Grand Army, under the orders of the

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

2SS

Emperor, was disposed as follows, ready to act towards the
east or west as the situation required : Soult's 4th Corps
at Landsberg, Marmont's 3nd Corps and the Guard at
Augsburg.

Sketch 23 shows approximately the relative position of
the several corps and the intervening distances.

A distance of two marches (25 to 30 miles) separates the
three Reserve Corps on the Lech from the covering groups.
This must be considered as about the minimum distance for
an Army of five or six Corps, which expects to be attacked
from opposite directions. For, suppose the Austrian Army
on the lUer, numbering 8o,ckX), had marched on Burgau on
the I2th October, it would have been able to drive back the
5th and 6th Corps some 10 or 12 miles. On hearing of the
advance in the afternoon. Napoleon would have had time to
select a battle-field between Burgau and Augsburg, and to
move out the 3nd Corps and the Guard during the night
I2th-I3th to it; and also at the same time to direct the
4th Corps in such a way as to strike the enemy's right flank
whilst he was engaged next day with the 2nd, Sth, 6th, and
Guard.

Similarly, if the Russians were to debouch from the Isar,
twenty-four hours at least would be required to organise a
battle between the Isar and Lech in which the ist, 2nd, 3rd
Corps, Guard, and Bavarians, and perhaps the 4th Corps
could take part.

The distance of two marches chosen by Napoleon on the
lOth October, as a suitable zone for strategical manixuvre, is
the same as what he advised Massena to form before the
opening of the 1800 Campaign. He recommended him to
concentrate all his troops near Genoa and to watch the exits
from the Apennines by detachments posted at two marcJus
from the entrenched camp,

An area of two marches, or say 3$ ^^ l^ miles, must be
considered the minimum possible for a zone of manceuvie for
an Army of five or six Corps, so as to allow of the bulk of the
forces being concentrated in one day against one of the adver-

3 56

CAVALRY STUDIES

saries and beating him, without the other adversary bein^
able to take part in the battle.

Thus, suppose So,ooo Austrians attacked Burgau on the
I3th October and that the same day 60,000 Russians arrived
in front of Dachau. On both fronts the two covering groups
must engage the enemy and dispute the ground yard by yard
in order to gain time. Let us imagine that Murat, facing the
Austrians, on the 12th October lost 12 or I3 miles of ground,
and that Bernadotte, facing the Russians, fell back the samQ,
distance.

Napoleon then decides to act first of all against
Austrians. On the 13th he gives battle, about 12 or 13 mill
west of Augsburg, with four of his Army Corps.

On the same day the Russians press Bernadotte
almost to Augsburg. Next day, the 14th, the Austrian Arm
(presumably beaten the evening before) is in retreat towardl
Ulm, followed (say) by the 2nd Corps. Napoleon is now ablia
to come with the 4lh, 5th and 6th Corps to the assistance (
the 3rd and 1st Corps, which are engaged with the Russian]
near Augsbui^. A new battle is fought with greatly superio]
forces and results in a second victory.

On the other hand, if the zone of manceuvrc were :
smaller, the Russians would have been able to reach I
battle-field on the west of Augsburg on the evening of t
13th October and to take the bulk of the French Aroiyij

I !//( October.- — Murat proceeds to drive back the enemy a
to the left bank of the Iller. At the same time Dupont'j
Division of Ney's 6th Corps with a Division of dismounta
Dragoons (the only troops of the Grand Army remaining c
the left bank of the Danube) is sent against Ulm with ordej
to capture it. Dupont is met by 25,000 Austrians and lose
severely, but succeeds in withdrawing without being foUowa

Napoleon is convinced to-day that the Russians are aboij
to debouch on to the left bank of the Inn. He estimate!
their strength (with Kienmayer's Austrian Corps) at 60,0
but Bernadotte is ordered to clear up the situation ma

I-

'^'%~'*«*4K*

/.•*

Si-.**'-

ly*'

••■ ..»

•v

r .

. i

».

•• .

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 257

fully before Napoleon takes action. Against these numbers
Napoleon prepares to operate with 90,000 — namely, Berna-
dotte's 1st Corps and the Bavarians, Davout's 3rd and
Marmont's and (or Soult's 4th), while Murat contains the
Austrians on the Iller with Ney's 6th, Lannes' 5th, and the
4th (or 2nd) Corps.

\2l/i October. — NajMleon's appreciation of the situation
completely changed to-day. Reliable news had come in
which indicated that the Russians were certainly advancing
towards the Inn, but their columns were so distant and
widely scattered that he concluded eight or ten days must
elapse before their presence would be felt Napoleon there-
fore at once turned all his attention towards the lllcr, with
that quick decision and energy which is a special trait in his
character.

Marshal Bernadotte, with the 1st, 3rd, and Bavarian Corps,
is to continue his " covering r6Ie on the Inn " ; but his force is
only to act as a group o{ observation, and is not to ino\-e until
further orders.

At 9 a.m. Napoleon wrote from Augsburg to Murat :
" Marshal Soult is marching on Memmingen, where he can
only arrive very late to-morrow nighl (13th). It is my
intention, should the enemy continue in his present positions,
and be willing to accept battle, to fight, not to-morrow but
the day after, so that Marshal Soult and hia 30,000 men may
take part in it : he will march against the enemy's right flank
and attack when he has turned it, a manoeuvre which will
assure us a certain and decisive result." Thus carefully did
the Emperor always prepare for battle, so as to have beforehand
every advantage on his side.

Napoleon believed that the Austrian Army was still in
position on the left bank of the Iller, between Ulm and
Dietenheim, and he expected it to march towards its right
during the 13th, in order to reach Memmingen and escape to
the Tyrol. Napoleon accordingly made his arrangements so
that his enemy would be strongly opposed at Kellmiinz by a
detachment of Soult's Corps : while at the same lime the 3nd

258 CAVALRY STUDIES

Corps (Marmont) would continue its march from Kriimbach
on Kellmiinz (14 miles) : two more Divisions of the 4th Corps
(Soult) were also to support him in this direction. The
enemy would thus be held in front by four Divisions while at
the same time the bulk of Ney's 6th, Lannes' sth, and the
Guard Corps would attack his columns in flank between
lUertissen and Illereicheim.

According to General Bonnal, this plan had the grave defect
that " time and space "had not been sufficiently considered,
and he shows that by the evening of the 13th or morning
of the 14th, the 4th and 2nd Corps could barely have accom-
plished the long and difficult tasks which Napoleon had set
them.

At 10.30 p.m. the Emperor left Augsburg and drove through
the night and pouring rain (which had been continuous since
the Sth) 30 miles to the vicinity of Weissenhorn. At the
moment of entering his carriage he received a despatch from
Murat that the " enemy are still at Ulm with 40,000 men."
Reflecting over the situation on the left bank of the Danube,
Napoleon came to the conclusion that the exits from Ulm
were not sufficiently guarded on that side. He had raised
no objection when Murat ordered the bulk of the 6th Corps
(Ney) to the right bank, because on the 10th, nth, and 12th
instant he had only Lannes' 5th and Ney's 6th Corps with
three Divisions of Cavalry at his disposal to confront the
whole of the Austrian Army then on the lUer. Nevertheless
he is now of opinion that a mistake has been committed in
thus denuding the left bank of the Danube of troops, and
hastens to repair it.

The Emperor now adds a postscript to his letter to Soult
directing him : " If the enemy is not at Memmingen to move
down the Iller like lightning until level with us. I see it will
be you who will gain everything. Not one of the enemy
should escape us."

According to the Emperor the position is as follows : —

" The whole of Ney's 6th Corps has been moved back to
the left bank of the Danube and Is closing in upon Ulm ;

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 259

Lannes' 5th Corps supported by Marmonf's 2nd is in a
position to block the bridge-head of Ulm on the right bank,
and Soult's 4th Corps, moving down the left bank of the Iller,
will pick up all the detachments which the enemy has left in
position on the river.

i^th October. — On reaching Pfaffenhofen on the Roth,
Napoleon discovered that Murat had not grasped the
importance of his advice about making a bridge across
the Danube between Albeck and Falheim. Ney was
accordingly ordered to seize the bridge of Elchingen next
morning (14th) and to cross the whole of his Corps to the
left bank.

At the same time Lannes' 5th Corps and the Reserve
Cavalry are ordered to advance against the bridge-head of
Ulm on the right bank and the 2nd Corps (Marmont), after
crossing the Iller near its position then, near Kellmiinz, to
descend the left bank until opposite Wiblingen.

On the 13th, Mack commenced his projected advance to
Heidenheim ; he marched part of his troops in that direction,
part towards Gundelfingen, while sending Jellacich back into
the Vorarlberg. The vanguard of the former column reached
Heidenheim, but the other column met with a French
detachment near the bridge of Elchingen, which it repulsed,
occupying this village ; the French, however, destroyed the
bridge and the Austrians could not advance any further,

I Mack now fell into the most egregious errors ; he even
went so far as to assume that Napoleon was endeavouring
to force a return to France, as a rebellion had broken
out in Paris and the English had landed in France !
In consequence of this opinion, he kept half of his Army,
which was still at Ulm, in that town, and did not send it
after the other half, which had advanced towards Heidenheim
and Elchingen.
14//; October. — Ney advanced towards Elchingen, and
Dupont towards Albeck ; the former defeated the Austrians
who tried to defend Elchingen, took the town by assault and
drove the enemy back towards Ulm. Lannes' (Sth) approached

26o

CAVALRY STUDIES
■ heights

)

: up a position on the heights of Pfuhl, whttst
Marmont ^2nd) reached the lUcr at Kirchberg. At 9 p.m.
tbe 14th, Napoleon issued the follon-ing orders from Falheii
for the next day

" Lannes (5th) to cross the Danube an hour before dayl^
by the bridges of Elchingen-Thalfingen, and to relieve Ni
troops (6th) at Elchingen and Albeck.

" The 6th Corps (Ney) as soon as relieved by the 5th Coi
(LannesJ to march about 8 a.m. and attack the Micbelsber^'
defences (on the north of Ulm).

" Klein's Dragoon and Nansouty's Cuirassier Divisions with
the Imperial Guard to follow Marshal Lannes" movemenL

" Beaumont's Dragoon Division to be attached to the 2ni
Corps (Marmont). The latter to assemble beside its advan*
guard opposite the Abbey of Wiblingen (on the right bank
the Iller) and to march from there across country in masB'
with the object of occupying the heights of Pfuhl . . . and in
this position to hold the enemy in Ulm and, if it faecomi
necessary, to defend the two bridges (of Thalfingen and
Elchingen) over the Danube," Note the order to march in.
mass across country a distance of 4^ miles : this meant
saving of three hours, and ensured a rapid deployment ii
of meeting the enemy.

IS/A October. — Ney occupied the Michelsberg, but couli
make no impression on the fortifications of Ulm.

Soult reached Biberach.

16/// October. — After one hour's bombardment the Emperoif;
opened negotiations with Mack regarding a surrender, and in^
the afternoon of the r7th these were concluded. " My plan,"
he wrote to Talleyrand this evening, with an evident feeling
of satisfaction, " was carried out exactly as 1 had conceived it.
I deceived the enemy completely, and of this Army of 100,000
men more than half are prisoners, killed, wounded, or

I. oti

orp^H

'>er^^^

General Notes.

I. Mack's Army should have acted as a strong covering;
force, or strategical advance guard, for the Russian ArmyJ

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

261

advancing from GalicJa against the French Army from the
Rhine. Under no circumstances should it have allowed
itself to be cut off from the Inn, but should have retired,
fighting step by step if need be, to gain time.

Under these conditions, according to Napoleon, its best
position was behind the Danube, between Ulm and Donau-
worth, but reconnaissances should have been puslied out, not only
into the Black Forest, but also on to the Neckar and beyond
it. The Austrian Army had essentially a manceuvring rSle
to play: if it had been handled in that way, great service
might have been rendered to the Allies, and Napoleon
might have been confronted with superior forces in the
decisive battle.

It will be noted that it was chiefly owing to the skilful use
made of the French Cavalry that Mack was not only kept
in ignorance of Napoleon's real objective, but was led to
believe that the Cavalry, which appeared from the direction
of the Black Forest, was part of the advanced troops of the
Grand Army.

There was no " Cavalry screen " put out after the manner
suggested by certain theoretical text-books with clouds of
patrols in front, all arranged with mathematical accuracy.
On the contrary, Napoleon's Cavalrj' was kept much concen-
trated, and a large mass of it was boldly pushed forward into
close contact with tlte enemy. It was thus an actual menace
to the enemy. Moreover, contact was kept up by means
of active reconnoitring bodies, not by a cordon of posts of
observation.

In view of the opinions expressed by certain military
authorities who profess to believe that the days of Cavalry
acting mounted are over, and that it is only likely to be of
use provided it acts dismounted, it seems interesting to con-
sider what would have resulted had General Mack also concen-
trated his Cavalry and employed it boldly in opposing the
French horsemen.

The logical conclusion would appear to be that, no matter
what firearm the Cavalry carried, a gigantic Cavalry combat

262 CAVALRY STUDIES

would in the fir^t place ba\-c resulted ; that success la tins
action must have fallen to that side which was the superior at
the decisive point, in numbcn, in traimng, and in moral: and
that the victor in ttiis Cavalry fight would probably then so J
have dispelled the " fog of war" for his own friends, and in- I
creased its density for the enemy that the tatter's after- i
manoeuvres must surely have failed, being, so to speak, planned
and executed in the dark.

2. Napoleon's strategy has been called " one-sided " ;
people have said : " He was really in his element only where A
the course of events allowed an unrestricted offensive, that is, I
strictly speaking, only at the head of superior numbers." But I
in this campaign the total strength of the Austrians and I
Russians together was in no way inferior to Napoleon's forcesi J
yet the latter appeared at the decisive point with an over«l
whelming superiority of numbers.

Mobility was the key-note of French efficiency. This*
mobility was derived from an almost entire absence of supply
arrangements. Owing, however, to the area swept over by
the troops in their rapid marches being large, increased
resources became available. But the want of organised
supply brought in its train a host of evils, even in an Army
having in its ranks a far higher range of intelligence and
patriotism than were then obtainable in any other country in '
Europe. Every one at all connected with the army ought to I
try to realise what mora! grit is required to ensure success i
war, and what tremendous " driving power " had to be applied 1
in one form or another by Napoleon to his subordinates. I
The complaints of Napoleon's marshals seem to show that hc'J
touched about the high-water mark of the attainable in the I
work he succeeded in getting out of his men during the UlmJ
campaign. To give an idea of the sufferings endured by thft;
soldiers of the Grand Army in October, 1805, the following
extract is quoted from Colonel Maude's " Evolution of Modet
Strategy " (page 69J :

" This state of destitution in which most of the corps noi
found themselves does not appear to have astonished 1

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

263

Emperor, for in answer to Marmont's complaints Berthier
writes on the l Ith October :

"In all the letters which M. le G^n^ral Marmont writes to
mci he speaks of provisions. I must repeat to him that in the
War of Invasion now being prosecuted by the Emperor there
are no magazines ; it is the duty of the Generals Commanding
the Corps to provide themselves with the means of subsistence
in the country they traverse. General Marmont has received
the orders to provide himself with four days' bread and
biscuit in advance ; he cannot, therefore, count on anything
but the resources he procures for himself, as all the other
Corps of the Grand Army likewise do, and no one knows
better than General Marmont the manner in which the
Emperor makes war."

This letter deserves study, as it reveals in the clearest
manner the " driving force " Napoleon knew how to apply.
As M. Colin points out, " It would be indeed a difficult task
to reconcile a satisfactory system of supply with the extreme
mobility absolutely essential to the methods of the Grand
Army " ; but be this as it may, the fact remains that
the extreme privations undergone by the troops brought
in their train marauding, pillaging, and the break-up of
discipline.

Davout writes on the nth October to Berthier :

" I have the honour to represent to Your Excellency that
it has become absolutely necessary to take prompt measures
to put a stop to the marauding and pillaging, which have
reached the limits of excess. The inhabitants of the districts
see with the keenest anguish that, at the moment when their
Prince and Army are making common cause with us, they
are receiving worse treatment than when allied With Austria
against us. I have the honour to solicit Your Excellency to
procure for me the authority of His Majesty to shoot a few
of these scoundrels ; terrible examples are necessary to stop
this evil, which is constantly growing."

To this he received no reply, and the fact, taken in con-
junction with Berthier's letter to Marmont, reveals only too

264 CAVALRY STUDIES

clearly the Machiaveliati insight of the Emperor. Hunger
was the "driving force"— what matter if the inhabitants
suffered, and the weakly men amongst the troops died ? The
survivors had to hunt for their dinners like wolves in a
pack ; thus, and thus only, could " mobility," the secret of
his " strategy," be imparted to the mass.

Fezensac sums up the whole story of these sufferings and
disorders in the following passage, which conveys a picture
of facts governing Napoleon's strategy absolutely indispensable
for the student's guidance :

"This short campaign proved for me an epitome of all
which were to come after it. The extremity of fatigue,
the want of food, the terrible weather, the disorders of the
marauders, nothing was wanting, and in one month I tasted
a sample of what was to be my destiny during the whole of
my career. The brigades, even the regiments, were sometimes
dispersed. The order to reunite arrived late, because it had
to filter through so many offices. Hence the troops were
marching day and night, and I saw for the first time men
sleeping as they marched. I could not have believed it
possible. Thus we reached our destinations without having
eaten anything and finding nothing to eat. It was all very
well for Berthier to write: ' In the War of Invasion, as the
Emperor makes it, there are no magazines ; it js for the
generals to provide themselves from the country as they
traverse it' ; but the generals had neither time nor means to
procure regularly what was required for the needs of such a
numerous Army. It was an authorisation of pillage, and the
districts we passed through suffered cruelly. We were often
hungry, and the terrible weather intensified our sufferings.
A steady, cold rain, or, rather, half-melted snow, fell inces-
santly, and we stumbled along in the cold mud, which was
churned up by our passage almost up to our knees. The
wind made it impossible to light fires. On the i6th October
the weather was so infamous that not a soul remained at his
post. One found neither sentries nor piquets ; even the
Artillery remained unguarded. Every one sought shelter as

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

26s

best he could, and never again, except in Russia, did I see
the Army suffer so much, or in such disorder. All these
causes deveioped insubordination and marauders. When in
such weather the troops entered a village, it was hard to get
them out again ; hence the number of stragglers roaming
about the country became considerable. The inhabitants
were exposed to ill-treatment of all descriptions; and the
wounded officers, left behind, who tried to assert their authority,
were openly defied and threatened by the marauders. All
these details are unknown to those who read the history
of our campaigns — one sees only a valiant Army whose
soldiers vie with their officers for glory — and the price
of suffering paid for the most brilliant successes is for-
gotten." M. Colin concludes: "Such was the condition
of the Grand Army in October, 1805, and thus we must
picture it, in following day by day its forced marches and
its victories."

3, Napoleon and von Moltke's Staff System. "The German
system of issuing orders, according to von Moltke's
standard, starts from tfu assumption that the subordinate
understands his business thoroughly ; the orders assist him
by giving him all the news which can be given, and the
orders are careful not to prescribe anything that he himself
is able to arrange. When studying Napoleonic operation
orders we have to admire over and over again the all-
embracing and active mind of the Emperor, who thought of
;rything and provided for everything ; but after a short
time we also arrive at the conclusion that leaders could never
be trained in such a sclwol. The helplessness and awkward-
ness of his Marshals, when confronted by real problems in
leadership, are most assuredly not an accidental misfortune ;
they are the consequence of that inconsiderate, and even
tyrannical, treatment preferred by the Emperor when dealing
ith his Marshals — a consequence of that constant inter-
ference by far too categorial orders, and of that cruelty with
which he punished every disregard of his commands. In
that way one does not bring up reliable assistants for difficult

266 CAVALRY STUDIES

work and great emergencies ; and just because he had no
such assistants, the Emperor had all those tnisfortunes in the
gigantic struggles which led to his overthrow. Any one
who is studying Napoieon's operation orders may easily be
misled if he does not clearly see this fact." — ( Von Cammerer,
p. 172.)

CHAPTER Vlir.
ATTOCK STAFF RlDE-co»tmufd.

THIS Staff Ride commenced on i8th of March, 1906, on
which date thirty-two officers joined the Director and
his four assistants at Hasan Abda! and took part in it. The
Directing Staff had arrived two days previously after riding
over the ground to be traversed during the exercise, and
6xing upon the more important situations for consideration.

PRELIMINARY WORK.

Appreciate the situation given in tltese General and Special
Ideas from the point of view of tlte Commander-in-Chief of
tlu Eastern Army.

Appreciation of the Situation.
I. Our forces are disposed as follows : —

Out own forces.
4 Infantry Divisions -j -y

I Infy. Bde. (British) Fighting men Mobilising

1 Cavy. Divn. (4 Bdes.) [approximately I at

I Bde. Howitzers, and Corps 52,000. Rawalpindi.

Troops J J

Note. — The orders and appreciations which appear in this accounl of Ihe
Staff Ride aie examples selected from the work done by the offioen who look

CAVALRY STUDIES 1

I Infantry Division

1 Cavy. Brigade

2 N. I. Brigades

I Infy. Division (weak)
I Cavalry Regiment

Independent State Troops

"I Fighting men ^Mobilising

^approximately-^ at

/ 20,000. l Abbottabad^

i J* Mobilising!

8,000. ] at '

iDerbend.
/North of
1 Malakand.

'20,000.

id.^H

Total forces available within the next few days,
100,000.

Reserve shortly to commence mobilising at Rawalpindi^-*-
50,000. There is nothing in the general or special ideas to
indicate how soon these latter will be available.

2. The enemy has established himself in the Independent
State, and occupies Nowshera and Mardan. He holds the
Indus from Attock to Dal with an advanced line guarding
Attock from the Junction of the Haro and Indus rivers,
along the Haro to Burhan Station, and north to the Indus
through Hazro.

Cavalry (estimated at about one Brigade) are scouting
from Dal towards Abbottabad and Haripur, with a bridge
of boats over the Indus in their rear. Supposing that he
has temporarily abandoned the Kurram line, in order to
economise troops, the enemy has still 55 miles of line of
communication from the Khaibar to Attock to guard, and
cannot entirely disregard the Independent State troops
(north of Malakand). It seems reasonable to assume that
60,000 troops is the maximum which he has on and beyond
the Indus, The advantage of numbers is on our side
by nearly 2 to i ; but the enemy has the advantage of
having taken the initiative before our troops are fully
mobilised.

3, There is nothing to indicate how far a violation of
neutral territory would complicate matters. In the late war
in Manchuria the violation of neutral territory was only such
as might occur on the borders of any weak power out of

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

269

f Europe. In the event of a war between France and Germany,
r violation of Belgian territory by the latter would possibly
I take place, but would be likely to cause other powers to inter-
I fere. Russia, in an advance against India, would probably
I not hesitate to violate Persian territory in order to gain the
[ granaries of Khorassan and Seistan. It is presumed, how-
I ever, that neutral territory in the case under discussion will
* not at present be violated, because the western power would
gain no particular advantage by using such an eccentric line
as that afforded by the Tochi or Gumal routes.

4. The Independent State forms a salient bounded by a

zone of mountainous country, the most intricate part of which

bars the way to the Eastern capital, Srinagar. In this salient

the Western Army is exposed to attack from north or east.

The line of communications from the Khaibar to Attock is

flanked on the south by the range of hills running west from

Attock, and on the north by the Kabul river. Outside a

rough quadrilateral, Khaibar, Attock, Campbellpur, Hazro.

Torbela, Malakand, the country is mostly unsuited to large

operations r that on the left bank of the Indus, up to the

, Haripur-Hasan Abdal road, though locally reported to be

i passable for all arms, is rough and hilly. Military operations

[ outside this area can only be undertaken by small forces, and

\ so must be indecisive in character.

Roads. — With the exception of the first-class roads shown
[ on the strategical sketch map, they are mostly " katcha " and
3ad condition. There are good roads along the Indus and
I Kabul valleys, and besides the main road there appear to
f be two good roads leading from the Grand Trunk road
[ to Haripur, and one from Han'pur to Torbela.

Rivers. — The Haro is reported to be fordable in many
1 places, and is turned from Haripur. The Indus is unfordable
k between Attock and Khushalgarh, where it runs in a deep
[ gorge through mountainous country with very difficult
I approaches ; but is reported to be fordable in many places
I between Attock and Torbela. The Kabul river is reported
L to be unfordable between Nisatha and Attock.

270 CAVALRY STUDIES

[NoU.— The report as to the possibility of fording the Indus
between Attock and Torbela, and part of the information as
to the enemy's dispositions afterwards proved to be false.
Misleading information as to trans-frontier topography, and
regarding an enemy's movements must, how'ever, be expected
at all times.]

5, The main objective must always be the destruction of
the enemy's forces. The latter are holding a line from the
junction of the Haro and the Indus to Dal, roughly 40 miles.
By crossing the Indus N.W. of Haripur this line can be
turned, and an advance from W, and N. against Nowshera
will force the enemy to form front parallel to his line of
communication. Time is the great factor ; for it is necessary
to defeat the Western Forces before reinforcements arrive
from Europe.

The following are secondary objects as compared with the
above, but are steps leading up to it :

(a) A point of safe concentration east of the Indus.

((^) The crossing of the Indus, preparatory to joining hands

with the troops of the Independent State, and

attacking the enemy.

6. It may be safely assumed that the enemy has concen-
trated his forces somewhere in the vicinity of Nowshera. If
he had continued to use his two original lines of advance,
his forces, initially inferior, would be divided and separated
by some 35 miles of bad country.

He has the advantage of having been the first to concen-
trate his forces, and of having gained the initiative. He has
the following courses open to him :

(0) To advance east of the Indus against our forces con-
centrating there.

(6) To await our advance, and retire slowly before it.

(a) Would mean an advance into a country of which the
physical difficulty increases as he proceeds, against numerical
superiority, and further away from his reinforcements ; during

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

271

the whole of which time his lines of communication are
threatened from the north.

(1^) Would mean the abandonment of territory easily
gained, of his present advantage, and of a strong defensive
line; though a retreat would carry him nearer his reinforce-
ments and add to our difficulties.

(c) Considering his present position, this course appears
the most natural one for him to adopt. It is anticipated
that he will contain the force north of the Malakand, hold
the Indus strongly, and push out east to try to delay and
interrupt our concentration. His power of manceuvre behind
the Indus is greatly increased by the bridges at Attock
and at Dal. His present position seems to indicate that
he expects a direct advance on Attock. His great object
is to delay ; ours to bring matters to a speedy issue.

7. The general plan of the Committee of Defence entails a
change of base, which is made possible by the formation of
our frontier. If this plan is successful, it means that the
Western Forces may be entirely cut off from their line of
communication, or forced back into the difficult country
south of the Khaibar-Attock line, and while part of our
forces pursue them, the remainder would be available for
striking at reinforcements issuing from the Khaibar. The
proposed plan uncovers our capital, in the event of large
reinforcements arriving ; but considering the natural obstacles
guarding Srinagar, a force based on Malakand would be
well placed strategically. But the enemy holds part of the
hue on which it is intended our Army should deploy, and
as yet our forces are very scattered and not completely
mobilised.

Abbottabad to Haripur is 21 miles, Rawalpindi to Haripur
is 38 miles, therefore troops first mobilised could not be
expected to arrive at Haripur from Rawalpindi in less than
three marches. Derband to Torbela is 14 miles, but the
Derband force has to march through what is practically a
defile, and it would not be safe for it to advance until
Torbela is in our possession. There is the alternative of

272

CAVALRY STUDIES

bringing it round by Abbottabad, but that road means si
long marches, and it would be better to keep ;
troops as possible off the Haripur-Torbela road,
undesirable that the general plan of the Committee of
Defence should be altered, as that would mean that instead
of carrying our oivn plan through with vigour, we allow the
enemy to impose his will on us. Still, safe concentration is
absolutely essential, and we must not expose our forces to
attack in detail. Again, any concentration about Haripi
with a view to crossing the Indus from that direction
confronted by the difficulty of communications. L(
reports cannot be relied upon, and the advance must not
undertaken without very careful reconnaissance. Further,
the enemy's Cavalry Brigade (which may prove to be a
larger force than reported) must first be defeated and forc(
back over the river ; until this takes place we will not hai
liberty of action. Our strategic advance guard moving fn
Rawalpindi will have two roles:

(i) To mislead the enemy as to our intentions, for it
only by successfully carrying this out that we can h(
to hold him to the Indus until we have outmanoeuvred him^

{2) To cover the flank march which the remainder of
Rawalpindi troops must make to reach their point of
cent rat ion.

But the Cavalry Division must be released as soon
possible to operate against the Western Cavalry. It is
by defeating them that our movements can be concealed.

To sum up, it is concluded that the general plan
best be carried out :

(i) by concentrating the Rawalpindi and Abbottal
troops in the direction of Haripur, covered by
advance guard ;

(2) by defeating the enemy's Cavalry east of the Indui

(3) by crossing the Indus at suitable places betw(
Torbela and Da!, during which operation the enemy shoi
be taken in flank by the troops from Derband,
cross the river north of Khabal.

;s to

ther, ^

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 273

Once across the Indus it must be our object to cut the
western line of communication and to hem the enemy in
against the Indus, acting in conjunction with the troops of
the Independent State.

Special Idea, — No. 2,

I. In order to cover the concentration of his Army on the line Huripur-
Torbela, the Eastern Commander-in-Chief sends forward an advance guard
from Rawalpindi, consisting of the First Cavalry Division, supported by two
Infantry Divisions, with their Protective Cavalry, with orders to engage the
enemy on the Haio river, and [o make him expect an advance from Rawalpindi
direct against Atloch.

The troops from Abboiiabid oie ordered to occupy Bharu and Haripur, atid In
push forward detachments south and west of these places to prevent the enemy
□sing the footpaths through the hills from the direction of Chazi.

3. One Cavalry Brigade (the ist) is ready to march from Rawalpindi on
Friday, l6lh March. The remainder of the First Cavalry Divbion will be ready
by daylight on Sunday, iSlh March,

3. The following instructions are given at a personal interview by the Genera.)
Officer Commanding First Cavalry Division to the Brigadier, First Cavalry
Brigade, at Divisional HeadijuBiters, Rawalpindi, at noon on Friday,
l6lh March :

"(0 Reliable information has just been received that the enemy occupied
Attock and Torbela last night. This morning his patrols entered Hazro village
•nd Campbellpur cantonment.

"(3) The Cavalry Brigade which is mobilising at Abbottafaad has been
instructed to clear up the situation in the neighbourhood of Torbeb.

" (3) Vou will move without delay towards Attock, with the object of
ascertaining what forces of the enemy have crossed 10 the left bank of the Indus,
nnd what his intentions are.

" (4) The remainder of the Division will march on Sunday at dawn towards
Hasan Abdal."

In accordance with this Special Idea No. 2, certain officers
were asked to write orders for the march of the Cavalry
Brigade. The following is an example :

No. 10. — Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding ist Cavalry Brigade.

I. {a) Reliable information has just been received that the
enemy occupied Attock and Torbela last night (15th). This

274

CAVALRY studies!

morning his patrols entered Hazro village and Campbellpur
cantonment,

{b) Our 5th Cavalry Brigade from Abbottabad is moving
towards Torbela.

(ir) Our 1st Cavalry Division (less ist Brigade) marches to
Hasan Abdal at dawn on Sunday (i8th).

2. The General Officer Commanding intends to march
towards Attock to gain touch with the enemy and ascertain
his movements.

3- The ist Hussars (less and L. T.) will march towards
Hasan Abdal at 12.45. The Officer Commanding will attend
at Headquarters at once for special instructions.

4. The remainder of the Brigade (with all 2nd L. T.) will
march in the following order to Kala-ki-Serai at 13 hours.
Starting-point, West Ridge Church. Advance Guard :
Officer Commanding Major D, 2nd Cavalry, i squadron
2nd Cavalry. Main Body: i squadron 2nd Cavalry, "A"
R.H.A., 3 squadrons 2nd Cavalry, 3rd Lancers, 2 squadrons
I. S. Troops (less 1 troop), Field Hospitals, 3nd L. T.,
escort to baggage, i troop 1. S. T.

5. The General Officer Commanding will be at the head of
the Main Body on the Grand Trunk road.

A., Major. |

landing 1st ^^^M

Jal, which yO^^I
he Haro rivt^^^^
\hdal— Harinur '

Special verbal inslmctions to Officer Commanding 1st
Hussars. (Information detailed as in orders.)

" Push on with your regiment to Hasan Abdal, which
should be able to reach to-night. I want the Haro
reconnoitred from where it crosses the Hasan Abdal-Haripur
road to its junction with the Indus. Send a small patrol
from Hasan Abdal to Haripur to gain touch with the Cavalry
from Abbottabad, Send a contact squadron towards
Campbellpur, and a contact squadron towards Hazro. You
must get me information as to what forces of the enemy
are east of the Indus, and in what direction they are
moving.

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 275

" I will camp at Kala-ki-Serai to-night, and will move
along the Grand Trunk road towards Attock to-morrow
at dawn."

A second task involved the consideration of the action of
the 1st Cavalry Brigade after its arrival at Hasan Abdal, and
pending the arrival of the Infantry Divisions in support (see
General Map No. 6, and Sketch 24):

The Isl Biigade reached Hasan Abdal at 12 hours on lylh, and was checked
lill darlt on the line of the river Haro. Palrols report that ihe country south of
the small range of hills about four miles south of Burham is free of the enemj.
Required :

(a) The disposition of the Brigade for the night of l^lh-lSth.
(*) What action would you lake on the morniog of the i8lh to nscenaio Ihe
strength of the enemy in front of you, and to mainlain your position
pending the arrival of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions from Pbdi,
due at Hasan Abdal on evening of iSth?

No. I.— Operation Orders by Brigadier-General
X, Commanding ist Brigade.

Hasan Abdal,
17M March, 1906 [17 hours).

1. The Brigade will halt for the night near Hasan Abdal,
and will bivouac south of the Ziarat hill on right bank of
stream flowing past Kamala Bania.

2. The 1st Hussars, who have rejoined the Brigade, will
bivouac south of road which passes east of Ziarat hill {shown
by the railway on the Map), and the remainder of the
Brigade north of Grand Trunk road passing west of same
hill.

3. The Brigade will be covered by outposts towards north-
west, holding the defiles east and west of Ziarat hili.

4. Signalling communication will be established between
the bivouacs and with the outposts.

5. In case of attack the Brigade will hold these defiles,
isX Hussars on right, 2nd Cavalry on left.

The Reserves, 3rd Lancers, and Battery R.H.A. in rear
of left.

A., Major.
lEsued at 17 hours to Officer Commanding Units and Outposts.

276 CAVALRY STUDIES

No. 2. — Operation Orders by Brig-adier-Genera! X,
Commanding ist Brigade.

Hasan Abpal,

17/4 March (t8 hours).

1. The enemy is holding the line of the river Haro, and ha:
checked our advance. Patrols report that the country south of
the smal! range of hills south of Burham is clear of the enemy.

Our 1st and znd Infantry Divisions are expected to arrive
at Hasan Abdal to-morrow evening. Sunday, iSth instant.

2. The General Officer Commanding intends to attaci
to-morrow the enemy holding the line of the Haro, with
view to preventing his advance beyond that line.

3. The Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry will detail for
reconnaissance one contact squadron and one officer's patrol.
Officers Commanding these bodies should report to Head-
quarters at once for orders.

4. The Brigade (with the fighting portion of 1st Line
Transport only) will march at 5.30 to a position of readiness
at the point where the nullah running south from Kacha
crosses the Grand Trunk road.

Order of March — Advance Guard: 2nd Cavalry (less
I squadron). Main Body: 3rd Lancers, R.H.A. Battery,
1st Hussars.

Starting-point, Hasan Abdal D&k Bungalow.

5. The advance guard will push on towards Burhan, and
will feel for the enemy along the Haro between Kolian and
the Grand Trunk road bridge over the Haro.

6. All transport (les.s fighting portion of the ist L. T.) will
park north of the Grand Trunk road by the K. of KamalaBania.

7. The General Officer Commanding will be first at head
of main body, and afterwards at Kacha.

A., Major.
Issaed at l8 hours to Ofliceis Commaniling Kcgimcnls and Baltet}-, and S. and
T. Officer.

Confidential Orders to Officer Commanding Units
issued verbally.

" If I am driven back by the enemy advancing over the
Haro, 1 mean to fall back to a position about Hasan Abdal,

)

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 277

and hold it at all costs. The Officer Commanding R.H.A.

1 select a position covering the defile north of Ziarat hill.
The ist Lancers will hold this defile and watch the ground to
north. The 1st Hussars will hold the defile through which
the Grand Trunk road runs, and watch the ground lo south.
The 2nd Cavalry will be in reserve on the Grand Trunk road
in rear of the defile held by the ist Hussars."

Reconnaissances: fi) One officer's patrol to south of hills,
south of Burhan (reported clear of enemy), directed on
Lawrence pur.

(z) Contact squadron directed on Jab, crossing the Haro
by Kolian.

Both to start with native guides at 12 midnight.

Preliminary Conference.

The first conference took place in camp at Hasan Abdal
on the evening of the day of assembly, iSth March. The
general and special " ideas " were reviewed by the Director,
and the preliminary tasks entered into and criticised.

With reference to special idea No. 3, it was pointed out that
the principles which the Brigadier should bear in mind in
dealing with this reconnoitring problem are — (a) first of all
make a few soundings with patrols: then, as the situation
develops, send out more ; (i) keep in hand, covered by patrols
the mass ready to strike when the situation is favourable.
Even nowadays these principles are often forgotten, and
squadrons arc scattered, as in the so-called "screen" formation.
The special strategical objective of the Brigade would be to
seize the position at Hasan Abdal, and to hold it as a pivot
for the flanking movement of the main Army in rear, moving
from Rawalpindi to Haripur, Compare Ney's position at
Stuttgart, " to be in so good a position as to prevent any
serious fighting taking place " : Ney's corps being then the
pivot on which the rest of the Grand Army wheeled. (See
Notes on Ulm Campaign, September 27.)

With regard to the march of the Division from Rawalpindi,
in India opportunities are rare of seeing the working in the

278 CAVALRY STUDIES

field of large bodies of Cavalry, such as divisions. It i
therefore very necessary for officers to try clearly to grasp*
the idea of what the movement of large masses of CavalryB
means, especially when confined to roads — e.g: the spacf
occupied by ist and 2nd Line Transport, the time required!
to get all the troops and transport on the move.
Without a clear realisation of such matters beforehand, th6g
staff work will certainly be bad, and men and horses
be worn out long before contact with the enemy is gained.

Time Table of Operations— i6th to i8th March.

—

Kriday, ifilh.

Saturday. ,,th.

Sunday, ,B.li.

EasUni.

m CavaJry Divisioti

.It and Md Infantry
DiviBioa), lup-

Svi'."™. ^'"^"'
Miin Body Eaiter..

5th"°?Abbottabad)

Cavalry Unirade.
Abhottibail Infantry

Derb'a'nd'Foree-

,11 Brigade
marches to
Kak-ki-Sarai.
Remiinder at
I'lddi . .

AtPindi . .

.St Brigade

on the'Ham
Remainder it

Rea°h' Ka*la-ki-

isl Brigade checks enemy [Ul
Infamrj arrives. Remainder
marchtoHaMoAbdaLarriviBK
.6 hours.

Reach Hi^an AbdaJ and occopx
ridpe of liitla la MUth uiS

Do. . .
Do. . .

AtPindi . .

At AbbDttabad .

Do. . .

March halfway lo Hiripur.
Reach Hiiripnr.
Ma>c>ibjUf»>y to Hiripur.

At Derband .

At Derband,

K'.si'.™.

ilTeli-AUKk i\Z'.

Mourned tronpa
rencepur

"SSSI

Infanlry arrive and uke over
Roa - Uwrcntepur poaition,

advance: checked as above.

Cavalry Detach-

Reich Sawihi .

Reach Pihoor

Reach Torhela. Scouts t«
Hiripur, etc.

Narrative up to the iSth instant.

So soon as the enemy were reported to be crossing i
Attock, the General Officer Commanding Eastern Arm;
forward one Cavalry Brigade (the 1st) to clear u
situation, the remainder of the Cavalry Division

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE ■ 279

unready to move. The ist Brigade marched from Rawal-
pindi on Friday, i6th instant, and was checked on Saturday,
17th instant, by enemy's mounted troops holding the line of
the Haro, west and north of Hasan Abdal. On Sunday,
1 8th instant, the enemy attempted to advance, but was
checked by the ist Cavalry Brigade until about midday,
when the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions from Rawalpindi
arrived to support. In the afternoon the enemy was driven
back beyond the line of the Haro.

Situation at 20 hours— Sunday, i8th instant.

Our isi nnd znd Infantry Divisions are holding Ihc Ziarat-Loiset hills {i.t.
bill* »outh, south-east, and south-wesl of Hasnn Abdul). The enemy occupy
the Kibla-i-Nandi-Liwrencepur ridge : oulposts in touch on the Haio. The
remainder of the 1st Cavalry DiviMon reached Hiaan Abdal nt l6 hours tQ-da.y,

FIRST DAY'S WORK.
Tacticjil Reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division.

I. Special ideas Nos. i and 2 above show that the primary
duty of the General Officer Commanding the Advance
Guard from Pindi is to assist the concentration of the main
Pindi forces on the line Haripur-Torbela by engaging the
enemy on the Haro river, and by making him expect an
advance from Rawalpindi direct against Attock. Accord-
ingly the General Officer Commanding the now combined
force of two Infantry and one Cavalry Division decides to
attack.

The following is a summary of the orders given to the
General Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade at a
personal interview at Headquarters of the ist Cavalry
Division at Hasan Abdal on Sunday, 18th March, 18 hours:

I. (a) The Kibla-i-Nandi-Lawrencepur ridge is occupied by the cnemy'i.
Infantry, who seem to have come up this afterniioo.
(_i) The right ha-ak of ihc Haro is watched by his mounted Iroops. But
how &T up and down stream his outposts extend is not yet clear.

28o

CAVALRY STUDIES

The poial where the Oiand Trunk road cro&sex the Haro and the Tend aboDt
one mile west of it are held in force. The enemjr'i mounted troops which ei^gcd
us to-day fell hack in this direction. Our patrols were lired on from Niku this
afternoon.

Z. To-morron' our Cavalry Division is to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and
to ascertain where his lefi flank rests. If possihle it will push a detachment lo
Hazro and northwards lo Ihe Indus, with a view lo finding out what troops the
enemy has in that quarter, and if it is possible to cross the river in that
neighbourhood.

3. To facilitate the movement of Ihe Cavalry Division it is necessary 10 have a
foothold on the right hank of the Haro by daylight to-morrow.

The nullahs on the west of Kolian »em 10 olfer facilities for a surprise. UeTC
are three guides lo lead some dismounted men.

Have the remainder of your brigade in bend of Ihe nullah south of Kolian
ready to ford the Haro at daybreak.

4. All guns of the Division will be ready lo cover your crossing from bigh
ground south of Kolion.

The DivLiional Cavalry are to demonstrate on west of Burhan, and are to
e the enemy's right.

The 2nd Brigade (Y's) was assumed to have been
bivouacked during the night iSth-igth west of Hasan Abdal
and north of the Grand Trunk road, with outposts observing
the line from Burhan along the left bank of the Haro river
to Kalu, the Hne of resistance being held by supporting
Infantry. On receipt of the above instructions officers were
first sent out to report on suitable approaches by moonlight
towards Kolian, and the Brigadier then issued the following
orders :

No. 3. — Operation Orders by Brigadier- General Y,
Commanding 2nd Brigade,

Camp, Hasan .Abd'_l,

l&tA A/arci. t9o6 (22 h

1. The Brigade will move off at midnight, iSth-igth I
to effect a crossing over the Haro river. Order of Marcl
Advance Guard: 1 squadron 4th Dragoons. Main
(less I squadron) 4th Dragoons, B Battery R.H. A., 5th Lancet
6th Lancers. Head of the column to pass the 237th milestoqi
on the Grand Trunk road at midnight.

2. Units to be on the line Kacha-Bai by s hours on i9th.J

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 281

3. B Battery R.H.A. and i troop 4th Dragoons will take
up a covering position on left bank of Haro ready to cover
the advance at daylight.

The 5th Lancers and 6th Lancers will push across the
river at the Bai~Kolian ford and establish themselves on the
far bank.

4. The General Officer Commanding will be with the
Battery at first.

B., Major,
Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade.

Colonel Z was placed in command of the Cavalry
Division for this first day's operations. Assuming that the
2nd Brigade had been successful in their task as described
in paragraph i above, the following instructions were issued
to Colonel Z :

" The enemy's oulposl line □□ the aiglit iSth-igth ran thiough Kncha and up
e right bank ol the river Haro— your outposts being in touch with the enemy.
During '.he night the znd Cavnliy Brigade gained a fooling on the right bank of
the fiver Haro in the vicinity of Kolian. The ist Cavalry Division is bivouacked
clorte to Hasan Abdal, and your Infantry hold the Hasan Abdal-Ziarat Hill and
the small mnge of hills 4 miles south of Burhan. .^s General OfHcer Command-
it Cavalry Division, you are instrucied (n) to locate the enemy's left flank,
1 estimate how his position is held, (f) to push reconnaissances towards
Hauo with the object of a^erlainlng the strength of the enemy in that quarter,
and whether it is possible to cross the river Indus north of that town. Our 1st
and 3nd Infantry Divisions are advinting at di^wn to attack that part of the
enemy's position lying in the hills north of the river Haio and west of the line
Kolian to Gurguehtian (4 miles south of the Indus)."

Required {(i) your orders, (1^) your instructions to the
econnoitring parties.

In accordance with these instructions, Colonel Z issued
the following orders :

No. I. — Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding ist Cavalry Division,

Hasan Abdal,
\^h March, 1906 (6 hours).
I. The enemy's outpost line on night 18th- 19th ran
through Kacha, and up right bank of river Haro.

382 CAVALRY STUDIES

During night 3nd Cavalry Brigade gained a footing on
right bank of river Haro in vicinity of Koiian. Our Infantry
hold Ziarat hill. 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions attack i
dawn (to-morrow) enemy's position in hills north of Hal
and west of line Koiian to Gurgushtian.

2. I intend to make a. reconnaissance with a view i
ascertaining : (a) enemy's left, (i>) with what strength enen
is holding line Roa- Lawrence pur, (c) what strength is
Hazro, and (rf) if it is possible to cross Indus north of Hazrc

3. The 1st Brigade will move at once to reinforce 2nd
Brigade at Koiian.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades will demonstrate against enemn
with a view of ascertaining his strength and the left of I
position, and will push patrols towards Hazro.

3rd and 4th Brigades and Divisional Artillery will move t
a position of readiness near Bai to support demonstration.

4. Signalling communication between all Brigades
Divisional Headquarters to be kept up.

5. Second Line Transport will remain parked.

6. Reports to Bai.
Dictated to oRicerG ftom each Brigade at 6 houis, 19th March.

Instructions issued for Reconnoitring; Parties.

(i) The reconnaissance in force will disclose enemy's lei
and strength ; it remains only to provide for r
Hazro, and passages over Indus north of it.

(2) Should Jab fall into our hands to-day, an ofEce
patrol, followed up by contact squadron, could get requi
information.

(3) If enemy hold crest at Jab in strength, scouts on foc
with local guides must be sent at night through the outj
lines to ascertain if Hazro is held, and to bring back loci
guides if there are passages over the Indus.

Z, Colonel. ,

3. All officers met the Director at I2 hours at a point'5
the hills south of Jab, whence the ground could be view

a
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282
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guide

the 1-

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

283

and the situation dearly explained. The Director pointed
out that it would have been impossible for the General Officer
Commanding Division to have gained any really valuable
information merely by sitting still and sending out scouts
and patrols. An advance in force was essential. In carrying
out this advance, note the sequence of events :

First gain a foothold during the night on the far side of
the river, with, say, one regiment, or even one squadron. At
daybreak push rapidly forward in support with the remainder
of the Brigade. Then, making full use of mobility, and
working in co-operation, make from one point of vantage
to another.

Narrative — 19th instant, Monday.

At daybreak this morning the 2nd Brigade obtained a
footing on the right bank of the Haro river near Kolian.
The remainder of the Division followed, and by nightfall had
gained the line of the watershed between the Indus and Haro
rivers west of Roa, the enemy holding still the broken ground
north-westwards and westwards towards Hazro. Patrols re-
ported that the country between the hills and the left bank
of the Indus was clear of the enemy cast of Gurgushtian.

Situation at 20 hours, 19th instant.

(a) 1st Cavaliy Division bivouacked in the hollow noilh of Jah. Outposts in

touch with the enemy to the west and north-west.
(#) ist and 3ad Infantry Divisions near Btirhan, holding the line of the Haro

livei us fac weslwaids as the point where the Grand Trunk road

(c) 5th (the Abboltabad) Cavalry Brigade in touch with the enemy's Cavalry
Delflchmenl, which latter holds the eastern exit from the Torbeln defile.
Our Abbottabad Infantry have reached Haripur.

(oT) The Derband Division has crossed the Indus lo Amb.

SECOND DAY'S WORK,

Action of a Cavalry Brigade clearing the Passage of a
Defile by Force.
I. It was assumed that the General Officer Commanding
the enemy received reliable information of the flanking

284 CAVALRY STUDIES

movement of the main Eastern Army from Pindi to Haripur
on Sunday night, iSth-igth instant. He accordingly de-
termined at once to commence to concentrate towards Sawabi
with a view to engaging the Eastern Army before the latter
could fully deploy from the Indus defile near Topi. On
Monday, 19th instant, orders were issued to his advanced
force which was holding the Roa-Lawrencepur position to
withdraw towards Attock, covered by the mounted troops.
And it was probably owing to these orders that our Cavalry
Division succeeded in pushing so far forward on Monday,
and reaching through such difficult country the crest of
the hills near Kibla-i-Nandi. On Tuesday the Cavalry
Division was occupied in following up this withdrawal
towards Attock, but its action was not considered in detail
by the Staff Ride. The whole party moved, instead, to con-
sider the forcing of the Torbela defile by the Abbottabad
Cavalry Brigade.

Now the object of our flank march from Pindi, via Harpur,
is to deploy in open ground south of Topi before the enemy
can concentrate superior force north of the Kabul-Indus
rivers to oppose this deployment ; then to move west, and
in conjunction with the forces of the Independent State,
at present waiting inactive in the Swat Valley north of the
Malakand Pass, to attack the enemy or to fall upon his
communications between the Kaibar Pass and Attock. Time
is therefore of the greatest importance.

With reference to this situation round Torbela on
Monday night, i9th-20th, we have :

(a) The Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade bivouacked
Padhana in touch with the enemy. Column!
Infantry reaching Haripur from both Pindi
Abbottabad ; long marches the previous day, men
and animals tired.

(d) The force from Derbard (i weak Infantry Division
and I Cavalry regiment) at Amb ready to march
the next morning to Khabal, 15 miles along a single

;en "

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

285

road unfit for field guns or wheeled transport, high
precipitous hills on one side, and the river on the
other. A very difficult position to force about one
mile north of Khabal {vide Sketch 25),
{c) The enemy (estimated at about 2,000 mounted troops)
holding Khabal and the Torbela defile. From the
nature of the general situation it is unlikely that
the enemy will make a very stubborn resistance.
But it is important that our Abbottabad and
Derband forces should attack simultaneously and
work in co-operation.

Colonel Z was placed in command of the Abbottabad
Cavalry Brigade with the following instructions :

Situation as eipIaiQed above. As General Officer Commanding 5th lirigade
Oivciuacked about Padhann). you receive instructions at zo hours on iglh
instant to Torce the defile between Kand^l and Torbela early on the morning ol
Ihe 30Ih, with a view to aEsisting the advance of the Derband Division down the
right bank of the Indus, (n) Write Brigade Orders for the Kth instant, (fi) be
prepared 10 stale, at a conference to be held at 1 1 hours near Thapla, how you
propose to carry out your ir

Colonel Z, accordingly, issued the following orders :

No. 2.— Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding sth Cavalry Brigade.

igM Marek, 1906(21 hours).

1. The Torbela defile is held by a portion of a hostile
Cavalry Brigade, which is opposing the advance of the
Derband Division.

2. I intend to force the defile between Kandal and
Torbela.

3. 1st Regiment will march at 2.30 hours and seize the
hill on right bank of Dore river just north-east of Kandal
at 6 hours.

2nd Regiment will march at 2.45 hours and seize the
hills at Dari.

286

CAVALRY STUDIES

The remainder of Brigade (less i Squadron I. S. Troops)
will march at 3 hours — order of march:— i Squadron I.S.
Troops, Bntt. R.H.A,, 3rd Regiment — starting-point, lamp
at fourth milestone Haripur-Torbela road, and take up a
position near Kandal to cover attack at 6 hours,

4. The whole of the transport will be ready to nnarch
6.30 hours: escort, i squadron I.S. Troops.

5. Reports to Kandal.

Z, Colonel.
Dictated 10 Commnndiiig Officers contidenliall; at 21 hoots, 19111

Note. — Reference C. T. 112 (i). I have assumed that as
I was in bivouac at Padhana at 30 hours on 19th March,
I had personally reconnoitred the mouth of the defile, and
had sent patrols out; so I have excluded any orders for
special patrols in my operation orders for 30th instant.

{Note 6}' Director, — "Night signalling arrangements: Will
there be a station at Kandal?" — D. H.)

Cavalry Detachment defending the Passage of a
Defile.

2. The action of the enemy defending the defile was all
considered.

Colonel Y was assumed to be in command of the
enemy's detachment, holding the Torbela defile with i
regiment of Cavalry (organisation 6 squadrons per regiment)
and 2 guns, whilst i regiment and 4 guns held the positions
north of Khabal on the right bank of the Indus. His
detachment was assumed to be bivouacked at Kot, with
outposts in touch with the eastern advanced Cavalry, The
following orders were issued (see Sketch 35):

No. 3,— Operation Orders by Colonel Y, Commandit
Detachment of Western Cavalry.

Kot, \^h March, 1906 (zo hours), J

I. {a) Information just received from Divisional Hei
quarters is to the effect that an important concentration i

^r Eastern
H Eastern
H^ this mon

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 287

Eastern troops is in progress at Haripur, while another
Eastern Force attacked our troops holding the Haro river
this morning. A third Eastern Force {estimated at 1 Infantry
Division with some Cavalry) has commenced to move down
the right bank of the Indus from Amb to-day.

(d) The remainder of this Brigade has been sent north to
oppose the hostile force from Amb, and my orders are
to oppose any advance that may take place from the direction
of Haripur.

2. The following troops will move out, and be in position
as follows by 5 hours to-morrow, the aoth instant :

isl squadron and 2 guns H, A. to Bharu and high ground
north of Bharu ; 2 troops 2nd squadron to high ground
S,-W. of bank of Dore at eastern end of defile near Dari ;
the remainder of 3nd squadron will be pushed out to E. and
S.-E. to get touch with enemy.

The remaining 4 squadrons will move at daybreak
under cover to north end of high ground north of Bharu
in readiness. The contact patrol towards Derband will

3. First position of Officer Commanding Detachment will
be with the guns.

In the event of having to retire. Colonel Y proposed
to fall back to a second position on "One-Tree Hill" as
follows :

"(«) The guns will move on to the main Haripur- Torbela
road, moving into the bed of the Siran north of their present
position, and then keeping along the stream north-westwards
cross it about a mile S,-E. of Tandula. (d) The withdrawal
of the guns will be covered by a dismounted squadron at
'One-Tree Hill ' sent back from the main body and by the
i squadron on the S.-V\'. of the Dore and Siran. (c) The
dismounted squadrons at Bharu will join the main body
mounted, (ef) The future arrangements will be: (t) guns
to keep to road, and come into action as ordered later ;
(2) one squadron to go by Derband road, communicating

288 CAVALRY STUDIES

with the i troop now reconnoitring on this road : this
squadron's object is to prevent possibility of a rapid advance
by Eastern Cavalry up Derband road threatening any retire-
ment on Torbela ; (3) J squadron to keep on main road,
cover guns and secure road ; (4) the remaining 3J squadrons
will at present remain in readiness north of 'One-Tree Hill':
Officer Commanding with the main body."

Possible Course of Events subsequently.

(i) The enemy's gmis come into action from Bharu. His
Infantry from high ground S.-W. of Dore river, his Cavalry
acting on his right flank.

(2) Our 4i squadrons near "One-Tree Hil! " now retire,
carrying on dismounted fight. Our guns and A squadron
move along road : the remaining squadron has already been
detached to watch Derband road.

{3) The retirement continues to 3rd position (sketched and
reported on by Major C), subsequently to open ground
near Mohrat. Here the guns, which have trotted on from
flank of 3rd position, take up a new position, and the
mounted squadrons take position in readiness behind.

March of a Cavalry Brigade through a Mountain
Defile.

3. A third problem was considered during this Tuesday
morning, viz. the passage of a Cavalry Brigade with all its
transport through a defile such as might be encountered on
the North-West frontier or in Afghanistan. It was assumed
that the neighbouring hill tribes were warlike and unfriendly,
but not openly hostile. The brigade was assumed to have
camped during the night I9th-20th at Padhana, and to be
marching the following morning to Torbela.

Order to Captain P, Commanding Patrol.

1. Yon will paltol defile tunniny from Bharu to Torbela. Infonnntion requiR
on following poials: (a) on what bank of river dots best ruad run; (.'

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

toad : (c) fealDTCS which you consider should be piqueted to <
at column.

z. Report to be sent to Thapk as soon as possible.

Report on Torbela Defile.

(a) (i) Road on left bank; Good hill cart-road 8 to lo ft.
wide, no very steep gradient, in good repair.
Passable Infantry in fours, Cavalry in ^ sections,
carts and guns one way.
(2) Road on right bank : Old road crossing Siran river
at Thapla, goes via Khoond and Mohrat, and
re-crosses river at Gojera Tali, near Torbela end
of defile. Road in very bad repair, and very
rough and stony. Passable all arms and pack
transport, but not carts. Both fords passable
all arms. Country on right bank rough, but
passable all arms, except in some places where
too steep and rough for wheeled Artillery: this
should keep on road. Width of road, 8 ft. to
12 ft, but boundaries very much broken and
obliterated.

(d) On left bank; About 10 piquets needed at various
points on spurs above road. Piquets should be
about 250 ft. to 350 ft. above road.
On right bank: This is the place whence danger is
most to be feared, and a strong flank-guard of
at least one regiment with Artillery should cross
at Thapla to right bank, and move parallel to the
column which is on the left bank. This force
could greatly assist the piquets on the left bank
by firing across the river at the enemy on hills
above cart-road. The flank-guard can re-cross
by ford at Gojera Tali. The A. G. Commander
should have about a squadron in hand at the
Torbela end to cover re-crossing of flank
guard.

P, Captain.

290 CAVALRY STTDIES

Special Instmctioas given to Mi^ar D^ ~

tbe Advance Guard, at an inter v ie w oa evening
of 19th March.

TGv wij^nd aaipfiSxncaXA^ zsd to

m-Z 'xxte biTooc af 7 iMnrs, and
; dcGlc kj S.x> ticsn. Tbe
ji =::-a. use wiH ppobablj lake

■D fvpeo, and see

On the above the following orders were issued :
Advance-Guard Orders by Major D, Commandii^.

PaDHANA, 19^4 JUttn-i, 1906 (zz boors).

1. The inhabitants of the hills bordering the Bham-Torl
defile are reported to be unfriendly. Our ist Ca^'alry Br^ade
is to march through ttft defile toicards Peshawar by the right
bank of the Siran river,

2. The Advance Guard will march through the defile
the left bank of the Siran river, and safeguard the
of the ist Brigade transport on same road.

3. Distribution: — Vanguard: Officer Commanding. Caj
X, A Squadron 2nd Cavalr>'. J/d/n Guard: 2nd Cavali
(less ij Squadrons), ist Line Transport. Rear Parry : Offi<
Commanding, Capt, Z. J D Squadron, 2nd Cavalry.

^, A— This Rear Pany is necessar; became main bodj marcbea by «

4. The Vanguard will march off at 6 a.m., and trot to 1
mouth of the defile, and halt there.

5. The Main Guard will follow at a walk, and close up |
750 yards at the defile.

6. The Rear Party will not be thrown out till the defile i
entered ; it will follow main guard at 150 yards.

7. Any important points commanding the defile W. 1
Thapla village will be piqueted by the vanguard : piquel

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

291

to fall in as a rearguard as baggage passes on. Arrange-
ments will be made for preventing the led horses from
blocking the road. The depletion of men from the van-
guard by piquet requirements will be filled up by Officer
Commanding Main Guard. The Officer Commanding Rear
Party will arrange to protect the led horses of piquets after
Advance Guard has passed on.

8. The Officer Commanding ist Hussars, from the main
body of the Brigade, is responsible for the piqueting of both
sides of the defile as far as Thapla village and the right bank
beyond.

9. Signalling communication will be arranged as far as
possible between all units and from piquets, also with
main body.

10. I shall be with the main portion of the vanguard till
further notice.

D, Major.

[Notes by Director. — Good work right through showing
knowledge and thought According to data, the danger is
from " snipers" or small parties seeking loot, not from serious
attack. Against these, small piquets (6 to lO rifles) on com-
manding points are generally sufficient, as they threaten the
retreat of individuals. A support here and there of about a
troop should be ample to reinforce piquets, if necessary.
About 7 piquets were judged to be necessary after seeing the
ground.

Reference paragraphs 7 and 8 of previous order. — Order 7
states "any commanding points W. of Thapla" will be
piqueted by vanguard. Order 8 states left bank only, This

somewhat confusing. It would be better to detail a van-
guard to piquet both sides of the defile, former being fed
as necessary from the main guard. One officer should be
responsible. In this case, the vanguard would not march
by the road along left bank of Siran as seems intended.

Orders 4 and 5. — The main guard should not close up to
750 yards of vanguard, but should feed it as necessary. This

292 CAVALRY STUDIES

closing up would bring it without reason within decisive rifle
range of ground the enemy's snipers might hold.]

4. All officers met the Director on "One-Tree Hill"' at
1 1 hours.

Here Colonel Z's plan for forcing the Torbela defile was
discussed, and also the dispositions made by Colonel Y
for its defence. The Director pointed out :

(a) That any attempt to hold the mouth of the defile by
occupying an advanced position in any strength on the hill
north of Bharu would probably be ineffective; for any such
position could be turned by a wide movement by mounted
troops over the open valley to the north. Such a movement
would directly threaten the line of retreat of the advanced
troops of the defence, and must cause an early evacuation of
the advanced position.

Inversely, should the hill be held, serious attack by Colonel
Z's troops on it would be likely to entail unnecessary
delay and loss, and to commit a large proportion of the
Brigade to premature and unnecessary action. The object
must be to gain access to the main position on "One-Tree
Hill" with as little delay and loss as possible.

The best tactics for the attack would appear to be a turning
movement towards the north by a portion of the Brigade
accompanied by guns. Then, should the enemy delay in
evacuating the advanced position, this turning force should
endeavour to cut them off and eventually to deliver a decisive
stroke against them while retreating, with the object of
throwing them into disorder, and next by an active pursuit
to allow them no time to rally or reform. Such a movement
would have to be covered by fire action by the remaining
troops of the attack.

The impracticability of retiring the guns of the defence
from the advanced position on Bharu hill by any other route
than up the defile itself was pointed out. Should the attack-
ing troops gain a footing in the hills on the left bank of the
Siran river commanding the main approach to the defile, it
would be verj' hazardous to attempt to withdraw guns even

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 293

in this way. Whilst, if forced to retire northwards on the left
flank of the main defensive position, guns must either follow
the Derband road, thus losing touch with their main body,
or else run the risk of getting into difficulties in the hilly
country west of this road to Derband. In any case to
attempt to leave the defile would entail considerable delay,
be exposed to view and fire of the attack, and must be con-
sidered impracticable under the circumstances.

(b) The retirement of the defending troops from the
advanced position on Bharu hill having been assumed, the
Director next considered the attack on the main position on
" One-Tree Hill." The hills on the left bank of the Siran
river were weakly held by only a half-squadron. The ground
favoured a concentric turning attack by superior numbers,
which must eventually cause the retirement of this half-
squadron. Once dislodged, these would be obliged to retire
at least one mile, and probably more, before finding and being
able to occupy another suitable position on the left bank.
The attacking troops on this left bank would then be able to
deploy a dismounted firing line at decisive rifle range on the
Thapla spur, whence, supported by guns under cover in rear
in the stream bed, they would also be able to direct oblique
and enfilade fire against the defenders holding " One-Tree
Hill " on the right bank. To command the approaches to the
defile, and the entrance of the defile itself, the defenders must
hold the forward crest of the hills, the lower slopes of the hills
being here precipitous. The attackers' fire position being
vithin decisive rifle range, it seemed that the defenders must
either remain ciose under cover of "sangars," etc., or must
retire altogether from the forward crest. In either case, after
some moral effect from a searching fire had been gained, and
under cover of it the remainder of the Brigade might well
have mounted and galloped through the defile, following the
river bed : the defending troops would then be in a precarious
position. Such a movement appeared the more practicable
owing to the precipitous slopes on the right bank, which
would cause the greater part of the river bed to be dead

294

CAVALRY STUDIES

ground. The principles of such an attack were the proper

use of dismounted fire by a portion of the force to cover
a dash at the greatest pace possible by another portion in
order to turn the enemy's position. A prolonged frontal
attack employing fire tactics alone was out of the question in
this case, and contrary to the Cavalry spirit.

The proposal to retire the guns by the main Haripui^
Torbela road along the left bank of the Siran river appeare
wrong. The road was cut out of steep and often precipitoiu
hillsides, and guns once on it would be deprived of all freedond
of manceuvre. They would therefore have to retire straight
to Torbela, and would be practically lost to the defendei
their retirement. It appeared preferable in every way '
withdraw them by the old road to Torbela, i.e. vii the righl
bank of the river. Although rough, this road was in no way"
impassable ; the hills over which it ran and bordering it were
comparatively low, and sufficiently practicable to allow of
guns taking up positions off the road, and even at somea
distance on either side of it. The guns would thus be abld^
to co-operate effectually, and to cover the general retiremenq
The lesson here brought out was the necessity for combtni
tion and co-operation of Cavalry and Artillery at all tima
and for reconnaissance of ground.

J. A second conference was held at about 13 hours i
Torbela, on a hill above the village where Colonel Vi]
plan for the defence of the Torbela defile, and especially 1
defence and attack of the last position covering egress frota
the defile itself into the Indus valley, was discussed ;
possibilities of co-operation between detachments, both of t
Western and Eastern Army, operating on the right bank, butJ
separated by the river, were also gone into.

The facilities for defence offered by a succession of ste<
and difficult spurs descending from a mountain range to sud
an obstacle as a broad and unfordable river were obvioui
so long as operations were confined to one bank only;
on the other hand, the attackers could gain great advanta
by advancing along both banks and employing Artillery s

sffeitHxs

To illustrate
PASSAGE OF

fro^

Top'--'

ORBELA DEFILE

Scale - ^ of an Inch -I Mil*.

^°'*? ■ ■ ■ 1 1 1 ■ ?

frO»",

A V ^

/ / ?

)f '^

I Mile .

Loiiidoxi : HoL^ Rees, Ltd.

'•^-

*».

C. .

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

395

j-range rifle fire from one bank to sweep the watershed
lines of the spurs on the other bank. (Compare a land force
advancing along a coast road between a mountain range and
the sea in face of opposition on land, whilst warships are
co-operating by gun fire from the sea, e^. the battle of
Nanshan.)

Referring to the actual ground, il was shown that the
possession of the egress of the Torbela defile was essential to
the Eastern force, in order to assist the advance of the
Derband Division down the right bank of the Indus, opposed
as it was in the very difficult ground above Khabal. The
position blocking the egress from the Torbela defile was
therefore held to be the decisive point with regard to the
operations in the Indus valley at this place.

The best plan of securing this position to the Eastern force
was then considered. The greater practicability of the ground
on the right (northern) bank of the Siran river obviously
indicated this as the flank on which to inanceuvre, whilst
facilities for signalling ensured the co-operation by Artillery
of the Derband force in support of such a movement. Once
the attack had gained the low open ground lying between the
Indus and the hills on its left bank north of Torbela village,
it seemed that the position of the defenders covering egress
from the Torbela defile would become untenable ; by bringing
Artillery into action on this low open ground at medium
Artillery range, the successive positions occupied by the
Western troops on the right bankof the Indus, above Khabal.
could in turn be enfiladed.

To sum up, the best method of forcing an advance through
such a defile as that presented by the Indus valley near
Torbela appeared to be fire co-operation between two forces,
one on either bank, directed to enfilade from one bank
positions held by the enemy on the other, and so to cover
and support the advance of men on foot to the attack of
otherwise very difficult positions. Each such force became
3 detachment in so far as reinforcement in men from the
other was impossible, and each such force must therefore

296 CAVALRY STUDIES

be capable of holding its own on its own bank againsi
counter-attack.

Narrative, 20th instant, Tuesday.

Assisted by the movement of the Derband Force toward
Torbela the 5th Cavalry Brigade succeeded in forcing the!
Torbela deiiJe by about 15 hours to-day. The enemy's ]
cavalry detachment withdrew towards its bridge at Dal, rear-
guard holding a position near Tirpali.

Situation at 19 hours, 20th instant.

(a) The Slh (AbbotlabadJ Cavalry Brigade liivouacltei! in open ground soulb
of Toibela in tuuch wilh enemy holding northern exit of the Dnl-TiipaJi defile.
The Derband. Division has reached Khabal. Head of Ihe main Army from
Hatipur is commencinE lo reach Torbela.

(i) 1st Cavalry Division, after being engaged with the enemy daring the day,
bivouacked near Yasin wilh a view to crossing the Indus the next morning.
Outposts in touch with Ihe enemy's Infantry in the direction of Hamid. Our
1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions on line Ilazro-Lawrencepur.

{c) The enemy's mounted troops concentraling at Altoclt with a view to
ncting on the north bank of the Kabul river.

THIRD DAY'S WORK.

Crossing: of the Cavalry Division and of 5th Cavalry

Brigade over Indus : covering deployment on

right bank.

I. The enemy, driven out of the Torbela defile yesterday,
was able to occupy a strong position near Tirpali with I
almost impassable cliffs on the east side, protecting hisJ
right, and with the Indus river on his left. The Abbottabad T
Brigade was thus checked in its pursuit, and bivouacked near ]
Torbela. Similarly on the right bank the Derband Division J
was unable to advance beyond Khabal.

At daybreak this morning, Wednesday, an observation post, siluat«d in ibs.n
heights above Srikote, reported to General Officer Commanding Eastern Amy '-■
that the enemy was crossing by their pontoon bridge at Dal to the right bank of^ ■
the Indus, and that only a small parly now held the Tirpali-Dal defile.

Orders were issued at once to the General Officer Commanding Slh Carftltjr I
Brigade lo push on and to endeavour lo seize the pontoon bridge at Dal befbie it X

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE zg?

couli] be removed oi deslioyed, and in conjunction with the Cavaliy regiment of
the Derband Division lo establish it fouling on the right bank near Pihoor, at the
mouth of the Indus defile. (See Sketch a6.)

From the observation post it would presumably also be
apparent that the enemy's detachment is unsupported.
Threatened from three different directions, viz. by the
Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade, by the force from Derband,
and by the Cavalry Division crossing near Minara, it is
unlikely that this small body of hostile Cavalry will make
any prolonged attempt to hold the crossing. The longer they
stay the better the chance of the 1st Cavalry Division being
able to cut them off. One regiment of the 5th Brigade is
therefore ordered to rush the Dal-Tarpali defile, being sup-
ported by the remainder of the Brigade in rear and by iong-
range fire from the force on the right bank of the Indus. It
was assumed that the regiment was successful, and succeeded
in occupying some low hills on the left bank south of and
covering the bridge, and that the latter was only partially
destroyed {see Sketch 36). So soon as he reaches a
position whence he can see the situation the Brigadier issues
the following orders :

No. 5. — Operation Orders by Colonel T, Commanding
5th Brigade.

(1) The enemy's Cavalry (strength about 2,000) has retired
to the right bank of Indus, partially destroying pontoon
bridge at Dal-Pihoor,

A detachment covering its retreat on the right bank has
been cut off and captured.

The 13th Cavalry is holding the ridges on left bank
J mile on each side of the bridge.

(2) The 5th Brigade will prevent the further destruction of
the bridge, and will establish a footing on the right bank.

(3) X Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, will at once come
into action near upper ferry, first, to clear enemy off positions

298 CAVALRY STUDIES

in vicinity of bridge, and, secondly, to support advance t
covering party across river.

(4) 14th Cavalry will extend the line to the south-v
crowning heights on left bank : they will make every effort
to cross river and seize Pihoor.

(5) 15th Cavalry will be in support near Dal and will make '
immediate preparations to cross river near that place.

E, Captain.
Brigade-Major, ^th Cavalry Brigade,
Issued personally to Officers Commantling units at 9 hours.
N.B. — Attack would be pushed home and supported
opposite Dal: that by the 14th Cavalry is a strong feint.

2. Simultaneously with the crossing of the 5th Cavalry
Brigade at Dal-Pihoor the ist Cavalry Division was ordered
to cross the Indus about 12 miles lower down. (See Sketch 27.)

General X was placed in command of the Division
with the following instructions :

" You are General Ofiicer Cummanding the 1st Cavalry Division bivouacked
about Vasin, with instructions lo cioss the Indus with the Division on the 2ls(,
above the line joining Aigar (south bank) and Gar (north bank) and below Ghaii.
Spies state at 20 hours on zoth March that the enemy's mounted patrols reached
the north bank of the river on the afternoon of the zoth and they report that about
one r^ment of Cavalry reached Kunda at 17 hours on the 20th,"

No. 6. — Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding ist Cavalry Division.

20l/i Afani, 1906. j

(i) (a) The enemy retired to-day in the direction of AttocU
Spies report that hostile patrols reached the north bank of ti
Indus this afternoon, and that one regiment of hostile Cava
arrived at Khunda at 17 hours to-day.

(1^) Our 5th Cavalry Brigade is near Torbela in toud
with the enemy holding the northern exit of the defilal
Dal-Tirpali.

■1,

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

299

Oiir 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are on the line Hazro-
Lawrencepur.

(2) The 1st Cavalry Division will cross the Indubi to-morrow
morning.

The 3rd Brigade will act as a covering force, and effect a
crossing near Mirpur, which point it should reach by 5 hours.

The 2nd Brigade will effect a crossing simultaneously at
Qasipur.

The 1st and 4th Brigades will follow the 3rd and 2nd
respectively.

(3) The Imperial Service squadrons of the 3rd and 2iid
Brigades under Major X will act as a Sank and rearguard,
and will send out detachments in the direction of Hamid-
Mal at 5 hours.

(4) A feint at crossing will be made by the Imperial
Service squadrons of the ist and 4tii Brigades under Major Y
at a point south of Dharae at daybreak.

(5) The outposts furnished by the 4th Brigade will rejoin
their Brigade on relief by the fiank guard.

(6) Each Brigade will leave all pioneers and lO men per
regiment on the left bank of the river to make rafts and assist
the transport to cross at Mirpur.

(7) The transport C2nd line) will march at 6 hours in order
of brigades and park south of Mirpur.

A, Major,
A.A.G., Cavalry Division. .
Diclaled lo Brigade Majors al zo hours.

Notes by Director on River-crossings.

The majority of the officers reporting on the river in con-
nection with these problems were inclined to make too much
of the difficulties of crossing. Every Cavalry regiment ought
to be able, by means of some extemporised raft for kit and
arms and by swimming horses, to cross a patrol or two over a
river such as the Indus is at this season. The local villagers
and cattle cross and re-cross. It is not too much to say that

300

CAVALRY STUDIES

horses could swim the river, at present state of flood, anywhere
between Torbela and the Attock gorge. Compare the crossing
of the Danube in flood by Skobcloffs Cavalry in Russo-
Turkish war of 1877. Orders in a case Hke this should be
very clear and precise, so as to ensure the crossing being
made or attempted.

3. Colonel Z was assumed to be in command of tb^g
covering Brigade, and issued the following orders (in realitj
independently of the Divisional Orders above) :

No. 7. — Operation Orders by Colonel Z, Commandiiig;!
3rd Cavalry Brigade.

zist March. 1906. ,

(1) Hostile mounted patrols have been seen on right ban]
of Indus, but spies state enemy's force does not exceed on
Cavalry regiment (6 squadrons), whose headquarters are i
Khunda.

(2) I intend to cross Brigade over Indus as soon as possibU)
and cover the crossing of the remainder of the 1st Cavalt]
Division.

(3) 7:h Regiment will forthwith cross dismounted on 1
and entrench on the further bank. The O. C. will detail 1
suitable detachment to remain with the horses.

8th Regiment will next cross in rafts, swimming thei
horses, and then, mounted, cover the crossing, pushing patrc
to Khunda and Zeyda and hills in vicinity.

gth Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, and Imperial Servic
Squadrons will then cross, followed by the horses and deta
merit of 7th Regiment,

The crossing on our side will be covered by one squadn
9th Regiment, dismounted, with a section Royal HorS
Artillery on island 200 yards below crossing, to which poiSI
they will be passed over on rafts, and by 3 squadrons c
Regiment and remainder of battery at wood 600 yards belowa
crossing place.

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 301

(4) AH horses will be watered before crossing.

(5) Reports to the crossing known locally as Tunga.

Z, Colonel.
Diclated 10 Officers from each unit at 6 hours.

On completion of the crossing the 3rd Brigade was dis-
posed as follows, though it was afterwards agreed that
probably one regiment in advance would have been quite
sufficient under the circumstances :

Dispositions of yd Cavalry Brigade to cover crossing of River
Indus by tlte \st Cavalry Division.

The 7th Cavalry will take up the line Hund-Zeyda with
patrols pushed on beyond Khunda.

The 8th Lancers will carry the line on from Zeyda
(exclusive) to Marghaz-Yara Khel, with patrols towards
Sawabi-Raja and up to the right bank of the Indus to
try and get touch with the sth Cavalry Brigade, which is
coming towards us. The 9th Hussars and battery will be at
Dudher in support.

Regiments to entrench their positions and arrange their
own supports. Signalling communication to be established
to Dudher, where all reports should be sent to the General
Officer Commanding.

C, Major,
Brigade Major.

The Division halted for the night, 2 ist-22nd, near Minara,

—Operation Orders by Colonel Y, Commanding'
1st Cavalry Division.

aiif March, 1906.
1. The ist Cavalry Division has secured the passage of the
river at Minara, and our patrols are in touch with the enemy
at Hund-Khunda-Shahmansur-Panjpir. Advanced troops of
the Derband Division have reached Topi.

302 CAVALRY STUDIES

3. The Division will halt for the night near Minara : the
1st Brigade will bivouac between Minara village and the river,
the 2nd Brigade west of the ist Brigade, and the 3rd Brigade
on the "bela" in the river west of the 2nd Brigade : the 5th ■
(Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade will join the Division thisi
evening and will bivouac east of the ist Brigade. Our isti
and 2nd Infantry Divisions are at Yasin to-night.

It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to I
continue the operations against the enemy at daybreak.

3. The 4th Brigade are providing the outposts under ordeni:]
issued direct.

4. In case of alarm each brigade will cover its own front on 1
the high ground north of the Divisional Camp,

5. Officers Commanding Brigades will replenish ammunition .j
and fill up supplies on arrival of convoy from Yasin.

6. Headquarters to-night will be in the 2nd Brigade camp.

S, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Dieialeii to Brigade Majors al 17 hours.

Narrative — Wednesday, 21st instant
The 5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade succeeded thiS'j
morning in forcing a passage across the Indus between Dal
and Pihoor, whilst the ist Cavalry Division simultaneousljn
crossed, unopposed in any force, some 15 miles lower dowiM
the river to a point near Minara, each force thus assisting th^a
passage of the other. The Derband Division continued its ,
march down the right bank of the Indus and occupied Topi.
The main Pindi Force commenced crossing to right bank by 1
pontoon bridges established at Khabal and Dal. The enemy's ■]
Northern Cavalry detachment withdrew from Pihoor In the j
direction of Maneri.

Situation at 5 hours on Thursday, 22nd instant

The isl Cavalry Division, which was joined by llie 5lh (Abbollabad) Brigade J
on the evening of the 21SI, bivouneked at Minara laal evening. A pontoon brigade 1
was construcled during Ihe night to Minara, and one Infanlrj Brigade of ibe Z

SKETCH 27

ThebMCtmkd

looMo Yank.

<3>

are ffood ArtUlcry
(for ooe section)

to eonrcr crweiiif at^^on

due-Tree Hill and on Hvt
Mill. »«/ a ield of ire oo
to the richt bank can only
be obtateed from North

edge of grooad betweea(§)

and^P TogetffuasacroM

Ae iaodjr itrip between (^

aad^funt should have

doable teams.
T>mtupon vUl probably
have to be manhandled

between (^ and (^

Men and horses can cross the
fiver bv swimming at many
points for a mile aoove and
below this crossing.!

CSnumel abont 40 yards wide
and i| feet to a feet deep,
eorrent slow, banks easy.

Channel aboot as vards wide
and abont a to af feet deep,
eorrent 3 miles per how.
Banks easy.

This h the main ehunnei
and most he crossed by
boat, raft, Ac, Ac. or by
swimming.

It is to yards wide and cor-
rent nras at 4} miles per
hoar. I do not think inis
place suitable for bridging
(except pontoons).

j: S M. 8.

t -

ATTOCK STAFF RIDF, 303

In&ultif Division crossed the Indus and now occupies a posilian covering Ilie
bridge-head. The remainder of [he 2nd Inlantiy Division is engaged in ccussing
over the bridge. The Derband Infanlry Division holds the line Topi-Balngiiri lo
cover the deployment of the main body of the Army from Haripur. The Cavalry
Division has sent out a contact squadron to the high gound east of Labor, which
reports country as far west as Tordhtr clear of the enemy. Enemy's outposts
hold the line of hills Shahmansur-Panjpir-Raja. A patrol reports that a \»Tge
force of mounted troops (estimated at about two Divisions of Cavalry) are
rated about Maneri.

FOURTH DAY'S WORK.
The Cavalry Fight.

I. The situation to-day being as it is, a fight between the
two masses of Cavalry is almost unavoidable. On both sides
the respective Commanders-in-Chief are desperately in need
of information. Individual scouts will not be sufficient,
and reconnaissance in force becomes essential. Detachments
risk defeat in detail : on both sides, therefore, the Cavalry
concentrate to fight

General X was placed in command of the division this
day. (See Sketch 28.)

Appreciation of situation at £ liours on 22nd instant by General
Officer Commanding ist Cavalry Division.

(i) The ist Cavalry Division bivouacked, at Minara, was
joined there on evening of 21st March by 5th (Abbottabad)
Brigade, and now numbers about 7,000 sabres, with 30 guns.
During the night one Infantry Brigade crossed the Indus at
Minara by pontoon bridge, and is covering the bridge-head,
while remainder of 2nd Infantry Division is stil! crossing.

The Derband Infantry Division holds the line Topi-Bataguri
covering deployment of main Army from Haripur.

(2) The enemy's Cavalry detachments retired yesterday
from Pihoor towards Maneri, a large force of enemy's Cavalry
(about 2 divisions or, approximately, 6,900 sabres and 24 guns)
is reported to be concentrated about Maneri.

304

CAVALRY STUDIES

Towards Attock the country is clear of enemy as far west
as Tor d her.

The enemy's outposts hold the line of hills Shahmansur-
Panjpir-Raja.

(3J My object is to find out, defeat, destroy, or drive back
the enemy's Cavalry so as to clear the way for and screen the
advance of our main Army, and to ascertain the movements
and strength of enemy's forces.

(4) The enemy's communications and line of retreat run
almost due west to Mardan, to which place there are two
roads from Maneri. His left flank rests on the hills. Round
his right firfnk from Khunda to Garhi Ismailzai the country is
open, and for the most part suitable for Cavalry action.

(5) The position of the ist Cavalry Division bivouac is
favourable for turning the enemy's right flank unobserved by
reaching the cover of the high ground by Khunda and Labor
before daybreak, from which a further advance under cover
may be made to south of high ground at point 1208, from
whence the enemy's communications are directly threatened.

(6) Contact squadrons should be sent towards Tordher and
Yar Husain and a covering force (i regiment Cavalry,
4 squadrons I. S. Cavalry) posted about line Jalsae-Salla
to protect left flank and rear of division from direction of
Attock, until further advance of our Infantry renders this
unnecessary.

X, Brigadier-General.

\Notes by Director. — (i) A good appreciation. (2) I do not
agree with marching before daylight in this case. (3) As
regards protection from direction of Attock, I would rely on
an entrenched post on Anbar or Labor hill, with an active
system of patrols and good communication. By this means
every available man is brought to the decisive point to fight
the decisive action. Should in the course of the day the
enemy come on from Jehangira, detach to Labor hill. But
before doing so you may have beaten the enemy's main
Cavalry force, which is of vast importance.]

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

rNo. 9.^0peration Orders by Brigadier-General X.,
Commanding: ist Cavalry Division
CO Th(

MlNARA,

' Marth, 1906 (ao hou

(i) The enemy's Cavalry detachment has withdrawn
towards Maneri. Our Derband Division occupies Topi and
our main body is now crossing the Indus at Dal and
Khabal. Our 2nd Infantry Division is ready to cross
to-night to this place by the pontoon bridge which had
been constructed.

(2) The Cavalry Division and the fth Cavalry Brigade are
to be ready to march to-morrow at 5 hours. All 2nd Line
Transport to remain here.

S, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

DictaleJ lo BriEa.de Majors at JO hours.

No. 10. — Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding ist Cavalry Division.

MlNARA,
22«rf March, 1906 (5 hours).

(i) The enemy's outposts hold the line Shahmansur-
Panjpir-Raja and a patrol reports a concentration of about
two Divisions of Cavalry at Maneri.

Our contact squadron (4th Brigade) reports the country as
far west as Tordher clear of the enemy. One brigade of our
2nd Infantry Division now covers Minara bridge-head, and
the Derband Division holds the line Topi-Bataguri.

(2) It is my intention to seize at daybreak the high ground
about Labor and Khunda unobserved. Thence to push on

_ towards the ridge marked 120S — 1142 and to attack the
hostile Cavalry.

(3) The General Officer Commanding, 4th Brigade, will
send a second contact squadron towards point 1,142 and Yar
Husain. He wil! also detail one regiment, assisted by the

3o6

CAVALRY STUDIESI

Imperial Service squadrons of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade, (the
whole under Colonel X) to take up a position on the line
Jalsae-Salla, so as to cover our left fiank and rear until the
further advance of our Infantry.

f4) The 1st Brigade will cover the advance to Khunda.

Order of march ; — ist Brigade, 2nd Brigade (le
2 squadrons I.S. Troops), 3rd Brigade (less 2 squadrons
I.S. Troops), 4th Brigade (less 2 squadrons and i regiment),
5th Brigade.

(5) The General Officer Commanding will march at i
head of the 1st Brigade.

(6) The troops now on outpost duty to withdraw at dav
break and rejoin the division at Khunda on being relicvd
by Divisional Cavalry.

S, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division. 1

Dicialed lo Brigaiic Majors at J. IS hours.

Copy sent to General Officer Cummaniling Infantr)- Brigade holding bridge-be
aod also to Officers Commanding Outposis by orderly.

2. A conference was held near Shahmansur at 14 hours t
consider the Cavalry action, after all officers had ridden ow
the ground where it was considered the 6ght would probi
take place.

The advance of the Eastern Cavalry was followed out in
detail. It was pointed out that the first objective, or pivot of
manceuvre, to be secured was the Anbar hill. This once
secured would allow of the division being collected in a
formation of readiness pending furthur reconnaissance. To
carry out the latter, the General Officer Commanding Division
would himself go on ahead of the division with a small
advance guard, no unnecessary patrols, etc., would be detached,
it being essential to concentrate every man for the decisive
stroke. All impedimenta would remain under cover ofa
Khunda hill, which would be entrenched and held by abouc!
a squadron. The formation to be adopted in the furthei
advance, when contact with the enemy became imminent^
should be adapted to the ground, concealment and readines

■ to act w

V the esse]

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

307

to act with the least possible delay to front or flanks being
the essential conditions to be attained.

From the northern foot of Anbar hill the ground rises at a
gentle slope to a well-defined ridge (marked on map 1208).
Seen from a distance this slope appeared uniform, and only
by traversing the ground itself was it to be realised that the
minor features afforded excellent cover for large bodies of
mounted troops. These minor features took the form of
spurs and small valleys descending from the main ridge to
south, south-east, and east, the undulations being everywhere
gentle, and the nalas broad and open.

A well-defined spur descended from the main ridge (1208)
directly towards Khunda hill, and the Director pointed out
how this could be made use of The formation suggested
was that shown in Sketch No. 5. The advantages of such a.
formation were pointed out as well as several similar forma-
tions on the same principle.

Continuing the advance, the importance of securing suc-
cessive " pivots of mancEuvre " was insisted on, and the use to
be made of them. The final pivot would probably be on the
main ridge itself as here, or near here — further concealment
becoming almost impossible to either force — the decisive action
must take place. The occupation of this pivot of manceuvre
was discussed ; one or two squadrons would probably be
dismounted and be hastily entrenched, one of these
squadrons acting also as escort to the Royal Horse Artillery.
The " manoeuvre " phase of the Cavalry fight had now been
entered on. The importance of guarding against a premature
opening of fire by the Royal Horse Artillery was pointed out,
the objective to be striven for in this respect being —

(a) To draw the enemy into such a premature opening of
fire ; then to manceuvre so as to cause his Cavalry
to mask it.
(^) To employ " surprise" fire tactics at the psychological
moment. To do so, the Royal Horse Artillery
Commander must remain to the last with the General
Officer Commanding Division, and yet be in

308 CAVALRY STUDIES

constaat commmtkation with his batteries. At the

cniciaJ iDOtnent, just prior to tbe deli\-en- of tbc

Cavalr>- stroke, these should cooperate by moving

out at a rapid pace to such a podttoa as to take the

enemy's Cavalry by oblique or enfilade fire when

the latter advanced to meet the attack. Only a

ver>- fleeting oppommitj- would be offered them ;

but if pn>per[y made use of, the element of surprise

plus the favourable position to a flank would exert

a very considerable influence on the result of the

Cavalr>' fight This is true co-operation bet«'ccn

Cavalry and guns. Only by rapid action on the

part of the Royal Horse Artillerj- could the Cavalry

be launched to the attack before the enemy could

manoeuvre to avoid being taken at a disadvantage.

The rflle of tbe Royal Horse Arrillery in the event of

{a) victory and {b) defeat was also discussed. Tbe guns must

remain in action until the result of the fight was declared, and

then either join in the pursuit or, by remaining in action,

cover the retirement of their own Cavalry and so form a pivot

behind which the latter could be rallied. On such an

occasion the auxiliary arm might even be called on to

sacrifice itself.

Narrative. — T/mrsday, zmd instant.

The 1st Cavalry Division engaged the main portion of
enemy's Cavalry to-day at about 15 hours on the hij
ground about 5 miles north of Labor, and was successft
The pursuit was checked by a hostile force of all arms on the
line Baragae-Khorighati. Reconnaissances pushed west and
north-west after the action got touch with large masses of
Infantry moving from Yar Husain and Turlandae, estimated
at about two Army Corps, At nightfall the ist Cavalry
Division fell back and was relieved by the Protective Cavalry^
of the main Pindi force. The Cavalry Division bivouacki
east of Panjpir hill.

' I

■^I 1

«•

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 309

Situation at 20 hours— T/iursefay, 22nd instant.

Eastern Army: (l) South of Indus (see Skelch 29) :

(o) Facing Atlock — I Brigade of isl Infantry Division + Divisional Cavalry
of 1st iLod and Divisions.

(i) Holding YBsin-Minara bridge (both banks)^! Brigade of tst Infantry
Division.

(!■) At Hasan Abdal — S.ooo reserve troops from Pindi and a supply depot,
(z) Bivouacked on line-spur north of Raja-Panjpir hills-Sbahmansur :
I Brigade 1st Infantry Division (lemainder 1st Division in (11} and (J>) above),
znd Infantry Division (less Cavalry).
The Derband Division.
The Abbottabad Division.
I Native Infantry Brigade from Abbottabad.

The Corps Howitwr Brigade from Pindi. ■

lit Cavalry Division — east of Panjpir.
The Stb (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade— at Khunda.

(3) Holding Dal-Pihoor bridge — I Native Inlanliy BTiga.de from Abbottabad.

(4) Still in Indus defile— 3rd Pindi Division (over In.ius on right bank),

4th Pindi Division (on lefi bank).

(5) Bivouacked about lo miles north of Mardan— 1 Division + i Brigade of

the Malakand Force.

All troops are accompanied by brigade or other supply columns : total, 7 days'
supply with troops. Wireless communication has lieen established between
Headquarters Eastern Army at fPanjpir and Headquarters Malakand Force,
Outposts thrown out in front of line mentioned in (i) above are holding roughly
from Moneri hill to Anbar hill, in touch with the enemy.

Waiem Army : (l) South of Indus — the enemy has retired over Atlock bridge
leaving a weak rearguard, holding the hills east of Attock. (z) North of Kabul
liver — Advance guards of troops which advanced from west and north-west have
occupied a position along the watershed line from ])oinl 3 miles west of l2o8
across tbe Topi-Mardan roads to hill 2 miles notlh-east of Ahad Khan, with
outposts in front.

Reports from Eastern patruls indicate that hostile columns are moving up from
Mardan and Nowshera. A contact squadron at Tordher reports the country clear
of enemy [or 2 miles west of this place, and a portion of the enemy's Attock
force still engaged in crossing Kabul river near Jehangira.

FIFTH DAY'S WORK.

Cavalry Division temporarily filling: a Gap in Line
of Battle.

I. Taking the situation as described above, certain officers
were asked to appreciate the situation. With reference to
these appreciations it was pointed out that —

3IO

CAVALRY STUDIES

(i) The two Armies being now in contact, strategy must
give wa>- to tactics, and the immediate objective must be
directed towards tactical success. In this ca^e tactical
success would at first consist in fighting a delaj-ing action on
the defensive in order to allow of the arrival of the ^tdt and
4th Divisions from Topi. These latter having once arrived
the further objective would be the decisi\-e defeat of the
enemy by means of the concentration of superior force at the
decisive point.

But until they do arrive there can be no question of dects
defeat of the enemy, unless he commits blunders.

(2) The enemy's communications cannot be "cut"
Mardan by frontal attack (as suggested in one of
appreciations), since the enemy's force lies practically ;
right angles to his line of communications, and such \
advance would, if successful, only force him back on
communications.

(3) Once tactical contact has taken place between thea
opposing Armies, an advance against the line of communica-
tions of the enemy (which lie through Marfan, i.e. straight to J
his rear) can only be undertaken by a force already disposed J
on the flank of the enemy, e.g. by the force from Malakand ; ]
in any other it would be necessary to execute a flank marc
within striking distance of the enemy — an unsound miUta
operation.

(4) To attempt the flank march after tactical contact I
occurred, beyond striking distance of the enemy involve
making a detachment and sending it beyond supporting-]
distance ; this means disintegration of force or running thctj
risk of defeat in detail.

(;J The possibility of outflanking an enemy and so strikinjr
at his communications must depend strategically on being 1
superior strength on the scene of operations. The possibtlit)
of making a tactical flank attack depends chiefly on being iflt
superior strength on the battle-field and on the ground itseIC
But ill this case the Eastern Force is assumed to i
numerically inferior to the Western on the battle-field.

I .

h i

V -;

-I

• \

I ■

I I

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

2. The special scheme for consideration this day was as
follows :

A general action is in ptc^ress, our troops (as given in the situition it lo hours,
2Znd inslant) held npproiimately the line (see Sketches 29 and 30) :

Spur north of Raja—Panjpir hill— Shahmansur hill ; wilh the 5lh Abboltabad
Cavalry Brigade towards Khunda and 1st Cavalry Division in a position of
leadiness east of Panjpir.

The enemy (estimated sltei^lh, 60,000 men) is taking from the north-west,
and has occupied Mancri hill and threatens our tight in hills to ea&t.

Two of our Infantry Divisions, occupying a front from the Topi-Maneri road by
the Panjpir and Shah-Mansur hills to the Topi-Khunda road, are ordered to make
a flank movement to about Antrar hill, and to carry oft a counter-stroke from
there against the enemy's tight tiank. (The country to west of Anbar is reported
clear of the enemy.)

The ist Cavalry Divisioo is ordered 10 occupy the gap thus formed from Topi-
Moneri road to Topi-Khunda road, pending the arrival of the 3rd and 4th Infantry
Divisitms from direction of Topi.

Colonel Z. was placed in command of the Division and
issued the following orders 1

No. 10.— Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding ist Cavalry Division.

Panjpir,
zyd Manh, 1906 (7 hours).

(1) Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions holding from Raja
to Shahmansur are moving to Anbar to make a counter-stroke.

(2) The 1st Cavalry Division will occupy the gap thus
formed from Topi-Mancri road to Topi-Khunda road,
pending arrival of 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions.

(3) The line will be occupied as follows'

lit Brigade from Raja (inclusive) to neck at eastern end of
Panjpir (inclusive).

2nd Brigade (less Royal Horse Artillery) from neck east of
Panjpir (exclusive) to Badrae Nullah (inclusive).

3rd Brigade from Badrae Nulhth (exclusive) to Khunda-
Topi road.

4th Brigade (plus Royal Horse Artillery of 2nd Brigade) in
reserve south of Panjpir.

The Corps Howitzer Brigade and Infantry Divisional

312 CAVALRY STUDIES

Artillery will retain their present positions at
Shahmansur.

(4) Reports to headquarters, 2nd Brigade,

Panjpir ai^^^f

ir Kala. ^H
Z, Colonel. ^^^1

Verbally lo Brigade Commandeis at 7 hours, 23rd Msich.
3. A secondary scheme involved the problem of how best
to employ the Divisional Cavalry with reference to the situa-
tion on the night of 22nd-23rd March. Officers were
unanimous as to the necessity of brigading the four regiments
available, and it was considered that the concentration cou!d
be effected before the morning of the 23rd. Once concen-
trated most officers were of opinion that the brigade should
be pushed forward in order to seize a suitable tactical point at
daybreak whence to support reconnaissances of the enemy's
position, partly mounted and partly dismounted, since patrols
alone in such a situation can discover little more than the
general front of the position. The enemy's left was con-
sidered to be the best flank to work against. The following
is an example of the work submitted :

Action of Divisional Cavalry.

(1) I understand that there are at my disposal four rq
ments of Cavalrj', viz. those of the 3rd and 4th Divisions a
of the Derband and Abbottabad Divisions.

(2) These, less two squadrons, would be formed into (
Cavalrj- Brigade, with the task of Protective Cavalry.

The supporting points of the outpost line would, I assuin
be held by Infantry, and the two squadrons 1 have detachi
would carry out the mounted requirements of the outpi
Our outpost line runs from Maneri hill to Labor hill.

(4) The enemy's advance guard hold the line from poid
2 miles west of 1208 to hill north-east of Ahad Khi
Their outposts are probably along line i2o8-Barg»
Nagrara.

(5) The hostile Infantry, estimated at about 6o,ocx> men,
are converging on the Maneri, with the evident intention of

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

313

getting possession of the hills there and north of it, and so
turning our right.

(6) Our Infantry are over 50,000 strong now, and 35,000
more are coming up in support from Pihoor.

(7) It will be the business of the Protective Cavalry
Brigade to seize and hold such tactical points as are suitable,
and to deny them to the enemy until our reinforcements
arrive,

(8) I assume that we have only to deal with the enemy's
Advance Guard Cavalry to-night. Also that the Abbotta-
bad Cavalry Brigade at Khunda will co-operate, and be
responsible for the high ground about 1208, Lai Beg.

(9) I consider that my duty will be best performed by
moving my brigade north of ridge north of Salim Khan, and
pushing out detachment to seize and hold the spurs to the
north of Jehangir Darra, Moghdarra, Nagram ; the last would
probably have to be forced. I should then be on the left
flank of the enemy's line of advance, and be able at any rate
to delay him.

(10) This position would also facilitate the reconnaissance
by patrols of the enemy's position next day,

4. A conference was held at 14 hours on a knoll near Kala.
Brigadiers and regimental commanders explained and pointed
out on the ground the dispositions proposed. The Director
first discussed the actual occupation of the position.

The course of the fight was then followed out, and the
probable direction of the main attack indicated, leading up
to the necessity which would arise for a considerable counter-
stroke, by means of which only could tactical success in
defence be hoped for.

The situation was such that this counter- stroke could only
be delivered by withdrawing local reserves from the first line,
and even depleting the supports, as the Eastern force was
fighting a delaying action and awaiting the arrival from
Pihoor of the remainder of the Army (two divisions), destined
to form the general reserve.

3"4

CAVALRY STUDIES

Such an occasion might necessitate Cavalry being emplo;
to reUeve bther troops in some section of the first line of t
defence, but not absolutely committed to the fight, and ther4
fore available to form a nucleus for a counter-stroke. Thei(
troops would have to be collected in rear of the defensive
position, as close as possible to the point (probably a Flanl^
from which the counter-stroke could best be delivered, movi
to a flank and deployed for attack. All this means dela})t,fl
The Cavalry taking the place of troops so withdrawn >
therefore be employed partly dismounted and actual!]!
occupying the trenches of this Infantry firing h'ne and pari
in hand as a local reserve to deliver local counter-stroke.

Such a depletion of the defensive line would probably I
carried out from one or more sections of the defensive positioi
centrally situated — a direct frontal attack being always lefl
likely to form the enemy's main attack. It would probabld
be covered, and the weakened sections of the defensive I
strengthened, by the building up of a line of guns in read
Such a concentration of artillery would have the addidonal
advantage of deceiving the enemy by the volume of fin
directed from it

In the case under consideration it was assumed that onj
complete Infantry Division (in local reserve) and all availabi
troops of a second Infantry Division (in first line) would 1
withdrawn from the centre section of the defensive line a
move to the extreme left to deliver a counter-stroke againa|
the enemy's right. The Artillery in this section would haw
consisted of the divisional Artillery (four Brigades Roya|
Field Artillery) and perhaps a Howitzer Brigade. Of thijj
at least two Brigades must accompany the troops for thi
counter-stroke, whilst two Brigades had already been disj
posed of on the left flank. The Artillery in this section*
must therefore be reinforced by — (a) Royal Field Artillery
from other sections (two Brigades would be required), the
Howitzer Brigade (if not already detailed to this section).
Royal Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division (four batterie^
and the Royal Horse Artillery Battery of the detachi

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

315

Cavalry Brigade. Two Cavalry Brigades would probably be
detailed to act dismounted, leaving their horses under cover ;
the batteries of these brigades going into action with the
other Field Artillery, the two remaining Cavalry Brigades
(with their Royal Horse Artillery) being held in hand as
local reserves in rear of the firing line, ready to deliver local
counter-strokes should a favourable opportunity present
itself.

The probable Artilleiy positions in the central section of
the defensive line were discussed. No time had been avail-
able to go over the ground carefully and to select the actual
gun positions, but the general distribution considered likely
was as follows :

Howitzer Brigade — In rear of low range of hills east of
Shahmansur forming the general defensive line ; observation
post, etc., in the hills. Guns covered from view and fire
except from hostile howitzers by slope of hills. Two Royal
Field Artillery and one Royal Horse Artillery Brigade
Divisions — A suitable position seemed to be offered by a
flat plateau lying between the Shahmansur and Panjpir hills.
The height of this plateau above the plain in front was not
sufficient to affect materially the lateral zone, which would be
swept by bursting shrapnel ; an excellent view was obtainable,
and the ground was suitable for entrenching. The guns
would probably be dug in on the system often adopted by
the Japanese in Manchuria, viz. guns so dug in as to allow
of direct laying over ground in front, with deeper pits for
detachments on cither side in which the personnel could take
refuge if under concentrated shell fire. The guns would be
shielded in addition. The nullah running behind the plateau
afforded a means of moving the guns into fire positions, and
for the supply of ammunition ; it would also render the
observation of ranging shell by the enemy more difficult.
Ample space was available for the 48 guns. Looked at
from the enemy's position, it appeared that if skilfully con-
cealed the accurate location of these batteries would be
, difficult. One Royal Horse Artillery battery (sth Brigade)

3i6 CAVALRY STUDIES

would be disposed of according to local requirements.
72 guns to about 2 miles of front.

Amongst other points touched on were —

The necessity to avoid taking up fire positions too soon.
Disposal of led horses. Employment of maxims. Necessity
for local reserves. Staff officers to watch the combat. Inter-
communication. Selection of trench line. Counter-stroke.
Duties of staff before, during, and after action. Pursuit
Action if Cavalry and Horse Artillery are called upon to
cover retirement.

Narrative. — Friday, 2'^rd instant.
The Eastern Army occupied a position from Shahmansur
vi4 Panjpir with right on the ridges north of Raja. The
enemy attacked and manceuvred to turn both flanks. In
order to extend the line towards Khunda the 3rd and 4th
Divisions, Eastern Army, were moved from Panjpir and
Shahmansur hills to Anbar hill, whilst the ist Cavalry
Division was moved up to fill the gap thus caused. At
about 15 hours the enemy's attack on the Eastern right was
pressed vigorously, and they succeeded in carrying Raja,
and pressed back the Eastern troops towards Topi. At this
moment the ist Cavalry Division was launched in attack
towards Maneri, and succeeded in checking pursuing Westerik
troops, and enabled the 3rd and 4th Divisions to withdraw
from Anbar hill on the Minara bridge-head.

Situation at 20 hours on Friday, 23rd instant.

The operations described above are now supposed not lo have taken p
an alternative situation will be considered, viz. tbe same as that s
20 hours, aand instant {see page 309) with the following modifications t

3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions from Pindi have come up and ai
south of Khunda. The ist Cavalry Division (4 Drigades) is bivouacked o
left banlt of the Badrae river, south of Khunda. No modification ii
tions of the enemy.

"Special Idea" for Saturday, Z4th instant.

The Eastern Fo

c morning of the 24ih, when Uic e
e holds tlie position running from Ihe q

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

317

Qorth of Raji Ihrough Paojpir and ShihrnaDsiu hills, with enlietne left on AnTiai
hill. At 10 a.m. a counter-sUoke executed by the 3rd and 4lh Divisions is in
progress from the line Khunda-Lahor in the direction of hill 1208. The
isl Cavalry Division a.t this hour is concentrated in a position of readiness south
of Anbar hill with instruclions to cover the left flank, and at to to 15 hours its
General Officer Commanding receives the following helio message from a contact
squadron out towards Tocdher ; — " Strong hostile column of all arms estimated
at a Division (16,500 riHes, 4S guns) and about 3 squadrons of Cossacks approach-
ing from direction of Jehonglra. Am in touch with his patrols : his leading
Infantry now 1 mile south-west of Turdher.— " (From Capl. A B, Commanding
Contact Squadron — Tordher, 9,4.5 hours, ?4/3/o6.)

SIXTH DAY'S WORK.

Cavalry Division hinders the advance of a column of
Infantry and Artillery advancing from Jehangira.

The problem as given in ihc "Special Idea" above is
similar to that discussed on the fifth day of the Medak
Study (see page 216).

Certain officers were asked to appreciate the situation from
the point of view of the General Officer Commanding
1st Cavalry Division. All were agreed as to the necessity
of immediate action in order to prevent the jiinction of the
enemy's reinforcing column with his own main Army on the
battle-field, or his interference in the development of our
counter-stroke now in progress. The following were amongst
the suggested plans of action :

(a) To advance at once concealed to Jalsae, whence,
pivoting on the massed guns, to charge the column
and strike home before enemy can recover from his
first panic, and to roll up the column before it can
deploy.
(3) To place the division between the force advancing from
Jehangira and the right of the enemy's position by
seizing a position between Tordher and hill 1208 in
the neighbourhood of Jalsae, and to hold it with
dismounted fire.
(c) (i) To send off the remainder of the regiment which
supplied the contact squadron towards Tordher to

3i8 CAVALRY STUDIES

support it and drive back the Cossacks, (ii) To
advance with the whole Division towards Jalsae
under cover \'.£. north-west of the ridges, to a
position of readiness south-west of Jalsae, whence
to break out and attack the enemy as far out as
possible, mounted if possible, sending the brigade
to which the detached regiment belongs to Mankat
with 6 guns. Then to hold the ridges pivoting on
the LahoT-Jalsae position.

On this last appreciation, which was judged to be the
of those submitted, the following orders were issued :

No. II. — Operation Orders issued personally and verbj
to General Officers Commanding Brigades by General
Officer Commanding ist Cavalry Division, at 10.15 hours,
Anbar, 24 306.

(i) A strong hostile column of all arms estimated at a
Division, 48 guns and 2 squadrons Hussars, is approaching
from the direction of Jehangira. His leading Infantry is now
about half a mile south-west of Tordher.

Our 3rd and 4th Divisions are now making a counter-
stroke from the line Anbar-Lahor in the direction of hill
1208.

(2) I intend to prevent this column from joining in the
action at all costs.

(3_) The Division (less ist Brigade) will move to '
position of readiness just south of Jalsae, moving
column of Brigade masses in the following order — zi
3rd, 4th.

(4) The General Officer Commanding ist Brigade
support the contact squadron now in front with the
mainder of its regiment to drive off the enemy's Cavalry]
The -.-_.... . ■

>all!^H
leral D

ling 2 regiments of his Brigade (less 2 squadroi
I. S. T.) and battery Royal Horse Artillery will proceed 1
Mankai

SK£TCH30.

2 o«U.R.H.>\

r#/v

^ To Topi

^m ^^ ^^■•^ ^" ^^ ^M ^S^B» — » aw ^M*^ M^^M ^M ^^ a^^^ ^^ ^^ ^M — ^^ 1^ Mi— M^ ^^ 1^ ^m0^<m^ ^» w

5t^ Cav. Bdi^

^'-'^ions ^rr,,in^ from Topi

^ScceiB,

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■ 1

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 319

(5) The guns of 3nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades will be massed
under the C. R. A.

(6) The 1st Brigade will detail 4 officers to make a rapid
reconnaissance of the ground towards Tordher.

(7) The General Officer Commanding 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Brigades, and the C. R. A. will come with me now tt>
Jalsae.

(8) Park all transport (except fighting portion of the ist
line) with an escort, 2 squadrons I. S. Troops, 1st Brigade,
under a field officer, ist Brigade.

S, Major.
A.A.G.

A conference was held near Jalsae at mid-day. The
Director pointed out that the lesson which to-day's problem
intended to bring out was the overwhelming advantage
of the mounted arm over a numerically stronger dismounted
force, when the latter is unprotected by its proper proportion
of mounted troops. But this advantage will not, as a rule,
be gained either by charging home at once or by taking up
a position and waiting to be attacked. Here on the one side
have the Cavalry Division (4 BrigadesJ, say, 7,500 men
and 24 guns, and on the other 16,500 rifles and 48 guns, and
the odds would be too great for either course. The tactics
best employed are those used by the Boers outside Ladysmith
on the Monday prior to the investment. Mystify, mislead,
and worry the enemy first, occupy a succession of false fronts
compelling each time the enemy to deploy, and always in a
different direction, outflanking, encircling, and appearing
even in the rear. Then when the Infantry begin to weary
and to show signs of distress, look out for your opportunity
and charge.

An historical example of Cavalry acting successfully in a
somewhat similar situation may be found in the Austrian
official account of the battle of Custozza, from which the
following extract is taken :

"The numbers employed, therefore, were the same on the

320

CAVALRY STUDIES |

both sides ; but the situation was unfavourable to die
Italian:^, who had deployed too many of their trcxjps, and
who, although their flank was threatened, had on that side
only one battalion (550 strong). Still. General Cerale held
Monte Cricole. the Austrians having been repulsed from
it, and was taking steps to make good his portion. But
there now occurred an incident which displayed the energy
and devotion of the Austrian Cavalry, and is well worth
quoting in full :

•'The sudden inlervemion of Eome Aiutriaa Canlry laekily modified ihe
litnatiaD. Six troops of Siciliaa U hlam, under Colooel de Beitrs, had bceo senl
from Corte a* a tupport lo Ihe Reserve Artillery of ihe Sib Corps. Tlutt
officer, ctosclj walchiog the progress of the 6ght on Monte Cricole, senl
Captain Becbtoldsheim. with three troops of Ihe 6lh squadron, lo Cake in fUnk
the enemy'* column marching on Fenile. The Uhlans al once advanced lo
the Ttotie, but while ihey nere tooluDg for a ford between Palaizo Alixrea
and Fenile, ihe enemy seized the Utter point.

" Bechloldsheim, however, did not slop. He crossed the rivet, moved forward
lo Ihe high-roail, wheeled lo the left, and passing the troops under General
Benko, ascended Monle Cricole lo recoimoilre Ihe enemy's position. He saw
on the road below the Forii Brigade in order of march. He descended like a
hurricane al Ihe head of his Uhlans, rode through the Pisa Brigade, and fell oa
the flank of the ForIi Brigade. The Imlians were completely routed. The
Generals and Iheir staflf turned bacV. The two guns which were at the head
did the same, and threw the In^try into confusion. The Uhlans pursued ;
again cut through the demoralised column, and captured Ihe two guns which
had been overturned in the tush. Generals Cerale and Dho were badly
wounded and escaped with difficulty. The lirsl was struck by a bullet, and the
latter received ihrec lance-wounds. The gans had to be abandoned for want of
teams to lake them ofil

" The ForIi Brigade was broken up. A perfect panic sciied the troops.
Of ihe live battalions, one alone offered resistance, and was not draped
along in the tout ; the others dispersed. Some of the fugitives stopped at
Olioii, bul the remainder fled as fat as Monzambano and Valeggio. The
battalion which had remained intact established itself in the ditches to Ihe
tight and left of the road, and when the Uhlans returned from the pursuit,
they were received with a marderous fire, which caused severe losses in a
few moments. General Benko was saved, but the brave Sicilian Uhlans paid
dearly for their heroic action. The three troops were reduced lo IJ men.
They had lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 2 ofhcers, 84 men, and 79

" In the charge, Captain Bechtoldsheim had his horse killed under him ; but
he mounted anothet belonging to an Infantry Major who had been mortally
wounded by a lance, and was thus able to tetura with Ihe remiuuit of his bnve

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE

321

" This glorious feat of arms, its success, and the signal service
it rendered to the Austrian Army, speak for themselves, and
are beyond criticism."

"The Cavalry," writes Von der Goltz in his 'Nation in
Arms,' "will again play its r61e in deciding the day as in
former days, when Seydlitz led the attack at Kolin, Rossbach,
and Zorndorf This claim of the Cavalry is, for the most
part, justified by the recollection of certain situations in the
late wars. The lines of sharpshooters were often seen to
dissolve under the fire, to become thinner and thinner, and,
in their endeavour to surround the enemy, to extend, dis-
perse, and become ragged. Their energies became exhausted
in advancing through thick corn or undenvood, in climbing
hills, in a breathless charge, following immediately a long
march and the evolutions of compact masses across country.
The ammunition almost gave out. Many officers fell ; the
command nearly ceased. Then arose in the hearts of many,
who saw all this, the fearful question : how if now the
enemy's Cavalry appear on the flank, and career over the
battle-field ? It would without more ado sweep away
the wreck of the Infantry! When, in the evening of the
battle of Vionville, the dusk descended, and scarcely anything
more could be discerned of the Infantry on the wide battle-
field, and the great masses of the Artillery of the centre,
more than 100 guns strong, stood defenceless, a similar
thought arose in our breasts. It appeared impossible to check
a resolute Cavalry charge, that might have hurled itself upon
these batteries. This view of the case was one of the
reasons for despatching all our available Cavalry against the
enemy."

Again, as an example of the effect of a long-continued
strain on weary Infantry, we read that after the battle of
Gettysburg, 2nd to 4th July, 1863, 24,000 loaded rifles were
picked up on the battle-field. Of these only 6,000 were properly
loaded; 12,000 had two charges; 6,000 had three to ten
charges. Some had five to six bullets to one charge of
powder, and in one rifle there were as many as twenty-two!

[22 CAVALRY STUDIES

Notes on Supply.

On the 21st inst, the following scheme was set :

" Assumiog an advanced supply dep6( at Hasan Abdal, and a carl road thence
to the htidge of boats at Minara via Buihan, Hazro, and Jalalia, sla.le tlie
aiTBngements proposed in this section of the line of eoroniuni cations for the supply
of [he Cavalry Division bivouacked at Minaia. Animal traiisport only U
available."

I. Now the amount and nature of supplies obtainable
locally depend on the area under cultivation, on the attitude
of the inhabitants, and on the season of the year. Supply
arrangements must be thought out early, and may require
constant modification in accordance with changes necessarily
introduced into the original plan of action, with each varying
phase of the operations. Every Commanding Ofificer, however,
acting independently must know exactly what he wants, and
when and where he will want it. In the area of operations
now being considered, in the spring green fodder can be
obtained locally in almost unlimited quantity : a moderate
stock of live meat is available and, in any case, meat on
hoof can easily be driven up in rear of the troops.
Fresh vegetables and fuel in limited quantities could
also be collected locally. All other supplies would
have to be brought up from the rear : grain, flour, etc.,
would be at their minimum in the local villages at this
season.

2. The weights of daily rations, as estimated by the
supply and Transport Department (Simla) in 1904,* are as
follows :

British /e«f««e/: something under 2 lb. per diem, exclusive
of meat on hoof or tinned meat and vegetables.

Native personnel: 2i lb. per diem, exclusive of vege-
tables.

It is contemplated to issue preserved (cooked) rations to
British troops, when on active service, in the proportion of

* These slaltslictti details cotistantly vary. The Itnpoilant point is Ihorou
to understand the main principles of their application.

^H^ ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 323 ^U

V one day in seven. This ration weighs sjlb., including ^^H

H packing and everything. ^^H

* 3. Taking the strengths given on page 21, the daily ^^H

requirements in foodstuff.s for one Cavalry Brigade to be ^^H

pushed up from the Advanced Depot is as follows ; ^^H

One Brigade. ^^H

.^Xi.

Ro.„d

per dieiii.

N.lurt.

.^^^1

712
3.348

'.933
1,106

710

i,z6o

British rilions

Riding lior«s and ponies '(grain) .
Mul«<grain) .. .^ . .

Toial
or, 537, 460 maundi.

This is equivalent to 36 mule-cart loads, or, say, 200 cart ^^^|

loads for the division (4 brigades), allowing a reasonable ^^H

spare margin. ^^H

f 4. A " staging system " is recognised as the most economical ^^H

for the organisation of the lines of communication, provided ^^H

safety permits of it. When used stages should be so arranged ^^H

as to be about 10 miles in length, so that transport from each ^^H

post can move out 5 miles to meet the convoy from the ^^^|

next post, and return the same day to its own post When ^^^|

changing convoy, animals would be unhooked from loaded ^^^|

vehicles, and the latter handed over as they stand in exchange ^^H

■ for the empty carts. ^^H

1 The F. S. Manual S. and T. Corps gives tables showing ^H

H requirements in transport on a line of communications for ^^|

H any number of stages calculated on a required input of 1,000 ^^H

H maunds daily. ^^H

^^ From Hasan Abdal to Manara over the pontoon ^^H

^1 bridge, the distance is about 35 miles. The most suitable ^^H

I J

324 CAVALRY STUDIES

places in which to locate transport are shown in the tafij
below :

PMtonL, ofC.

C«rt8 required i«r
mpufoU6''Jmau'ddi.

input of t.oiu miuDils.

Minara

Hoirn (lo miles) . . . .
RuihanriomileO ■ ■ . ■
Has*ii Abd«l (8 miles) . .

46*
46

i 1

ToUl

138

- 1

The above is an example of a rough calculation of an
estimate of supply such as any commander of Cavalry should
be able to work out for himself It would be sufficiently-
accurate for practical purposes ; all detail would, of course, be
the duty of the Departmental Staff.

* The 2nd Line Transport (wheel) of the Cavalry Divis
made use of for some days at Minara, to work back ti
reducing requirements by 46 carts per brigade, or, say, 3C

fould in this case be
nara at night, thus

In the foregoing Studies and the Staff Ride, are to be found
many orders given, many duties imposed. And in bringin
this work to a conclusion, 1 would give counsel to my brothei
officers as to the dealing with the orders, and the duties whichl
may come to their notice, not only when reading Militai
History, whether real or, as in this book, imaginary, but alsofl
when themselves actually in the Field, A mere understanding
of an order, or of the nature of a duty, will not suffice,
recipient of the order, and he who has to carry out the dutyj
should alike endeavour to ascertain the connection of the tastf
with the larger operation of which they are merely singld
incidents ; and, conversely, what is the larger operation into
which they enter. The literal execution of a command
received is, of course, a first and primary consideration ; bQl
this may be found not to be possible ; and in this case it E

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE 325

the officer, and he only, who, understanding the main purpose
of and the reason for the command, will be in a position to
adopt, as a substitute^ some line of action which will contri-
bute indirectly, though perhaps to a less degree, towards the
desired main purpose ; but contribute // will.

Lastly, it must also be fully recognised that no matter how
keen or how highly educated in his profession an officer may
be, he will not be able to get the best service from his troops
in war unless he has also a knowledge of the human heart
and understands the art of dealing with men.

APPENDIX I.

NOTES ON WORK DONE BY OFFICERS
DURING THE RIDES.

I. Reconnaissance Reports. — Some excellent work was producet
but the following points should be borne in mind :

{«) On receipt of orders, first get a thorough grip of what is wanted
Don't start till quite sure that you have done this,
conversely, when giving orders don't let any one else {
started.

ifi) Make up your mind how this object is to be arrived at.

(f) Finally, give the result shortly, clearly, concisely : attachiii|
details for reference as required. State an honest opinioi
and don't shirk the responsibility of giving it.

What the officer ordering a report or reconnaissance wants to \
at is the pith of the matter, and neither he nor his staff have I
time to wade through pages of closely written matter when in I
field. Accordingly —

Show everything possible on the sketch, remembering " clearnei
not artistic effect, is required."

Confine the report to the most prominent points.

Spell strictly according to the map in use. Reports and stcetchi
must be readable at once in the saddle, or by a flickering t
light, therefore avoid fine pencilling, write absolutely distinctly am
accentuate important tactical features. Keep a stock of red and Utn
pencils. When pinning reports together leave the pin margin clear. \

2. Appreciations of situation were, in general, too voluminous a
often involved. An appreciation of a situation is a critical examin«*|
tion of a military situation culminating in a plan of action.
mental steps are exactly the same as in paragraph i.

Consider the aspects of the problem from both your own and t

APPENDIX 327

enemy's point of view, not forgetting that the enemy has legs and
will not remain stationary whilst you develop your plans.

Come to a conclusion, and settle how you are to act.

Write it down in telegraphic language, succinctly, by successive
steps.

Too much dependence still appears to be placed upon memoria
ttchnktx, text-book data, and lists of headings. Such aids are valuable
as a preliminary training course for young officers ; but once an
officer lakes the field, he should depend upon his own grasp of the
situation and his imagination to supply all that is required.

Similarly, far too much reliance is placed upon note-books instead
of trusting to the memory : the more the latter is trusted the stronger
it becomes.

3. Orders. — Don't interfere with the initiative or duties of smaller
unit commanders under you. See "CavalryTactics," page 6: "Leaders
must train their subordinates to work intelligently and in accordance
with brief and very general instructions." Avoid too much detail :
say what you want done, not how to do it [compare the difference
between Napoleonic and German methods — p. 265.] Practise
giving and receiving verbal orders quickly. Night-march orders
should usually be given confidentially.

4. Outposts. — " And in case of attack such and such a position
will be held " is constantly forgotten. Too many troops are usually
put on outpost duties {see " Cavalry Tactics " Note at foot of page 63),
e.g. in Attock Staff Ride on the night tSth-igth March, a whole
regiment was detailed for outpost duty in the 2nd Brigade, and the
commander of this regiment put three whole squadrons out. When
enemy's outposts are near, a detachment (say, one section, half troop
or troop) should be pushed out to keep touth during the night.

5. Camping Grounds or Btviiuacs ;

The 4th (Gott's) Brigade was given the task of selecting and
reporting on a bivouac for the Cavalry Division for the night of
iSth-igth March. With reference to the work done in connection
with this problem the following notes were made:

(o) Insufficient attention has been devoted to military considera-
tions in presence of enemy by several officers. There was
no reason why the bivouacs should not have been in this
case out of view and out of possible Artillery range of the
enemy, to the east of Hasan Abdal. Bivouacs may some-
times have to be within Artillery range, but should never
be within view also of enemy. Compare, for ii

APPENDIX

British camp at Peiwar Kotal, 1878, which was first p'tched

within range of Afghan guns. These opened fire during
the afternoon instead of waiting till night, and camp was
shifted in daylight. Imagine the confusion, if the enemy
had bided his time and had opened Artillery fire at night, {

(6) Water arrangements are sketchy, and insufficient information
is given for writing Divisional and Brigade Orders. Each
brigade must have its own supply of drinking and animal
water to avoid confusion, etc. The approaches to and
from animal watering places should be clearly shown.
Animals to return by a separate route. How many animals
can water at one time ? Quantity of drinking water
available ? If wells are used, depth and quantity available
in wells ?

(c) The spaces allotted to brigades are insufficient. 600 yds. x
450 yds. may be taken as a minimum for one brigade with
its ist and and Line Transport, Ammunition Column^J
Supply Column, etc.

APPENDIX II.

NOTES ON THE ORGANISATION OF A SINGLfl
STAFF RIDE.

1. A good " general idea " is necessary really only as a framework
into which certain problems, based on situations nether strategically
nor tactically improbable, can be made to (it. In order to obtain as
much instruction as possible in the short rime available, a great many
phases of the operations have to be unnaturally hastened. If necesr-
sary, imaginary lapses of time can be assumed (c/. pp. 166 and 223) ;
but on the whole it Is best to make the operations continuous, so
long as unreasonable or absurd situations are not thereby involved,

2. After deciding roughly on the " general idea," all, or as many
as possible, of the directing staff should thoroughly reconnoitre the
selected ground, after which the terms of the general idea can be
finally decided on and an " operation table " drawn out {e/. p. ajS).
In all five rides it was found convenient to make the operations
culminate in a general engagement. And ibis general engagement
is best made the basis of the operation table — i.e. having selected

APPENDIX

329

a good site for the battle, bearing in mind the general idea, next
work out the marches of both main Armies, or in any case that of the
enemy, backwards to some situation suitable for the first special
idea — e.g. if the main Armies are required to meet at a certain
point A on the loth instant, then on the gih they will be at B B',
approximately two marches apart, on the 8th at C C or approximately
four marches apart, etc. :

8th

gth

lOlh

9th

8th

nfor,

Secondary situations involving the action of the respective advanced
mounted forces, of detachments, etc., can then be fitted into the
space between the two main Armies as found convenient. The
ofKration table should be for the use of the directing staff only, and
should therefore be kept secret ; on it are founded the special ideas,
situations, etc., on which in turn the tasks are based. And if every
one knows beforehand what course the operations are about to follow,
ail interest is likely to vanish.

3. With the operation table, when completed, as a guide it can
next be determined where the staff ride itself can daily most con-
veniently camp. Camping grounds should then be selected and the
civil authorities given plenty of warning as to supplies, etc. Unless,
as in the Medak Staff Ride, a railway is made use of, camping
grounds should rarely be more than 15 to 20 miles apart; occasionally
it was found to be convenient to stay more than one day in one
camp.

4. The general idea, the first special idea, and a map should be
issued to all officers at least fifteen days before the assembly; and
on these data as many officers as possible should be given a pre-
Uminary task — e.g. an appreciation, to work out beforehand. This
ensures that officers arrive at the assembly with some previous study,
both of the general idea and of the country in which the imaginary
operations are about to lake place.

Maps should not be on a larger scale than j miles to the inch.
The special value of a staff ride lies in the study of ground, a point
that is apt to be forgotten when large scale maps are available.
Officers, moreover, should get accustomed to work with no better
maps than are likely to be provided on service.

5. Excluding the Director himself, four officers were found to be

330

APPENDIX

mber for the Directing Staff of a ride, attended by
about thirty others ; too many staff officers are apt to get in each
Other's way. The duties were roughly divided as follows ;

(a) The Director, with personal assistant, — prepares the situations,
issues divisional orders when necessary, and deals with the
work and criticisms as a whole. Excepting in the last siaiT
ride, the Director usually retained imaginary
the Division. In the Attock Staff Ride Brigadi
command in turn,
(i) Two officers — select the tasks for Brigades or individuals,
e and note on the work done, and prepare for sub-
1 to the Director. A^.,B. — The tasks should, as far
as possible, all be decided on beforehand ; once started,,
there is little time to think out good ones,
(t) One officer — issues and collects tasks, supervises camp

ments, issues routine orders in connection with stafT-ri*
transport, supplies, etc., and manages the Directing Si
Mess ; he should have a smart native officer and
orderlies to assist him.
As the Directing Staff are chiefly busy whilst other officers are
rest, and vi'i-e versa, it is best for them to mess apart.

6. In addition to the special tasks assigned them, Brigadii
should assist the Directing Staff by arranging, supervising, and col
menting on all work executed by officers in their Brigades, bef
submitting it for the Director's criticism. In certain cases it i
found convenient to issue a task to a Brigade as a whole and to ;
the Brigadier to allot tasks to individuals. All officers should
available, irrespective of their supposed appointments, for duties
ali sorts.

7. Tasks for individuals should be as varied as possible. I
only possible to keep up the interest by varying the work and
making perfectly sure that all officers understand exactly what
supposed to be taking place. Copies of divisional orders, situatioi
etc., should therefore be issued to every one, and those in doul
should be encouraged to ask questions. At least one good cli
with a cyclostyle should be at the disposal of the Directing Staff
ensure sufficient copies being available. Some arrangement for
rapid reproduction of sketches and maps, though never actui
practised in the staff rides, would certainly have been most useful.

8. Officers should put into writing all orders, instructii
memoranda, etc., required from them in their supposed situati<

staff ii

dof^H

ials,^^^

APPENDIX

33»

including orders or instructions assumed to have been given verbally.
And alt writing should be in an Army Message Book (No. 153) or
its equivalent.

9. All conferences dealing with tactical situations should as far as
possible be held on the spot, and the actual features of the ground
be referred to whilst discussing them. Strategical and general
subjects can he dealt with in the evening in camp. For the latter
a blackboard is useful ; a sheet of white calico with a few coloured
chalks is better still.

10. Finally, a very clear understanding should be arrived at
beforehand with the Pay Examiner as to the payment of bills and
contingent expenses. More time has, for instance, been wasted and
trouble caused in the settlement of the accounts of one staff ride than
in the compilation of the whole of this report. — Experto credt.

APPENDIX III.

A FEW SPECIMENS OF TASKS SET.

. Select and report on a bivouac for your Brigade and show
measures taken for security.

. Report on the river from westwards

with a view to forcing a passage.

Battery commander ditto from an Artillery point of view. Not
to approach within half mile of far bank: work to be divided into
sections by mutual arrangement.

3. Calculate length, in column of route, of your Brigade : {a)
fighting ranks ; {b) first and second Line Transport.

. Reconnaissance showing dispositions recommended for the

e of the defile by the leading Brigade.

5. Report on dispositions recommended for the defence of the

defile until the arrival of our Infantry, with the following

troops placed at your disposal: Regulars: i squadron. Nizam's

Irregulars : 1 Mountain Battery, i Regiment Cavalry, 3 Battalions

Infantry ; the Royal Engineer Officer to work with the above and

recommend types of works, with due regard to time and material

^m available.

^h 6. You are appointed Brigade Intelligence Officer. What would
^H your duties be, and how would you proceed to organise a system ?

7- Calculate
Division ; {^) :
mating the

APPENDIX

d class of supplies required for {a\
Brigade. Give a mugii -and- ready method of (
of supplies that could be collected betwe*
in twenty- four hours and be ready for issue

and dispose your Brigade to

1 command of

8- Select a position near
cover the Division crossing the r

9- The situation being so and
Advance Guard. State your actioi

10. Four officers to enlarge the map (scale i inch to 4 miles)
one of 2 inches to the mile, and conect it with a view to assisting
the Cavalry Commander in disposing his troops for the Cavalry fight.
One Officer to supervise and to compile into one the sketches
reports. Sketch to be completed as rapidly as possible and hani
to the Director on the ground.

11. What are the duties of a StafT Officer during and
successful engagement ?

1 2. On what points should prisoners and inhabitants be questioni

13. Appreciate the situation from the Divisional Cotmnandei
point of view.

14. In the event of the river rising to a height of 6 feet,
arrangements can you make with local material for the crossi
the Division over the river. Time required.

15. In the event of the Division moving off before the supplj
collected at can be issued, what arrangements can you makei
to convey them to utilising local transport ?

16. Report on positions suitable for occupation by lines of
munication troops (when they come up) to secure the road fi
attack from the north on the section of the road from
to assuming that troops are placed at your dis|
and report on the measure you would adopt for the establishi
staging posts at and

17. Show on a sketch, scale 1 inch to i mile, the arrangemi
you suggest for maintaining signalling

and and on the assumption that the latter will beet

posts on the line of communications.

18. Report on a route from to and thence lowj
with a view to a flank movement against the enemy's

19. Make a reconnaissance of position extending from
to suitable for occupation by the Cavalry Division ag
enemy advancing from the north.

- ,- APPENDIX 333

ao. How many carts would you require to place 60 maunds per
diem at and seven intermediate stages, each stage requiring

the same amount, employing Army transport carts ?

ai. With reference to Southern Force Order No. too (p. 167),
paragraph 3 (a), reconnoitre the ground and make your dispositions
as if commanding a section of the enemy's force on this line.
Strength at your disposal : 1 Cavalry Brigade, i Infantry Division.

21. With reference to Southern Force Order No. 100, paragraph 3
{i), reconnoitre the ground towards the north with a view to co-
operating in the Infantry attack to-morrow, with special reference to
(i) approach, (s) preparation, (3) assault.

23. A reconnaissance of a route for the Cavalry Division from
towards and , selecting positions of readiness

for the above-named force with a view to co-operating in the attack
on the 19th and aoth.

34. The Brigade is advancing to the attack from , the enemy

is advancing from . Estimate the minimum time required

for a Brigade to deploy into line from column of masses, and point
out on the ground {a} the amount of ground which would be covered
in such a deployment, and (^) where the actual collision would
probably take place. How would you employ your guns 7

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